WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE
PROCEEDINGS

(Continued from Vol.X, Nos. 3-4)

The World Conference on Religion and Peace was held in Kyoto, Japan, October 16-21, 1970, to discuss the urgent present obstacles to peace in the light of common religious principles. (For its “Findings” see Vol.IX, No.4)

Part One consists of addresses delivered at the inaugural plenary session, October 16. Part Two contains three fundamental papers read at the Conference (See Vol.X, Nos. 3-4). Part three consists of position papers including an appeal addressed by Dr. Ralph David Abernathy.

PARE THREE: POSITION PAPERS

Creating a World without Arms: Disarmament

By Dr. Homer A. Jack*

Ten Theses for Disarmament and A Warless World

I. Were nuclear weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed.

"There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armories which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosives that have ever been

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used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict. Many of those who survived the immediate destruction, as well as others in countries outside the area of conflict, would be exposed to widely-spreading radioactive contamination, and would suffer from long-term effects of irradiation and transmit, to their offspring, a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generation...The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to corrupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent, is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitations that have already been agreed, ...’’ —Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons; Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations. 76pp. 1968.

II. Modern war is no longer a useful instrument in furthering a nation’s policy.

"In an age such as ours which prides itself on its atomic energy, it is contrary to reason to hold that war is now a suitable way to restore rights which have been violated..." Pacem in Terris, by Pope John XXIII. 1963.

"War in our time has become an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, war in the future can serve no useful purpose."—Dwight Eisenhower. April, 1956.

III. Modern security can come, not through weapons and the arms race, but through disarmament.
“The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them...Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.”—Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons.

“Every scientist, general, minister, and military commentator is agreed that (modern weapons) have destroyed the hope of national defence; there is, quite literally, no present or prospective hope of defence against them; the very employment of the word, defence, to describe modern military preparation is an extreme example of how language can deceive...”--The Arms Race, by Philip Noel-Baker. London: Atlantic Books. 579pp. 1958.

“Against nuclear weapons, transported by modern aircraft and guided or ballistic missiles, there is no military defence...”

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“The romanticists are those who still believe that modern armaments can make a nation safe. There is no military defence today for any nation except in drastic measures of disarmament embodied in a multilateral treaty to which all governments subscribe...”--The Arms Race.

IV. Nuclear war can start by accident of man or machines.

“Accidents involving nuclear weapons are important for two reasons: 1-They might start a nuclear war. This could happen if one country detonated a bomb by accident on the territory of a nuclear power or a nuclear power’s ally. It might
also happen if it dropped a bomb on its own territory, and another country was suspected.

2-An accidental detonation, even if it did not start a nuclear war, could do great damage if it were detonated over a populated area. Accidents could result from some kind of mechanical failure, or from the miscalculation or insubordinate behaviour of members of the military forces who operate the weapons delivery systems...

There are various estimates of the number of accidents which have involved nuclear weapons...A total of at least 33 major accidents up to March, 1968...However, there are sources which suggest a higher number...There are reasons for thinking that the total number of accidents involving nuclear weapons systems is significantly higher than the total number officially announced...

The risk of accident per nuclear weapon deployed may be diminishing owing to the shift to missiles and improved safety systems. On the other hand, the number of nuclear weapons deployed...has been increasing rapidly and continues to do so.”--“Accidents of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems.” SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament. 1968/69.

V. Disarmament can precede the settlement of some international disputes; certainly the world cannot wait for all disputes to be settled before beginning substantial disarmament.

“President Eisenhower has said so often: that it is desirable to work both for disarmament and for the settlement of political disputes; the work on both should go forward simultaneously; progress on one will improve the hope of progress on the other.”--New York Times, March 31, 1955.

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“President Eisenhower has said so often: that it is desirable to work both for disarmament and for the settlement of political disputes; the work on both should go forward simultaneously; progress on one will improve the hope of progress on the other.”


“Disarmament can only be a consequence, and never a cause,
of an improvement in international relations...Political disputes are much less likely to be settled while an arms race is going on, and that, if you want settlements, the arms race must first be stopped.’’—*The Arms Race*.

“The sub-Committee had no right to wait, before resuming its progress on the path of disarmament, for a settlement of the most serious political disputes. Indeed, M. Moch was convinced that they were practically insoluble in an atmosphere of distrust, whereas they would constitute no major problem once included in the general framework of agreement on disarmament.”—*U.N. First Committee. December 6, 1955.*

VI. *Rapid and complete disarmament may have fewer complications than slow, gradual disarmament.*

“‘Partial’ disarmament has difficulties of its own. It is harder to solve the technical problems... Control is more difficult, if not impossible... ‘Partial’ disarmament is very fragile. There was much more of it between the wars than is now proposed; it collapsed because no ‘comprehensive,’ more drastic, general disarmament was carried through...”—*The Arms Race*.

