Between The Crossfires: Some Reflection on Religion, Peace, and Human Rights

*By R. J. Zwi Werblowsky**

It is customary for "leaders," "representatives," or otherwise articulate members of religious groups, when they meet at conferences or inter-religious jamborees, to give lectures for which they may, or may not, have the necessary qualifications. For a change, and since I am neither leader nor representative of any denomination but merely a professional scholar, I intend today to preach a sermon although I have no licence, and certainly no qualification, to preach one. The subject of my sermon is determined by the nature of our gathering in Kyoto. We are to address ourselves to the overall theme of Religion and Peace, and I am supposed to approach this overall theme more scientifically from the angle of Human Rights. Since my sermon will be somewhat critical of many naive, and at times naively presumptuous assumptions, let me begin by expressing a sense of satisfaction at the fact that this Conference takes place, and of gratitude to those who took the initiative for it and who spared no labour and effort to make it possible. Religion has so often and for so long—and with so much good reason—been considered a factor making for division, misunderstanding, arrogance, backwardness, mutual contempt, and plain hostility and cruelty in human affairs, that the very fact that religionists

Delivered on October 17, 1970 at a Plenary Session of the World Conference on Religion and Peace in Kyoto, Japan. Dr. Werblowsky is Professor of Comparative Religion at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

get together for the purpose of furthering peace and sharing the hard labour required for that end, is in itself an encouraging sign of the times.

The title of my sermon implies a kind of triangle: the relations between peace and human rights, between religion and peace, and between religion and human rights. Undoubtedly for many a religionist, religion is the apex of this triangle and and it is from there that he views the problems of peace as well as of human rights. Permit me, therefore to say a few words about this triangle, especially as it challenges our capacity to be honest with ourselves.

What is the "Religion" we have in mind when we speak of its relation and relevance to peace and to human rights? More often than not religion is defined in a "prescriptive" rather than in a "descriptive" way. That is to say that many speakers and writers do not state what religion has been, or is, in actual fact and how it has functioned, or functions, in the actual history of human societies. What they really say is how they would like religion to function, what they think it ought to be, or what they deceive themselves into believing that it has been. Hence the tendency of many utterances on the subject to degenerate into apologetics of the most childish and irrelevant sort. Members of the various denominations each produce proof-texts from their religious scriptures leading up to the triumphant and comforting demonstration that the particular speaker's religion proclaims peace and human rights no less—and perhaps even more—insistently than any other religion. Of course nothing is easier than editing an anthology of "purple patches" from the religious literatures of the world, but the depressing

thing about this noble and childish competition is that it fails to show *how* the norms and principles, allegedly implicit in this or that religion, have manifested themselves in actual practice, in the realities of social and political life, and in human relationship patterns.

The record of most religions in the matter of peace is too well known to need recounting here. Again, nothing is easier than to produce proof-texts from the various sacred scriptures to the effect that peace is a good thing, a desirable goal, a major ideal and aspiration, a gift bestowed by God or even an attribute of God himself. But if religions have waged "holy wars," or have encouraged or sanctioned (either actively or passively) attitudes that have led to wars (whether called holy or not), then a great deal of critical sense as well as humility is necessary when approaching our subject. Even Buddhist kingdoms have fought and waged wars, and Buddhists too may have to face up to the unpleasant truth that wars are not an invention of the crusading "biblical" religions or an importation from the wicked West. What, as a matter of fact, does "peace" mean? Is it the absence of bloodshed in international relations? Or the absence of violence in all social relationships? Is it considered an overriding value for which a price may have to be paid even in the form of tolerating iniquities of many kinds? Or is justice in human affairs an overriding value for which even the price of violence should not be considered too high? Is peace to be defined negatively as the absence of certain conditions, or is it a positive concept whose place is within the context of other positive concepts (such as e.g. freedom)? In the latter case peace would merely be part—or perhaps the apex—of a value system

which posits other values as well, and it could be argued that as long as these other values are not fully realized, the crowning value of peace is out of place. After all, non-violence itself is not identical with peace; it may, as the example of Gandhi has shown, be a method of warfare, applicable and successful only with a certain type of adversary. Situations may arise when peace, to some minds at least, becomes definitely immoral, and those concerned with human rights, once they cease to talk in generalities, often find themselves in a considerable state of bewilderment. It is by now a commonplace that the issue of human rights may come into direct conflict with the desire for peace. Should insurrection, revolution, or even outside intervention be countenanced in places and at times when there seems no other way of ending the violation of what we today consider as essential human rights? How far should we be influenced by the consideration that acts of war and violence often tend to create new, and occasionally greater, evils than those which they were supposed to abolish? Is there any religion foolhardy enough to offer specific guidance on these questions? Once we descend from the lofty pinnacle of religious ideals and general principles to the maddening casuistry of specific instances, the number of possible answers even within a particular religion may well equal that of its members. There are some who think that peace is ultimately a matter of the heart and of spiritual achievement, and that it is from this vantage point that religion has to make its essential contribution. But is there any evidence for the assumption that the peace of hearts can "spill over", as it were, into social and political structures and contribute to world peace? The peace of hearts, for all we know, may remain

