BULLETIN
of the
Nanzan Institute
for Religion & Culture

Vol. 47 (2023)

Contents

The *Bulletin* is edited by the staff of Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture and can be accessed for free on the institute's homepage (https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/).

Lectori benevolo!

T HIS YEAR'S issue of the *Bulletin* marks a year of transition at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture. In 2022, travel restrictions due to the COVID19 pandemic continued to hinder research activities, restraining our participation in international conferences and limiting the number of visiting researchers from abroad. This hiatus resulted in a shortage of material for publication in the *Bulletin*.

Fortunately, a few associated researchers were kind enough to contribute articles based on lectures from the previous year. Combined with a translation of an article from this year's *Shohō* and the annual announcements, we were able to pull together a fantastic collection of essays. After the lifting of travel restrictions in 2023, we have resumed our research activities with a renewed vigor, and the number of visiting researchers is at an all-time high. Next year's *Bulletin* promises to be a bounty of essays by Nanzan Institute researchers.

In 2022, we welcomed several new researchers to the institute. Enrico Fongaro joined us as a Senior Research Fellow. As a specialist in Japanese philosophy, Enrico has organized workshops and seminars on Japanese philosophy throughout the year. We anticipate next year's *Bulletin* will include the results of these events. We were also joined by Van Bragt Research Fellows Suemura Masayo and Ishihara Yamato. Their assistance with organizing events and editing the *Shohō* has been indispensable during this year of transition, and we are fortunate that they will continue their work with us for another year. Finally, this year we welcome our newest member of the institute, Associate Editor Kaitlyn Ugoretz. This issue of the *Bulletin*, as well as the *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, could not have been completed without Kaitlyn's help. Thank you everyone for contributing to this year's issue of the *Bulletin*.

Staff of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture
Nagoya, Japan
1 February 2024

Calendar of events

April 2022–March 2023

2022

14 April Peter C. Phan (Georgetown University) presented on What the Catholic Church has Learned from the Interreligious Dialogue.

24 June Antonio D. Sison (Catholic Theological Union) presented on Silent Inculturation: Serendipity, Dangerous Memory, and Japan's Hidden Christians.

25 June Enrico Fongaro held a workshop on Reading Nishida Kitarō's Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity.

1 July The fourteenth Nanzan Shūkyō Kenkyūkai was held with presentations by Ishihara Yamato on Religion and Nyōraikyō in Early Modern Nagoya and Suemura Masayo on Case Studies of Modern Exchanges Between Japanese and American Religionists.

1 July Matthew D. McMullen held workshop on Book Proposals on Japanese Religions, held in collaboration with the Society for the Study of Japanese Religions.

8 July The fifth Faith among Faiths lecture was held by J. Abraham Velez de Cea (Eastern Kentucky University) on Panikkar's Notion of Peace and the Future of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue.

15 July Gereon Kopf (Luther College) presented on Envisioning Multi-Cultural and Multi-Disciplinary Engagement: Lessons from the Twelve Wolf Encounter Pictures.

14 Oct. Kim Sung Hae (The Sisters of Charity of Seaton Hill, Professor Emeritus of Sogang University) presented on Humanity's Pilgrimage toward the Light: The Mystics of World Religions as Torchbearers.

15 Oct. Suemura Masayo moderated a workshop on Nishida Tenkō with presentations by Ōhashi Ryōsuke (Japanese-German Cultural Institute/Kyoto Institute for Technology), Miyata Masaaki (Ittōen Museum/Tezukayama Univeristy), Mizuno Tomoharu (Kansai University), and Noda Ryūzo (Ittōen historian), with comments by Iwata Fumiaki (Osaka Kyoiku University).

5 Nov. Enrico Fongaro moderated a workshop on Between Loneliness and Isolation, organized with the Nanzan University Institute for Social Ethics.

9 Nov. Thomas P. Kasulis (The Ohio State University) presented on Tetsugaku: Wissenschaft or Michi.

25 Nov. The fifteenth Nanzan Shūkyō Kenkyūkai was held with a presentation by Enrico Fongaro on Nishida Kitarō as Intercultural Philosopher.

3 Dec. The second meeting of the Hawaiian Buddhist Cultural Properties Study was held with a survey report presented by Moriya Tomoe on the Settlement of Japanese Immigrants and the Opening of Hawai'i from the Honpa Hongwanji Hawai'i Collection.

7 Dec. In collaboration with Mushin'en—Intercultural Philosophy Research Group, Rein Raud (Tallinn University) presented on For a Process Philosophy of Mind.

12 Dec. A discussion on *Playing with Ghosts* (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2022) was held with presentations and a discussion by contributors Ōmichi Haruka (Kokugakuin University) and Saitō Takashi, with comments by Doi Hiroshi (Monozukuri University).

13 Dec. Moriya Tomoe moderated a rountable on Religion, Food, and Immigration: Interdisciplinary Considerations of Translocal Religious Practices with a report by Higashi Seiko (Kindai University), Matsumoto Yuki (Kindai University), and Kirihara Midori (JSPS Special Research Fellow).

19 Dec. Enrico Fongaro held a workshop on Miki Kiyoshi's *The Logic of Imagination* with support from the Toshiba Foundation.

24 Dec. A symposium on the Forefront of Religion and Gender was held by the International Japanese Cultural Research Center with support from the Institute.

2023

17 Feb. Paul L. Swanson and Matthew D. McMullen held a Nanzan Book Talk on the *Nanzan Guide to Japanese Religions* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006) to celebrate the volume being reissued in paperback.

18 Feb. Ishihara Yamato held a workshop on Creating a Virtual Academic Society introducing virtual meeting spaces Gather Town and oVice.

5 Mar. Moriya Tomoe held a meeting of the "Literature and Religion" Study Group on Literature of Border Crossers in America: Thinking from the Relationship with Buddhism. Presentations were given by Hori Madoka (Osaka Public University), Suemura Masayo, and Mizuno Mariko (University of Toyama).

18 Mar. Ishihara Yamato moderated a symposium on the Publication of Nyōraikyō-Related Documents in the Shimizu Isami Collection: Nyōraikyō and Religious Institutions in the Early Modern-Modern Transitional Period.

31 Mar. Kim Seung Chul held a seminar on Stepping on Lotus Flowers: Rethinking Buddhist Faith in Modern Asia with presenters from Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, and Japan.

Japanese Journal of Religious Studies

Matthew D. McMullen

Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture

The following is a summary of activities and circulation of the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies during the 2022 academic year. This update includes table of contents for published issues, an overview of online engagement with articles, and notes on present and future plans for the journal.

THE PAST year has been a busy one for both the *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* (*jjrs*) and the Nanzan Institute. In addition to new staff, we also launched a new website (https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp). The core of the new website is a series of databases for institute publications, including the *jjrs*, as well as authors and research associates. Although editing the content of the website is an ongoing process, we hope readers of the *jjrs* will find it easy to navigate.

The annual trend toward an increase in online engage with *jjrs* articles continued this year with 103,952 successful DOI searches between April 2022 and March 2023 (see the *jjrs* update in *Bulletin* 44 for an explanation of DOIs). The influx in searchers via DOI was perhaps due to the expansion of our contracts with ProQuest and ATLA to include *Contemporary Religions in Japan* (*crj*), the latter of which also distributes other Nanzan Institute journals. This means the *crj*, like the *jjrs*, is available through most online databases and search engines such as EBISCO. On JSTOR, *jjrs* articles were accessed 100,715 times between April 2022 and March 2023. These numbers do not include downloads directly from the Nanzan Institute. Fourteen copies were sold print-on-demand during the same period.

Despite having had a productive year with the launch of a new website, we were only able to complete one issue of the *jjrs* in 2022 (vol. 49/1). This outstanding volume includes articles on the image of Korea in writings of Edo-period nativists, representations of the Pure Land in anime, the discovery of objects hidden inside the Kannon statue at Kofukuji, and the relationship between Buddhism and the state in the early modern period. A special issue featuring articles stemming from

a series of bilingual conferences hosted by Columbia and Nagoya Universities is still in production, but it hopefully will be available by the time you are reading this announcement. A slate of three excellent articles on topics ranging from notions of motherhood in sixteenth-century Sōtō Zen to Buddhist institutional support of World War II is currently in the works, and a special issue on Tenrikyō and Ōmotokyō is planned for the fall of 2023.

Finally, I would like to thank Tim Graf for his hard work as associate editor. Tim began as associate editor in 2018, and in addition to the *JJRS* he assisted with numerous publications at the institute before leaving for a position at Manchester University in the fall of 2022. Much thanks are also due to Suemura Masayo and Ishihara Yamato for their assistance in editing the 2022 *JJRS* issue.

Table of Contents

Japanese Philosophy

Enrico Fongaro

Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture

The following essay announces a new series of workshops on Japanese philosophy hosted at the Nanzan Institute. In 2022, the workshops were held on 25 June and 19 December. We are currently preparing publications stemming from the presentations and discussions among participants in the workshops.

The Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (nirc) has a long tradition of research and publications on the topic of Japanese and interculture philosophy. Through the efforts of James Heisig, the Institute has published *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (translated into several languages), several volumes of the Frontiers in Japanese Philosophy series, and various translations of texts of the best-known Japanese philosophers. All of these activities have contributed to creating a network of relationships between scholars in Japan and the rest of the world, which has enabled the nirc to serve as a platform for intercultural philosophical dialogue.

On the base of the success of these initiatives, our intention is to continue to offer the opportunity for discussions in various languages, whether online, in person, or in a hybrid format. In fact, the intercultural encounter must, in our opinion, be first and foremost a meeting between people, in accordance with that spirit that has marked the Institute's activities for decades, and which has enabled it again this year to become a "place" for dialogue in all forms: interreligious, philosophical, and this year even artistic. With the cooperation of anyone ready to share ideas in frank and friendly discussions, we hope to be able to offer more and more opportunities for the development of thought in the years to come as well.

In 2022 the nirc has begun a new cycle of international workshops dedicated to Japanese philosophy. We organized two meetings, one dedicated to Nishida Kitarō and the other to Miki Kiyoshi. The meeting on Nishida held on 25 June was dedicated to the 1939 text *Absolutely Contradictory Self-Identity* 絶対矛盾的自己同一.

Each of the ten speakers were invited to engage the text from different points of view. The second meeting was held on 19 December and focused on Miki's *Logic of the Imagination* 構想力の論理. Again, we were honored to host several participants from all over the world, this time to discuss the topic of myth within Miki's text on the basis of an English translation provided by John W. M. Krummel.

