JUNG AND THEOLOGY: 
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

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It would, I think, be fair to characterize the present state of scholarly 
relations between Jungian psychology and theology as chaotic. If one 
takes the trouble to study the shelves of books and reams of articles 
that have appeared on the subject, one is consistently left with the 
impression of an adventuresome, potentially fruitful and perhaps 
even revolutionary inter-disciplinary project that has somehow failed 
to make a presentable case for itself. The initial skirmishes between 
uninformed critics and uncritical devotees have gone on unabated and 
the few flashes of brilliance have done little to enlighten matters. 
Darkness continues to hover over the waters. Perhaps every human 
process of creativity requires such a period of chaos; but until we can 
acknowledge this state for the "rudis indigestaque moles" that it is, we 
can have no hope of moving through it.

This, then, is the principal motive behind the present essay, which 
will attempt to set forth in a systematic fashion the literature available 
on the topic "Jung and theology", and to sketch the broad outlines of 
its achievements. I proceed within certain limitations which it is best to 
clarify at the outset. To begin with, we shall adhere strictly to our 
subject matter, dealing only with those works which attempt to de­
scribe, compare or evaluate the religious dimensions of Jung's thought. 
Related questions (such as the archetypes, the collective unconscious, 
the theory of symbolism and the like) will only be considered if they 
are presented in such a context. Likewise, historical treatments of the 
psychology of religion, later developments of the Jungian school and 
the adaptation of Jungian principles in theological investigation are 
mentioned only when they form part of an explicit and extensive 
confrontation with Jung's own thought. Very brief commentaries, 
short reviews and obiter dicta have been excluded for the most part.
Within those limits, I have made every effort to gather together as comprehensive a bibliography as I was able, omitting nothing that fit the theme, however outdated, insignificant or useless it appeared. To that end, the standard European, North and South American and Australian indices of periodical literature (up to August 1972) have been consulted, as well as scores of more specialized bibliographies. Entries which I was unable to locate and read, but whose titles suggest that they ought to find a place in such a study, have been marked with an asterisk (*) in the actual bibliography, although reference to them has been omitted in the text of the essay.

The adoption of a scheme for organizing the material at hand is more a matter of convenience than of rigid logical classification. Jung's writings on the psychology of religion form an organic whole and do not take easily to neat categories. It is to be expected that commentaries on his work will tend to reflect this, and that the apparent tidiness of the outline which follows will have to be taken occasionally cum grano salis.

It only remains to mention in passing that to my knowledge nothing of this scope has yet been undertaken. A much more modest attempt at a bibliographical study on Jung and religion was compiled in 1956 by STRUNK (345), but contained no more than a dozen entries of secondary material, most of which were lifted out of Psychological Abstracts. Other efforts to review the relevant literature on the subject have been equally restricted (v. HAENDLER 146, 149; HOSTIE 182, pp. 109—10; MANN 245; STEFFEN 338). Indeed, as we shall see, this is only symptomatic of a more general state of affairs in which needless repetition has helped to maintain constructive criticism at a sub-standard level.

1. General Studies - I

We begin with the more thoroughgoing confrontations with Jung's psychology of religion, among which can be found the most solid description and criticism that has appeared on the subject. Even here however, certain fundamental lacunae have gone unattended. For one thing, no one has yet bothered to do a proper job of investigating and reporting on the primary source material. The more than fifty volumes of unpublished seminar notes, accessible for the past twenty-five years, have all but gone totally ignored. Also, Jung's personal correspondence,
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which is now beginning to appear and which, when fully published, will be seen to shed considerable light on almost every facet of his views on religion, has not yet found its rightful place. Those two areas aside, one still looks in vain for a definitive study embracing the whole of Jung's published corpus.¹ The situation with secondary sources is hardly more satisfying. Large areas of critical work seem somehow to escape the notice of even the best commentators, and, in more than a few cases, there are wide gaps between the promising listings of a concluding bibliography and the internal textual evidence of what has actually been examined with care.

With these reservations, we can turn first to the work of VICTOR WHITE, whose sympathetic understanding of Jung's thought and deep appreciation of the Christian tradition served him admirably in the years he devoted to the dialogue between psychology and theology. A Dominican priest and lecturer on scholastic thought, FR. WHITE'S growing interest in psychology led him to Zurich, where he studied at the newly-founded Jung Institute and came to form a lasting, if finally somewhat turbulent, friendship with Jung himself. From the very start he was convinced of the rich possibilities that archetypal psychology,² in marked contrast to the Freudian approach, held for the theologian (396, 397, 398). In time this led him to God and the Unconscious, a book organized about a number of earlier lectures and essays (401). Its reception, undoubtedly aided by Jung's superb foreword, was overwhelmingly favorable, the chief reservations centering on his shaky interpretation of non-Jungian psychology (STERN 339, ALLERS 10, SCHWARTZ 327; cf. FORDHAM 108, LEAVY 232, MESEGUER 261). Others were skeptical of his use of St. Thomas (STEVENS 340, BARTEMEIER 23) and one reviewer accused him of being unversed in theology (LEONARD 235). From the Catholic side, however, his most vigorous opponent was the Italian Franciscan AGOSTINO GEMELLI, who concluded a short and unsympathetic book on Jung with an attack on WHITE'S orthodoxy (127; cf. 128). At a conference in 1957 which both men attended, WHITE (404) took the opportunity to conclude a paper on the therapeutic value of dogma with a reply to these attacks, to no apparent avail. For in 1959, while lying in a semi-conscious state after cracking his skull in a motor-scooter accident, WHITE received a letter from his Master General, informing him that the Holy See had ordered the suspension of the
sale of his book. A humble consent from FR. WHITE and not so humble complaints from his superior helped to lift the ban and the book went into several reprints and foreign translations. At that time, he had also been preparing a second book of lectures for publication, which carried the themes of the earlier volume to greater depth and concluded with a number of appendices on specific questions relating to Catholic theology (408; cf. LAYARD 231). Shortly after its appearance, he died. Appropriately enough, the book ends with a brief appendix on the problem of evil, which had been a matter of considerable tension between him and Jung during those final years, as their correspondence amply demonstrates.

The only attempt to trace the development of Jung's religious thought through his writings was undertaken by a Belgian Jesuit and professor of theology at the Louvain, RAYMOND HOSTIE (182; cf. 183). His chronological outline of Jung's career into three periods of increasing openness to religion quickly, if rather unquestioningly, became a classic reference among those within and without the Jungian school. In spite of the artificiality of the scheme, the dubious selection of material and the frequent errors in footnoting, this book has long been the only developmental study available, and for that reason alone deserves careful attention. His actual confrontation with Jung, on the other hand, has been less well received, arguing as he does from a dogmatically Catholic standpoint and thereby often failing to appreciate Jung's arguments (LAMBERT 224; A. JUNG 203; HOBSON 176; WHITE 402, 405). On the more favorable side, CROWLEY (78), THIRY (352), and RÜSCHE (304) seem to have accepted HOSTIE'S arguments tout court.

No less comprehensive than the works of WHITE and HOSTIE, HANS SCHAR'S (317) study on Jung's psychology of religion leaves much to be desired from a critical point of view. He accepted Jung's wide-ranging researches and conclusions without question, and greatly overestimated his scholarly achievements. The merit of the book lies in the early recognition (1946) by a Protestant pastor of the need for both theoretical and practical theology to take Jung seriously. But, as FRISCHKNECHT (122) has pointed out, SCHAR presumes that a mere summary of Jung's ideas solves the problem of integrating them into patterns of Christian thought. LEONARD (236) has also ques-
tioned SCHAR'S theological competence and is suspicious of his tacit assumptions.