in the hearts, and far from impinging on the dynamics of society, may remove the hearts in question to the "other shore." The assertion that it would affect things this side of the river in any decisive measure may be a pious wish but it is as yet an unproved assumption. The salvation of the world—as distinct from that of sectarian micro-societies—through the transformation of all hearts is an eschatological concept and not a social program.

In fact, we are moving somewhat too happily in a limbo of pious wishes and unfounded assumptions. It has been said, by no less an authority than the Secretary-General of the United Nations (in his Foreword to a U.N. publication, *The United Nations and Human Rights*, 1968), that "the establishment of human rights provides the foundation upon which rests the political structure of human freedom; the achievement of human freedom generates the will as well as the capacity for economic and social progress; the attainment of economic and social progress provides the basis for true peace." There are more unexamined assumptions in this admirable statement than can be dealt with in one lecture. Surely we are wise enough, by now, to know that certain types of economic and social progress may tend to interfere with certain forms of human freedom, even as progress may create conditions for aggression among societies that previously had been incapable of, or little inclined to, war.

Nevertheless, the statement which I have just quoted should be helpful to us in more than one way. In the first place it is wholesome because it makes no reference at all to religion, and hence may serve to remind us that neither the concern for human freedom and social progress, nor the desire for peace are the

monopoly of religions. Religionists too may share these concerns (even as they may share artistic and other interests with non-religionists), but they have no cause to claim a special role for themselves. In fact, almost two hundred years ago, one of the world's greatest philosophers wrote an essay in which he argued that humanity could approach peace only on the basis of freedom. According to Kant, this idea of human freedom and its concomitant human rights could be realized only in what we would today call a democratic constitution; for then only could a federative relationship between states render peace possible. It is not my intention to discuss Kant here. I mention him because neither religion nor God plays any part in his important and instructive essay.

The point I am trying to make is simply this: Those gathered here should be clear in their minds that they are using the term "religion" in a selective and prescriptive sense. It has been said that "religionists are men and women who proclaim, and witness to, the truth as they see it." If this were true, then Marxists and denominationally unaffiliated agnostic socialists, as well as freedom- and peace-movement representatives of diverse kinds (including the Women's Liberation League) ought to be here at our Conference. But evidently the above definition intended a narrower connotation. Similarly it has been said that "religionists are men and women who serve other people." Since this statement is factually untrue, I take it as a prescriptive sentence, meaning "religionists in the best sense of the work *ought* to serve other people"—but in that case the sentence should continue "like so many others who serve their fellowmen and do not call themselves religionists." Some of us

may never have felt much sympathy with the peace-movement headed by the late Bertrand Russell, but did not he and his movement try to serve humanity and the cause of peace and justice more than many a religious denomination represented here in Kyoto? And Bertrand Russell, like Kant, was certainly neither the leader not the representative of what in our current jargon is called a religious group. This is not the time or place to examine the problem of the definition of religion, or to raise the question what precisely "religion" does or does not have in common with other systems of attitudes, values and commitments which are frequently called "ideologies"—possibly for the purpose of distinguishing them from "religion." But though I cannot go into these questions here, I want to remind ourselves of their existence, and of the fact that we have not even begun to clarify ourselves whether, or to what extent, these questions are of a substantive or a semantic nature. Surely a generation that has gotten accustomed to the idea that there may be "atheistic" religions, and which has witnessed a certain type of Christian intellectuals creating fashionable fads with the slogan of a death-of-God theology, will be less confident about the possible meaning of an alliance of all religionists against the forces of irreligion and materialism. And who, by the way, is the real materialist? The activist of Mao's cultural revolution, or the pillar of a local church whose pilgrim's progress on this earth is measured by size and value of his suburban house and of his latest model motor car?

One of our Conference "Background Papers" tells us that "religionists have to be constantly reminding society of human dignity and values, and accordingly of the importance of human

rights." Here I beg to differ most emphatically.

