IV. Handeln
Theologische Weltoffenheit in praktischer Verantwortung

Vorwort ............................................. 219

Jan Milič Lochman:
Was heißt: Dein Wille geschehe? .................... 221

Günther Hauff:
Um der Verantwortung willen: Theologie .......... 235

Charles S. Milligan:
Existential Ethics and Empirical Philosophy ...... 263

Peter Schulz:
Verantworteter Journalismus ..................... 275

Werner A. Sommer:
Verantwortetes Leiden. Ein tiefenpsychologischer Sermon .... 285

Walter Neidhart:
Hoffnung für das Leben. Predigt am Sonntag Quasimodo geniti
1986. Text 1. Petr. 1,3–9 ........................... 293

Schriften von Fritz Buri 1932–1987
(Alfred Jäger/Imelda Abbt) ........................... 299

Autorenspiegel ....................................... 323


Imelda Abbt/Alfred Jäger (Herausgeber)

Weltoffenheit
des christlichen
Glaubens

Fritz Buri zu ehren

Verlag Paul Haupt Bern
Verlag Katzmann K.G., Tübingen
Inhaltsverzeichnis

Laudatio .................................................. 9

I. Verstehen
Theologische Weltoffenheit im Selbstverständnis des christlichen Glaubens

Vorwort .......................................................... 15

Heinrich Ott:
Das dialogische Prinzip im theologischen Denken ................... 17

Charley D. Hardwick:
Naturalism, Objectivity, and Existentialist Interpretation ........... 29

Harold H. Oliver:
Myth and Metaphysics: Perils of the Metaphysical Translation of Mythical Images ........................................... 43

Alfred Jäger:
Der Gott der Zukunft – die Zukunft der Erde .......................... 51

Florian Schuller:
Zwischen Skylla und Charybdis. Was katholische Theologiestudenten bei Fritz Buri lernen könnten ...................... 65

II. Denken
Theologische Weltoffenheit in philosophischer und anthropologischer Nachbarschaft

Vorwort .......................................................... 75

Imelda Abbt:
Eine anthropologische Besinnung zur Ganzheit der Person ......... 77

Dominik Schmidig:
Vermittlung von Theorie und religiöser Praxis nach der Wissenschaftslehre Fichtes .................................. 87

(Fortsetzung hintere Umschlagseite)

Tendai Buddhism and Christianity – Theory and Practice in Religion*

JAN VAN BRAGT

Permit me, at the beginning of this sixth Nanzan Symposium, to say a few words about its spirit and its theme, and bear with me when my words sometimes sound challenging, even provocative.

As a meeting place of East and West, Buddhism and Christianity, our Nanzan Symposia aim at a mutual understanding of the "twain" at a profound level. We are duly conscious thereby that both great traditions have a depth and riches that is hard to gauge and still harder to put adequately into words. Prerequisite of all serious dialogue is, therefore, the consciousness that one does not yet truly understand the other, together with the heartfelt need to come to a better insight into "what makes the other tick."

This desire for true understanding of the other is rooted, at a still deeper level, in a longing for unity, harmony, with the partner. It thus presupposes an attitude of respect for the other and the willingness to part with one's own preconceived ideas and everything that divides us. It does not imply, however, that the path to harmony must necessarily be a smooth one. Would it sound all too Western to say that real mutual understanding implies a catharsis of our preconceptions and is possible only by way of the shock of a serious confrontation? However this may be, I want my words to be an invitation – a provocation, if you want – to a frank and open dialogue, a real "befragen" of one another.

How can Tendai Buddhism and Christianity see, evaluate, approach one another? What can they exchange? What can they learn from each other? Those are the big questions facing us. We have no ready answers for them at this moment and may call ourselves blessed if our experimental explorations of these days bring us nearer to the answers or, at least, deepen and enrich our questions.

It is a felicitous occasion that brings us together today: the fact that this year Tendai's headquarters, Mount Hiei, celebrates the 1200th anniversary (787-1987) of its founding by Saichō or Dengyō Daishi – a celebration which will have its highlight in a "Religious Summit" to be held on
August 3–4. It is in connection with this Summit that Yamada Etai, the ninety-two year old Chief Abbot of Mt. Hiei, has recently spoken these very significant words: "Mt. Hiei is not simply a mountain temple of the Tendai School. It is the cradle of Japanese Buddhism, the mountain where the founders and many eminent monks of the various Japanese sects, such as Hōnen, Shinran, Eisai, Dōgen, Ippen, Kōya, received their religious training ...".