“Each part of a program of nuclear disarmament depends on the rest, even though the different parts may be put into operation at different times. However desirable it may be to separate one or more of them into a ‘partial’ agreement, attempts to do so will probably fail. In any case, no one part would last long without the rest, and what is needed is a complete system of nuclear disarmament that will endure...”—*The Arms Race*.

“Against the great evil of the present arms race, and the modern weapons, small remedies would only produce a small result; they would probably produce no significant result at all.
Even if they were signed and ratified, they would be so difficult to control that, in all probability, they would soon break down.”

—The Arms Race.

VII. The Arms Race is one cause of wars.

“Throughout the whole period (to 1939) there was also the arms race. The arms race was not the sole cause of war; but it was a powerful and constant contributory cause...The arms race helped to make people believe that war is inevitable, and thus ultimately helped to cause its outbreak.”—The Arms Race.

“Great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on other sides... Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each government felt it would be criminal and betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every government regards every precaution of every other government as evidence of hostile intent...”—Lord Grey of Fallodon.

“The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them, it was these that made war inevitable.”—Lord Grey of Fallodon.

VIII. The universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons would not detract from any nation's security and their research, development, production, stockpiling, and use should be banned.

“All weapons of war are destructive to human life, but chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons stand in a class of their own as armaments which exercise their effects solely on living matter. The idea that bacteriological (biological) weapons could deliberately be used to spread diseases generates a sense of horror. The fact that certain chemical and bacte-
riological (biological) agents are potentially unconfined in their effects, both in space and time, and that their large-scale use could conceivably have deleterious and irreversible effects on the balance of nature adds to the sense of insecurity and tension which the existence of this class of weapons engenders. Considerations such as these set them into a category of their own in relation to the continuing arms race...

"No system of defense, even for the richest countries in the world, and whatever its cost, could be completely secure...

"Because chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are unpredictables, in varying degree, either in the scale or duration of their effects, and because no certain defense can be planned against them, their universal elimination would not detract from any nation's security...

"Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability... The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.

"The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned. Their use, which would cause an enormous loss of human life, has already been condemned and prohibited by international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol

IX. World Military Expenditures Today Consume an Inordinate Amount of the Resources of Mankind.

"World military expenditure began to rise sharply in 1965. It went up about 10 percent in both 1966 and 1967, and then probably by around 6 percent in 1968. The world is now devoting to military purposes nearly 30 percent more resources than it was doing three years ago. This is a formidable rate of increase - not very different from that which preceded the First World War, though still a good deal less than the increase in the years before the Second World War. U.S. Military expenditure in Vietnam accounts for a good part of the rise...There has been a big increase in the spending of the Warsaw Pact powers as well...The trend of military expenditure in developing countries...is a very small part of the world total, of course; but since the beginning of the 1960s it has been rising faster than the world average. Whereas from 1960 to 1968, world military expenditure rose 6 percent in volume, developing countries’ expenditure rose 7½ percent a year. This is not simply the consequence of the creation of new states, whose military expenditure naturally rises rapidly when they are building up their forces for the first time. If the comparison is restricted to states which were already in existence at the beginning of the period, the proposition still holds true - that their military expenditure has been rising at an above-average rate...The long-term trend since 1913 has been for the world’s military expenditure to rise at around 5 percent a year. The trend increase in the last 20 years has been,
if anything, slightly faster than this—nearly 6 percent a year...
In the absence of some kind of arms limitation agreement between
the two great powers and between the two blocs, the rise in
world military spending in the next 20 years will probably be
as fast as in the last 20...If military spending maintains a con­
stant share of world national output, this is a recipe for an infinite
arms race. If things do in fact go on like this, then military
spending will continue to double every 15 years. By the early
years of the next century the world will be devoting to military
uses a quantum of resources which is equal to the whole world’s
present (1968) output. This is not so preposterous as it sounds.
The world is now devoting to military purposes an amount of
resources which exceeds the world’s total output in the year
1900.”— “World Military Expenditure,” SIPRI Yearbook of

"Global expenditures for military purposes have reached a
new record high level. From $132 billion in 1964, they rose to
$138 billion in 1965, $159 billion in 1966, and an estimated
$182 billion in 1967...Since 1962, when U.N. experts estimated
world military outlays at $120 billion, the increase has been more
than 50 percent.