I do not want to go so far as to assert that "secular humanists have to be constantly reminding religionists of human dignity and values etc.," but surely the notion that those who consider themselves as "religious" are charged with a kind of prophetic function in contemporary society has no psychological, social or historical basis whatever. In fact, much of the contemporary social consciousness of religion has been generated from other sources and subsequently been absorbed by individuals or segments in the various religious groups. Surely you need not be a Marxist, or a secular liberal, or a progressive agnostic, or a materialistic socialist, in order to realize how much contemporary religion owes, in its social and moral stance, to Marxism, to secular liberalism, to agnostic progressivism and to materialistic socialism. *Rerum Novarum* may still be a "revolutionary" document in the context of the social and religious atmosphere in some Catholic societies. But even in its own time, it was a regressive and out-of-date statement which, far from blazing new trails, merely tried to catch up with the social conscience of the 19th century. The same can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of many of the documents produced by Vatican II.

Perhaps one of the hardest things for religionists to come by is honesty. Let us therefore admit at the outset that in practice the attitudes of many individuals and groups within the religious denominations did not, and do not follow automatically and, as it were, by logical deduction from any of their religious doctrines. From the point of view of the sociologist the opposite is true: the state of general ethical sensibility and the general social and moral climate—themselves dependent on diverse social,

economic and historical circumstances of which religion, to be sure, is one—act as major factors in the evolution of the religious conscience. When moral sensibility and social conscience develop sufficiently, they challenge religion which then tries to absorb these new achievements and insights into its own system. A Christian can contemplate the South African scene and strive to formulate a Christian view, that is to say a view which for him, as a Christian, is prescriptive and normative. But whether "the" Christian view is that expressed by Fr. Trevor Huddleston or that held by certain circles in the Reformed Church in South Africa cannot be answered except by another *a priori*, normative, prescriptive commitment. One of the Chief Rabbis of Israel declared after the six-days war that no Israeli government, present or future, had the right to return the occupied territories since these were part of the land which God had given to Israel under an eternal covenant and promise. Other rabbis emphatically repudiated this view, and again there is no objective method of logical deduction by which to settle the issue. The attitude of Judaism on this question is formulated prescriptively by people not simply searching the scriptures but projecting their conscience on the scriptures which they search.

From the point of view of the sociologist of religion the question therefore becomes one concerning the relative capacities of the different religions to absorb and to adapt successfully. Occasionally certain new values are sufficiently compatible with certain elements in a religious tradition to render absorption fairly smooth and easy—sometimes by way of re-interpreting religious traditions sometimes by emphasizing some elements

of tradition whilst conveniently forgetting or soft-pedalling others. When the new values or orientations are in accordance with certain trends or principles of a particular religion, they can conveniently be presented as a fuller unfolding and articulation of what had allegedly always been the true, implicit meaning of the norms of religion. Things are more awkward when the new moral demands seem to run counter to traditional attitudes and norms, for then considerable ingenuity and at times radical efforts at intellectual and emotional adjustment are required to bring the two into alignment. Still, nothing is impossible and history is notoriously open-ended. Muslim modernists have managed to oppose slavery and polygamy in the name of their understanding of Islam, and it is not *a priori* unthinkable that one day Roman Catholic teaching will proclaim contraception to be a basic human right, inseparable from human freedom and from the doctrine of man as a being created in the image of God.

I do not wish to deny that some of our most cherished moral and human values have their historical roots in the religious past of humanity. But if, at this Conference, we want to find our bearings in the world of today and for the world of tomorrow, rather than conduct a seminar on the pre-history of social values, then it may be more useful, as well as more truthful, to admit that many of the norms to which we are committed have assumed their effective and decisive form outside religion. Of course every human being interprets his experiences in a certain context, and if he is a religious human being he will interpret them in a religious context. If he is committed to a specific religious or denominational tradition, then he will try to articulate his ex-

perience and his sense of responsibility and *engagement* in terms of the tradition to which he feels committed. A Soto Zen follower will quote Dōgen Zenji and a Pure Land believer will quote Shinran Shōnin to prove to himself and to others that he is all for Human Rights and World Peace. Christians may feel they want a theological superstructure in order to collaborate more effectively in the emancipation and development of the so-called "third world." Muslims may look to koranic authority, to Hadith, or to a more diffuse sense of "Islam" to encourage disarmament and to abolish war. Hindus may turn to the resources of their own tradition to promote human equality and to liquidate the caste system. Jewish rabbis will speak of the biblical passion for justice and evoke the prophetic vision of peace upon earth. All this is very fine and edifying. For our purpose, however, it holds one important lesson, and the lesson as I understand it is this: We do not share common values because we have made an exhaustive study of all religions and discovered, to our great joy and surprise, that they all share the same basic values. On the contrary, we have come together as children of the 20th century, sharing *a priori* certain 20th century (or possibly 19th century) values, and determined
a) to justify and to sanction these values within the framework of our respective religious traditions; and
b) to commit ourselves to the task of mobilizing the resources available, in various degrees, to the various religions for the purpose of promoting these ideals and values.