Somewhat in this same vein is a more recent book by CHARLES HANNA (152) which is a popularization of Jung's religious ideas, aimed at pastors and seminary students. Even more facilely than SCHAR he weds Jungian theory to traditional Christian dogmatics with surprisingly little sense for the complexities involved. JOLANDE JACOBI'S (194) treatise on the individuation process, which represents her only attempt to deal at length with Jung's religious psychology, is a tribute to her customary flair for making more order out of Jung than he was able to make of himself.

An avid disciple of Jung's and a German Jewish convert to Russian Orthodoxy, GERHARD ZACHARIAS (423) has climbed out rather far and rather alone on a limb in an imaginative attempt to use Jung's ideas to reformulate a contemporary Christian theology. His approach centers around viewing the Self as an image of Christ, which he supports by weaving together theological and psychological insights on the notion of transcendence. As WHITE (402) has noted, ZACHARIAS' allusions to the Christian biblical and doctrinal tradition are far too amateurish and his use of Jung far too uncritical to provide the kind of support his case needs (cf. HOCH 178).

In a light, popular and preachy book, J. M. HONDIUS (181) undertakes the same project of reconciling the doctrine of Self to that of Christ, approaching the matter from the opposite end of the spectrum by seeing psychology as an ancilla to theology, the perennial regina scientiarum.

More dependable from a theological point of view is the work of JOSEF GOLDBRUNNER, a Catholic priest and noted authority in catechetics. Already in 1940 (131) he showed enthusiasm for the possible uses of depth psychology in problems of pastoral care. At the same time, however, he accused Jung of "psychologizing" religious dogmas away and disagreed with his understanding of the sacraments — to which judgments MESEGUER (259) gave his support. In a later and more mature book, GOLDBRUNNER (134) made use of Jung's later writings and as a result was slightly more charitable in his estimation, even though he persisted in adhering to the supremacy of Catholic dogma and to his inadequately argued criticism of Jung's "positivistic agnosticism". JACOBI (192) was quick to refute these
charges, which, however, had once again earned MESEGUER'S (261) unqualified approval.

Even stronger than the judgments of GOLDBRUNNER are those of MAX FRISCHKNECHT (121), who concluded in a little booklet on Jung that he could find nothing other in his psychology than a subtle variety of atheism. What he saw in Jung was an ambivalent attitude towards religion, which actually masked a divinization of the Self in place of Freud's supreme Sexuality. Curiously enough, nearly 20 years later FRISCHKNECHT (123) published his highly laudatory reflections on Jung's autobiography, citing his own book as an example of the kind of unfortunate misunderstanding that had arisen between Jung and the theologians.

VIKTOR VON GEBSATTEL, a Catholic psychotherapist and one of the inspiring lights of existential psychology, took over many of the arguments of FRISCHKNECHT'S book in his own critical auseinandersetzung with Jung (383). His main complaint was, and remained (384), that Jung had misconstrued religion by ignoring the whole realm of the "personal", seeing God instead in the inadequate categories dictated by his model of the psyche. WALDER (387, pp. 152—58) criticized VON GEBSATTEL at some length for misrepresenting Jung's actual methods, only to show that he himself had quite missed the fundamental sense of the objections. Some years later WINGENFELD (414) made the same accusations in a more systematic and thorough fashion. Nevertheless, as FREI (118) has noted, the book is riddled with misinterpretations of Jung's ideas.

Arguing from many of the same premises, RUDOLF AFFEMANN (4) has presented us with a more systematic piece of work, confronting Jung's religious psychology on six major points with the teaching of the Bible, and concluding with a chapter on the division of labor between theology and psychology. In the process, Jung emerges as a pantheist of gnostic stamp. An intelligent and consistent book, it suffers, however, from a virtually total isolation from secondary material, which leads in this case to a simplistic and overbearing tone in his biblical theology and a lack of appreciation for the finer points of archetypal psychology. (My own suspicion is that AFFEMANN intended the book as a response to ZACHARIAS [423], from whom he would have picked up his interpretation of Jung.)
WALTER BERNET (38), now professor of practical theology in the University of Zurich, attempted to find a place for Jung within the theological circle by pasting together a montage of insights from liberal theology, existentialism and his own special reading of the theory of archetypes. While Jung was not personally pleased with the results, there is much to commend the work as a piece of philosophical theology, and indeed BERNET'S central idea concerning the Self as man's hint to a God-beyond-experience deserves far more attention than it has hitherto received (cf. HOCH 178).

In a massive and impressive study on religion in Marx, Freud and Jung, H. M. M. FORTMANN (114) has given us what may well be the most organized presentation of Jung's religious thought, along with some of the most perceptive evaluation. Descriptively, only his conception of Jung's notion of "faith" is questionable. Critically, his strong point is his rejection of the adequacy of Jung's articulated methodology and of his understanding of the historical aspects of Christianity. Moreover, as he stated in an article prefiguring the main ideas of the book (113), he considers Jung to have given us the best psychology of religion to date: full of brilliant questions and untenable answers!

Of all the longer studies mentioned in this section, by far the least convincing seems to be that of ANTONIO MORENO (269). His book is so full of misinterpretations, faulty judgments and technical and grammatical errors that it would hardly merit mention, were it not for the fact that his attempt to compare Jung with Eliade, however unsatisfactory the results, stands alone. Elsewhere I have criticized the book in detail (165).

The most ambitious work in Italian has been done by LUIGI PINTACUDA (277), who unfortunately did not understand Jung at any depth. His book shows a decisive lack of linguistic rigor and an overall unevenness of style. Furthermore, the reader is annoyed to find so many unidentified quotations, typographical errors and faults of information in a study that is obviously aimed at an educated audience, not to mention the more serious complaint of an almost Inquisitional Catholic orthodoxy which is used to steamroll Jung's achievements into "mere dilettantism".

Finally I would refer to various unpublished dissertations. RIUKAS (287) has done a lengthy and moderately competent job of
summarizing Jung's notion of the God-archetype according to its genesis, structure and function. When he goes on to find in Jung's ideas on religion in general a viable answer to the challenge of the "death-of-God" movement in theology, his judgments of that radical theology are too hasty and his appreciation of the critical literature surrounding Jungian psychology too meagre (despite a considerable, but deceptive bibliography) to uphold his cause. An earlier thesis by DAWSON (85; cf. 84) is somewhat less impressive in its understanding of Jung's writings, bringing the author to the point where he cannot finally decide for himself what rôle Jung is to play within the Christian theological tradition. BEVERIDGE (45), on the other hand, does take a firm stand on the rapport between theology and archetypal psychology, stressing the value of Jung's thought for making the Gospel relevant to modern man. Although he is suspicious of the consequences of Jung's quaternity theory, most of what he writes is too vague and undisciplined to be of much use.

2. General Studies - II

In addition to the longer pieces cited above, there are numerous shorter attempts to deal with Jung's religious psychology in an equally general, but for the most part less impressive manner.

