Shibusawa's main efforts were put into currency reform, issuing public bonds, and laying the groundwork for national banks. Responsible for balancing expenditure and income, he came into conflict with Ōkubo Toshimichi and others, who advocated a larger budget for the army. Demands for a bigger share of the budget also came from other departments, such as Justice and Education. Shibusawa and his mentor, Inoue Kaoru, refused to yield and in a power struggle both resigned from the government. And here, Shibusawa's story ends.

On reflection, I wish that Shibusawa had been more forthcoming in the final chapter, for here we have a rare, first-hand insider's account of decision-making in the early crucial years of the Meiji government. But Shibusawa explains apologetically, 'I cannot tell you all the details because of the official nature of the work' (p. 126). And, as the translator notes, many of the key figures whom Shibusawa talks about—Ōkuma, Itō Hirobumi, and Inoue—were still living. Such prudence to avoid offending people who matter, memory loss, and a tendency to interpret events in a favorable light to oneself, all must be kept in mind when reading and evaluating an autobiography. Craig is aware of such dangers, and she warns us in places where Shibusawa may be less than candid, for example, when he speaks about his impeccable sexual morals.

Although the final chapter is sketchy, it provides a revealing clue to a key ingredient in Shibusawa's subsequent successes—he had intimate connections with top leaders in the Meiji government. While serving in government as a young man, he had built a human-relations network that he effectively utilized later to promote not only his business but social activities as well. At the end of his long and useful life, Shibusawa was involved in five-hundred business organizations and six-hundred social and humanitarian activities.

This book was obviously targeted for a wide audience, including those with little or no background in Japanese history. To help those readers along, pertinent notes are included. The style is clear and readable, and Shibusawa's personality comes through well. By making this work available to English-language readers, Teruko Craig has made an important contribution to our knowledge of modern Japanese history. Shibusawa Eiichi, who was called 'the Grand Old Man of Japan' in his day, deserves to be known by today's generation.


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Some books reveal much about their authors, especially when the authors boldly step onto the scene and do not hide behind the content or the traditions of their discipline. The present book is a case in point. I have the impression that, by reading the book, I got to know Gregor Paul rather well, although my factual knowledge about him is indeed scant. According to the blur, his formal training included philosophy but not apparently any East Asian thought or language. It tells us that since 1979 he has been
in Japan for long stretches of time, teaching German studies at universities, and he thus presumably knows some Japanese. From the bibliography I learn that he is a prolific writer (listing no less than 29 of his own books and articles), covering a broad range of subjects, including many things oriental: Chinese, Japanese, and comparative philosophy, Confucianism, Buddhism, Japanese literature—with a special focus on logic and aesthetics.

From these data we might be inclined to draw two unfavorable conclusions. One, Paul must have the temperament of a journalist rather than of a serious scholar. Two, he cannot be a true specialist in what he is writing about this time: Japanese philosophy. Let me provisionally say that a study of the book confirms these suspicions up to a point, but not completely in a pejorative sense. But before I discuss the book’s contents, let me add just one more word. The author cannot be blamed for not being a specialist in Japanese philosophy. For who is? As Paul himself correctly notes, much has been written about Japanese thought in various periods, but a history of Japanese philosophy hardly exists at all. Kudos, then, for anyone daring to step in where angels fear to tread.

*Philosophie in Japan* consists of three parts, which are preceded by an Introduction (‘Some basic principles’) and followed by a summary reflection. Part 1 (‘The beginnings of philosophy in Japan before the introduction of Buddhism’) defends the thesis that some philosophical ideas entered the country early in the Yayoi period. Confucianist theories concerning the state, as well as Taoist and ying-yang notions on cosmogony and cosmology, are found in the correspondence between the Chinese and Japanese courts, as well as in *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*. Part 2 (‘Philosophy in the Asuka and Nara Periods’) treats Buddhist philosophy as represented by the six Nara schools and heavily stresses inmyō (logic or doctrine of argumentation); it also covers Confucian philosophical ideas regarding ethics and society in Prince Shotoku’s Constitution and, more generally, in the Taika Reform. This section concludes with an analysis of the aesthetic ideas found in the prefaces of poetry anthologies. Part 3 (‘Milestones of Heian-Period Philosophy’) focuses on Buddhist thought, ‘because it is the only area that offers anything basically new’ (p. 265). Paul presents here a rather traditional picture of the rise and development of the Tendai and Shingon schools, but adds again an overview of the aesthetic theories of the time.

The author rounds off his work with a list of inmyō works produced or influential in the Japan of that time—quite a feat in itself, if only for the translation of their titles—and an exceptionally elaborate and near flawless index.