What religionists are doing, in fact, is not so much to state what their respective religions are about, but to confess what their own value orientations are, to find them in (or read them

into) their religious heritage, to live them in the total life of their religion, and to undertake to persuade their co-religionists and their denominational bureaucracies to commit themselves seriously to these same values. The religionists assembled here are in fact contributing both to a very definite concept of religion and to a new concept of fellowship. The new—and prescriptive—concept of religion implies that whatever else religion may be (and here a great variety of opinion and approach is possible), it loses its authenticity and credibility if it ignores its social responsibility, and social responsibility today means, among other things, peace, human rights, and development. Participants at this Conference may differ on the question to what extent the religious message is or is not exhausted by its social or human content. But we are all agreed, or so it seems, that the kind of religion *we* care for involves social responsibility. The new concept of fellowship means that whilst, on the one hand, religionists admit to considerable differences among themselves and, on the other hand, also realize that close collaboration with non-religionists may often be more important and relevant for the achievement of our aims, yet they experience an overwhelming sense of communion. I think that this sense of communion goes beyond partnership in social, political or cultural collaboration. It may be the incipient manifestation of a new religious mutant, but this is not my subject-matter for today, and the theme is better discussed in connection with the problem of inter-religious dialogue. Let us be sober and remind ourselves of the fact that so far the record of religious collaboration in the social sphere has not been too spectabular. Neither in the Middle East, nor in Nigeria, nor in Vietnam, nor in Northern Ireland have

religionists shown a capacity for acting *from the inside* to help blunt the sharp edges of religious, racial or political conflict. Perhaps we should not be too harsh in our judgment. Precisely because religionists as well as their church organizations are not outside society and charged with a duty towards it, but are—their occasional claims to the contrary notwithstanding—part of society, involved in and aligned with its various economic, social and political interests, it would be unreasonable to expect too much, especially as religions often exhibit a tendency to fall between two stools: the fear of detracting from the purity and authenticity of religion by involving it in the struggles of the market-place, and on the other hand the knowledge that by non-involvement religion loses its authenticity and credibility even more. In this respect there is a wide spectrum of differences between the religions of the world, and they may well learn something from each other.

Unlike conferences devoted to problems of inter-religious dialogue, our Conference has the advantage of being concerned with problems that are not directly and immediately religious. Peace is a political problem and, like most political problems, has its social and economic dimensions. Development is an economic problem, and as such has political and socio-cultural dimensions. Human rights are a socio-legal problem with its own political and economic aspects. All of them are moral problems, simply by virtue of the fact that they are human problems. A religious man will approach these problems with a religious motivation, impelled by a religious commitment, and acting in a moral climate determined by his understanding of his religion. This does not make the problem of peace less political,

or the problem of development less economic, or the problem of human rights less juridical. In other words, if religionists want to address themselves to these problems with any degree of seriousness, they must practice the virtue of realism and soberly assess their own capacities. To be concerned with problems that are deeply rooted in the political, social, psycho-social and economic movements and dynamisms of our times means that one relies on the guidance of experts. Even when the experts err—and at times they err very grievously—it is not the religionist but a better expert that must analyze and correct their errors and mistakes. No amount of religion, but only sociological insight will tell us what kind of educational aid or programme will help a developing country along the road to freedom or, conversely, perpetuate its underdevelopment and social iniquities, albeit in a grotesquely "modernized" form. You do not need theologians to tell you that agricultural modernization may result in the growth of unemployment and of larger and worse urban slums. You do not have to be the follower of any particular religion in order to realize that the spread of means of communication, whether transistor radios, TV sets or satellites, may make human beings subject to more subtle and insidious forms of manipulation long before they can begin to profit from the new possibilities of intellectual freedom. To deal with these problems, expert competence is of greater urgency than theological manifestos, and whilst I would be the first to insist on the necessity of a genuinely philosophical and/or theological clarification of our underlying assumptions and values, I do feel that much fashionable verbiage could be dispensed with. Much ado is occasionally made about the distinction between