A first class of entries comprises non-critical descriptions and popularized accounts. Among these, a paper by ELEANOR BERTINE (42) recommends itself for clarity of approach; after a brief personal introduction (cf. EVANS 101), she summarizes Jung in five points of increasing specificity, clarifying these with examples from her own psychotherapeutic practice. In a later, more loosely organized essay (43) she adds to her résumé something of the methodological polemics in which Jung got involved. E. B. HOWES (184) has written the closest thing to a "primer" on the subject, presuming almost no knowledge of psychology at all. FRIEDA FORDHAM's (105, pp. 69—83) chapter on religion in her excellent little introduction to Jung, if read in context, is as fine a short summary as there is. The Portuguese equivalent to it was done by E. CALLUF (62, pp. 19—23, 277—98), who has only slightly weakened his effort by incorporating HOSTIE's (182) theories on Jung's development; and in Dutch there is E. CAMERLING's (63, pp. 41—45) far more simplified account.
Without intending to write an account of Jung's religious psychology, ANIELA JAFFE (199) has done an admirable job of summarizing his major thoughts on religion against the broader context of his life-myth. In contrast, ELLENBERGER (99, pp. 723-26), who has done a mammoth job of research into the origins of depth psychology, somehow falls flat in his treatment of Jung's writings on religion, denying them the importance they deserve. CHARLES BAUDOUIN (28, ch. 15) — founder of the school of "psychopedagogy" in Geneva in which he embodied his lifelong concern of combining the theories and therapeutic methods of Freud and Jung — included a chapter on Jung's views on religion in his last and posthumously published book (cf. BAUDOUIN 27, pp. 101-07, 112-28). A less reliable attempt to contrast Freud and Jung on religion was undertaken by ZUNINI (430), unfortunately without reference to the work of BAUDOUIN. HAENDLER (148), KIRSCH (218), ROCHEDIEU (288), WILWOLL (413, pp. 38-45, 54-55), and RUSSLER (290) write of Jung's religious psychology in contrast to Freud's atheism, as does GOTTSCHALK (137, pp. 56-66), who, like WEHR (391, pp. 59-72), adds a section on the subject in the course of his rather loose and journalistic portrait of Jung (cf. also PRUYSER 281).

TONI WOLFF (420), in a brief but typically precise lecture, has approached the topic from the aspect of the "religious function". JACOBY (196) deals with the same topic from a more clinical point of view. JACOBI (191) also chose the religious function as a starting point for her rigidly orthodox reconstruction of Jung's notion of the homo religiosus. FROBOESE (124) assumed a similar stance in a paper contributed to a special edition of Der Psychologe, although her own ideas are indiscriminately mixed up with those of Jung. M. E. HARDING (153, 154) took religious symbolism as her point de départ in two papers condensing Jung's ideas on religion. Similar comments in a later article (155) sparked a discussion with DOUGLAS (92 and HARDING 156).

A second class of entries under the same heading comprises the endeavors to relate Jung's ideas on religion to his personal experiences. M.-L. VON FRANZ (382) has recently published an interesting and readable essay on Jung's life and thought which begins with a chapter relating Jung's boyhood experiences to the dominant concern of his life: the imago Dei. ALM (13), THURNEYSEN (356) and FRIBERG...
KNECHT (123) had all previously noticed this aspect of the autobiography and commented on it at some length. LOOSER (240) has given us a short, simple commentary on the childhood prayer Jung refers to early in his memoirs, drawing the somewhat improbable conclusion that it enables one to see in the four-year old Jung the direction of his later work. FORDHAM (112) argues more convincingly for the influence of childhood experiences on adult religious attitudes, drawing on Jung's autobiographical account as an example. We can also mention here THORNTON (354), who adopted Jung's thought patterns to interpret his own mystical experiences; finding in Jung "a mystic of the first order", he gives a number of interesting personal impressions of Jung's religious nature. Similarly SERRANO (331), in his flowery and naive study of Jung and Hermann Hesse.

In the third place, we include those works which go beyond mere description to take up the debate between Christian tradition and archetypal psychology. As we might well expect, SCHAR (319) and ZACHARIAS (422) are unconditionally optimistic in finding a place for Jung among the theologians, stubbornly oblivious of any difficulties other than the possible narrowmindedness of the theologians themselves. MERLIN (258), BENZ (37), DE HAAS (86), and CARLSSON (64) concur with a similar lack of theoretical rigor. Only slightly more reserved in their judgments are RYCHNER (306), SAURAT (309), and KÖBERLE (219, pp. 185—200), to whom HAENDLER (146, 149) lent support in his brief surveys of the relevant literature. To these names we should also add that of J.-W. HEIDLAND (161), an Evangelical Bishop who has given Jung high praise for his services to the Church.

JOSEF RUDIN (301), whose essays on the dialogue between theology and Jungian thought are among the most intelligent available, is more circumspect, more conscious of the complexities, but no less excited by the possibilities. Similarly, WHITE (400), in a BBC radio broadcast, pleaded the cause of Jung's psychology to Christian theologians and believers, always within the limits of doctrinal tradition. A serious-minded attempt to subordinate Jung's religious psychology to Christianity by means of a comparison of the notions of Eros and Agape was undertaken by LANTERO (227); finally, however, the relations turn out to be more linguistic than conceptual and his conclusions, consequently, remain unconvincing. H. KIENER (210) pre-
sents an enthusiastic defense of Jung's psychology of religion and elsewhere (212) goes to lengths to refute some casually made theological criticisms levelled against Jung, mustering to her aid a flurry of quotations from Jung's writings. CARLO PETRO (274), a noted Italian psychotherapist and professed Jungian, returns frequently in his book on Jung to insist that he finds Catholicism wholly compatible with Jung's views. Essays by E. METMAN (262) and P. METMAN (263) on Jung suffer from a certain vagueness in logic, as do KIENER and PETRO, confusing description with argument.

We can now turn to a number of less favorable general studies, and here the spectrum runs wide and varied. On the one hand, we have as intelligent and informed a thinker as SBOROWITZ (312, 314) seeking to find in Christianity an answer to certain inadequacies in Jung's opinions on religion. Whatever one may think of such an approach, it is surely easier to come to grips with SBOROWITZ than with the bias of someone like GLOVER (130, pp. 54—64), who throws together in a kaleidoscopic fashion various unidentified bits of Jungiana and then concludes, with no premises other than his own occasional parenthetical jibes, that it is all basically irreligious nonsense. DRY (94, pp. 192—227) disagrees with Jung's views for more solid reasons, questioning in her account his understanding of Christian doctrine and Christian mysticism. BISHOP'S (47) criticisms represent a one-sided attack from a viewpoint which sees theology as unassailable by psychology but quite able to show up its shortcomings. SMITH (333), KIJM (216), and RUMPF (305) are slightly more positive, but basically operate from the same position, as does MAIRET (244), who is skeptical of those who would find in Jung's psychology a surrogate religion. GRANJEL (138) demonstrates the same preference for orthodoxy in his criticisms of Jung, but he is far from convincing, if only for the many tell-tale hints in his essay of insufficient acquaintance with the material. MACINTOSH (242, pp. 68—73) finds a subjectivistic psychologism in Jung's writings on religion, but fails to note any development beyond the earlier, Freudian-influenced writings. It is easier to exonerate REIK (284), writing in 1921, for holding like views. To a generally favorable account, HINDEL (175) appends his objections to Jung's attack on the sacrificium intellectus and the metaphysical reality of God. Similarly partial to Jung, VETER (378) and WURM (421) have only to complain about the use of
an immanentistic, mechanical model of the psyche to describe the rapport between man and God in religion. NORDBERG (271), in a death notice on Jung which appeared in a prominent American Catholic weekly, accused him of preaching a "hazy pantheism" which had been grossly over-rated as to its usefulness for Christian theology.