When I asked myself which parts of the book I might be most likely to consult later on, there was no doubt about the answer: the treatment of the inmyō literature and of aesthetic ideas—clearly two favorite topics for the author. On the other hand, I regretted the (relative) absence of ontological and anthropological issues (the human in the world and beyond, the status of the ‘self’, the underpinnings and implications of hongaku thought) and, in general, ‘Shinto philosophy’.

Readers may learn more about the quality of the book, however, if I say why it irritated and, at the same time, pleased me. This brings me back to my opening remarks for, on reflection, I believe that both these feelings find their origin in what I said there about the author’s temperament. Irritating is the fact that the book is not at all what we might expect of a specialist in balanced command of the whole field. It is a somewhat disorderly work, a kind of quilt sewn together from pieces of cloth unequal
in size and quality. Why, for instance, the long introduction to general Buddhism and no parallel flashback on Confucianism? Why are 'non-philosophical' backgrounds painted elaborately in some cases and not in others? Thus, the author sometimes gives the impression that he has written the book for the sake of 'doing' one more book (as Americans like to say when speaking about obtaining tenure). But this would be an unfair judgment, since Paul clearly has several messages to express and was probably prompted to write the book in order to convey them.

This brings me to the exhilarating aspect of the book: in many places its opiniated and iconoclastic views are like a refreshing breeze blowing through the corridors of academe. The author is certainly nothing if not opinionated, feeling duty-bound to own, express, and defend an opinion on every question he touches on. He is no slave of accepted tenets in any narrow field of expertise and few holy cows are respected. Instead, he lets his opinions be guided, on the one hand, by general convictions grown out of a broad erudition and, on the other, apparently by first impressions.

The main opinions or theses defended throughout the book are clearly laid out in the Introduction. The author notes there that philosophy in the full sense of the term ('critical reflection on basic questions, oriented by logic and experience', p. 4) has existed in Japan since ancient times and not only since the Meiji period, when Western philosophy was introduced. The hesitation to call Japanese thought 'philosophy' rests on 'lovingly fostered prejudice', and on the idea that Japanese thought is guided by a special logic that is more aesthetic than logical. When it comes to such basic human potential as logical thinking, however, there do not exist any significant differences between cultures, and philosophy is certainly not determined by language. A special Eastern or Japanese logic, therefore, does not exist. As a universal phenomenon, philosophy must serve intercultural exchange. Most Buddhist systems of thought are mixtures of philosophy and doctrines of faith, and it is possible to pry the two apart.

Up to this point I tend to agree with Paul, but the way in which he disdainfully discards, in the name of philosophy, all religious doctrine, as found in Christianity and most Mahayana sutras, is surely a little too cavalier.

The author offers many opinions that are both commonsense and thereby refreshing, but only a few can be mentioned here. Although he believes that Buddhist philosophy is usually given too much weight in treatments of Japanese thought, he judges Buddhism to be philosophical in nature and the Buddha's teaching to be truly ontological and not merely pragmatic. Mahayana thinking did not, however, add much to Buddhist philosophy, and Mahayana sutras are sources of 'superstitions and religious Buddhism' rather than of philosophy. As the epitome of the 'crassly anti-philosophical basic traits' (p. 90) of these sutras, the Lotus Sutra is treated at length. Also by their mystifying 'identity doctrines', these influential sutras have downgraded the philosophical level of Japanese Buddhism. T'ien-t'ai philosophy is not really based on the Lotus Sutra but on Zhi Yi's reading his philosophical ideas into the Sutra. In the context of the Lotus Sutra, Nichiren and Shinran are also judged severely: 'In my opinion, the great attention given to the [Lotus] Sūtra, Nichiren, and Shinran in German- and English-language publications on Japanese thought is paradigmatic for the . . . mystifying way Japanese culture is received' (p. 97).

In what may be called an afterword, Paul returns to two 'prejudices with regard to Japanese culture' he wants especially to debunk: the idea that Japanese thought is aesthetic and not logical, and the notion that it may be characterized by a special unity of the human and nature. In connection with the latter, he carefully analyzes what can be
meant by that idea and remarks that such an aesthetico-mystical experience of nature cannot be found in Nara or Heian poetry. 'As documented especially in Kokinshū, people preferred an enjoyment of nature that was reflective and at a distance. "Wild nature" was simply a horror for the court' (p. 348).

If Paul's book cannot be recommended unconditionally as an introduction to Japanese philosophy, it provides enough sound perspectives and challenges to make it well worth reading for the critical scholar.


**STEPHEN P. NUSSBAUM**
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This is a remarkable text. It demonstrates the revolutionary potential of a familiar idea; it speaks to issues that are central to Japanese studies; it is a richly collaborative and thoroughly interdisciplinary effort; and finally, it warrants what may be a book's highest accolade, it provokes thought.