negative and positive freedom. E.g. capitalism is accused of knowing only negative freedom, whereas the new humanism allegedly aspires to a more positive freedom. But how much of all this is serious philosophy and how much is mere playing with words? My own, thoroughly unphilosophical, understanding of the distinction between freedom from and freedom to, makes me doubt the (capitalist) dogma that the freedom to own private property is, in all cases and in any circumstance, an inalienable and basic human ight, whereas freedom *from* want, hunger, sickness, ignorance etc.. seems to me to be of the essence of any human form of existence. In the year of grace 1970 it seems that the right to freedom from assault by noise and freedom to breathe unpoisoned air should be added to the human bill of rights. In order to affirm these rights some people may feel that they require an elaborate theology about the purpose of God's creation and of man's place in it. Others may feel that they do not require such well-meaning, though perhaps somewhat presumptuous theological justifications. But evidently all of us, whether we believe in a creator and creation or not, want experts and technicians to plan and to advise and to execute, and we do so on the basis of choices, decisions, commitments and values that are beyond technology and expert competence, and which are grounded in our human awareness. Unfortunately this awareness, even in religious circles, is often hopelessly out of date. Whether or not we keep pace with the moral implications of our gallopping history, is a matter of openness, responsiveness and flexibility rather than "religion." Even when your religion makes you profoundly concerned with peace, it does not guarantee a proper understanding of the new

dimensions which this problem has assumed in the nuclear age. Religionists would seem to have to guard against two subtle dangers; the danger of getting intoxicated with their own verbiage, and the danger of overestimating the significance of what they are doing. We get caught all too easily in the magic circle and in the narcissistic web of our fond imaginings, "in-group" phraseology, and futile albeit spectacular gestures.

I could no doubt entertain you, if I wanted to, with an account of how a Jew would articulate his conception of human rights on the basis of the Jewish religious tradition. I suppose I could do the same in terms of the Buddhist or other traditions. I desist from this exercise not because it would be uninteresting—on the contrary, it could be very fascinating indeed—but because I think it irrelevant to our purpose. What then is, our purpose?

We know that the concerns that exercise us here are shared by many others who do not describe themselves as religious. But we assume that a sizeable part of humanity considers itself as somehow religiously affiliated, and we further assume that as long as religious groups with organizational structures, bureaucratic machineries and financial assets exist, it is not unreasonable for religionists who care about certain things to get together for the purpose of taking stock of their capacities, and making a realistic assessment of what they can reasonably hope to contribute with the means at their disposal. These means include not only funds, but also organizational structures, means of communication, mobilization of membership, forms of diffuse influence and—last but not least—the availability of an astonishingly large number of truly dedicated individuals. This preliminary stock-taking is essential, for not only is the influence

of religion on the social, political and economic realities more limited than some enthusiasts seem to think, but religions (both in their institutionalized or semi-institutionalized, as well as in their more free-floating forms) are themselves parts of social systems, dependent on them, influenced by them and involved (though obviously not wholly identified) with them. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to gain clearer insight into the nature and scope of the actual influence available to religious initiative and acuity, and into the kinds of "feedback" that the religious sub-systems can consciously and deliberately put into the larger social system. Finally, the religious desire to contribute to a solution of the world's most pressing ills must face up with greater lucidity to the paradox that vitiates much well-intentioned effort: the closer the contacts of religious bodies or individuals with centers of power, and hence the greater the (often illusory) possibility of exerting some influence, the more they get caught in the inevitable ambiguities of compromise and of the political game. Religions often please themselves with pointing to the uncompromising radicalism of their founders, martyrs and saints. In actual fact they excel in the art of guarding vested interests, of jumping on bandwagons that others have set rolling, and of walking—like Agag —very delicately.

The Kyoto Conference will be more than a wasteful exercise if instead of producing high-sounding declarations of principles, or beautiful phrases about peace, brotherhood, freedom and human rights, or making the participants "feel good," it will succeed, in its group discussions and workshops, in addressing itself to the ask of isolating problem areas, assessing their dy-

namics as well as the extent to which the dynamics of religion can impinge on them and interact with them, and sketching out concrete modes of action both inside the religious world and in the contact of the latter with other sectors of society.

The Creation of A World without Arms

*By Hideki Yukawa**

The achievement of world peace, I think, is a problem common to all religions of the world. For a religion, which can be termed a universal one, must be aiming at the salvation of individual souls and at the same time, the salvation of the whole of mankind as well. Especially in such an age as ours when the relationships of the various regions of the earth with one another are so close, the salvation of mankind is considered a matter of course.

So let us consider the salvation of the whole of mankind. Now it is only on condition that nothing worse than nuclear war can happen that the effort toward stopping war can be meaningful. Since about fifteen years ago I have been a participant in a scientists' peace movement which is based on the major premise that war must be abolished to achieve world peace. Nowadays this major premise is perhaps an almost self-evident thing to most people. It must be an earnest desire that both religionists and scientists cherish in common.