These words offer us already a first topic of discussion: What has been the significance and role of Tendai, not only in the whole of Japanese Buddhism, but even wider, in the formation of Japanese religiosity as we know it today? There can be no doubt that Tendai's role has been an enormously important one, but how can we explain, then, that only thirteen years ago the American Buddhist scholar, Stanley Weinstein, under the title of "The Neglected Tendai Tradition", had to deplore the fact that this Tendai is nearly not studied in the West? We might expect that, at least in Japan itself, Tendai is receiving due attention from the academic community, but again this does not seem the case, since, about the same time, the Japanese scholar, Tamura Yoshiro, could write: "In comparison with doctrinal studies on other schools, research on Tendai doctrine lags far behind... This glorious mother of Japanese Buddhism and Japanese culture is completely forgotten."2

In the face of that rather unexplainable situation, we could offer as one more reason for having this symposium that we want to make a, be it very modest, contribution to the reversal of this tide of neglect. But, more central for us is, of course, the idea that it is high time that our two traditions start recognizing one another, not only as two social entities in the ever shrinking "global village", but more still as two sister religions, such as Honen, Shinran, Eisai, Dōgen, Ippen, Kōya, received their religious training..."

It is the cradle of Japanese Buddhism, the mountain where the founders and many eminent monks of the various Japanese sects, such as Hōnen, Shinran, Eisai, Dōgen, Ippen, Kōya, received their religious training...

Let me now first remark that we have agreed to circumscribe "Tendai" here as "the mahāyāna School of Buddhism centered on the Lotus Sutra, as founded by T'ien-t'ai Ta-shi (Japanese, Tendai Daishi) Chih-i in sixth century China, and as it is common to Chinese T'ien-t'ai and Japanese Tendai."

With this limiting definition, we do not want to exclude from our discussions such important questions as the exact differences between Chinese and Japanese Tendai, the role of Taimitsu esotericism in Japanese Tendai, the question whether this esotericism was brought into organic unity with Lotus doctrine and practice, etc., but merely to relegating them to the fringes of our dialogue, in order to focus our attention on the "Lotus message," as interpreted by Chih-i and his followers.

It has been the practice of our Nanzan Symposia, right from the beginning, to propose, as a kind of guiding thread for the discussions, a general religious theme or topic that may permit the partners in the dialogue to plumb the depths of each other's traditions and to reveal the great lines of the mutual similarities and differences. I would now like to offer a few words of explanation on the theme chosen this time: "Theory and Practice in Religion." In all honesty, the choice of this topic goes back, in part, to a misgiving which has plagued us and which can be summarily expressed as follows: Is not Tendai an extremely philosophical Buddhist School, and will not, therefore, an encounter with representatives of this school take on the character of an academic debate rather than that of a religious dialogue— which is, after all, what we aim at? This misgiving, which is rooted in old impressions and, possibly, prejudices, is certainly not laid to rest by pronouncements like that of the pre-war German student of Tendai, Bruno Petzold: "At present, the shi-kan praxis has been pushed aside in Tendai by Shingon praxis, with the result that there do not exist any longer instructors in this Tendai form of meditation. Its techniques had been orally transmitted and cannot be fully found in writings. One can therefore say that the Tendai doctrine has significance today only as theoretical doctrine, philosophy."3

We may have to come back to that concrete fear later, but for the moment we want to concentrate on the intellectual and universal problem it intimates: The interrelationship and relative weight of theory and praxis in religion. I believe that this is precisely one of the problems that beset most Christians who expectantly approach Buddhism, and that lurk in the background of all Buddhist-Christian dialogue. So, kindly permit me to bring it to the light of day, from the Christian perspective, as an introduction to our discussions.

I would like to tell you first how this problem presented itself to me anew in the course of my readings in preparation of this symposium. For...
example, the following formulation by the Japanese American scholar, Taitetsu Unno, has set me thinking: “Chih-i’s ultimate concern was the realization of the true nature of reality (tattvasya laksana) through religious practice...” This sentence sufficiently recognizes that religious practice was very important for Chih-i; still, it made me ask myself whether, for instance, these words could be applied as such to any of the Christian saints or “eminent monks.” It seemed to me then that, in the case of nearly all Christian saints, as exemplified by a St. Bernard or a St. Francis of Assisi, their ultimate concern would be more truthfully expressed by words like “perfect obedience to the Father” or “pure love to Christ and neighbor,” and that even to figures such as a St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquin - who, after all, are counted among the Greats in Western philosophy – the above formulation could not be unreservedly applied.