"Military spending today exceeds that of any prior period
except the peak fighting years of World War II. Global mili­
tary expenditures now take more than 7 percent of the world’s
gross product. In money terms they are equivalent to the total
annual income produced by the one billion people living in
Latin America, South Asia, and the Near East. They are grea­
ter by 40 percent than world-wide expenditures on education by
all levels of government and more than three times worldwide
expenditures on public health...If the recent rate of increase in military spending continues, the arms race will consume another $4,000 billion in only ten years.” --World Military Expenditure, Report for 1967. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

X. The Diversion to Peaceful Purposes of the Resources now in Military Use would be an Unqualified Blessing to all Mankind.

“All the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind.” --Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament; Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations. 1962.

DISARMAMENT BALANCE SHEET OF THE 1960s

A. Favorable Actions

1. Disarmament Research. During the entire decade, individuals, institutions, and governments undertook more research in disarmament and arms control than in any other period in world history.


3. Antarctica Treaty (1959-61). This resulted in the first portion of the planet to become a nuclear free zone.

4. Disarmament Agencies (1961). The creation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reflected growing concern in this field by many governments, including the creation of several ministers of disarms (e.g., United Kingdom and Sweden).

5. Studies in Economic Reconversion (1962). A U.N. Expert's Report demonstrated that no nation need continue to arm for fear that disarmament would
adversely affect its economic health.

6. **Disarmament Negotiations** (1962). The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) continues as the Conference of the Twenty-Six Nation Committee (CCD) and has provided an important forum for negotiations, even if the accomplishments have been sparse.

7. **Test-Ban Treaty** (1963). The signing and coming into force of the partial test-ban treaty was a positive step which lessened radioactive fallout and probably slowed down the development of new atomic weapons (if not new military atomic nations).

8. **Outer Space Agreements** (1963, 1967). These provided principles for the exploration and use of outer space, including an agreement not to station nuclear weapons in outer space.

9. **Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone** (1967-69). The Treaty of Tlatelolco created a nuclear-free zone in Latin America which could be a model for other continents and regions.

10. **Non-Proliferation Treaty** (1968-70). The treaty will help prevent the creation of a new circle of military nuclear nations - if existing civilian nuclear nations sign, ratify, and abide by the treaty.

11. **Strategic Arms Limitations Talks** (1969). The commencement of SALT between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may be a harbinger for the limitation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

12. **Containment of the Military.** By the end of the decade, the military establishments in several nations, but especially in the U.S., were being questioned by both public and parliamentarians, with a much greater concern for a revision of national priorities.

**B. Unfavorable Actions**

1. **Contamination of Atmosphere.** Hundreds of atmospheric tests have been undertaken by five nations (and are being continued by China and France). These have produced serious radioactive fallout injuring present and future generations. Even some underground tests have been injurious.

2. **Rise in Arms and Military Budgets.** The arms race accelerated in much of the world, with military expenses skyrocketing in the decade until, at its end, the world was spending an estimated $180 billion annually for its combined military establishment - an increase of more than 50% in the decade.

3. **New Members of Nuclear Club.** France and China both joined the nuclear club in the decade. France refused to participate in the disarmament negotiations and China was in effect barred.

4. **Development of New Weapons.** The whole decade saw the continuing development of families of new weapons, the latest being chemical-biological weapons, MIRV, lasers to trigger H-bomb explosions, etc.

5. **Conventional Arms Traffic.** Large and medium-sized powers sold arms to
to smaller powers and helped fan smoldering tensions into hot wars.

6. Refusal of Civilian Nuclear Nations to Sign Non-Proliferation Treaty. Several powers, such as India and Israel, have so far refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty and thus could become military nuclear powers within months; other nations (such as Japan) have signed the treaty but not yet ratified it.

7. No Progress in Peace-Keeping Machinery. The international community, including the U.N., made almost no progress in creating international peace-keeping machinery - a vital adjunct to substantial disarmament.

DISARMAMENT AGENDA FOR THE 1970S

A. Unfinished Actions

1. Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The partial test-ban treaty must be made comprehensive, with the banning of all underground nuclear tests. Also the treaty must be signed by all nations, including China and France.