In conclusion, I mention briefly three studies which approach the problem of Jung's psychology of religion from the question of the "soul". ROTH (296) defends Jung against his critics without a trace of personal objection; PYE (282) goes even further to uphold Jung's very vagueness of language as an indication of the therapeutic need for ambiguous words in which the religious emotions can find repose. In contrast, STOCKER (343, pp. 323–25; cf. 342, pp. 104–25) attacks Jung for his emphasis on collectivism which, he holds, does grave injustice to the traditional doctrine of the dignity of the individual soul.

3. Methodology

Almost every entry of the bibliography upon which this essay is based makes some mention of Jung's methodology. Still, it seems worthwhile to bring together under that heading a number of the more specific and extensive treatments. It should be noted parenthetically that from here on almost no reference will be made to the general studies contained in the previous sections, which by definition treat to one degree or another most of the particular subjects that follow.

Among those who have undertaken to extract and evaluate Jung's methods, few seem to have had as keen an appreciation of the problems as did FREI (117), who yet persisted in championing Jung's right to treat theological matters from a psychological viewpoint. SIERSMA (332, pp. 113–95), ADLER (2), and ALM (12, pp. 98–107) present comparable arguments, but tend to weaken their case by adhering rigorously to Jung's often unjust criticisms of Freud. FORDHAM (111) is one of the few who is fair to Freud, and as a result dispels many of the commonly-held prejudices stemming from Jung. ABENHEIMER (1), BARZ (26), and BINSWANGER (46) all stress the coherence of Jung's own statements regarding his strictly empirical and non-metaphysical methods (cf. JOHNSON 201). KELSEY (208) asserts that Jung has bridged the gap between philosophy and theology by providing a "consistent pragmatic realism
within a phenomenological base which can deal with religious experience"; but from a purely philosophical point of view, his defense of Jung’s methodology is far too simple and uninformed to justify his conclusions. SANFORD (308) reflects the same point of view, although he is careful to point out a certain inconsistency between Jung’s articulated epistemology and his actual analytical methods, which depend on both scientific and quasi-religious models of knowledge-acquisition. One of the most competent attempts to assess Jung’s methodology has been done by BURRELL (59). In the course of a lengthy reconstruction of Jung’s “language of the soul” he argues that Jung’s implicit metaphysic and his theological finesse suggest that psychology may yet prove a reliable handmaid for theology. CAHEN (61) (Jung’s French translator) has contrasted the languages of psychology and what he calls “traditional religion” in order to support his conclusions on the value of Jung’s psychology for faith in search of understanding. Similarly, KELLER (205) has seen in the methodological limits Jung set himself a means to distinguish nature from grace and to appreciate their interactions. ALLENBY (6) also faces the question from a standpoint within archetypal psychology, outlining four ways in which its methods have a bearing on our current religious situation; one of her points, the balance between inner and outer experience, is taken up as the leitmotif of a similarly-orientated essay by SUMNER and ELKISH (349; cf. VON LOWENICH 385, pp. 197—218). VON MORAWITZ-CADIO (268) concludes from a brief summary of Jung’s career that he has offered us the Christian psychology (cf. also Anon. 433). The frequent criticisms of “relativism” and “psychologism” are met by VON FRANZ (381) in the course of an article where she insists that Jung’s personal, non-scientific convictions were in favor of an objective God, transcendent to the psyche. Accepting Jung’s opposition between creed and experience in a far more dogmatic fashion, FRENKLE (119) has applied it to case material under the illusion that he is thereby lending support to Jung’s fundamental approach to religion. And HAYES (158) muddles her defense by indiscriminate quotations from philosophers and poets, with no apparent sense for speaking with precision.

Criticisms of Jung’s methodological positions towards religious phenomena range from caution to condemnation. A. BRUNNER (55) finds the Jungian approach a wholly unsuitable tool for appreciating
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religion, to judge by the results which it yields. STROJNOWSKI (344) likewise finds Jung incompatible with Christianity, and strikes a warning against the possible penetration of his brand of 20th century gnosticism into Polish-speaking lands. MACQUARRIE (243, pp. 96—97, 109—11) sees Jung as unduly subjective, non-metaphysical and "naturalistic" in his conceptualization of religion. In a short treatise embracing the whole of Jung's religious psychology, STAUB (337) comes to conclude that Jung has not understood what religion is all about; with far more detail and evidence at hand, he arrives at the same basic complaints as MACQUARRIE. Both LIRAN (238) and DE LA CROIX (87), in contributions to a 1958 symposium on Jung and religion, attacked his methodological distinction between faith and experience as inadequate, and DE LA CROIX added some important criticisms of Jung's avowed empiricism. Many of the same ideas appear in ULANOV (367, pp. 5—12, 111—27), who is otherwise not particularly conscious of adverse criticism to Jung. JAGER (197) disagrees with Jung's claims to empiricism, insisting that "mystical" elements not answerable to scientific canons form an essential part of his psychology. SCHARFENBURG (323) raised a number of complaints against Jung's invasion into theology, to which BARTNING (24) wrote a rather unimpressive and defensive reply. PIMENTA DE SOUZA (276) found the professed agnosticism towards matters metaphysical in Jung's writings an inconsistent and unsatisfactorily grounded posture. Along the same lines, BEACH (29) has argued that Jung had set up an unsuitable line of demarcation between metaphysics and science, which might have been more profitably drawn according to a model like Paul Tillich's.

WHITE'S attitude to these matters is mixed. On the one hand he argues for the identification of the concepts of soul and psyche in both psychology and theology (408; cf. BURNS 58), and yet on the other hand he objects to Jung's tendency to a subjectivism that leaves out the reality of a transcendent Other (407). GOLDBRUNNER'S (132, 133) evaluation is similarly ambivalent, except that it is more harsh in its judgment of Jung's psychologizing of God. In fact, this latter is the most common of all methodological complaints against Jung. CARUSO (65; 66, pp. 373—97), a student of VON GEBSATTEL and founder of his own depth psychology circle in Vienna, returns to this charge again and again. And DAIM (80, 82), who
seems to be waging in one form or another a continual battle with Jung, raises the same issues, accusing Jung of a sort of psychological idolatry which is kept alive by the "esoteric-gnostic community" of loyal Jungians.

Given such objections, it is not surprising to find a number of thinkers, like BEIRNAERT (32, 34), who consider Jung’s theories more dangerous to Christian thought than Freud’s explicit atheism (cf. Anon. 432). BODAMER (50, pp. 218—23, 227—28), MCPHERSON (255, pp. 170—75) and ROOSLI (289) find a faith-destroying undercurrent to Jung’s therapeutic pragmatism; and POHIER (279) sees the same fundamental psychic reductionism in Jung albeit in a more covert and subtle form, which Jung had attacked in Freud’s attitudes to religion. BERNET (39), who seems to have grown more distant from Jung over the years, finds a similar deceptiveness in Jung, adding elsewhere (40), however, that he considers the almost total lack of attention paid by theologians to Jung a regrettable oversight.

4. God, Christ and Self

Jung never tired of pressing the distinction between God as he is in himself and the God-image as it appears in the psyche, this latter being at times indistinguishable from the central archetype of the Self. The way was thus open for Christian thinkers such as SCHAR (322), COX (74, 76), and HEYER (169) to argue that a transcendent God was wholly compatible with Jung’s theories. In his later works, however, Jung was to identify Christ with the Self, while the God-image was identified with the collective unconscious, an idea frequently overlooked (e.g., GUT 142, pp. 161—69), although it had already been developed to some length in Aion (summarized in BENNET 35, pp. 113—25 and BACH 19). But for those more or less committed to reconciling the Jungian position with traditional theology, this did not cause any grave problems, as COX (75) and BOC­KUS (49) have shown. H. WOLFF (418) and HOWES (186) get into exegetical waters well over their heads in similarly trying to validate Jung’s Christological notions. On the other hand, EDINGER (97) obviously preferred the earlier version, to which he returned by maintaining the Father as an image of the Self and aligning Christ to the individuating ego.