Next, there is Tendai’s “shōaku setsu,” which we might freely render as the theory of “the universal presence of evil.” I want to mention it here in the hope that we shall find a chance to discuss its real meaning, and thus can be short in its introduction. Chih-i distinguishes ten realms of reality: On top there are the Buddha realm and three other “good” realms; at the bottom there are hell and five other “evil” realms. He then adds, however, that these various realms all interpenetrate and “contain one another.” Consequently, there is Buddha goodness even in hell, and demonic evil even in the holy Buddha realm. This theory by Chih-i may be considered to be the rational elaboration or logical outcome of a tendency common to nearly all Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely the effort to transcend all dichotomies, especially that of good and evil, by a logic of “coincidentia oppositorum.” I deliberately do not dwell on the admirable religious possibilities of this theory, to use it here merely as an occasion to formulate our problem in a stringent form: Chih-i distinguishes ten realms of reality: On top there are the Buddha realm and three other “good” realms; at the bottom there are hell and five other “evil” realms. He then adds, however, that these various realms all interpenetrate and “contain one another.” Consequently, there is Buddha goodness even in hell, and demonic evil even in the holy Buddha realm. This theory by Chih-i may be considered to be the rational elaboration or logical outcome of a tendency common to nearly all Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely the effort to transcend all dichotomies, especially that of good and evil, by a logic of “coincidentia oppositorum.” I deliberately do not dwell on the admirable religious possibilities of this theory, to use it here merely as an occasion to formulate our problem in a stringent form: Can religion be considered to be the rational elaboration or logical outcome of a tendency common to nearly all Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely the effort to transcend all dichotomies, especially that of good and evil, by a logic of “coincidentia oppositorum.” I deliberately do not dwell on the admirable religious possibilities of this theory, to use it here merely as an occasion to formulate our problem in a stringent form: Can religion be dominated by such philosophical rationality? Would not, on the contrary, such rationality signal the death of true religiosity? Is not it possible that other, earlier and later, Mahāyānists did not draw that conclusion from their own premisses for valid religious reasons?

But let us open the question as wide as possible, and return to the impressions of the Christian sympathetic observers of Buddhism we mentioned earlier. When these people come into contact with Buddhist praxis, let us say the life in a Buddhist monastery or “parish-temple” – something the first generation of Western Buddhologists apparently never did –, they immediately recognize this as religion. On the other hand, however, study of Buddhist doctrine tends, in nearly all cases, to evoke the question: “Is this religion or is this philosophy?” A good articulation of this, as it were, natural reaction can be found in a recent issue of The Eastern Buddhist, where an American theologian with a deep interest in Buddhism writes: “As in verbal discussions with Buddhist thinkers, so here the initial surprise is the (to us) strangely dominant role that what seem to be philosophical (epistemological and metaphysical) judgments play in the religious existence of the Buddhist, or at least in buddhist reflection on that existence... The philosophical affirmation of endless dependent origination and anatta (no-self) are the basis for spiritual rebirth, for the fundamental spiritual metanoia (no-self) necessary for salvation. Buddhism seems at first glance to be a religion based on a particular set of speculative metaphysical affirmations, and even Buddhist salvation seems dependent on intellectual agreement to these metaphysical doctrines.”