2. Non-Proliferation Treaty. Sufficient nations must sign the non-proliferation treaty so it can come into force; equally, such civilian nuclear powers as India and Israel must sign and ratify the treaty and abide by its provisions.

3. Sea-Bed Treaty. Negotiations must be concluded to produce a treaty to prevent the militarization of the sea-bed and continental shelf and ocean floor.

4. Limitation of Strategic Arms. The SALT must continue with at least a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., limiting severely their offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. In the meantime, these two nations should agree on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons systems.

5. Geneva Protocol. The U.S. and Japan and other countries which have not ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol must do so, so that the use of chemical and biological weapons will be universally prohibited, and this prohibition must be universally interpreted to prevent the use of tear gas and herbicidess.

B. New Actions

1. Limitation of Conventional Arms. New efforts must be undertaken to limit and eventually ban the trade of “conventional” arms.

2. Elimination of Chemical/Biological Weapons. Since the Geneva Protocol does not prevent research, production, and stockpiling of chemical/biological weapons, an international treaty should be negotiated toward this end.

3. China and France. China and France must be brought into the disarmament negotiations, with the former also taking her seat in the U.N.

4. General and Complete Disarmament. This goal is not as remote as many think. Several of the collateral items of the first age in both the existing American and Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament have
already been undertaken. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should both overhaul their general and complete disarmament proposals and the Committee on Disarmament should accelerate its efforts to negotiate a treaty.

5. Comprehensive Program for the Disarmament Decade. Since the 24th U.N. General Assembly asked the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out as immediate guidelines for U.N. action in the Disarmament Decade a comprehensive program to end the arms race and begin general and complete disarmament should be made. Governments, organizations, and individuals should contribute to this effort.

**RELIGIOUS EDUCATION/ACTION**

1. Education.
   A. Work closely with specialized religious and secular agencies. (See Appendix B.)
   B. Within Religious Communities.
      1. Insert articles in religious press.
      2. Organize meetings and seminars to inform religious constituency.
      3. Arrange for several leaders to become experts in the subject matter.
   C. Within Total Community.
      1. Draft and issue background statement on general or specific issues.
      2. Organize meetings, forums, and seminars for secular leaders or general public.
      3. Arrange press interviews, radio and TV appearances, especially of informed religious leaders, to enlist fully the mass media.

   A. Frame resolution on current policy issues before or as they are being debated.
   B. Send leaders to lobby on issues before Parliament; where there is no effective Parliamentary system, use other appropriate means.
   C. Attempt to influence members of religious organizations who are prominent policy-makers.
   D. Arrange for specialists to lobby on issues at U.N.
   E. Organize various kinds of appropriate demonstrations.
   F. Offer carefully-prepared civil disobedience.

   A. Priorities and strategies should, at least in part, be determined by special national or international coalitions of religious and secular organizations for education/action to have the widest impact.
   B. Inter-religious implementation is often more effective than by one religious group or several religious groups in an uncoordinated fashion; at times, however, education/action should be undertaken separately by each religious group.
World Conference on Religion and Peace

C. While trans-national statements are important, some statements are more effective if based upon the national history, needs, patterns, and possibilities.

D. Policies of religious groups should often transcend those of national governments toward total human concerns.

E. The test of commitment is not rhetoric, but often the expenditure of time and money, and the formation of new instruments and long-time structures and the assignments of individuals to do new tasks.

F. The dimension of prayers and other religious services should always be considered, since this is one of the unique contributions of organized religion in modern society.

APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF WORDS, PHRASES, AND ABBREVIATIONS.

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM). A surface-to-air missile designed to intercept an incoming adversary warhead; or a system of missiles with radars and computers.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). Multiple efforts to put out of function the adversary's submarines.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. (ACDA). The arm of the U.S. government devoted to negotiating agreements in these fields.

Arms Race. A reciprocal build-up in the quality or quantity of the military power of two or more opponents, and their allies, caused by each striving to maintain or to achieve a desired military posture relative to the other.

Assured Destruction Capability. Ability to inflict a certain—usually very high—level of damage on an adversary with a very high degree of confidence; the ability to destroy adversary population and industry, but not military force.

Balance. Adjustments of armed forces and armaments to the end that one state does not have military advantages vis-a-vis other states agreeing to any given measure.

Ballistic Missile. A rocket that along most of its trajectory moves freely, under the influence of gravity alone.

Blackout. The phenomenon caused by a nuclear explosion in space.

Chaff. Bits of metal or other material dispersed about a warhead to confuse radar by reflecting multiple signals.