In the days before the appearance of nuclear arms, however, the idea of total abnegation of war was, in fact, the opinion of

* Delivered on October 17, 1970 at a Plenary Session of the World Conference on Religion and Peace in Kyoto, Japan. Dr. Yukawa is a Nobel laureate in physics.

an absolute minority. Anti-war sentiments or more thoroughgoing principles of non-violence and non-resistance were regarded as being utterly unrealistic by the vast majority of people. Some of them said, "War is undesirable, but sometimes it is inevitable." Others said, "There is war for the sake of justice. One ought to participate and cooperate positively in such a case." Thus the fact was that "the partial approval" of war varied in nuance from a reluctant to a positive attitude as the predominant opinion of the majority. But with the appearance of the nuclear weapon and the subsequent increase of its destructive power, the phrase, "the total destruction of the human race," ceased to sound hyperbolic and now its actual possibility can by no means be ignored. The total blasting power of nuclear arms, hoarded by the two nuclear powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., has been said for some years to have reached such a point that it is capable of exterminating the human species tens of times. Under these circumstances, there can no longer be any reason whatever for approving a nuclear war. Accordingly, the problem of today and hereafter will be whether not only nuclear war but warface of all kinds should be banned. Now the destructive power of weapons other than nuclear is also rapidly increasing. The so-called chemical and biological weapons, though neither of them is so decisice as nuclear ones, are presumed to be increasing in their mass-slaughtering power and causing inhuman atrocities. In consequence, the disaster caused by a non-nuclear small and local war will grow greater and more formidable. Moreover, there is always the likelihood of the escalation of an ordinary war into a nuclear one. I think these reasons alone

are sufficient enough to condemn all kinds of war.

However, there still seem to be a great number of people who would not be persuaded by these reasons alone. The idea of war in the cause of justice, which is as old as anything, has not completely vanished yet.

Actually wars are going on in various parts of the earth. The belligerent parties opposing each other, and those countries supporting either party, have respectively their own valid reasons for their war activity. Among these reasons, three are most fundamental. The first is the alleged superiority of the system of values (ideology) adhered to by one country or group of countries over that believed in by the other country or group of countries. The second is the judgment that the endangered or threatened existence or survival of a country or a race cannot be ensured except by war of self-defence from the armed aggression of the opponent. The examination of many instances of war in the past shows that the first reason, namely, the alleged superiority of one system over the other, is generally hard to justify objectively. As to the second, namely, the self-defence from aggression, we can find some cases where the reason can be objectively justified even from today's standards.

The third case is the war for independence of the colony from its home country. Generally speaking, war of this kind can be judged to have been right even from today's viewpoint. The total abolitionists of war of all kinds, while making allowances for these circumstances, claim that, in the future world, peaceful negotiation should be substituted for war of any kind whatever. Thus the claim inevitably assumes a highly idealistic color. But to make it more realistic, it must be accompanied by a great

joint effort on a world-wide scale to enable, at least those countries which wish to get independence anew, to attain their purposes by some means other than war.

After all, the most important and urgent thing for the whole of mankind is the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war. For this purpose, it was necessary that the idea of the total negation of war of all kinds should be made the starting point.

Here, as a member of the Japanese nation, I wish to draw the attention of this audience to the following point. Article Nine of the new Constitution of Japan, enacted in 1946, declares Japan's renunciation of war. By unilaterally giving up its belligerent rights, Japan endorsed its claim that international disputes should be settled by peaceful methods without resorting to war. Until now, Japan has kept its Constitution and is willing to continue guarding it.

If the idea of the abnegation of war is set up as the starting point of the discussion on world peace, the minimum necessity required for making it effective and realizable is the settlement of the idea of peaceful co-existence in peoples' minds. I have already said that the incompatibility of the system of values believed in by one country or group of countries with the other system believed in by the other country or group of countries can be a cause or a reason for the justification of war. The principle of "peaceful co-existence" implies that, even in such a case, each party would refrain from resorting to war in order to press its system to the other party. The concept of "peaceful co-existence" has been rapidly gaining strength since the 1960's and thereafter. Now it seems to be gaining acceptance among many individuals and countries. If one can say that this is the

first stage, the second shall be the disarmament of all nations. Many people, however, think that stage extremely difficult to reach, given the present international politics and armament competition.

In practice, as long as each country has its own sovereignty and owns its own armament, it will try to make its armament as effective as possible. If one country strengthens its armament as far as its national resources permit, that will incite others to proceed in the same direction. Thus the armament race will never come to an end.

In fact such an idea is already obsolete, unacceptable for today or tomorrow. Consider, e.g., the nuclear deterrence strategy. This is what a group of scientists of a great nuclear nation tried to counter the assertion made by another group of scientists, including myself, who declared it was imperative to abolish nuclear weapons.

According to the former group, a nuclear war can be deterred as long as the two great nations, the United States and U.S.S.R., maintain the balance of power. So, there is no need, they say, to abolish their nuclear weapons. If they have equal nuclear power, neither nation can begin a war, because there is no decisive blow to the other nation even by a first nuclear attack, which could avoid a retaliatory nuclear attack from the other, and devastating damages and losses. Consequently, both nations will refrain from the first attack. Therefore, there will be no nuclear war.