The premise of this new series of international workshops is to bring together scholars from around the globe to discuss a single text by a specific author. Participants are asked to prepare brief presentations on a portion of the text, which will then be the basis of discussion at the workshop. Therefore, the Japanese philosophy workshops combine translation with philosophical debate on the content of the texts. The NIRC plans to publish the results of the workshops in a new book series, which will include translations in multiple languages along with commentary.

These initiatives will continue in the coming years, extending the scope of meetings to other Japanese authors and beyond. Efforts will also be made to initiate a permanent seminar on Nishida's philosophy on a monthly basis, in a hybrid form, open to all and without language limits. Such meetings devoted to topics in contemporary philosophy that have cross-cultural relevance aim to involve as many people as possible, not just specialists in Japanese thought, and without necessarily privileging the use of English or Japanese.

First Meeting of the Japanese Philosophy Workshop
25 June 2022
Morning session (9:00–12:00)
Afternoon session (13:30–17:00)

Along with *The Position of the Individual in the Historical World* 歴史的世界に於ける個物の立場 (1938), *Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity* 絶対矛盾的自己同一 (1939) is arguably one of Nishida's most important texts in which we find the essential framework of his mature philosophy presented in a concise manner. At this workshop, which focused specifically on this 1939 text, emphasis was placed on the joint-creative process of collective dialogue. There were a total of ten short presentations. Each presenter was asked to isolate one passage in the text they find particularly important or interesting and to speak briefly (10 min) about it from their own perspective. Jacynthe Tremblay opened the workshop by situating *Absolute Contradictory Self-Identity* within the work of Nishida and speaking to its importance in the development of his thought.

Stephen Lofts, *King's University College*
Jan Gerrit Strala, *Kinjo Gakuin University*
Tobias Bartneck, *Kyoto University*

Sova Cerda, *Kyoto University*
Yoneyama Masaru, *Nagoya University*
Jacynthe Tremblay, NIRC
Felipe Ferrari, *Yokkaichi University*
Enrico Fongaro, NIRC
Hans Peter Liederbach, *Kwansei Gakuin University*
Morten Jelby, *Ecole Normale Supérieure*

Second Meeting of the Japanese Philosophy Workshop: On Miki's *The Logic of the Imagination*
19 December 2022
Morning session (8:30–12:00)
Afternoon session (13:00–16:00)

The workshop primarily focused on the topic of myth in Chapter One of Miki's *The Logic of the Imagination*. Presenters were asked to discuss a specific passage they find interesting and important. We then discussed as a group the presenter's interpretation of this passage, with the aim of clarifying the philosophical potential and power of Miki's thought.

John W. M. Krummel, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*
Stephen Lofts, *King's University College*
Fernando Wirtz, *Kyoto University*
Takushi Odagiri, *Kanazawa University*
Nobuo Kazashi, *Hiroshima City University*
Hans Peter Liederbach, *Kwansei Gakuin University*
James Heisig, NIRC
Enrico Fongaro, NIRC

New Religions and the Realization of Gender Equality

Inose Yuri 猪瀬優理

Ryukoku University

Tʜᴇ ᴄᴏɴᴅɪᴛɪᴏɴs of modern society reflect ongoing changes in the social, cultural, economic, political, and spiritual environments surrounding people's lives. Such changes include "urbanization, industrialization, and accompanying transformations in the lifestyles of local communities; change in family structure from extended families to nuclear families," as well as "the advent of mass media, the development of transportation, and the spread of education," resulting in significant changes in "the lifestyles of ordinary people as well as the overall intellectual and information environment" (Inoue 2009, 22). Amidst these societal transformations, the position of "religion" in various fields has also shifted significantly, and topics such as secularization/privatization, religious decline, or religious revival—based on modernization theory—have been topics of discussion.

Some have argued that "new religions are more susceptible to environmental influences than traditional religions" (Inoue 2019, 289). Considering changes in social conditions and research perspectives, previous research on new religions has raised six key points. First, new religions can help create mutual relationships apart from geographical, blood, and social ties (Inoue 2004, 34–35). This function of new religions can be seen as a response to many people seeking new connections with others amid social transformations such as the higher mobility of the population associated with changes in industrial structure. Second, a new debate emerged regarding the boundary between politics and religion in postwar Japanese society, in which the separation of religion and state and freedom of religion became the established norms. Third, research has clarified the social factors that

draw people to new religions, introducing reference group theory with regard to economic factors and pointing out the importance of various forms of information dissemination, such as church publications, given the spread of secondary and higher education. In recent years research has focused on the changes in the information environment due to the spread of the Internet. Fourth, there are regional differences even within a single religious organization. Fifth, research has revealed the extremely close and complex relationship between new religions and religions that were already established in Japan before modernization. Finally, scholars have begun to focus on the "negative aspects" of religion, such as the so-called "cult" problem, and are reconsidering the assumption that "religiosity is inherently good" that had long been implicit in religious studies.[1]

Based on the above points, the "challenge for research on new religions in the twenty-first century" (Inoue 2019, 287–289) is to examine new religions as "niche adaptations" to various environments and to accumulate comparative research from a global perspective. Such research should consider the "social and cultural environment" as the combination of "factors in social change"—changes in livelihood patterns, urbanization, changes in family structures, changes in education, globalization, informationization, etc.—and "sociocultural factors"—regions, social classes, age groups, etc., each with their own history and structure—brought about by modernization.

Previous scholarship on new religions has insufficiently addressed the "changes in the framework of gender." The framework of gender in Japanese society was reorganized to support modernization and the maintenance of such changes. The framework of gender in Japan is intertwined with sociocultural factors, such as changes to livelihood patterns, family dynamics, education, and social class structures. If this point is not regarded as an important axis of analysis, scholars will overlook a vital aspect of the "challenge for research on new religions in the twenty-first century." Over the course of this process of change to the gender order up to the present, Japanese society had the potential to move toward "gender equality." However, society has moved in a different direction. Scholars have pointed out that the speed of change in the gender order of Japanese society is significantly slower when compared with that of other societies, and it is most likely that we can ascertain the characteristics of modern Japanese society within this reality (Ōgoshi 1997; Igeta 2000; Muta 2006; Katō 2014; Ochiai and Tachibanaki 2015).

In this article, I interrogate the question of whether existing new religions contribute to gender equality in society. I consider "new religions" as "religions

---

1. While critical points have been raised against the activities of new religions from the perspective of gender studies (Yamaguchi, Saitō, and Ogiue 2012), there also exist complex elements within the relationship between religion and gender that cannot be simply summed up one-sidedly as negative aspects (Kawahashi and Kuroki 2004).

with new characteristics emerging under the influence of the conditions of modern society" (Inoue 2009, 22), in other words, "modern new religions."[2] I view such modern new religions as "mirrors of society" (Inose 2007), as they allow us to analyze new religions as reflections of "the new conditions emerging in response to major social changes collectively known as modernization" (Inoue 2009, 21). While recognizing their diversity, I find that new religions fail to achieve the goal of gender equality. Rather, new religions continue to reproduce, in one form or another, the framework of "gender inequality" in modern Japanese society.

Gender Equality in New Religions: The Case of Sōka Gakkai

In the statement of purpose and principles for the Sōka Gakkai Charter established on 18 November 2021, the seventh article states: "The Sōka Gakkai will safeguard and promote human rights. It will not discriminate against any individual and will oppose all forms of discrimination. It will contribute to the achievement of gender equality and promote the empowerment of women."[3] In line with this declaration, the organization's goals for 2023—enumerated under the category of "Peace, Culture, and Education Movement"—also includes "striving to build a 'human-rights culture' and to promote gender equality and women's empowerment."[4] In other words, Sōka Gakkai clearly—and publicly—advocates for "gender equality" as one of its organizational goals.

On the other hand, as of December 2022 the organization of Sōka Gakkai is divided by age and gender into the "men's division," "women's division," and "youth division." The youth division is further divided into the "young men's division," "student division," and "future division." For the leaders of local groups, the district leader is a man and the district married women's division leader is a woman. This system of assigning leaders in pairs—one man and one woman—in each region and block is maintained across the country. Although the local group leaders are evenly distributed in terms of gender, the main leader of each regional organization is de facto a man. Thus, the current organizational structure does not allow for the possibility of a woman becoming the local group's main leader.

In November 2021, Sōka Gakkai's "married women's division" and "young women's division" were officially merged to become the "women's division." Prior

---

2. Inoue (2009, 2019) uses the terms "post-new religions" and "hyper religions" to refer to new religions that emerged after the 1970s and 1990s, respectively, to distinguish these groups from the "modern new religions" that preceded them. In this article, I focus on "modern new religions" and their relationship to gender in modern society. Although some use the term "post-modern" to refer to the current era, and gender policy has increasingly become a political issue, the framework of gender in contemporary Japanese society has not fundamentally changed from that of the earlier modern era.

3. For an English translation of the charter, see https://www.sokagakkai.jp/about-us/charter-eng.html.

4. See "Regarding the activities of 2023," https://www.sokagakkai.jp/practice/activities.html.

to this change, the term "four parties" referred collectively to 1) the men's division, 2) the married women's division, 3) the young men's division, and 4) the young women's division, with the latter two making up the youth division. These four groups were regarded as the collective that would serve as the base for Sōka Gakkai activities in each region. In general, married women belonged to the married women's division and unmarried women to the young women's division.[5] This point also differed from the men, since the transition from the young men's division to the men's division was determined solely by age, regardless of marital status.

Previously (Inose 2023), I considered how these four parties served as a symbolic device to represent the Sōka Gakkai organization as the "Sōka family" and the "Gakkai family." I also examined the overlap between the image presented by the religious organization and the image perceived by Sōka Gakkai members. In this article, I would like to reexamine this issue by focusing on how the framework of gender is related to the expression of "family."

I performed a correspondence analysis on selected Sōka Gakkai texts using KHCoder3 (Higuchi 2020). The first group of texts focus on the different kinds of guidance provided by the religious organization regarding gender and age. I entered all the text of speeches that Honorary President Ikeda Daisaku gave to the young women's division, young men's division, married women's division, and men's division included under the "Guidelines for Each Division" published in Sōka Gakkai shidōshū hensan iinkai (1976) and Ikeda (1995).

In FIGURE 1, the squares □ identify each of the four groups: young women's division 女子部, young men's division 男子部, married women's division 婦人部, and men's division 壮年部. The circles ○ surrounding the squares represent frequently used words and phrases in the content of the guidance given to each section. The greater the frequency with which the word/phrase appears, the larger the circle. Consequently, FIGURE 1 helps us intuitively understand the characteristics of the messages for each group.