Chemical/Biological Weapons (CBW). These "non-conventional" and non-nuclear weapons are often linked together.

Civilian Nuclear State. A nation which has advanced nuclear techniques but has not yet devoted them to make nuclear weapons and thus become a military nuclear state.

Collateral Measure. A stage in the whole disarmament process.
Comprehensive Treaty. An agreement which would include a greater rather than a lesser degree of disarmament; e.g., comprehensive versus limited test-ban treaty.

Control. Supervision of the implementation of a disarmament agreement to provide assurance that it is being observed by all parties.


Cost-Exchange Ratio. The ratio of the cost of a defence to the cost of the offensive force needed to overcome it.

Damage Limiting. Measures taken to reduce the amount of damage from a nuclear attack.

Denuclearisation. The effort to rid a state or area of nuclear weapon.

Deterrence. The prevention from action by fear of consequences; the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counter action.

Disarmament. Reduction of military forces or armaments, especially to levels set by international agreement.

Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, meeting in Geneva from 1963 to 1969, at which time it was broadened to include 26 nations and called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). So far France has never taken her seat; in fact this has been a 17-nation and now is a 25-nation committee.

Escalation. The deliberate or unpremeditated increase in the scope or violence of a war.

Fireball. The luminous sphere of hot gases produced by a nuclear explosion.

Fire Storm. A phenomenon occurring in very large fires, causing winds to blow in toward the fire from all directions, with virtually all the combustible material within the area burned.

First Strike Capability. Ability to destroy sufficient of the adversary’s offensive weapons to prevent a successful counter-attack.

Flexible Responde. The capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, thus coping with anything from general atomic war to guerilla infiltration.

Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). A system involving the delivery of nuclear weapons from low-attitude orbital trajectories.

Freeze. An attempt to hold the status quo on a category of weapons.

General and Complete Disarmament (GCD). Reduction of armed forces and armaments by all states to levels required for internal security and for an international peace force for international security.

Geneva Disarmament Conference. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) and now enlarged to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), both meeting in Geneva, Switzerland.

Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT). A program of unilateral initiatives for reducing international tension and bringing about eventual disarmament.

Hardening. The protecting of military facilities to make them resistant to the blast effects of a nuclear weapon.

Inspection. Agreed procedures by which individuals, either as representatives of national states or international organizations, conduct activities for the primary purpose of verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements.

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). A rocket with a range between 2,000 and 4,000 nautical miles.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). A rocket with a range of between 5,000 and 8,000 nautical miles.

Such U.S. missiles include Atlas, Titan I and II, and Minuteman I, II, and III.

Such Soviet missiles include SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An agency associated with the U.N. devoted to atomic energy problems, with headquarters in Vienna.

Invulnerability. Condition that exists when, regardless of the scale and timing of an attack, an aggressor cannot expect to destroy a target.


Megaton. The explosive power of one million tons of TNT.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). A rocket with a range of approximately 1,5000 nautical miles.

Moscow Treaty. The partial test-ban treaty which was finally negotiated in Moscow in July, 1963.

Multiple Individually-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). A system which can carry in one missile several warheads which can be individually delivered on separate targets. U.S. missiles to be adapted for MIRV include Minuteman III and Poseidon.

Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRV). A system which can carry several warheads in one missile; these cannot, however, be individually targeted.

Mutual Deterrence. The situation that obtains between two powers when each is deterred from attacking the other (i.e., launching a first strike) because the damage expected to result from the victim's retaliation (second strike) would be acceptable.

Mutual Example. Parallel, unagreed reduction of forces, armament, or expenditures by adversaries.
Nth Country. The next country to acquire nuclear weapons.
Non-Nuclear Nations. These nations which have no nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Free Zones. Areas in which the production and stationing of nuclear weapons is prohibited.
On-Site Inspection. A visit to ascertain if a state did or did not explode underground atomic devices; often used in broader sense for my disarmament agreement.
Parity. The quality or state of being equal in military strength.
Peaceful Explosions. Atomic tests to develop atomic energy for non-military purposes, such as excavations.
Peacekeeping. Institutions or measures for the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
Penetration Aids. Devices aboard missiles and aircraft which aid passage through adversary defence systems; these may include decoys, chaff, and electronic jammers to interfere with radar.
Pre-emptive Attack. First strike designed to knock out the adversary’s offensive forces, population, or industry in anticipation of a possible strike.
Progressive Inspection. A system in which the intensity and scope of inspection increases with the progress of disarmament.
Proliferation. The acquisition of nuclear military capabilities by states not previously possessing them; horizontal proliferation is the obtaining of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states; vertical proliferation is the increase in the number of nuclear weapons by states already possessing them.
Second Strike Capability. The capability to destroy a large proportion of an adversary’s industry and population, after the adversary has first launched a nuclear attack (a first strike).
Soft Facilities. Missile sites and other facilities that have not been provided with protective shielding against the effect of nearby nuclear explosions.
Stability. A mutual relationship of nuclear deterrence characterized by mutual constraint on military initiatives because of risks of unwanted conflict escalation.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which began in November, 1969, to limit both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.
Strategic Forces. Offensive forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons against industrial or population targets and defensive forces designed to defend against such attacks.
Test-Ban Treaty (TBT). The partial treaty which came into force on October
10, 1963, and attempts to prevent the testing of nuclear weapons under water, in the atmosphere, and in outer space.