MANN (247, 249) has approached the question of the suitability
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of Jungian psychology to theology from another angle, insisting that Jung was in fact unable to uphold his distinction between Deus and the imago Dei, but was forced to enter into theological speculation every bit as much as today's responsible theologian is forced to enter into the world of psychology. In his own massive but undisciplined study of the development of the God-image, MANN (248) operates wholly under the inspiration of Jung's researches, except for the fact that he is more conscious of its hybrid character. LANG (226), by way of contrast, feels that contemporary anthropology — and here he seems to mean the direction initiated by Fr. Wilhelm Schmidt — renders Jung's approach valid for examining the origins of polytheism, but not of monotheism. HILLMAN (171) could hardly agree with the assumptions of such an approach, but has argued that a certain theological bias lay behind Jung's tendency to elevate the Self and its imagery to the rank of a quasi-eschatological norm. In so doing, he claims, the possibilities of a "polytheistic psychology" have been unjustly ignored.

Several critics, such as RORARIUS (292, 293), UHSADEL (366), and GOLDBRUNNER (135), have objected to a psychologistic immanentism in Jung that leaves no room for a transcendent God except as an occasionally hygienic illusion. HAENDLER (147) ran into objections from the more orthodox Jungians in making similar complaints (cf. ZACHARIAS 424). SCHWERMER (328) attempts to exonerate Jung from the charges by affirming that he was too passionately preoccupied with his own psychological investigations to do more than simply refuse to affirm or deny the reality of the God of the theologians. MARTINS (253) and DAVIES (83, pp. 18—25) take the opposite view, insisting that Jung should have admitted to the objective reality of a non-psychic God.

5. Trinity and Quaternity

Nothing has caused so much consternation among Christian theologians as Jung's suggestion to complete the Trinity with the addition of a fourth figure, alternatively woman or devil — a notion that few indeed seem able to describe without critical comment in the way FABRICIUS (103, pp. 96—105) does. LEIBBRAND (234), for example, has some very intelligent comments to make in his attack on Jung's idea. For him, Jung errs in treating the Trinity, after the manner
of the modernists, as if it were an object d'art, capable of being interpreted according to one's personal aesthetic inclinations, instead of the dogma purum which it is. BLEUEL (48) resists Jung's attempts to compare the Christian trinity with "pagan" parallels and claims that he is trying to preach a sort of "Gospel of Nature" that supplants faith with reason. WILSON (412, pp. 176—97, 704—17) dismisses Jung's "Quaternity" as wholly unbiblical, somehow supposing that such a judgment suffices to dismiss what Jung was in fact trying to do. Within the Jungian school, MANN (246) defended Jung's right to handle such questions psychologically and saw in the Quaternity theory a goad for theologians to come to grips with the scientific and comparative approaches to religious phenomena. EDINGER (96) attempted to take some of the sting out of the concept by suggesting that the Quaternity be reserved for symbolizing the eternal and static qualities of God (or the Self), while Trinity be related only to the dynamic and developmental aspects. GORDON (136) backed up this idea, while ADLER (3) took fundamental issue with it. ANRICH (18, pp. 534—83), on the other hand, rejected the Quaternity because of his own prejudice for models of three, around which his lengthy, woolly treatise on the philosophic roots of body and soul gravitates.

Predictably enough, when Jung tried to feminize the image of the Deity by interpreting the Assumption of Mary as a transformation of the Trinity, theologians of every persuasion complained. SCHULZE (326) called it a kind of "allegorical exegesis" that was entirely unbiblical and gnostic. DOYLE (93, pp. 867—70) dismissed it as contradictory to the official magisteria of the Roman Church, to which CREHAN (77) added that it was an infiltration of pagan idolatry into accepted Christian tradition. No less partial to official dogmatics, O'MEARA (272) nevertheless appears to accept in some vague fashion the validity of Jung's insights for mythology, if not also for theology (cf. HUBSCHER 189). The most favorable and extensive commentary on this question has been done by ULANOV (367), who approached the problem from the broader context of the reintroduction of the feminine into theology via Jungian psychology.

The idea that evil might find a place within the Godhead has hardly met with universal approval either. After a sketchy summary of Jung's views, MICHAELIS (266) jumps to the conclusion that they are an indication of what VON GEBSATTEL (383, p. 52) had already
called “the mystical power of paganism”. DAIM (81) sees Jung’s distortion of trinitarian dogmatics as rooted in his basic error: the relativizing of good and evil by substituting for absolute transcendence the mechanical interaction of conscious and unconscious mind. WHITE (399) had also been a constant opponent of Jung’s general notion of evil, eager to defend the scholastic notion of the *privatio boni* against alleged misinterpretations. HAENDLER (150) felt that the more acceptable conception of the “wrath of God” would cover the data to which Jung refers, without having to assume Satan into heaven. RUDIN (299, 303) has done his best to defend Jung here and to translate him into theologically acceptable terms, although he has not succeeded in giving more than a selective paraphrase. BERTINE (44) takes Jung with far less difficulty, as does SEIFERT (329) whose facility with philosophical jargon masks a certain unclarity of thought. But the most sustained attempt to confront Jung on evil has also been the most disastrous. I am referring to PHILP’S (275) book, which is built around a correspondence between him and Jung, and is so full of annoying misunderstandings that it is impossible to follow any consistent line of argument. LAMBERT (224, 225) attacked PHILP for misconstruing Jung, and WHITE (408, pp. 258—59) rightly accused both sides of obstinacy and incoherence.

6. Protestantism and Catholicism

Attempts to describe and evaluate Jung’s desultory comments on the relative merits of Protestantism and Catholicism have been few. In an article that was praised by Jung for its “objectivity”, KIESOW (213) sketched a plan of what was later to become his doctoral thesis (214), in which he presented a synoptical view of Jung’s attitudes to the two traditions, concluding that Jung remained a Protestant in his convictions, but was compelled by his empiricism to acknowledge the psychological value of many things in Catholicism (cf. HILTNER 172, 174). By contrast, DILLISTONE (91) has argued that Freud corresponded better to Protestantism and Jung to Catholicism, which is supposedly clear from his attitude to the sacraments. Far more naive is a little book by WITCUTT (417) whose hagiographical loyalty to Jung and utter unfairness to Freud render his arguments for Jung’s relevance to Catholicism wholly unconvincing, as WHITE (395) has observed. MCLEISH (254) is hardly an improvement, despite the
fact that he writes nearly twenty years later. CHOISY (68, pp. 135—59), whose leanings are basically Freudian, counsels the Catholic to caution in the face of Jung's immanentistic "paganism". Similarly, at least one editorial in a Catholic journal warned its readers against the destructive pantheism that lies hidden underneath Jung's religious psychology. Finally, we note in passing an irresponsible and often flippant piece of work (RITCHY 286) in which the author presumes to argue from Jung's writings to the total rejection of what is loosely called "the Church".

7. Prophecy or Gnosticism?

We have heard Jung called everything from atheist to mystic. For some, the placing of Jung at the fringes of Christianity via some appropriate label is a matter of prime critical importance. Jung's pastor in Küsnacht, W. MEYER (264) characterized Jung in his funeral eulogy as a prophet whose voice deserves to be heard by Christians everywhere. For RIEFF (285) and HOCH (179), this same title is used ironically, to dismiss him as possessed of messianic illusions of grandeur.