Near the young women's division square □, we find that words such as "marriage" 結婚, "good fortune" 福運, and "education" 教育 are used frequently. The guidance given to this group, mainly consisting of unmarried women, is to acquire—while young and unmarried—the faith to bring them the "good fortune" to find happiness in the future through "marriage" and becoming members of the married women's division.

---

5. For members of the young women's division, there were many cases in which women who remained single were transferred to the married women's division when they got older. After the reorganization into the women's division, young members who would have belonged to the young women's division now belong to the Ikeda Kayōkai 池田華陽会.

FIGURE 1: KHCORDER3 correspondence analysis of the top 60 frequent words from the "Guidelines for Each Division" (Sōka Gakkai shidōshū hensan iinkai 1976; Ikeda 1995).

For the young men's division, we find words such as "youth" 青年, "world" 世界, "eternity" 永遠, practice" 実践, "mission" 使命, "truth" 真実, "humanity" 人類, and "fight" 戦い. Furthermore, in the texts analyzed here, the young men's division is addressed using the distinctive term "lads" 諸君. These terms of address and frequently occurring words demonstrate how the young men's division often receives guidance under the assumption, or expectation, that they will become leaders of Sōka Gakkai in the future. At the same time, the young men's division is expected to "fight" for the "mission" to contribute to the good of "humanity" and "the world."

Between the young women's division and the young men's division, we find words such as "young" 若い, "peace" 平和, "philosophy" 哲学, "youth" 青春, "learning" 教学, "self" 自分, "to live" 生きる, and "(Nichiren) Daishōnin" 大聖人. The young men and women within the youth division are instructed to strive for "learning"— for example, through study of the teachings and life of Nichiren Daishōnin—in order to acquire a "philosophy" needed for "living" their lives.

Near the center of the diagram, we find the frequently occurring words common to all four groups, that is, the guidance shared to all groups. All members are "guided" 指導 to maintain their "faith" 信心 in "Sōka Gakkai" 創価学会 and become "happy" 幸福. The married women's division and the men's division are located close to one another on the graph, meaning that these two divisions tend to receive overlapping or similar kinds of guidance. Near the married women's division, we see words such as "maturity" 壮年, "mother" 母, "one family" 一家, and "household" 家庭. The guidance given here suggests that the members of the Married Women's Division are expected to assist and support the men's division within the context of "one family" and the "household." For the men's division, we find words such as "Gakkai" 学会, "Sōka Gakkai" 創価学会, "activity" 活動, "engagement" 活躍, "responsibility" 責任, "to stand" 立つ, "dissemination" 広宣流布, "guidance" 指導, and "faith" 信心. This shows how members of the men's division are instructed to "stand" as leaders in Sōka Gakkai and have the "responsibility" to "engage" in "activities" for the "dissemination" of the teachings. In contrast with the term "lads" used to address the young men's division, the term "everyone" 皆さん was used to address the young women's division, married women's division, and men's division.

Expanding on this previous analysis of official guidance from Sōka Gakkai leadership, I demonstrate in FIGURE 2 how Sōka Gakkai members themselves perceive each division. These data are based on a 2001 questionnaire of Sōka Gakkai members in taken in Sapporo, which resulted in 656 responses to an open-ended question regarding the mental image respondents had of each of the four divisions. This survey was attached to a separate open-ended questionnaire regarding faith inheritance that I conducted in Sapporo in 2001 (Inose 2011). Using the NVIVO word cloud, FIGURE 2 illustrates the top thirty most frequently used words (exact matches) in responses to the questionnaire.

Respondents perceived the members of the young women's division as "people" 人 who are "active" 活動 in the "Gakkai" 学会 as "refreshing" さわやか, "bright" 明るい "women" 女性, likened to "flowers" 花・華. Respondents "wish" ほしい that the members of the young women's division will become the married women's division of the "future" 未来. Meanwhile, participants regarded the members of the young men's division as "youths" 青年 and "young" 若い "individuals" 人 who are "energetic" 元気 and engage in "activities" 活動 within the "Gakkai" 学会. They see these members as capable individuals who will lead Sōka Gakkai in the "future" 未来. The members of the married women's division are "people" 人 who are engage in "activities" 活動 in the "Gakkai" 学会, "household" 家庭, and "local community" 地域 as a "bright" 明るい "presence" 存在, like the "sun" 太陽. They are the "mothers" お母さん of the "organization" 組織. The members of the men's division are the "presence" 存在 that engages in "activities" 活動 as the "pillar" 柱 of the "Gakkai" 学会

FIGURE 2: Word clouds created with NVIVO depicting Sōka Gakkai members' impressions of each of the four divisions of the organization: young women's (top left), young men's (top right), married women's (bottom left), and men's (bottom right).

"organization" 組織. They are the "fathers" お父さん who work hard in the Gakkai organization while doing "work" 仕事 in "society" 社会.

From the above results, we can see that even if the guidance from President Ikeda and the Sōka Gakkai leadership does not explicitly use words such as "father" and "mother," gender roles are presumed. That is, Sōka Gakkai members themselves accept the organization as a "pseudo-family." Regarding the gender roles of the "Sōka family," older men are the "pillars" and leaders, while older women serve a supportive and nurturing role in the organization/family as its "sun." These women are also expected to produce and rear young people who will become their successors. The young men are expected to take on leadership roles as future successors, while the young women are seen as "flowers" who will blossom as the future married women's division. We can interpret this gender framework as one in which men are at the center of decision-making and women are expected to serve as caretakers of the organization/households.

Gender is at the core of the organizational structure of Sōka Gakkai's community activities, a structure that overlaps that of the "modern family" (Usui 1995). The fact that the married women's and the young women's divisions were merged

into the women's division in 2021 reflects how shifts in the social framework of gender brought about changes in the structure of the organization.

According to Morioka Kiyomi (1989, 311–318), "the parent-child model" is "the original structure of religious movements in Japan." According to this theory of religious organization, the hierarchy of the parent-child model, or "household model," tends to be expressed using the metaphor of "family." However, the egalitarian "fellowship model," or "bureaucratic model," found in organizations such as Sōka Gakkai and Risshō Kōseikai, departs from the metaphor of "family." I question whether Morioka's theory of the parent-child model fully accounts for the contradiction between the egalitarian ideals and the gender framework that underlies the structure of religious organizations.

From the late nineteenth century to the postwar era, the center of the family structure in Japanese society has shifted from that of a hierarchal household model to that of the "modern family," which is premised on the separation of public and private life and the gendered division of labor in the husband-wife relationship. The modern family differs from the household model because it is a "family" centered on the relationship between the "husband and wife"—defined as one man and one woman—and the resulting "parent-child" relations. In contrast to the hierarchal household model, the husband-wife relationship within the modern family is based on the idea of an "equal" or egalitarian relationship in which the men and women each have a role. In reality, however, this relationship is not equal, because it also assumes a hierarchal relationship in the roles of men and women in which the husband plays the central role whereas the women serves in a supporting capacity.

As mentioned above, the structure of the Sōka Gakkai organization lacks a formal route for women to become the leaders. This means that the Sōka Gakkai structure is based on the principles of the modern family in which the father/husband is the leader, the mother/wife supports him, and the son—the future father/husband—and the daughter—the future mother/wife—follow the father. Such principles do not constitute being "friends" or "comrades," or even a "bureaucracy." In fact, before the establishment of the women's division, the organization had a clearly delineated structure based on the modern family model: men's division as "fathers," the married women's division as "mothers," the young men's division as "sons," the young women's division as "daughters," and the future division as "children." In the past, there also existed a system in which the "older sisters" of the young women's division and the "older brothers" of the young men's division would take care of the "children" of the future division (Inose 2011). Here again we find the combination of hierarchal and egalitarian relationships.

The image of the modern family in which hierarchal and egalitarian relationships coexist was applied to the organization of Sōka Gakkai. This most likely

played an important role in attracting new members, especially women, to Sōka Gakkai activities as well as stabilizing the management of the organization. Furthermore, in a section of the religious organization's newspaper, (*Seikyō Shinbun* 2021), Sōka Gakkai is described as a "gathering of families united by the Wondrous Law," demonstrating the continued use of the metaphor of "family" in the management of the organization. Thus, the organizational structure of Sōka Gakkai is best expressed through the metaphor of the "family" in what we could call the "family model."

Sōka Gakkai continues to allocate different roles/powers to men and women. In other words, the religious organization is a mirror of modern Japanese society. Like Japanese society, which merely applauds "women's empowerment" while maintaining the existing gender framework with its built-in inequalities, Sōka Gakkai has not advanced toward the achievement of substantive gender equality.

New Religions as Mirrors of Society

In a prior publication, I reference Usui (1995) and describe Sōka Gakkai as an organization that aims to "harmonize into a single unite while utilizing the characteristics of men and women" (Inose 2011, 99). I wrote this passage to critique gender inequality within Sōka Gakkai. In response, a leader of the married women's division—one of the informants in my research—remarked, "That's right! That's exactly how our organization has been working!" She interpreted this passage as an affirmation and a "joy to have outsiders understand the work of our women's division." This response verified my analysis and revealed that women in the married women's division carried out their religious activities with this understanding. Nonetheless, her response caught me by surprise, and I was once again reminded that how one interprets this data depends on the perspective from which one views reality. Obviously, we should not—from the outside—easily deny nor affirm the lives of people who are proud to continue to be religious insiders or, at times, persevere to do so.

Gender is embedded in all social spheres, meaning that it is fundamental to the way each person views the world. For this reason, it is difficult to clearly see the social framework of gender without being influenced by one's own biases. How then should researchers approach the topic of gender in order to reveal the ways in which new religions function as "mirrors of society"?

One approach is exemplified by the meticulously researched sociological studies on family and women in new religions conducted by Watanabe Masako. Although Watanabe's specific research subjects are wide-ranging (Watanabe 2007), she has published many case studies that record in great detail the relationships between individuals and their families within religious organizations (Watanabe

1985, 1991, 1993, 1994, 2016a, 2016b), including a special focus on female believers and female founders of religious traditions (Watanabe 1986, 2001, 2019).

For example, Watanabe (1979) analyzes the theme of "family crisis" based on the results of a survey conducted in one community in which twenty-six out of a total of fifty-four households belonged to new religions (fourteen in Risshō Kōseikai, five in Sōka Gakkai, seven in Tenrikyō, and one household that refused to respond). Watanabe provides two reasons for focusing on the family, while maintaining that it is the individual [and not necessarily the entire household] that joins a new religion. First, the fact that most of the believers in the community are women who play the roles of mothers, wives, and daughters-in-law makes it more appropriate to consider the experience of deprivation from an analysis of the family to which these women belong, rather than as something that affects only the individual. Second, membership in new religions is often based on households, and therefore it is necessary to analyze the relationships within the families that constitute these households (Watanabe 1979, 201–202). Regarding the impact that new religions have on each household, Watanabe's analysis shows that the function of a new religion to create meaning affects the ability to cope with crises within the family. Moreover, new religions provide the household with a support network outside the family comprised of groups of fellow believers (Watanabe 1979, 224–225). Watanabe's insightful perspective toward the relationships between the new religions, families, and individuals belonging to each household, and in particular the women, offers a model for investigating how new religions mirror the framework of gender in Japanese society.