As appears from his use of the verb “seem” and the qualifiers “initial” and “at first glance,” this author too does not offer a conclusion but only a honest impression. As a stimulus for our discussions, we could analyze and amplify this impression as follows. It is hard not to sense some kind of paradox in Buddhist history. On the one hand, there is the figure of the founder, Sakyamuni Buddha: Not a teacher of theoretical doctrine – he explicitly refuses to touch metaphysical questions –, but a supreme “pragmatist,” a physician of the soul, who only wants to show the way out of the magic circle of human suffering. On the other hand, however, the subsequent history of his movement confronts us with the birth of very philosophical sutras, a Chih-i interpreting in an extremely philosophical way the lotus Sutra (which originally strikes the reader as characteristic of the extreme use of the religious language of drama and myth), the fact that the main schools of Buddhism are determined and distinguished by their epistemological and metaphysical doctrine, etc. One may be very conscious that all this does not permit one immediately to conclude that the development of Buddhism has been guided by philosophical rather than religious concerns, by the rules of wisdom rather than the ruses of compassion, but it would be less than intellectual honesty to hide the bafflement that remains.
Now, please, do not misunderstand me. My frank and "no holds barred" remarks on "theory in Buddhism, as seen by a Christian" are certainly not meant as an attack on Buddhism, but rather as an introduction—a very one-sided one, it is true—to our discussions, and as a "bad example" inviting you, our Buddhist partners, to, please, voice with the same lack of restraint the impressions, questions, and criticisms with regard to Christianity which you carry in your hearts. At the same time an earnest plea to all panelists is implied. Let our discussions on religious doctrine remain castles in the air, let us try to pay sufficient attention to the practice that is supposed to accompany, undergird and realize these doctrines, as well as to the relevance of these doctrines for human life in today's society.

As a kind of conclusion to my introductory musings on our guiding theme, I want to submit to your discussions two tentative "theses": 1. The religious exigency or quest differs from the intentionality of pure reason. Religious truth demands that the processes of reason be continually checked by the lived experience of human life and by religious practice. 2. No religious doctrinal system can be entirely without presuppositions. A religion can be rationally systematized only on the basis of a previously accepted framework and problematics. As long as we stay within the framework of our own religion, we tend not to be aware of these presuppositions. One of the main functions of the religious dialogue might therefore be to make us, reciprocally, aware of the presuppositions underlying our religion.

My next task is to lay on the discussion table some questions which are not directly touched upon by the prepared papers; but time obliges me, of course, to be short.

There is first of all, as is only fitting, a question concerning the heart of T'ien-t'ai, the Lotus Sutra. For the outsider it may be hard to understand how this Sutra could come to occupy such a central and dominant role in the Buddhism of China and Japan. I for one must confess that, at a first reading, it appeared to me completely preoccupied with its own glory and not likely to add anything decisive to the rich contents of Mahāyāna Buddhism—an impression that made me feel for Tamura's characterization of it as "one of the seven wonders of Buddhist history." I then started wondering whether maybe the Lotus Sutra became so important in Buddhist history, not so much for its contents as such, but rather by the fact that it appeared at the right moment to restore a threatened balance, for instance. Of course, in that case we might have to distinguish between the significance of the Lotus Sutra within Buddhism and its general religious significance. What can, for instance, its insistence on śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas (people already far advanced in Buddhist practice) also being called to full Buddhahood mean to me, who am at best a common mortal?

Next we come to the question about the exact role which the Tendai School, this great champion of the Lotus Sutra, has played in the history of Mahāyāna Buddhism? Wherein does its importance lie? Would it lie in the fact that Chih-i, by presenting (in his famous p'an-chiao, classification of doctrines) a comprehensive view that knew how to accommodate all the doctrines of the various sutras "of the Buddha's life-time", showed the Mahāyāna movement, until then splintered into many schools, a way to unity? Or would it rather be due to the fact that T'ien-t'ai, as the first sinitic Mahāyāna movement, until then splintered into many schools, a way to unity? Or would it rather be due to the fact that T'ien-t'ai, as the first sinitic Mahāyāna school to consciously crystallize and become recognized as such, contributed greatly to the inculturation of Buddhism in China and its cultural influence sphere? In this case, it would become specially important to discern the typically Chinese elements in the Tendai synthesis. Could the following be relevant here? While Indian Buddhism focuses nearly exclusively on the "mind", Tendai pays more attention to the world of "nature" (to the point of recognizing Buddhahood even in the inanimate members of the natural world). Or again, Tendai is said to prolong the Indian Madhyamika (śūnyatā, emptiness) line, but does not, in fact, the Lotus Sutra belong to a different strand, and did not this prompt Chih-i to see the "real face of things in the "middle" rather than in emptiness? Did he thereby strike a balance between Indian world negation and Chinese world affirmation?