But by far the most frequently encountered title applied to Jung is that of "gnostic", which — in spite of its exceedingly complex historical connotations — offers a convenient dust-bin for complaints against his psychology of religion. MANUEL (250), VERGOTE (377), and FRIEDMAN (120) use it to accuse Jung of radically psychologizing all forms of transcendence, while KUNZLI (222) and BEIRNAERT (33) take it to represent Jung's indomitable rationalism and opposition to religious belief. Others, like HER WIG (167, pp. 86—90) and KIESOW (215), mean thereby to attribute a pantheistic-dualistic metaphysic to Jung's psychology. ALTIZER (15) (whose theological views, malgré lui, show considerable influence of Jungian thought [cf. NOEL 270, pp. 154—61 and ALTIZER 16]) refers to the ego-destructive metaphysics which Jung appears to share with gnostic thinkers.

The most celebrated attack of Jung's gnosis is that of MARTIN BUBER (56, 57), who accused Jung both of denying the validity of faith and of distorting the Judaeo-Christian notion of God. As he himself stated, it was the "VII Sermones ad Mortuos" which revealed to him the personal confession of a gnostic deity. QUISEP (283)
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takes the critique as a compliment and goes on to draw some ambiguous connections between Jung's *opusculum* and what he reconstructs as the doctrine of Basilides. FODOR (104) has described the rather odd events surrounding the composition of the sermons. JAFFE (200) gives a fuller account of Jung's activity during this period and quotes for the first time from Jung's "Red Book" of visionary poetics. As for the psychological interpretation of the sermons, I remain partial to my own views (163), which, however, disagree on every significant point with those of HUBBACK (188).

8. Psychotherapy and the Cure of Souls

Perhaps no one in the Evangelical tradition has been so consistently and unambiguously positive in his assessment of the service Jungian psychotherapy can perform for the pastoral care of souls than SCHAR (315, 316, 320, 321), who somehow manages to summarize, defend and expand on Jung's views without a hint of criticism. STICKELBERGER (341) and VON DER HEYDT (380) give similar approval, while MEIER (256) departs from Jung only in admitting to the metaphysical aspects of including religious problems in therapy. HAENDLER (145) early adopted Jungian psychology as a ground for a theology of preaching without, in contrast to his later writings, questioning the ontological *epoché* of a transcendent God. WHITE (396), in one of his first published essays on Jung, suggested that archetypal psychology could offer us solutions to many of the ethical dilemmas of psychotherapy. In a book on dreams, SANFORD (307) totally subordinates the cure of souls to a loyal and unquestioning obedience of Jung's views. HEUN (168) and THURNEYSEN (357) are more conscious of the differences and consequently admit to a mutual enrichment of theology and psychology. WHITMONT (409) intimates the same notions in his analysis of the Jungian position. KELSEY (206) has done what is surely the most comprehensive American study on the topic, leaving no doubt throughout how influential Jung has been in shaping his own personal convictions. Elsewhere KELSEY (209) argues from his own experience in favor of the benefits of Jungian psychology for the priest in the modern world. ALEX'S (5) advice to an ex-priest at sea with his God is far less satisfactory: a random selection of Jung's thoughts bound together only by the author's rather odd conception of theology. MACAVOY (241, pp.

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1154—56, 1161—64) finds Jung's psychology useful for the spiritual direction of Catholics precisely because it cultivates values long familiar to the Roman Church. Minus the creedal attachments, MORA"WITZ-CADIO (267) agrees in seeing the lasting advantages of an encounter between Christian spirituality and archetypal psychology. On like grounds, ALLENBY (8) describes Jung's brand of psychotherapy as a form of monasticism in modern dress.

On the negative side, DESSAUER (89) claims no honorable minister would ever send anyone under his care to a disciple of Jung, whom he considers a pseudo-mystic. UHSADEL (365, pp. 54—84) is far less rash in his judgments, but insists all the same on the need to maintain proper frontiers between psychotherapy and spiritual guidance. The same arguments, though not the same competence, appear in VOGEL'S (379) references to Jung. VAN DE WIENCKEL (369) finds Jung of inestimable relevance to Catholic asceticism, provided one rejects his notions of evil, the Quaternity and Christology. MESEGUER (260) approaches Jung with optimism and tries to suggest his usefulness for Christian believers, but in the end he yields to the pressures of his Catholicism in rejecting Jung's basic world-view.

In terms of more specific contributions, SPENGLER (334) has tackled with admirable success the difficult problem of extrapolating from Jung's writings a theory of conscience, contrasting it with that of Freud. RUDIN'S (298, 300, 302) concern with the therapeutic interpretation of what Jung called the "imago Dei" merits careful attention. In attempting to distinguish unhealthy distortions from genuine experiences of revelation, he has gone a long way in posing the questions in an intelligent and workable fashion. JACOBI'S (193) confident interpretation of God-symbolism found in certain of her patients' paintings has the curious, but ironic, advantage of exemplifying the sort of issues RUDIN is raising. From a more general and methodological perspective, an essay of mine (164) restates these problems in a somewhat different fashion. DU PEREZ' (95, pp. 108—27, 177—82) application of Jung to religious education and the case-study arguments of FROBOESE-THIELE (125) and ALLENBY (7) appear to me too incomplete to perform even that function. Finally, I would include a reference to ZIEGLER (429) who has suggested that, along Jungian lines, physical illnesses might often be viewed with profit as a kind of psychosomatic "incarnation of religious interests".
9. Archetypal Hermeneutics

Jung's idea that the rites, symbols and dogmas of religion might be read as the language of unconscious psychic processes has caused no little stir. No less a theologian than TILLICH (358, 359) has admitted to the revolutionary potential of such an approach. FRAYN (115) had suggested the same thing nearly twenty years earlier, under Jung's influence. Nevertheless, while men like WALLACE (389), UNDERWOOD (368), KELSEY (207), and J. G. WILLIAMS (411) continue to plead Jung's cause, little significant impact has been made on formal theology itself. Endeavors to evaluate critically Jung's own adoption of this approach have been motley. In a ponderous and sloppy doctoral dissertation, SPINKS (336, pp. 1213—46) has suggested certain amendments to the archetypal theory to render it more suitable to theology. LONDERO (239) arrived at much the same position in a more sustained study without, however, facing the more fundamental philosophical issues. WISSE (416), who devotes a good deal of attention to Jung in his book on the religious symbol, gets trapped in questioning the psychic mechanics of the system and the apparent immanentism involved. HEPBURN (166, pp. 104—18), on the other hand, has presented what seems to me the most important and informed criticism in this area yet to appear. His whole essay should serve as an angel's warning to those who would rush into theology armed only with Jungian archetypal theory. And many there are who have rushed in, as a brief survey by STEFFEN (338) shows; perhaps the most cavalier and light-hearted of these is ROLFE'S (291) attempted reinterpretation of Christianity. Standing over against HEPBURN, FORDHAM (110) and MAUD BODKIN (51, pp. 167—80) have argued in favor of the Jungian approach and its scientific merits.