*Situated Meaning* introduces the reader to many of the key ideas emerging from debates on language and practice during the seventies and eighties. In doing this it advocates a performative approach to cultural practice in which the lines between structure and agency blur and in which the strategic goals and orientations actors bring to events, and use to shape the events that in turn shape them, take center stage. In such a world, self, other, and society are no longer bounded entities, but rather emerge through interaction and dialogue. While this argument is familiar, its implications remain largely untapped, and it remains a powerful and necessary corrective to the much more common and monolithic depictions of Japanese society.

One of the abiding questions within such an approach concerns how social relations come to be negotiated and determined, if only provisionally, through interaction. The originality of this text, and the reason why it will be widely read, concerns its response to this question.

Notions of *uchi* ('inside') and *soto* ('outside') are familiar to observers of Japan. Indeed, when we think of them as markers of in-group and out-group status, they are stock tools in the social sciences. In recent years it has been suggested that all languages share such orientational devices for situating life within spatio-temporal frames. These ultimately spring from our own embodiment, but are developed metaphorically in culturally specific ways. 'Up and down', 'front and back', 'in and out' are but a few of these.

The contributors to this volume argue that *uchi/soto* refers to an elaborately developed orientational tendency in Japanese. The book richly describes in the shaping of language and social intercourse a tendency to break social and linguistic universes into spheres of inner/nearer/closer/more intimate and outer/further/more distant/less intimate.

This continuum frames interaction and, in language, is employed to situate both
the act of speaking and much of the social content of language. For example, in even simple utterances it is regularly used to situate self, other, referent, and topic. Jane M. Bachnik argues that this orientation is also often encountered in the use of space in Japan in distinctions between 'intimate' or 'informal' and 'distant' or 'formal' spatial settings or locations.

The continuum is presented as remarkably labile, shifting, and situationally determined. Indeed, one of the key contributions of the text is that by focusing our attention on situations, it permits us to see crucially important aspects of life in Japan that simply can’t be viewed in more static depictions of Japanese society.

This *uchi/soto* continuum is not only situationally determined, but its use is often strategically motivated. Because of this, for example, women in the community where I did fieldwork were frequently reluctant to address the PTA—they were not confident in their ability to hit the proper tones of inclusivity, or exclusivity, in addressing an audience that included many other mothers equally concerned about their children, as well as teachers, school officials, and others.

The text introduces tools that will be new to some readers. One of these concerns the importance and functioning of ‘deixis’ (or ‘indexicality’) within Japanese language and culture. ‘Deixis’ refers to the way in which certain signs function to ‘root’ language in specific situations. ‘Deictic signs’ point to specific people, objects, or relations. Standard deictic devices in English include tense, demonstratives, and personal pronouns. Without such devices, without the ability to refer to ‘my car’ or ‘that apple’, language would tend to float as a string of signs not referring to anything specific. The *uchi/soto* distinction is the key deictic device in Japanese.

In a key article Patricia J. Wetzel argues that much of the literature on deixis assumes an egocentric bias—a bias toward the notion of a bounded self or an ‘I’ that functions as the ‘zero’ deictic point. She demonstrates that such a focus is misleading in Japanese and that the grammatical person is not its central deictic distinction. Rather, she suggests that we should recognize *uchi/soto* as playing this role. *Uchi/soto* provides a flexible and shifting continuum within which persons and groups are situated. Among other things, this permits us to recognize that ‘Japanese verb forms obligatorily “conjugate” for *uchi/soto* in much the same way that Indo-European languages conjugate for person’ (p. 83).

Bachnik and co-editor Charles J. Quinn introduce a related idea. Following the lead of A. L. Becker and I. O. N. Oka, they suggest that in comparing languages, especially distant ones, we should look at what language does rather than look for similar words or classes of words such as pronouns. This shifts attention to ‘discourse functions’. Central among these is ‘the cline of person’. This refers to ‘the ordering of linguistic forms according to their distance from the speaker’ (p. 284). Quinn argues that within Japanese this is ‘an indexical field extending out from a socially constituted *uchi*, the minimum instance of which is an individual speaker’ (p. 285). He then shows how this indexical field shapes important features of Japanese grammar—this results in much of the information itself that we receive through language being marked for its location along a continuum stretching from *uchi* to *soto*.

In making this argument, Quinn surveys the semantics of grammatical devices in areas such as transitivity/intransitivity (for example, *tsubusu/tsubureru*), aspect (*akete aru* and *aite iru*), and modality (*ikitai* and *ikitagaru*), as well as clause nominalizers (*no* and *koto*) and locative particles (*ni* and *to*). He concludes that in each of these areas the indexing of information in Japanese is largely a matter of situating it