In a later work, Watanabe (1994) follows the lives of twenty-five male and female trainees at Konkōkyō's Airaku Church, describing how they decided to became trainees and the challenges they faced during their training.[6] In this study, Watanabe notes that there was not much difference between men and women in how they were drawn to their spiritual leader ("parent teacher" [male]) and consequently become trainees. However, after they entered into training, the way male and female trainees were taught completely differed. Specifically, Watanabe observes that, 1) the religious activities for female trainees are restricted based on several ideas like: "the kitchen is the (sacred) boundary for women"; 2) because they mainly work in the kitchen, the female trainees end up having "many relationship problems," making it difficult to concentrate purely on training; 3) in spite of this situation, the female trainees are told "if you accept everything as spiritual

6. Of the thirteen men and fourteen women (nine of whom were married couples), two women, ages 69 and 77, were hospitalized at the time of the study and thus not included in the research. The maximum training period for an individual trainee was twenty-three years, the minimum two years, with ages ranging from 27 to 66 years old. The training separates the trainees from secular society.

training, it is the same no matter where you practice," and their problems tend to be ignored; 4) the spiritual leader's wife, despite her not being a teacher, is considered the model for their training; 5) married female trainees are expected to be subordinate to their husbands (who are male trainees); and 6) through these circumstances, evaluations result in comments like "male trainees are better than female trainees in terms of faith" (Watanabe 1994, 4, 88–89).[7]

From an outsider's perspective, this situation for female trainees certainly seems unreasonable. But, it is not the teachings of Konkōkyō, the new religion that the women themselves have accepted, that cause this situation. Rather, it is the ways in which the female trainees are expected to support the daily activities within the church, that is, because they are in charge of food—which is essential to daily life—their time is divided and limited (Watanabe 1994, 65). In other words, this situation results from the unequal and unbalanced "family model" of gender within which the teachings of Konkōkyō are situated.[8]

> In contrast with the case of men who have never thought about any other gender, female trainees express an ambivalent attitude about themselves being women. They are prompted to reflect on their own femininity in relation to their spouse, their missionary work, and other daily activities and events. When the female trainees get married, they are expected to obey their husbands, and their of activities also becomes restricted. This stands in stark contrast with men who have never denied their manhood. (Watanabe 1994, 82–83)

In such a manner, Watanabe describes in careful detail this situation in which the female trainees continue to work hard in their training despite being relegated to the background. But the unbalanced burden of essential labor such working in the kitchen and childcare negatively affects the quality and quantity of their religious activities.

Watanabe does not, however, deem this situation as unreasonable. Rather she concludes the study with her own observation that the female trainees' journey

---

7. From the descriptions of the survey interviews, we also get a glimpse of the suffering and hardships faced by the children of the trainees.

8. Watanabe (1994, 91 n. 9) notes that the Airaku Church "is a church that is considered unique in Konkōkyō. There is strong faith in the spiritual leader as a living god and as the model for others. The strongly defined gender roles may also reflect the local characteristics of the Kyushu region." Watanabe observes that, at the time of the study in 1990, women did take on some religious duties other than those in the kitchen, but since May 1993 the pattern became more noticeable for "men to serve in the center and front of religious spaces, while women serve in the background in areas of cooking, providing childcare, etc. (tasks centered on the kitchen)" (Watanabe 1994, 73). As a reason for this change, Watanabe (1994, 65–66) describes how three trainee couples successively left the church during this period, resulting in a labor shortage.

began with their faith in the spiritual leader (Watanabe 1994, 89–90). Their goal is to be like the spiritual leader; that is, the female trainees never aspired to be like the spiritual leader's wife. There are things in the spiritual leader's teachings that attract women to the faith. According to the teachings of the Airaku Church, there is a feminine side to the spiritual leader, represented by the "heart of earth," which is something that both men and women must practice.[9]

In the midst of the social changes that gave rise to the new religions, the founder, the founder's successors, the church leaders, the members, and the people surrounding them form and manage their religious organization through various interactions inside and outside the group according to their respective positions. In order to identify specific obstacles to achieving gender equality in society as a whole, it is important to carefully confirm each situation and to suspend our judgment for the time being as we encounter circumstances within religious groups that may be fraught with problems for the people involved. Similarly, the framework of gender that supports inequality arises—in various contexts—from a complex interplay of different, sometimes contradictory, elements.[10] For this reason, in order to achieve gender equality, we need to unravel the multiple layers of this framework one by one. As Watanabe's studies (1979, 1994) demonstrate, research and analysis that carefully depict the lived realities of believers and organizations have the potential to reveal—and not overlook—tangled threads and split seams that create differences and divisions.

Within the histories and circumstances of each religious organization, gender frameworks specific to that group are constructed, maintained, and changed over time. Rather than employing a perspective that tries to "discover" inequalities and imbalances, we should focus on the construction of specific kinds of relationships and examine what kinds of situations occur as a result in the relationships between various members of the group. I think this kind of work could help us clearly show the substantive "inequalities" that exist, not only to those outside the religious group, but also to those inside the group.

Research on New Religions and Women (Gender)

In her work of exploring theoretical issues in new religions, Igeta Midori discusses the positions and roles of women from a feminist standpoint. In the foreword of

---

9. This reflects the philosophy of the Airaku Church concerning a heart like earth or soil that "turns everything into fertilizer," relating to teachings with practical and universal validity or teachings that can be experimented with and proven in real life (Watanabe 1994, 14).

10. For example, Igeta (1992, 198) uses expressions such as "the role of the housewife intertwined with the myth of motherhood."

to a 2000 edited volume on the topic of women and the state, Igeta questions and historicizes the modern Japanese nation-state from the perspective of gender:

> Gender as knowledge—as far as we know it—emerged from the unequal relationship between women and men—politically, economically, and culturally. Rarely has it been advocated in order to create an equal relationship between the sexes. When we employ a gender perspective, we revisit stories that have been told as part of the histories of societies and communities—as well as events that have never been publicly told—as processes of formation of power relations, or as histories on relations of domination. (Igeta 2000, 11)[11]

The themes in Igeta's work on new religions are also based on the recognition that gender in Japan—a "modern nation-state"—is organized through unequal relations of power and domination between men and women. She summarizes her view as follows:

> Since the late nineteenth century, the entire society and culture of Japan has been subject to external pressure and influence from Western countries. Japan's new religions could be thought of as a kind of rescue device that precipitated and structured itself in the midst of people striving to transform themselves during the modernization process. In order to overcome political and economic turmoil, changes in value systems, and crisis situations, they created a kind of "therapeutic culture" that has achieved positive results in the daily lives of ordinary people. In their doctrines, the new religions—as social organizations embodying a therapeutic culture—often regard the complete fulfillment of gender roles as a sacred duty inherent to human beings, pointing to the restoration of the "sacred order" of the universe through such practice as the perfected, supreme state of salvation. Moreover, the majority of the practitioners are women. (Igeta 1992, 187)

In this manner, Igeta presents her view of new religions as a type of "therapeutic culture" and finds the study of new religions effective for reconsidering the unequal framework of gender that has become a "sacred order" in modern Japan.

Igeta further examines "the question" for a "feminist approach to new religious movements" (Igeta 1989, 5), writing:

---

11. Although Igeta herself does not discuss new religions in this edited volume, new religions are examined in chapter seven "Female Founders of New Religions and the Modern Japanese State" by Kashimura Aiko.

> We ought to ask what makes social forces powerful: in the relationships between men and women, self and others, the power the self exercises over others, and the power that others exercise over the self. We must investigate the basis of power that defines the situation and society, and how and by what means that source of power is ultimately justified. (Igeta 1989, 20)

As an example, Igeta raises the idea of the spiritual "power of women" that has attracted the attention of scholars in fields such as folklore studies. Igeta proposes from where this "power" emanates:

> Women's efforts poured into areas of life that are closely related to women's gender roles, such as housework, childcare, and production labor (i.e., women's work) are considered secondary by historians, who focus mainly on political and economic history. It is not a power emanating from women's true nature or some quality that is "natural" to women, but rather a power made functional by society. (Igeta 1989, 15)

The source of the "power" acquired by female founders of new religions and active female believers is similar to Igeta's observation about the academic field of history. The study of new religions has not directly interrogated issues such as the "social meaning-making" imposed on female believers by those around them, by the religious organization, and by general society (Igeta 1989, 16).

Igeta's critical perspective is not directed toward the new religions or their members (often women); rather, she criticizes the perspective of researchers (often men) who conduct studies of religious communities that treat women as "invisible beings" (Igeta 1989, 11). New religious groups develop their activities through a mechanism in which the religious organization makes great use of the power of women as a source of vitality for the expansion of the group, while the women also gain "power" by becoming members and being active. Despite this reality, previous research on new religions rarely tried to examine and relate elements such as the growth of the new religious movements and the development process of these groups, the modes of social existence for women, the norms preached to (and about) women, and the ways in which women define themselves based on such ideas (Igeta 1992, 188).

Igeta's main concern is how male researchers in the study of new religions formulate their "questions." She asks repeatedly, "Are the realities of women included in the perspectives of researchers of new religions?"[12] Strangely, female members

---

12. Igeta (1993, 154–155) further questions, "who exactly is the main subject of this 'understanding of ancestors' analyzed in Kōmoto Mitsugu's study of Reiyūkai? Is the main subject exclusively the head of the family or the man who has the potential to become the head of the family? Otherwise,

were not visible to male researchers, despite their recognition that many active members of new religious groups were women. Researchers focusing on new religions, women, and gender accurately pointed out how male-centered research on new religions overlooked the relationship between the social framework of gender and new religions, a relationship that is essential to interrogate and understand in order to also decipher the fundamental mechanisms in the establishment and maintenance of modern states.