The most tempting road for archetypal psychology into Christian tradition is, of course, the richly symbolic world of the Bible. As early as 1933 TUINSTRA (364, pp. 192—200) had ventured in with a theory of symbols that drew considerably from Jung. Not much later, WESTMAN (393, 394) undertook an even more explicitly Jungian interpretation of two stories from the Pentateuch, for which THUM (355) singled him out in his criticisms of Jungian exegesis. But from the theologian's point of view, boldness had surely reached the borders
of folly in two studies by HOWES (185, 187) who went at the Gospels with a regrettable lack of scriptural finesse, only to come up with a suspiciously one-sided confirmation of Jung’s views. COPE (70) did little better, linking psychology at its weakest point (biblical hermeneutics) with theology at its weakest (depth psychology) to argue that Jung had cleverly and subtly demonstrated the truth of Christianity! SUARES (346, 347, 348), although convinced that Jung’s rationalism and his theoretical explanations of the psyche were an anachronistic residue from the last century, nonetheless appears to accept the purely descriptive qualities of the archetype theory, which he uses in studying the myths of Genesis.

ALM (11) has argued in an intelligent manner that Jungian psychology may help provide us with a more suitable model for appreciating mysticism. Where he may have gone too far is to conclude from his work that the collective psyche is equivalent to what Jung’s theological critics refer to as the “Thou”, the God who transcends the psyche. DILLISTONE (90) and EVANS (102) are less impressive in their interpretations of Christian symbolism à la Jung. WHITE (408, pp. 248—57) treads very carefully in integrating Jung’s understanding of the Mass (cf. CURTISS 79) with the theological notion of sacrifice. GAFFNEY (126) is more direct, bringing a rare sort of hard-nosed logic and historical competence to bear on Jung’s over-simplifications and inaccuracies concerning the Mass. BARZ (25) has tried to give an archetypal interpretation of the Christian baptismal rite in the form of an extended dialogue between a theologically well-read layman and an analytical psychologist, where the author’s bias stacks all the cards on the side of the latter. BEIRNAERT (32), on the other hand, has clearly opted for subordinating the archetypes involved in Christian sacramentalism to the Divine Power which he claims theology finds at work there.

10. Comparative Studies

Given the enormous breadth of his researches and his highly suggestive and imaginative style, Jung lends himself readily to comparison with a wide range of thinkers. For instance, VASAVADA (372, 373) has tried to bring Western and Eastern philosophies together by adopting Jung’s concepts as both a bridge and a protective filter. At the same time, he insists that archetypal psychology can learn from
the spiritual superiority of the East the need to abandon its strictly scientific prejudices and don the robes of the guru (371, 374, 375). To judge from his comments on Western philosophy, one might be righteously suspicious of what VASAVADA says about the “East” as well. Indeed, the highly unfavorable treatment which JACOBS (195) has Jung’s theories of religion suffer at the hands of Indian metaphysics gives us cause to wonder. Generally speaking, however, there is wide recognition of Jung’s genius in enlightening for the West the spiritual traditions of the Orient (WEHR 391, pp 83—99): everything from Zen (JOHNSTON 202) to the Vedanta (THORNTON 353) to Vipassana meditation (BYLES 60). R. C. ZAEHNER (427, 428) even went so far as to refer to Jung as a “new Buddha”, prepared for the role in a special way by the mystical experiences of his childhood. Elsewhere (425) he makes considerable use of Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious, which he feels finds its proper place in religion. In his Gifford Lectures, ZAEHNER (426) qualified his admiration by admitting that he finds Jung more illuminating for Oriental religions than for Western Christianity. LINSSEN (237) has given a synoptic summary of Jung and Krishnamurti, commenting on the notion of the Self in particular as their main point of contrast. LAUTERBORN (229) has produced a similarly-orientated study on Jung and Swami Omkaranda.

Because of Jung’s attachment to the East, as well as to alchemy, astrology and mystical traditions of every kind, it has never failed to surprise and annoy the savants of anthroposophy how Jung could so deliberately and totally ignore the work of Rudolf Steiner. As one commentator observed not without irony, had Steiner written in Latin, Jung would have gone at his books wholeheartedly (HEYMANN 170)! HUPFER’S (190) comparison of the concept of spirit in the two thinkers offers little more than a summary of two positions, without critical appraisal. LAUER (228) attempts to get at their roots in a common Zeitgeist, before suggesting how Steiner could complement the work of Jung. A new book by WEHR (392) is by far the best thing on the subject, fair in its judgments and always conscious of fundamental differences.

There has been no lack of attempts to compare certain aspects of Jung’s religious psychology to the thought of the spiritual and intellectual giants of Christian tradition. DAVID COX (73) has gone to
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great lengths to compare St. Paul's soteriology to Jung's psychology of individuation. His proposed technique of using "common language" as a methodological tool actually comes to mean reducing each to its lowest common denominators, at which point it is relatively easy to draw connections. (Gun [141] and Lambert [224] present contrasting evaluations of the book.) Allenby (9) has drawn attention to certain similarities between Jung and Joachim of Fiore. Beck (31) sees in the theology of St. Francis de Sales a means to correct the positivistic humanism of Jung's psychology. Meissner (257) found what he considered a remarkable correspondence between Origen's allegorical exegesis of the Song of Songs and certain of Jung's psychological categories. Sumner (351) had attempted the same feat with John Climacus' meditations. Earlier (350) he had dealt with St. John of the Cross, disagreeing somewhat with the result of Fordham's (107; cf. 106) interpretation. Yet a third attempt to understand the great Spanish mystic on Jungian principles was made by Baudouin (27, pp. 234—67).

Closer to modern times, Koplak (221) uses Jung's psychology to get at the meaning of the plays of O'Neill, convinced that both men shared a common concern for the religious plight of contemporary man. Likewise, Martin (252), writing under the spell of archetypal psychology, compares Jung with Toynbee and T. S. Eliot. Apart from the serious questions that such efforts raise in terms of literary criticism, the level of psychology strikes one as amateur and full of abstractness.

Barnes (20) put forward the thesis that the metaphysics of Plotinus can be compared to Jung's conception of the psyche, gnostic literature serving as the common ground. Schar (318) is on more solid footing in indicating Jung's ties to Burkhardt. Gilen (129) only slightly develops the theme of Jung's ideational attachments to the modernist movement — a fascinating and suggestive area for future research. Baroni (21) compares Jung and Nietzsche, effectively skirts the question of actual dependence and remaining at the surface of Nietzsche's thought. Moreno (269, pp. 216—50) is more ambitious, but hardly more successful, in taking up the same task (cf. Heisig 165). Winkler's (415) comparison of Jung to the theological currents at the end of the last century is weak and not always accurate. Worthy of special notice, however, is J. M. Clark's (69)
exposé of the scholarly blunders and erroneous arguments inherent in
the picture Jung gives of Meister Eckhart in *Psychological Types*.