This theory may appear logical, but it is completely false. First of all, the old concept of balance of power has always been used as an excuse to justify the armament race between great

nations. A nation might think to keep its military power superior even slightly, to that of the other, to ensure its own security. But the other might think the same. If so, the armament race will escalate infinitely. This is a horrible reality, with great losses to the nations involved and to mankind. It also leads us to conclude that the theory: "Each one of the two great powers will refrain from making the first attack in fear of the retaliation from the other," the very premise of the nuclear deterrence strategy itself, has begun to lose its effectiveness, as we realize more and more clearly now.

The old proverb: "Attack is the best defence," is well valid even since the appearance of nuclear weapons, though we are sad to admit it. A nation may build a nuclear missile base on the ground or may use a submarine as a moving base of nuclear missiles to prepare the retaliating attack. Yet the experts point out that the probability of ensuring the safety of those nuclear missile bases against the first attack is rapidly diminishing.

We need not go into such technical questions. The existence of a great quantity of nuclear weapons by itself is a continuous threat to mankind, and for this clear and fundamental reason alone we must not hesitate to abolish the nuclear weapons immediately from the face of the earth.

Furthermore, for the reasons I already mentioned, mankind must keep forward to abolish not only nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons, but also any arms of any nations in order to live without nuclear war or any other kind of war. This claim comes, not only by an intelligentia isolated from the international politics. As early as in 1959, at the United Nations General Assembly, it was made by the member-nations introduc-

ing the so-called Resolution of Eighty-two Nations on Total Disarmament.

It was voted for unanimously. This clearly indicates that these nations espressed their concern and desire to reach the great goal of abolishing all arms, including ordinary weapons. Yet, seeing what actually happened to this disarmament proposal now, one may think that is was merely a lip service or diplomatic gesture on the part of the statesmen and diplomats.

Nevertheless, regardless what each representative at the United Nations General Assembly felt, I believe this Resolution was the expression of the will of mankind. Two years later, in 1961, a Joint Declaration of the United States and U.S.S.R. was disclosed as a report to the General Assembly. It is the summary of the agreement reached by those two nations on various principles in order to promote disarmament among other nations.

The United Nations Disarmament Committee, in fact, had existed long before. However, it seems that it has become more active lately, encouraged by the above mentioned Resolution and Declaration. In 1963, the United States and U.S.S.R. signed the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The responses to it were varied, but it seems that the world welcomed it as the first step towards peace.

The change in the international situation, however, betrayed our hope. The wars in Viet-Nam and the Middle East and other conflicts are steps backwards. The number of nations possessing nuclear bombs—including hydrogen bombs—has increased to five by the addition of China and France. The nuclear weapons of the United States and U.S.S.R. are becoming

more and more diversified and numerous. Nuclear submarines carrying nuclear missiles appeared, anti-ballistic missiles and MRIV followed. It seems that this endless race in nuclear armament has made useless the Disarmament Committee and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which have been carried on since 1969.

However, there is a limitation in what a nation can do no matter how big and powerful it is. This reckless and endless race must come to a stop sooner or later.

As I already pointed out, the absurdity behind the nuclear power deterrence strategy is clear, and its supporters cannot defend it any longer. The superiority of attack over defence has become apparent. Even an expression such as "equilibrium through fear" is obsolete, and the situation is now such that even a great nuclear nation has to be in constant fear of the first attack by another.

Under such circumstances, some may say that total disarmament itself is an impossible goal and some believe that it is the destiny of mankind to live under the constant threat of nuclear weapons. In spite of all this, I still wish to believe in the proverb: "When the darkness of the night is the deepest, the dawn is near." This nuclear age which has been lasting for twenty years, is not a natural phenomenon; the gigantic body of nuclear weapons is what man has developed. Therefore, the hope and possibility to stop this foolishness depends on man himself.

Nuclear weapons are not a natural phenomenon far away from us like a planet, but a product of man's intellect. On the other hand, international politics also are a product of man's

intellect. These two constantly influence each other. If total disarmament appears to be impossible, it might be because we separate them. We should not think of total disarmament as a final objective in itself, but we should take it as one of the goals which lie ahead of us. Then it will be possible for men to have it.

To prevent disputes between nations from breaking into open war, the United Nations are supposed to be a place where the representatives of all nations can discuss current issues. It has often contributed to the peaceful settlement of international disputes but there have been a few instances where we had to realize that the U.N. were powerless. This came out most clearly when the nations involved in dispute were nuclear nations. Moreover one obvious shortcoming of the United Nations is that some nations are not members, especially China, which has a population of one fourth of the entire world. These people have no representative to the United Nations.