In contrast to such studies, female researchers in the study of religion have attempted to capture the realities of women.[13] For instance, Usui (1994b, 107) argues that "the 'housewife' is the keyword for thinking about women's independence and authority in the modern and contemporary periods. New religions highly valued the presence of women as 'housewives' and gave women authority in the management of the household." After summarizing this general tendency in new religions, Usui examines the activities of women from different generations to describe the changes in religious activities of women influenced by the changes in the social conditions of women. She follows the development of activities by Shūkyōdan Hōseikai's "Omina kai," comprised of elderly female members, and the "Gathering of the Mrs.," mainly comprised of younger generations (second-generation female members and the female spouses of male members). Usui describes the situation in which the members of the "Mrs." group show discomfort and resistance to the founder's view on men and women—the idea of women "lowering" themselves in front of others)—and yet still preserve the gender roles. Usui also demonstrates how this in turn is criticized by younger generations. Regarding the organizational transformations associated with changes in society, Usui's study on Sōka Gakkai confirms the coexistence of diverse groups of women and indicates "the social fact that women's lives have become more diverse" (Usui 1995, 169). However, even if there are aspects of the new religions' organizations or teachings that could contribute toward the realization of gender equality, the gender binary is constant

---

isn't the wife thought to have the same exact view on ancestors like the husband? But it would be premature to conclude that the meaning of 'family' for women is the same as that for men."

13. Works on ancestor rituals by Kōmoto Mitsugu (2001) are important studies often cited in research on new religions, women, and gender. In addition, Kumada Kazuo (2005, 2022) has published essays on gender in religions such as Ōmoto, Byakkō Shinkōkai, and Tenrikyō primarily from a male perspective. Sakurai Yoshihide (2003, 2023) also addresses issues of gender. Regarding the study of female founders, there are the works of Mega Atsuko (1985), Usui Atsuko (1987), Yamashita Akiko (1990), Helen Hardacre (1994), Kashimura Aiko (2000), and Asano Miwako (2001). Regarding the role of women and their various activities in religious groups, Usui Atsuko has researched multiple groups such as Tenrikyō (1992), Risshō Kōseikai (1994a), Shūkyōdan Hōseikai (1994b), Sōka Gakkai (1995), and Shinnyoen (2002). Additional work on this subject includes Komatsu Kayoko's study on Sekai Kyūsei Kyō (1995), Ishiwata Yoshimi's work on PL Kyōdan (1996), Kaneko Juri (1995) and Horiuchi Midori (2012) on Tenrikyō, Hibino Yuri (2001, 2002, 2022) on Reiyūkai/Risshō Kōseikai, and Nakanishi Hiroko (2004) on the Unification Church.

throughout the management of the religious community. In other words, new religions tend to maintain a gender-based division of labor in which men lead and women assist. There is no mechanism for realizing "gender equality" in practical or substantive terms within such a system.

Yet, this situation is not fixed. Rather, it is in the process of transformation in response to societal changes. As "mirrors of society," new religions offer a glimpse into this transformation without simply reaffirming an unequal and unbalanced framework of gender. In her analysis of female members who are housewives, Igeta points out that they "gained power by accepting the existing power structure and fulfilling the roles assigned to women" by joining a new religion, but "as long as the division of labor by gender is sanctified and treated as absolute, this ends up strengthening the social order of modern Japan that sees the gender roles as essential prerequisites. The women's life energy is getting sucked into the power structure of the corporatized 'state'" (Igeta 1993, 168).

Watanabe's (1994) study on female trainees in Konkōkyō provides another reflection of gender and social change. On the one hand, these women have heterosexual marriages within the church, have children, and become subordinate to their husbands. On the other, they depart from the typical role of housewives and homemakers by leaving their children at home and becoming trainees, or in some cases they become trainees along with their children to seek a religious path. Even then, there exists in the church a substantial division of labor between men and women based on the gender of the trainees, and this division of labor has had a strong influence on how the training itself is conducted. Although the church does not clearly state its intentions, this situation was probably not designed to intentionally exploit the domestic labor of female trainees. Here we find another kind of influence of gender that cannot be deciphered through just one interpretive framework, namely that the labor power of female members was simply exploited by a new religion that was coerced by the power of the state.

I also want to note that the above studies on new religions rarely present arguments that challenge the gender binary and heterosexism due to their focus on the order and power structure of "women" and "men" as social and cultural categories. As long as men and women continue to be treated differently, it is important to examine the current circumstances in new religions. Yet, society is changing. Analyzing the elements that constitute the framework of gender from a perspective that reconsiders the hetero-normative gender binary will possibly lead to clues for restructuring the gender order and the realization of gender equality.

Conclusion

Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō on 8 July 2022, much attention has focused on various issues related to the Unification Church (Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, currently the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification). The resulting investigation has led many questions about the Unification Church. One query that is related to the issued discussed in this article is the matter of why so many victims of the practices of the church are women.

Previous studies have demonstrated the prominence of gender inequality at the core of the teachings and activities in the Unification Church. For example, the Unification Church tried to exert political control over the domain of gender at the local council level (Yamaguchi, Saitō, and Ogiue 2012), and the organization incorporated into its teachings the idea that Japanese women must take responsibility for the atonement of Japan's colonial rule over Korea (Sakurai 2023). In other words, the Unification Church is a religious organization that has used the framework of gender to control its believers and manipulate their perceptions of society.

After the Abe assassination, it was discovered that the assassin's mother had significant contributions to the Unification Church, adversely affecting the his life. Additionally, it was revealed that politicians, especially those from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), had close ties to the Unification Church. As a result, other "second-generation" members of the Unification Church began to speak out, stating that they had suffered harm from the organization.

The media attention on "second generation" members shined light on similar problems in other religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witness (Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society), in particular issues regarding children being whipped or denied blood transfusions as well as the shunning of apostates.[14] Jehovah's Witness is a religious group also known for attracting female members (Inoue 1988). Furthermore, it is a religious community with a strong sense of gender roles within the organization and the family in which men often take leading roles and women assisting roles.

In her examination of women who join new religions, Igeta (1989) points to how the teachings of new religions include the idea and image of a "sacred order between men and women," especially how ancestral rituals gave women "power" within boundaries approved by their families. This paper reaffirms the importance of examining the ways in which modern new religions grant legitimacy to the

---

14. There are growing number of organizations for addressing the issue of second-generation Jehovah's Witnesses, such as the "Lawyers Support Team for the Jehovah's Witnesses Problem" (https://jw-issue-support.jp) and the "Sunshine Center for Support for Religious Second-Generations" (https://nisei-hidamari.org).

framework of gender in the modern family and as well as a certain level of empowerment for women.

Social control using the concept of "family" is not something limited to new religions. The Japanese nation has long used it, as observed in phenomena such as the "Japanese-style welfare state" (Andō 2022). Recently, the state implements one component of family policy as "countermeasures to the declining birthrate," which is to an extent accepted by society. In the current trends, Nishioka Susumu sees some progress toward a more social democratic regime in the family policy of the "Japanese-style welfare state" with strong norms of "familism" (Nishioka 2021). But, I would say that the influence of familism is still strong and deep-rooted. This is because the modern family, which was formed based on norms such as the gender binary of man and women, the separation of public and private, and the gendered division of labor, has been the very logic underpinning the social fabric of the nation (Muta 2006).

Under such norms of the modern family, it is difficult for women to live their own lives and liberate themselves from women's roles. They are pressured to locate the "self" within family relationships such as daughter, wife, mother, grandmother, mother-in-law, etc. As I demonstrated in my analysis of Sōka Gakkai, women are expected to keep the household bright and warm, like the "sun." Because women are designated the role of maintaining "harmony" among the groups to which they belong (including their families), many women find it difficult to choose actions that potentially disrupt this harmony. In some cases, by participating in a new religion, women may be able to find a certain amount of "escape" from such gender norms or gain a certain amount of "power." In some situations, however, the religious activities of members may lead to conflict, confrontation, or harm within the family. If members succumb to feelings of fear or obligation in the face of extreme demands and expectations from the religious organization, it could lead to harmful exploitation by the religious group in the form of excessive monetary contributions or labor and time commitments.

Currently, there are various movements—including feminism, gender theory, and human rights advocacy—trying to reorganize the framework of gender toward a more egalitarian direction. In opposition, there are those who consider the status quo, which takes gender inequality for granted, to be a "sacred order" and therefore resist change. This resistance is where conflict arises (FIGURE 3). With the declining birthrate and aging population—and with no means to stop these trends—the framework of gender, which has been fundamental to the structure of the modern nation up to the present, will have to be reorganized throughout society. The conflict between values or worldviews (as shown in FIGURE 3) is the result of such social changes.

男女二分法
…不平等

ジェンダー平等へむけた「意識」の変化とそれに伴う行動・制度の再編成の動き

ジェンダー不平等を「当たり前」とするジェンダー秩序・「近代家族」の強化・復権・温存

異性愛主義
…性生殖管理

公私の分離
…無償労働

FIGURE 3: Conflict regarding family values and the people involved in this conflict.

Many new religions have conducted their religious activities in accordance with the framework of gender implicit in the modern family, which divides labor based on a gender binary, assumes a gender essentialism, and separates the public and private. In general, these new religions have had neither the intention nor the action to substantively transform the social norms and structures that create gender inequality in Japanese society as a whole. Rather, they have tended to utilize such societal norms and structures to maintain and operate their religious organizations. For new religions to contribute to the realization of gender equality, they would need to fundamentally reform the teachings and institutional structures that have historically supported them. Such reforms are likely to be extremely difficult, although the degree of difficulty varies according to the new religion in question.

It is often assumed that feminism (or gender studies) and the study of religion are incompatible. However, Kawahashi and Komatsu (2016) argue that the relationship between religion and gender cannot be so simply dismissed. As seen in the example of Sōka Gakkai, although the group advocates for "gender equality" as its official organizational goal and philosophy, gender inequality functioning within structure of the organization is preserved as a "sacred order."

Komatsu (2021, 27) provides a detailed analysis of the activities of people who believe that feminist movements (led by women during the 1970s) and religious

worldviews are continuous. She states that "many women's activities were not systematized, with various ideologies and movements coexisting and intermingling. It appears that no structure remained afterwards. However,… there is no doubt that these movements continue to exist in different forms." Komatsu further points out how "the big wave that seems to have disappeared is now reappearing here and there as smaller waves. How we understand these movements that lack institutional continuity remains a constant challenge." Efforts to examine overlooked movements to connect feminism and religion could serve as driving forces towards the realization of gender equality.

On the other hand, resistance to gender inequality does not necessarily manifest as large or small waves of direct opposition to religious groups by clearly articulating feminist values. In some cases, it may take the form of not making waves, as if holding your breath and staying still. Still other strategies may be employed, such as creating a whirlwind of conflict and confrontations by involving the people around oneself, such as family and local residents, and raising objections that are not necessarily premised on feminist ideology.[15] Various kinds of waves can be found in the everyday experiences, such as big and small waves that directly challenge the traditional gender order; receding waves that do not show a clear stance on gender, as if going into hiding; vortexes created by bringing together different worldviews and value systems; and still other variations that respond creatively to the gender inequality. In order to achieve gender equality, it is necessary to explore ways of coexistence that are not exclusive, so that even when it is impossible to directly interact with people whose ways of thinking and acting appear incompatible with ours, we can still find meaning in connecting with each other.