In the area of contemporary religious thought, DE ROUGEMONT (88) sets Karl Barth and Jung in contrast to one another:
"possibly the greatest theologian and the greatest psychologist of our
century". KIENER (211) rather carelessly finds a place for Jung in
the ranks of Bonhoeffer, Tillich, Bultmann and John Robinson; and
NOEL (270, pp. 158—61) attributes to Jung much of the inspiration
behind the theology of Thomas Altizer, the man who sired death-of-
God theology. Predictably, there have been various attempts, none of
them particularly solid, to bring together Jung and Teilhard de Char-
din. TOWERS (360) is the clearest of the lot, while BRAYBROOKE
(53) does little more than piece together unidentified quotations from
the two men, leaving the reader on his own to draw the conclusions.
LECOURT (233) basically does the same thing by means of paraphrase. An essay by BENoit (36), which compares both Jung and
Teilhard to Whitman, is a fairly superficial and imprecise bit of work.
ULANOV (367, pp. 96—110) has seen similarities in the theories of
symbolism found in Jung and Tillich, while COWLES (72) parallels
their ideas in terms of Christian ethical concerns. JAEGGER (198)
argues that Jung advanced beyond the theories of Rank by breaking
free of the I-Thou dichotomy, precisely the opposite view from those
who side with Buber against Jung. TRUB (361, 362, 363), who made
the confrontation between Jung and Buber his life work (cf. SBOROW-
WITZ 311), owes much to each of his masters, although in the end he
sides with Buber in matters of faith. WALDER (388) takes him to
task for this and for his "extraordinarily subjective" interpretation of
Jung. SBOROWITZ (310) repeats many of TRUB'S views in a slightly
different approach to the two men. PROGOFF (280) brings in Tillich
as well, comparing the inner myths of all three (or their "dynatypes"
as he calls them), and ends up with a misty and colorless generality.
Last of all, we cannot fail at least to mention the work of Erich Neu-
mann (reviewed by SBOROWITZ 313), who in developing his own
approach to myth carried out many of the ethical and religious con-
sequences of Jung's thought.
11. Reviews

We conclude our guided tour through this bibliographical wonderland by referring to the more substantial and important book notices that deal specifically with Jung and religion.

Jung's Terry Lectures on psychology and religion (1938) were generally well received in America, as reviews by LAWS (230) and ROSENFELD (294) attest. BARRETT (22) and BOISEN (52), however, did take issue with the way in which Jung appeared to reduce religion to a function of the collective mind (cf. also ELLARD 98). FREI'S (116) remarks on the occasion of the appearance of the German edition, written from a Catholic point of view, represent the same cautious enthusiasm that was to characterize all his later writings on archetypal psychology. A later review by SCHARPFF (324) summarized Jung's arguments without critical comment. By the time the eleventh volume of Jung's Collected Works appeared, some twenty years later, attitudes were becoming more sophisticated — and more hardened (cf. WHITE 406, PLAUT 278, SPIEGELBERG 335).

But if there is one single touchstone which can serve to test the metal of both Jung's disciples and his critics, it is surely that passionate, ironic and divisive little book, Answer to Job. FORDHAM (109) and LAMBERT (223) were able to assimilate the book with apparent ease by subordinating its various arguments to the general genre of a kind of active imagination by proxy. GUETSCHER (143) took a similar stance as a theologian, insisting that Jung was avoiding all speculation about the transcendent. HILTNER (173) maintained his loyalty to Jung by simply sidestepping the difficult points, for which he was later taken to task (CHAMBERLIN 67). EVANS (100) accepted the book with only minor reservations, as did O. WOLFF (419), who set out to defend Jung's right to a psychological approach to the Incarnation. CORBIN (71) had no apparent problems in reconstructing the book around one of its sub-themes, the doctrine of Sophia, the eternal feminine, leaving nothing to complain about for an historian of alchemy. JAFFE (199, pp. 101—11) embraced Jung's ideas more fittingly by locating them in the broader context of his life-concerns.

The overwhelming majority of commentators, however, were less easy to please, as ROTH (295) has shown in his brief survey of the book's acceptance. MANN (245) raised his typical complaint about
the inadequacy of Jung's espoused scientific empiricism, finding in *Job* a clear instance of what he called "psychotheology". VELASQUEZ (376) referred to it as a brand of non-scientific esotericism, and WATKIN (390) and MICHAELIS (265) saw it as a presumptuous and wholly grotesque venture into religion. SCHMIDT (325) claimed that it was Jung's over-rationalistic approach which was responsible for his frequent distortions of scripture and Christian tradition.

Jung has fared no better at the hands of the exegetes. An unsigned article in a Jewish monthly (431) listed a number of scriptural errors (one of which, an incorrect reference in the book's motto, was corrected in later editions). BERNHARDT (41), SEMMELROTH (330) and GRILL (140) were of the opinion that Jung had distorted and would even have destroyed faith in the Bible as the Word of God. VON WEIZSACKER (386) concurred in a somewhat distasteful *ad hominem* attack on Jung. KEHOE (204) specifically goes at Jung's notion of the figure of Satan. In an impressive and thorough essay on the book, VAN DEN BERGH (370) accuses Jung of, among other things, abusing the book of Job for the sake of his own psychological fantasies, which might have found a less blasphemous romping-ground. Likewise WILDBERGER (410) thoroughly rejects Jung's interpretation of the Book of Job and of the New Testament image of God as wild and frivolous speculation, concluding that it has far more affinity with Indian thought than with anything recognizably Christian.

And finally WHITE (403; 408, pp. 233—40), who has nowhere attacked Jung with such unexpected vehemence, criticized him for reading the Bible with "deliberately distorted glasses". As FORDHAM wrote to WHITE concerning the harsh reviews he had given, "Jung is on Job's side and you are on the side of God." 4

For others, the main complaint is Jung's seemingly apparent refusal to take theology seriously. Thus RUDIN (297) accuses him of blending shabby biblical scholarship with a cavalier dismissal of the transcendent God of Christian theology. Similarly, HOCH (177) and BERNET (38, pp. 189—96) claim that Jung has overstepped the frontiers of psychology in a radical immanentizing of God within the human psyche. For the same reasons, HOFFMAN (180) and HABERLANDT (144) find in *Job* an insensitivity to the meaning of revelation, and MARTI (251) asserts that Jung 'is divinizing man via an "enlightened rationalism with a gnostic costume". HEDINGER (160) and KOEP-
GEN (220) both contrast Buber’s faith with Jung’s psychologistic relativism. PANNWITZ (273), in the course of a more general commentary, refers to Jung’s handling of the Job-myth as a twisted approach to Christian doctrine. HEAVENOR (159) criticizes Jung for totally missing the point of Protestantism. From a “freethinking” standpoint, HARTWIG (157) objects, in opposition to Jung’s other critics, that Jung had lacked the courage to carry his insights to their logical and inevitable conclusion: atheistic humanism.

If I have argued anything in the preceding pages, it is that scholarship on the borderlands between theology and archetypal psychology has grown tired. What it needs to avoid declining into an eremitic glass-bead-game is not so much the flair of revolutionizing ideas, as the painstaking re-examination of fundamental assumptions. Given such discipline, and not a little perseverance, the night may yet pass into dawn.

1 As might be expected, there is a personal project hiding in the shadows of this polemic: I am now in the final stages of completing a study of Jung’s notion of the imago Dei, a preliminary sketch of whose main arguments appeared in 1971 (162).

2 I deliberately use the word “archetypal”, in place of “analytical”, “complex” or “Jungian” to characterize Jung’s psychology, because it seems to me the most precise and unambiguous. In so doing, I express agreement with Hillman’s reasons for suggesting the term. (Cf. J. Hillman, “Why ‘Archetypal’ Psychology?”, Spring 1970, N.Y., Spring Publications, pp. 212—19.)

3 The work referred to is: Pierre Barthel, Interprétation du langage mythique et théologie biblique. Leiden, Brill, 1967. Unless the original thesis differs considerably from its published version, Barthel’s criticisms are all made en passant and not argued at any length.

4 Quoted with the permission of the author.
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The following material arrived only after the above had gone to press. It has therefore not been included in the essay, but a reference to the relevant sections has been included in square brackets.

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441 WERBLOWSKY, R.J.Z. "Psychology and Religion." The Listener 49 (1953) pp 677–9. [Sec. 2]

442 —. "God and the Unconscious." The Listener 49 (1953) pp 758–9. [Sec. 1]