Or again, would part of Tendai's importance lie in the fact that it remained loyal to Sakyamuni Buddha, while several other schools found their central object of devotion in a different Buddha (Vairocana, Amida, . . .)? But I must confess that I do not really grasp the significance of this point in the delicate balance of reliance on the Dharma and trust in a Buddha, any more than I would fully understand the implications of the fact that, in the Lotus Sutra, Sakyamuni is revealed as the "ever abiding" Buddha—not any longer the teacher who "disappeared" already into Nirvana. My only point of reference here might be a very misleading one: the figure of Jesus Christ who intimates that he will be with us in a more "graciously efficient" way precisely by his bodly
disappearance. What is exactly the function, in the development of Buddhism, of this revelation of the "trans-historical" character of the Buddha? Could it be that here, in a clear-cut way, the Buddha ceases to be an ascending figure "come from below", and is now experienced as "descending from above" for our benefit? Or are my Christian "lenses" betraying me here...?

There is, finally, a rather involved set of questions for which I would like to beg some enlightenment from our Buddhist partners—questions which are more directly connected with the Japanese scene, and maybe also with practice in daily life. It is, as you know, an undisputed presupposition of all Japanese Buddhism today that all "sentient beings" are saved without exception; and it seems rather clear that, on this score, the influence of Tendai thought concerning Buddha Nature and Original Enlightenment has been decisive. We only have to remember how Chih-i himself is said, in his study of the Lotus Sutra, to have been impressed most of all by the Sutra's insistence that all are called to supreme Buddhahood (more even than by the quasi-eternity of the Buddha), and how in turn the Japanese founder of Tendai, Dengyō Daishi, most ardently defended the universality of the attainment of liberation against the Hossō monk, Tokui. It would be worthwhile to study this point by itself in comparison with Christian ideas, but here I want to associate it with that other prominent characteristic of Tendai, its comprehensiveness.

To embrace all elements of Buddhism, no matter how widely divergent, was undoubtedly a fundamental trait of Chih-i's stance, and in the same spirit, Japanese Tendai has endeavored to adopt, not only many elements of Buddhism still unknown to Chih-i—especially Tantrism, but also Hua-yen philosophy, Northern Zen, etc.—but even non-Buddhist religious elements: the gods of Shinto and Japanese religiosity in general. It may be debatable in how far this Tendai spirit lies at the basis of the synthetic and tolerant character of Japanese religion in general, but the question that preoccupies me is rather whether from such a spirit there can go out a call to conversion and betterment, on the individual as well as on the social level; whether there is room here for discernment and "sollen" (ought). When professor Shioiri describes Tendai as "the spirit of absolute affirmation of all things", it is hard to see how from there a negation of evil in individual and society can come forth.

Still, it is said that it was Dengyō Daishi's ideal "to turn the whole country into a Pure Land (paradise)" and there is, a few centuries later, the activist figure of Nichiren who, animated by the sense of mission pervading the Lotus Sutra, displayed an extraordinary "prophetic" spirit. How to reconcile these things I do not know.

There is probably no better way to qualify this provisional catalogue of my questions to you than the old saying current in several Western languages: "A fool can ask more questions than hundred wise men can answer." As the final part of my presentation, I would like now to reflect a moment on what Christianity could learn from Tendai Buddhism. It must be understood, however, that these musings too are utterly tentative and provisional, since we can really come to know what to learn from one another only in the course of the dialogue itself.

A preliminary question could be whether, among the many strands of Buddhism, Tendai would be relatively close to or, on the contrary, far from Christianity. A special trait of the Lotus Sutra, already alluded to—namely, its eschatological concern and its sense of personal mission: the individual is personally chosen by the Buddha, promised attainment of Buddhahood, and given a special mission—might, for example, be construed as a point of proximity to the so-called "prophetic religions". However this may be, when it comes to learning from one another, distance or proximity is not a decisive consideration, since we all have the experience of learning the most from people most different from us. For lack of time, I must now proffer my tentative list of possible lessons for Christians without any real explanation.

First of all, would not Christianity, which generally pays very little systematic attention to the relativization of religious forms (including concepts), have much to learn from the "dialectical relationship" of form and non-form in Tendai?

In Tendai, mind, Buddha, and the world (the others) are distinguished, but it is stressed that they are finally identical with one another. Could this approach not contain valuable hints for a further refinement of the Christian position on the delicate problem of God's transcendence and immanence, and the being or nothingness of the creatures over against God?