In the introduction, I argued that "modern new religions" do not contribute to gender equality in society. This is because "modern society" is based on the modern family and the framework of gender established by the gendered division of labor between men and women; new religions are religions that were formed and organized on the premise of this modern family. However, in the future, we must discover the potential forms of religion that aim to realize gender equality and connect feminism and religion, the budding of "new religion" that reflects a new society by considering how each individual's life and experience are woven together in different ways while fundamentally interconnected.

---

15. One example of this could be joining a controversial new religion that some people in society may designate as a "cult."

References

Andō Yūko 安藤優子. 2022. *Jimintō no josei ninshiki: "Ie chūshin shūgi" no seiji shikō* 自民党の女性認識―「イエ中心主義」の政治指向. Akashi shoten.

Asano Miwako 浅野美和子. 2001. Onna kyōso no tanjō: "Nyoraikyō" no so, Ryūzen Nyorai Kino 女教祖の誕生―「如来教」の祖・如来喜之. Fujiwara shoten.

Hardacre, Helen. 1994. "Shin shūkyō no josei to jendā" 新宗教の女性とジェンダー. In *Jendā no Nihonshi* ジェンダーの日本史, vol. 1, Wakita Haruko 脇田晴子 and Susan B. Hanley, eds., 119–152. Tōkyō Daigaku shuppankai.

Hibino Yuri 日比野由利. 2001. "Kyōizon to josei: Risshō Kōseikai no jirei kara" 共依存と女性―立正佼成会の事例から. *Gendai shakai riron kenkyū* 11: 162–175.

Hibino Yuri. 2002. "Josei shinto no soshikika: Kyōdan ni okeru kanryōsei kikō no sōshutsu to jendā: Risshō Kōseikai no jirei yori" 女性信徒の組織化―教団における官僚制機構の創出とジェンダー―立正佼成会の事例より. *Gendai shakai riron kenkyū* 12: 232–243.

Hibino Yuri. 2022. "'Josei katsuyaku' ga umaku ikanai no ha nazeka: Nihon josei no habitōsu" 「女性活躍」がうまくいかないのはなぜか―日本女性のハビトゥス. *Kanazawa Daigaku kokusai kikō kiyō* 4: 17–30.

Higuchi Kōichi 樋口耕一. 2020. *Shakai chōsa no tame no keiryō tekisuto bunseki: Naiyō bunseki no keishō to hatten o mezashite* 社会調査のための計量テキスト分析―内容分析の継承と発展を目指して. Nakanisha shuppan.

Horiuchi Midori 堀内みどり. 2012. "Jendā no shiten kara mita kyōso den" ジェンダーの視点から見た教祖伝. In *Katarareta kyōso: Kinsei, kingendai no shinkōshi*, Hatakama Kazuhiro, et al., eds., 61–93. Hōzōkan.

Igeta Midori 井桁碧. 1989. "Sei no ikai: Feminizumu teki shikaku kara no shūkyō kenkyū no tame no jo" 性の位階―フェミニズム的視角からの宗教研究のための序. *Shūkyō kenkyū* 63: 1–23.

Igeta Midori. 1992. *"Shufu" no matsuru senzo: Jūzoku suru shutai* 「主婦」の祀る先祖―従属する主体. Gendai shūkyōgaku 4. Tōkyō Daigaku shuppankai.

Igeta Midori. 1993. "'Onna no yakuwari': Kenryoku e no kairo" 「女の役割」―権力への回路. In *Shūkyō no naka no josei shi* 宗教のなかの女性史, Okuda Akiko 奥田暁子 and Okano Haruko 岡野治子, eds., 144–171. Seikyūsha.

Igeta Midori. 2000. "Sensō suru 'kokka': 'Bōryoku' to jendā" 戦争する〈国家〉―〈暴力〉とジェンダー. In *"Nihon" kokka to onna* 「日本」国家と女, ed. Igeta Midori, 368–426. Seikyūsha.

Ikeda Daisaku 池田大作. 1995. *Kibō no asu e: Ikeda meiyo kaichō supichi shugyokushū* 希望の明日へ―池田名誉会長スピーチ珠玉集. Seikyō shinbunsha.

Inoue Nobutaka 井上順孝. 2004. "Shinkō kyōdōtai no ima: Henshitsu shi tsutsu aru kizuna" 信仰共同体の今―変質しつつある絆. In *Kizuna: Kyōdōsei o toinaosu* 絆―共同性を問い直す, ed. Ikegami Yoshimasu 池上良正, 27–51. Iwanami shoten.

Inoue Nobutaka. 2009. *Hito wa naze "shinshūkyō" ni hikareru no ka?* 人はなぜ「新宗教」に魅かれるのか. Mikasa shobō.

Inoue Nobutaka. 2019. "Shinkō shūkyō kara kindai shin shūkyō e: Shin shūkyō imēji keisei no shakai teki haikei to kenkyū shiten no henka" 新興宗教から近代新宗教へ―新宗教イメージ形成の社会的背景と研究視点の変化. In *Shūkyō to shakai no sengo shi* 宗教と社会の戦後史, ed. Horie Norichika 堀江宗正, 267–293. Tōkyō Daigaku shuppankai.

Inoue Setsuko いのうえせつこ. 1988. *Shufu o misuru shin shūkyō* 主婦を魅する新宗教. Tanizawa shobō.

Inose Yuri 猪瀬優理. 2007. "Gendai Nihon no shūkyō" 現代日本の新宗教. In *Jendā de manabu shūkyōgaku* ジェンダーで学ぶ宗教学, Tanaka Masakazu 田中雅一 and Kawahashi Noriko 川橋範子, eds., 87–105. Sekai shisōsha.

Inose Yuri. 2011. *Shinkō wa dono yō ni keishōsareru ka: Sōka Gakkai ni miru jisedai ikusei* 信仰はどのように継承されるか―創価学会にみる次世代育成. Hokkaidō Daigaku shuppankai.

Inose Yuri. 2023. "'Kazoku' imēji o sono seijisei" 「家族」イメージとその政治性. In *Sōka Gakkai: Seiji shūkyō no seikō to airo* 創価学会―その成功と隘路, Sakurai Yoshihide 櫻井義秀 and Inose Yuri, eds., 207–268. Hōzōkan.

Ishiwata Yoshimi 石渡佳美. 1996. "PL kyōdan ni okeru tsuma, haha yakuwari no kōzō: Haisen kara kōdo seizai seichōki ni kakete henyō" PL教団における妻・母役割の構造―敗戦から高度経済成長期にかけての変容. *Shūkyō to shakai* 2: 3–23.

Kaneko Juri 金子珠理. 1995. "*Onna wa dai* saikō: Tenrikyō ni okeru seibetsu yakuwari o megutte" 『女は台』再考―天理教における性別役割をめぐって. In *Josei to shūkyō no kindai shi* 女性と宗教の近代史, ed. Okuda Akiko 奥田暁子, 45–77. San'ichi shobō.

Kashimura Aiko 樫村愛子. 2000. "Shin shūkyō no josei kyōso to Nihon kindai kokka" 新宗教の女性教祖と日本近代国家. In *"Nihon" kokka to onna* 「日本」国家と女, ed. Igeta Midori, 289–321. Seikyūsha.

Katō Chikako 加藤千香子. 2014. *Kindai Nihon no kokumin tōgō to jendā* 近代日本の国民統合とジェンダー. Nihon keisei hyōronsha.

Kawahashi Noriko and Komatsu Kayoko 小松加代子. 2016. *Shūkyō to jendā no poriteikusu: Feminisuto to jinruigaku no manazashi* 宗教とジェンダーのポリティクス―フェミニスト人類学のまなざし. Shōwadō.

Kawahashi Noriko and Kuroki Masako 黒木雅子. 2004. *Konzai suru megumi: Posuto koroniaru jidai no shūkyō to feminizumu* 混在するめぐみ―ポストコロニアル時代の宗教とフェミニズム. Jinbun shoin.

Komatsu Kayoko. 1995. "Shūkyō katsudō to josei no yakuwari: Sekai Kyūsei Kyō ni okeru shizenshoku undō ni kangamite" 宗教活動と女性の役割―世界救世教における自然食運動にかんがみて. In *Josei to shūkyō no kindai shi*, 79–110. San'ichi shobō.

Komatsu Kayoko. 2021. "Igirisu dai 2 ha feminizumu to josei no seisei o tori modosu undō" イギリス第2波フェミニズムと女性の聖性を取り戻す運動, *Tama Daigaku gurōbaru sutadeīzu gakubu kiyō* 13: 17–30.

Kōmoto Mitsugu 孝本貢. 2001. *Gendai Nihon ni okeru senzo saishi* 現代日本における先祖祭祀. Ochanomizu shobō.

Kumada Kazuo 熊田一雄. 2005. *"Otokorashisa" to iu yamai?: Poppu karuchā no shin, danseigaku* <男らしさ>という病?—ポップカルチャーの新・男性学. Fūbaisha.

Kumada Kazuo. 2022. *Kakusa shakai no shūkyō bunka: "Minshū" shūkyō no kanōsei o saikōsuru* 格差社会の宗教文化—「民衆」宗教の可能性を再考する. Fūbaisha.

Mega Atsuko 妻鹿淳子. 1985. "Sōshō shūkyō ni okeru josei kyōzo no bōseikan: Nyoraikyō, Tenrikyō, Ōmotokyō o chūshin ni" 創唱宗教における女性教祖の母性観—如来教・天理教・大本教を中心に. In *Bōsei o tou: Rekishi teki hensen* 母性を問う—歴史的変遷, vol. 2, ed. Wakita Haruko, 71–99. Jinbun shoin.

Morioka Kiyomi 森岡清美. 1989. *Shin shūkyō undō no tenkai katei: Kyōdan raifusaikuru ron shiten kara* 新宗教運動の展開過程—教団ライフサイクル論の視点から. Sōbunsha.

Muta Kazue 牟田和恵. 2006. *Jendā kazoku o koete: Kingendai no sei/sei no seiji to feminizumu* ジェンダー家族を超えて—近現代の生／性の政治とフェミニズム. Shinyōsha.

Nakanishi Hiroko 中西尋子. 2004. "'Chijō tengoku' kensetsu no tame no kekkon: Aru shin shūkyō kyōdan ni okeru shūdan kekkonshiki sankasha e no kikitori chōsan kara" 「地上天国」建設のための結婚—ある新宗教教団における集団結婚式参加者への聞き取り調査から. *Shūkyō to shakai* 10: 47–69.