Tlatelolco Treaty. The treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America was signed in Mexico City on February 14, 1967.

Unacceptable Damage. Degree of destruction anticipated from an enemy second strike, sufficient to deter a nuclear power from launching a first strike.

Unilateral Initiatives. An effort undertaken by one state in the hope that an adversary might reciprocate.


Verification. The totality of means, of which inspection is just one, by which one nation can determine whether another nation is complying with obligations under an arms control or disarmament agreement.

Violation. A demonstrably provable breach or infringement of a treaty, accepted as such by an offended state or control organization, causing a lapse of the constraining provisions or abrogation of the treaty or agreement.

Warhead. Section of a missile which contains the explosive charge (either conventional or nuclear).

Weapon System. A combat instrument, including both the weapon and its related equipment and support service and facilities.

Yield. The total effective energy produced in a nuclear explosion. Usually expressed as an equivalent tonnage of TNT.

Zonal Inspection. Inspection that is initially limited to particular geographical areas within a country.

APPENDIX B: SELECTED LITERATURE ON DISARMAMENT.

2. U.N. Reports.


*The Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons; Report of the Secretary-General*. 76pp. 1968.

*Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use; Report of the Secretary-General*. 100pp. 1969.

3. Periodicals.


*War/Peace Report*. New York: 218 E. 18th St. (Monthly.)

*Documents on Disarmament*. Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Annual.)

*Arms Control and Disarmament: A Quarterly Bibliography*. Washington: Library of Congress. (Quarterly.)

*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Chicago. (Monthly.)


*Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Ann Arbor: Michigan Center for Research on Conflict Resolution. (Quarterly.)

**APPENDIX C: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AGENCIES OFFERING RESOURCES IN DISARMAMENT.**

1. Religious.

Commission on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, 150 Route de ferney, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.


Committee on Society, Development, and Peace of the World Council of Churches and the Pontifical Commission Justice and Peace, 150 Route de Ferney, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.

2. Secular.

a. Organizations.


World Council of Peace, Bulevardi 13A9, Helsinki 12, Finland.


World Association of World Federalists, 46 Elgin St., Ottawa 4, Ontario, Canada.

b. Research Institutions.

The participants of the World Conference on Religion and Peace will deal in depth, through three simultaneous workshops, with three themes which are continuing subject areas for debate and action of the United Nations General Assembly: disarmament, development, and human rights. Since leaders of all world religions are often noted for their rhetoric more than their attention to firm political issues, these three workshops were devised by the Preparatory Committee of the World Conference just so the participants could study in depth continuing issues facing world statesmen—and thus facing the statesmen of their own countries.

The Pre-Conference Study Packet, which will be mailed to all Conference participants--delegates, fraternal delegates, and observers--will contain background material on all three workshop themes. In addition, each workshop will be reflected in a Position Paper, commissioned by the Conference Secretariat, to be drafted by a religionist who has worked professionally in the subject area. Such religionists, rather than solely academic experts, have been selected just so the position papers, as the workshops themselves, will emphasize the role of organized religion. The purpose of the background pamphlets and the position papers is not only to give information in depth; it is also to give participants from a wide variety of religions, and national and intellectual backgrounds, uniform information on the themes so that they may come to the World Conference with fairly uniform understandings. While each workshop is being asked to submit a short (1,500 word) Workshop Statement to a closing plenary
session for debate and adoption, the position papers may or may not be the basis for debate and for drafting the Workshop Statement. The participants in each workshop will be free to make their own decisions as to the form the Statement should take.

The three position papers, including that above, have been written with the above values and procedures in mind. --The Secretariat.