Moreover, the United Nations Charter was already drafted before the end of the Second World War. We might, therefore, say that the Charter was bound to become obsolete to solve today's conflict over a nuclear problem. Today we are eager and anxious to overcome the obstacles of the nuclear age. This expectation will inevitably lead us to a greater vision of international politics, one which surpasses the present scope of the United Nations.

Soon after the first appearance of the atomic bomb, I became deeply interested in the concept of a World Federation. The concept, therefore, is nothing new. It has been pointed out time and time again that as long as the human community con-

tinues to be a conglomeration of nations of absolute sovereignty, a possibility of war remains between nations or between blocs of nations. It has also been asserted frequently that unless we establish an International Law with a supreme authority to control and check the nations under its jurisdiction, and set up various institutions of the World Federation, we cannot even hope to create a world that has no war.

It may be more true to say that the idea of a World Federation was a concept that appeared sporadically and independently in various places in history rather than an idea advocated and voiced by one person.

Be that as it may, the primary shortcoming of the United Nations is that it is an organization which explicitly acknowledges national sovereignty. A nation should refrain from using its power recklessly to protect its interests. At present, the fear of public opinion is contributing to prevent nations from engaging in a reckless use of power. But in order to strengthen its restrictive action, public opinion should be incorporated into an international system. For this purpose we must, first of all, establish an International Law. It means that each nation must concede an important part of its sovereignty to an organization which resides over all nations.

Soon after the end of the Second World War, a movement to establish a World Federation became active, and I have been cooperating with this movement as a member of the World Association of World Federalists. The motto of the Association is "World Peace through International Law."

A little while ago I mentioned that though we upheld the objective of total disarmament, we have not been able to get

near it. One of the reasons for this is the extreme difficulty to examine and ascertain whether or not each nation practices disarmament as it proclaims. Unless a nation has the assurance that the other ones are abiding by the mutual disarmament agreement, it will be very reluctant to disarm. An international organization whose functions would be to investigate into this, therefore, must be granted an authority superior to that of each of the nations when it comes to matters of disamament. This is beyond the scope of the United Nations.

As I pursue this thought, I feel that disarmament and the realization of the World Federation are not separate processes but can be carried on simultaneously.

This is my dream, and to make this dream come true mankind must take a great step forward in the near future. When we look back upon the long history of mankind, we see that there are several epoch-making steps taken by man. The most noteworthy of those is the remarkable progress made in the spiritual life, which started in the sixth century B.C. In the culturally advanced countries of the time, such as China, India, the Middle East and Greece, there appeared great thoughts and religions almost in the same period. It is hard to say when this period ended. Perhaps we can safely assume that it lasted till the sixth or the seventh century A.D. The teachings of these great thinkers and religionists, of course, show differences. Nevertheless, there was a unity in one particularly important point. That is what we call today humanitarian love.

The world religions which appeared during this period played an important role in saving numerous souls spiritually. But since the modern science arose in Western Europe in the se-

venteenth century men have become more concerned with improving their material life, and begun to make a great deal of effort toward this goal. All this is very significant in a way. We must admit that we have to continue making every effort to utilize science and technology in order to raise the quality of life, because we have not yet succeeded in wiping out poverty and starvation from the face of the earth.

Yet on the other hand, the progress of science and technology did not merely bring happiness to mankind. Nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons and the like are part of the undesirable by-products of science. Not only that but pollution which has now become a serious problem for some technologically advanced nations is also a by-product of technology. For better or worse, science and technology exercise an overwhelming influence on the human communities today. In contrast, it is undeniable that the role of religions has become comparatively small. Has the role of religions ended? I am very sure that you would not agree to this. As a scientist, there is one thing which I want religionists to do at present and in the near future. A few minutes ago I talked about International Law and the World Federation. They may appear at first to be related only to the world of law and politics. That is not so. In order to establish the International Law and it to be obeyed, there must be among men friendship, love and mutual trust which overcome national boundaries and differences of races. A great stride toward a new world without wars cannot be realized by statesmen and scientists alone. Mankind must make a spiritual leap in another form, and the jumping board we need is no other than humanitarian love as it was two thousand years

ago. Aside from wars mankind faces a precarious age full of pollution problems and destruction of nature. It is no longer the time to waste our energy and resources in conflicts or wars between nations. This is the time for all mankind, including statesmen, scientists and religionists to devote their efforts and energy to save themselves and humanity.

I think it is very significant that this Conference should meet at this time, and I would like to express my deep gratitude for your sincere will and concern for world peace. I am expecting much from your future efforts.