Nishioka Susumu 西岡晋. 2021. *Nihon gata fukushi kokka saihen no gensetsu seiji to kanryōsei: Kazoku seisaku no "shōshika taisaku* 日本型福祉国家再編の言説政治と官僚制—家族政策の「少子化対策」化. Nakanishiya shuppan.

Ochiai Emiko 落合恵美子 and Tachibanaki Toshiaki 橘木俊詔, eds. 2015. *Henkaku no kagi to shite no jendā: Rekishi, seisaku, undō* 変革の鍵としてのジェンダー—歴史・政策・運動. Mineruba shobō.

Ōgoshi Aiko 大越愛子. 1997. *Kindai Nihon no jendā: Gendai Nihon no shisō teki kadai o tou* 近代日本のジェンダー—現代日本の思想的課題を問う. San'ichi shobō.

Sakurai Yoshihide 櫻井義秀. 2003. "Shūkyō/jendā, ideorogī ni yoru 'kazoku' no kōchiku: Tōitsu Kyōkai josei shinsha o jirei ni" 宗教/ジェンダー・イデオロギーによる「家族」の構築—統一教会女性信者を事例に. *Shūkyō to shakai* 9: 43–65.

Sakurai Yoshihide. 2023. *Tōitsu Kyōkai: Sei, kane, han kara jitsuzō ni semaru* 統一教会—性・カネ・恨から実像に迫る. Chūō kōron shinsha.

Seikyō shinbunsha 聖教新聞社. 2021. *Kōsen rufu to sekai heiwa: Ikeda Daisaku sensei no shidō senshū* 広宣流布と世界平和—池田大作先生の指導選集, vol. 2. Seikyō shinbunsha.

Sōka Gakkai shidōshū hensan iinkai 創価学会指導集編纂委員会, ed. 1976. *Sōka Gakkai shidōshū* 創価学会指導集. Seikyō shinbunsha.

Usui Atsuko 薄井篤子. 1987. "Josei kyōzo no tanjō" 女性教祖の誕生. *Shūkyō kenkyū* 61: 345–380.

Usui Atsuko. 1992. "Shin shūkyō to josei: Tenrikyō ni okeru josei kyūsei o tōshite," 新宗教と女性—天理教における女性救済を通して. In *Ima shūkyō o dōtoraeru* いま宗教をどうとらえるか, Shūkyō shakaigaku kenkyūkai 宗教社会学研究会 ed., 191–214. Kaimeisha.

Usui Atsuko 1994a. "Shin shūkyō ni okeru katei kyōiku no yakuwari: Risshō Kōseikai no katsudō o tōshite," 新宗教における家庭教育の役割―立正佼成会の活動を通して. *Nishi Nihon shūkyōgaku zasshi* 16: 31–43.

Usui Atsuko. 1994b. "Josei no jiritsu shin shūkyō: Shūyōdan Hōseikai 'Tōkyō misesu' no baai" 女性の自立と新宗教―修養団捧誠会「東京ミセス」の場合. In *Nan no tame no "shūkyō" ka?" Gendai shūkyō no yokuatsu to jiyū* 何のための〈宗教〉か?―現代宗教の抑圧と自由, ed. Shimazono Susumu 島薗進, 105–153. Seikyūsha.

Usui Atsuko 1995. "Josei to shūkyō to soshiki: Sōka Gakkai fujinbu o megute" 女性と宗教と組織―創価学会婦人部を巡って. In *Josei to shūkyō no kindaishi*, ed. Okuda Akiko, 143–182. San'ichi shobō.

Usui Atsuko. 2002. "Josei no 'reinō' to Bukkyō: Shinnyoen no Reiso, Shōjuin no baai" 女性の<霊能>と仏教―真如苑の霊祖・摂受院の場合. *Shūkyō kenkyū* 76: 135–160.

Watanabe Masako 渡辺雅子. 1979. "Kazoku kiki to taiō ni okeru shin shūkyō no ishiki: Hakudatsu riron no kentō o tōshite" 家族危機との対応における新宗教の意識―剥奪理論の検討をとおして. *Shakai kagaku jānaru* 17: 201–227.

Watanabe Masako. 1985. "Aru josei kitōshi no seikatsu shi: Fusha toshite no jiritsu to jinsei no kōsei" ある女性祈祷師の生活史―巫者としての自立と人生の構成. *Meiji Gakuin ronsō* 382: 125–293.

Watanabe Masako. 1986. "Shin shūkyō shinja no raifukōsu to nyūshin katei: Ōmoto no ichichihō shibu o jirei toshite" 新宗教信者のライフコースと入信過程―大本の一地方支部を事例として. In *Kingendai ni okeru "ie" no henshitsu to shūkyō* 近現代における「家」の変質と宗教, ed. Morioka Kiyomi, 175–238. Shinchi shobō.

Watanabe Masako. 1991. "Burajiru ni okeru Risshō Kōseikai no tenkai to josei shinja no seikatsu shi" ブラジルにおける立正佼成会の展開と女性信者の生活史. *Meiji Gakuin ronsō* 475: 257–293.

Watanabe Masako. 1993. "Shin shūkyō to jūgo no josei: Reiyūkai no kaihō ni miru 15 nen sensō ka no josei 'kaihō' to jubaku" 新宗教と銃後の女性--霊友会の会報にみる15年戦争下の女性「解放」と呪縛. *Meiji Gakuin ronsō* 514: 165–221.

Watanabe Masako. 1994. "Konkōkyō ni okeru shūgyōsei no jiko keisei katei to seibetsu yakuwari: Naisei sekuto gata kyōkai no gōraku kyōkai no baai" 金光教における修行生の自己形成過程と性別役割―内棲セクト型教会の合楽教会の場合. *Meiji Gakuin ronsō* 534: 1–96.

Watanabe Masako. 2001. *Burajiru Nikkei shin shūkyō no tenkai: Ibunka fukyō no kadai to jissen* ブラジル日系新宗教の展開―異文化布教の課題と実践. Tōshindō.

Watanabe Masako. 2007. *Gendai nihon shin shūkyō ron: Nyūshin katei to jiko keisei no shiten kara* 現代日本新宗教論―入信過程と自己形成の視点から. Ochanomizu shobō.

Watanabe Masako. 2016a. "Kankoku Risshō Kōseikai ni okeru Zainichi Korian nisei no josei kyōkaichō no seikatsushi" 韓国立正佼成会における在日コリアン二世の女性教会長の生活史. *Meiji Gakuin Daigaku shakaigaku, Shakai fukushigaku kenkyū* 146: 113–199.

Watanabe Masako. 2016b. "Risshō Kōseikai ni okeru josei no ichi to josei kanbu kai'in no jirenma: Toku ni shigoto o motsu shunin ni shūten o atete" 立正佼成会における女性の位置と女性幹部会員のジレンマ:とくに仕事をもつ主任に焦点をあてて. *Chūo gakujutsu kenkyūjo kiyō* 45: 62–97.

Watanabe Masako. 2019. *Kankoku Risshō Kōseikai no fukyō to juyō* 韓国立正佼成会の布教と受容. Tōshindō.

Yamaguchi Tomomi 山口智美, Saitō Masami 斉藤正美, and Ogiue Chiki 荻上チキ. 2012. *Shakai undō no tomadoi: Feminizumu no "Ushinawareta jidai" to kusa no ne hoshu undō* 社会運動の戸惑い―フェミニズムの「失われた時代」と草の根保守運動. Keisō shobō.

Yamashita Akiko 山下明子. 1990. "Shin shūkyō no josei no kaihō to genkai" 新宗教の女性の解放と限界. In *Seisabetsu suru Bukkyō: Feminizumu kara no kokuhatsu* 性差別する仏教―フェミニズムからの告発, Ōgoshi Aiko, Yamashita Akiko, and Minamoto Junko 源淳子, eds., 164–240. Hōzōkan.

Translated by Naohito Miura

Nothingness, *Chōra*, and the Heart's Desire

James W. Heisig

Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (emeritus)

The following essay was first presented at a Symposium on "Critical and Generative Chōra" as part of the 23rd International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law, held in Rome in May of this year.

NEITHER ancient Greek discussions of *chōra* nor its modern interpretations coincide with the discussions of nothingness we find in Japanese and other East Asian intellectual traditions as neatly as it might seem at first glance. I say this not to toss the overlaps aside. On the contrary, Plato's idea—along with its presocratic precedents and its reverberations in Western thought—provides a useful bridge for traffic between philosophical worlds. The noncoincidence I would like to address here is a mark of that utility.

I

As modern readings of Plato attest, the *chōra* has proved a fitting metaphor for reflecting on a range of questions, from theological ideas of creation and *kenosis* to metaphysical alignments of the relationship between the permanent and the impermanent. In many cases, such interpretations add little more than a supporting paraphrase for what the interpreter already takes to be the case. But—and this is the more critical point—the original idea of *chōra* stipulates a distinction between the notions of Being and becoming that is carried over uncontested into these adaptations. If becoming were to collapse into Being, or Being into becoming, *chōra* could no longer serve as a middle ground between the actual and the eternal, between inconstant, visible forms and the invisible, indestructible formless form of all forms. Plato's *chōra* is not a backdrop to the material world but the crucible in which matter takes shape in things and the substratum that holds them in place. It is not merely an indeterminate place for existence to take place but the creative and structured womb of a world in the making. This generative quality of *chōra*

takes its meaning from the bond it forms between the degeneration and flux of that world and the stability of eternity. In short, insofar as *chōra* is seen as the locus of potentiality, the power to transform that which is not into that which might be, it belongs to a beingness superior to any sort of nothingness, and it allows meaning to emerge only in departure from the realm of non-being for the realm of Being. Plato's *chōra* is a third "realm"—the original meaning of the word in Homer—in which non-being is transformed into Being. Its meaning lies in not in the *nihilum* from which it created but only in the creations it positions *extra nihilo*.

Adjacent to *chōra*, the notion of nothingness stipulates the irreducible correlativity of Being and becoming. The logical marker for this is the copulative *soku*, which combines the opposites into a continuous identity of opposites, like a Moebius strip in which the two sides of a piece of paper flow into one another. Being *and* becoming are seen as Being-*in*-becoming. Together they constitute a "beingness" that stands in opposition to a "nothingness." Nothingness cannot be reduced to becoming or any other negation of Being. The more the absence of potential is seen as the presence of something more ultimate, the further the reality of nothingness slips away from the metaphor of *chōra*.