Next, we should have, I believe, a careful look at Tendai's classification of doctrines and its understanding of upaya (skillful means, provisional truth). Here, the various doctrines are assigned a place in a hierarchy according to their relative truthfulness; but it is simultaneously maintained that the truth of the highest level is already contained in the Christianity as a valid expression of the final truth. Could not the
Christian theology of religions gain insights from this for the difficult question of the recognition of truth in other religions?

As already mentioned, we find in the Lotus Sutra the problematics of the Buddha's presence after he has absented himself in Nirvana. Here too the Christian way of thinking about God's presence and "absence", and about Christ's presence after (and as a result of) his resurrection, might possibly gain by a comparison.

We might also do good to come back to the problem of good and evil, already alluded to earlier but from a very special perspective. In its effort to overcome this dichotomy, Tendai will, for example, say: "What we must strive for is not the one pole of good or spirit, but the unity of good and evil, spirit and matter...; good exists in identity with evil, spirit exists in unity with body." Christianity, on the other hand, is wont to present religious life as a struggle between good and evil. Historically speaking, it cannot be denied that this view has often been abused and has caused much human strife and suffering. Could not dialogue on this point lead to a more balanced view and saner practice?

As my very last point, I want to mention the trait of Tendai which has impressed me most deeply: The fact that Tendai's doctrine about "everything being real truth" permits an attitude of wonder and gratitude before all things. In connection with the strenuous ascetical exercise, practiced at Mt. Hiei, of walking around the mountain top for a thousand days, it has been written: "The practitioner on his path worships every tree and plant, every stone and waterdrop of the mountain." And Bruno Petzold expresses the idea in a more general way: "It is customary to say, 'for a Tendai believer everything is wondrous.' How could it be otherwise, since for him everything is absolute reality?"

Even forgetting for the moment the reservation we have voiced earlier, there is of course the question whether Christianity could ever go all the way, with Tendai, in that "pantheistic feeling". But would not a sound dose of it—a kind of "Christian pantheism" that knows how to detect the presence of absolute reality, God, in all things—enrich Christian life and maybe help to save nature from destruction?

Notes

This paper is a free translation of an introductory talk (in Japanese) to a three-day dialogue symposium by a panel of five Japanese scholarly Tendai monks and five Christian students of Buddhism, held at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan), March 16–18, 1987. — It is offered here to Fritz Buri in grateful friendship and in the hope that he will thoroughly criticize it from his Buddha-Christ standpoint.

4 Taitetsu Unno, "Spirituality in San-lun, T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen Buddhism" (unpublished manuscript).
5 The same kind of question could be directed also at the hongaku or original awakening theory which became so influential in Japanese Tendai.
6 Langdon Gilkey, "Abe Masao’s Zen and Western Thought", The Eastern Buddhist, 19/2 (1986), 111–112.
7 Tamura Yoshiro, o.c., pp. 199–120.
9 Tamura Yoshiro, o.c., pp. 106 and 107.
11 Bruno Petzold, o.c., p. 137.
John Elbert Wilson:
Schelling: Neuzeitliche Glaubenswissenschaft .......................... 97

Odilo Kaiser:
Geschichte, Mythos, Existenz. Wissenschaftskritische Erkundungen im Diskurs einiger Kategorien ....................... 107

Hans Batzer, Carl Eugster, Hans Gorsler, Albert Schmidt, Heinz Waser, Heinz Zumstein:
Das Denken als ein Aspekt im interdisziplinären Vorgang der menschlichen Bewusstseinsbildung ......................... 127

Jeanne Hersch:
Les efforts œcuméniques des chrétiens considérés d’un point de vue non chrétien ........................................ 135

III. Glauben
Theologische Weltoffenheit im interreligiösen Dialog

Vorwort .......................................................... 143

John B. Cobb, Jr.:
Dialogue Without Common Ground .................................. 145

Klaus Otte:
Identität und Nicht-Identität im Verstehen zwischen den Religionen und Kulturen ............................................. 155

Jan van Bragt:
Tendaj Buddhism and Christianity – Theory and Practice in Religion .......................................................... 169

Ock Hee Shin:
“The One Mind and the Encompassing” – Understanding of Reality in Wonhyo and Karl Jaspers ......................... 181

Rudolf Brändle:
Christen und Juden in Antiochien in den Jahren 386/87. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte altkirchlicher Judenfeindschaft ........ 197