For these same reasons, nothingness cannot be seen as generative. All generation is at the same time a degeneration. All causality is an abstraction of reality in the sense that something of what *was* is always sacrificed for what *comes to be*. This may be so for existence, but there is no coming to be or passing away for nothingness. Generation and degeneration are rather seen as manifestations of nothingness, as ciphers of a presence that hides itself by showing itself. It is not itself a power or a force or an energy field; it is only *experienced* as such. Nothingness is present both in the effects of force as well as in the force itself, but it is not reducible to either. If the supreme expression of Being is pure happening, then nothingness cannot be said to "happen" at all. There is no conditioning, no cause, no contingency, and no necessity—nothing to take place and nowhere for it to be placed in.

Moreover, insofar as *chōra* is imagined as "the receptable of all coming and being,"[1] it is always full to the brim. In this sense, *chōra* differs from the devouring mother of Anaximander's ἄπειρον and the tranquil void of Democritus's κενόν. Nor can it open up and overflow like an Aristotlean τόπος. Setting aside the logical question of how a container that contains everything could be considered a container at all, it is what is *in* the receptable that gives *chōra* its meaning. It is a creative matrix in which Being and becoming generate the world—both the fragile world of appearances and the infrangible world of Ideas.

Metaphors of nothingness rest on the opposite assumption. Nothingness is not seen as a receptacle for beingness but precisely the other way around: the world in

---

1. Plato, *Timaeus*, 48e.

its constant flux is where nothingness takes place, where it becomes visible, tangible, knowable, and meaningful.[2] Reality itself is the Moebius strip of nothingness-in-beingness, impermanence revealed in permanence, *nirvana*-in-*samsāra*. As such, it always overflows the receptacle of beingness. The ultimate reality of nothingness is accessible to us only in glimpses and fleeting sentiments that interrupt the rhythms of the everyday world. Beingness is like Laozi's cup. By itself, it is useless and without meaning. Its meaning and purpose begins where the cup ends, in the emptiness that it holds within it.[3]

Rather than enter deeper into the rational thicket that such a reversal of perspective on *chōra* opens up, I would like to use the remainder of my space here to hint at how the glimpse of nothingness in human experience may also help nudge metaphors of *chōra* to dimensions beyond mere logical abstraction.

II

The paradoxical mystery of the human spirit—and by extension, of God—is as indispensable to human life as it is immune to our disposition. By this I mean that it is experienced as a kind of "missingness" that takes a step back for every step the mind takes towards it. Although consciousness makes more of reality accessible to us than it does, say, to a rock, a tree, or a bird, the core of reality—what makes things real—remains finally beyond our ability to identify with confidence, let alone to name or access at will. The idea of reality is, we might say, the ultimate *Grenzbegriff*. Talk about God belongs to religious language as one attempt to create a language for the unspeakable, not in order to speak of it with certitude but in order not to forget that it is inaccessibly there. It remains a nothingness to us, but it is present as an absence. The unknown author of the fourteenth-century *Cloud of Unknowing* puts it, somewhat cryptically, this way:

> Leave aside this everywhere and this everything, in exchange for this nowhere and this nothing…. A person's affection is remarkably changed in the spiritual experience of this nothing when it is achieved nowhere.

To paraphrase, the mystery of the human spirit is nowhere more in evidence than when its affections are freed of attachment to its achievements. Further, the power of this mystery is not at our beck and call, much as we might want it to be.

---

2. Nishida Kitarō's idea of the ultimate *basho* of nothingness is not itself a *basho* but a manifestation of all other *basho* as *basho*. It is not any kind of a divine *locus locorum* but rather the point in human experience at which we see our *basho*-affected thinking as the nothingness of ultimate reality at work in Being and becoming.

3. The image is from chapter 45 of the *Daodejing*.

Unsurprisingly, that "want" has often been used to explain both the origin of beliefs in a spirit realm, whether as part of the natural world or completely beyond it, and the origin of attempts to submit to that higher realm in order to make up for what is wanting in our lives.

Whether we trust in that mystery not only to be with us but ultimately on our side is a matter of faith, not of doctrinal certitude. Karl Barth tried to soften the radical nature of this act of fundamental orientation by insisting that it is a divine gift not at the disposition of human volition—*unverfügbar*. I am more inclined to side with his successor Heinrich Ott, who did not share Barth's deep distrust of human experience unaffected by Christian faith. Ott preferred to begin from what he called "the inaccessibility of our own heart." As he explained, behind our every feeling and thought and decision, each of which has a specific something that makes it "what" it is, lies a "nothingness" so unknown and unidentifiable that every symbol we devise to speak of it is swallowed up in that nothingness. In Ott's words:

> We cannot directly access what we are. What does that mean? It means that everything we experience, feel, suffer, act, or think, does not ultimately come from ourselves…. But neither does it mean that we can confront nothingness as an "other." It is an inaccessible and uncontrollable reality already present within us.[4]

His point is that we need to preserve the difference between unproductive, self-deluding attachment to control and achievement and acceptance of the ultimate reality of the inaccessible. This leads to the question: From which of these did the idea of *chōra* itself come? Obviously, an echo of *something* in experience gave it its shape. To locate the origins of the idea in an eternal realm indifferent to the workings of mind is to reject the question. But if, as I am confident Plato himself believed, philosophy's pursuit of clear thinking belongs to the quest of the good life, then the idea of *chōra* is a response to something in our nature, and the difference between being guided by it and being misguided hangs on our experience of that mystery of our own humanity. In this sense, any idea of *chōra* disassociated from human experience is, to borrow the expression of William James, "always dust and disappointment" compared to "the real goods which our souls require."[5]

4. Heinrich Ott, *Das Reden vom Unsagbaren: Die Frage nach Gott in unserer Zeit* (Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 1978), 86, 125.

5. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*, Lecture III. See *Writings 1902–1910* (Library of America, 1987), 131. In his 1977 book *L'Idole et la distance*, Jean-Luc Marion highlights the way in which Heidegger rejects ontotheological descriptions of God as idolatrous precisely because of their disconnect from the dwelling of the divine in the experience of the lack of God and their distance from cult. See the discussion and references in Maria Villela-Petit, *Questioning Greece with Heidegger and Simone Weil* (Chisokudō Publications, 2023), 216–19. This is not to say that I find Heidegger's notion of *das Nichts* and its relationship to Being any closer to the East Asian tradition than Plato's *chōra* is.

The idea of nothingness stands squarely against the assumption that we can take ourselves out of the picture and secure knowledge of the universal principles governing reality. The surety of such knowledge, in turn, begets the assumption of our right to govern in accord with those principles. In fact, universal principles are always an imposition on the world they are thought to preside over. If the history of thought should teach us anything, it is that even the most esteemed of our universals cannot escape servitude to epoch-specific and culture-specific ways of thinking. Nevertheless, we carry on passing laws and enforcing them on the natural world as if they were objectively true and just. True, this propels the scientific method, but it also justifies the imperium of human "civilization" within the natural order, despite the fact that, in the larger scheme of things, the short history of consciousness gives us no such right.

The impersonal character of nothingness is more cautious. Not only does it resist the infliction of anthropomorphic or perceptual bias; it also rejects the attempt to de-anthropomorphize thought by elevating certain ideas to the status of eternal verities. All ideas, including ideas of nothingness, are seen as human convention bound to the specificities of time and place—that is to say, of beingness. At the same time, thinking is a supremely human way of manifesting a nothingness whose presence is known by its absence.

From the standpoint of nothingness, the idea of principles governing the creation and transformation of reality drives the mind in the vicious circle of a tautology. If reality is the whole of it, and if there is no Being without becoming, then there cannot be some principle within beingness that makes everything into *every thing*, that makes beings actual rather than potential. In other words, the reality of beingness—actual and potential, past and future, generating and degenerating, causality and contingency, principle and achievement—is *not* the whole of reality at all. Only a nothingness glimpsed in beingness and conventional truth but not coincident with them can be said to represent ultimate reality.[6]

Now if the idea of *chōra* echoes an unacknowledged, anthropocentric attachment to beingness as ultimate reality, the idea of nothingness echoes something else within human experience, something that cannot be located in the memory of past experiences or even in the administration of perceptions and the regulation of reason. Nothingness itself has no location, no within or without, and its

---

6. Obviously, not all conventional thought is conventional truth. The distinguishing characteristic of the former is that it seeks ultimate truth in rational conventions about Being and becoming; of the latter, that it points beyond beingness to ultimate truth, of which ideas like nothingness and no-self are merely conventional ciphers. For example, conventional thinking populates the world of ideas with dualities like good and evil, subject and object, divine and human. Conventional truth proposes nondual thinking, not in order to reject the utility of conventional ways of thought but in order to protect them from being set up as ultimate.

manifestation *in loco* does not change that. Eckhart provides us with just the right image for this when he speaks of an uncreated "spark" that flashes for a moment in the "inward desert" of the soul. It is a desert not because it is barren of life but because it lacks the landmarks that orient our everyday lives. Only in the experience of complete disorientation can the ultimate reality of nothingness show itself in our experience, like a naked spark that "time and place have never touched;" it illumines all times and places—if only for a moment—like an "imageless image" or an "image beyond images."[7]

The proper starting point for explaining the experience of nothingness, then, is the point at which Kant's three pivotal questions are made to stand on their heads: What can I know? —Nothing. What ought I to do? —Nothing. What may I hope? —Nothing. The desire to know with certainty, to act correctly, and to hope for the fullness of life are not reducible to concrete facts and theories, to laws and principles, or to expectations of a better existence in this world or the next. When these questions are voided of content, which is another way of saying, when the questioning itself has no identifiable object, then thinking in terms of self and other, subject and object, question and answer is no longer adequate. One has to see oneself as no-self in order to understand that nothing specific *I* can know or do or hope is a proper analog for the whole of reality.

The term "no-self" does not register easily with our usual understanding of agency, just as the idea of "nothingness" grates against our way of talking about reality. The terms "empty self" and "emptiness"—both of which have a long philosophical history in East Asia—are less hostile to our ordinary preconceptions of agency and reality, but the experiences they tag are the same.

Far from any kind of *unio mistica* or radical negation of self, the experience of nothingness is a radical affirmation of self—not as imperial ego but as an instrument of an all-embracing impulse to connect with the world and everything in it. No-self is agency empty of self. It reconciles the apparent contradiction between Jesus' rebuke of those who parade their virtues on the street and his injunction against putting one's light under a bushel. The Japanese proverb captures the essence of selfless agency: "The foot of the lighthouse is dark." It is only by turning the light away from oneself that the darkness can be lit up for others. Unlike a halo attracting attention to a virtuous agent, it is like a candle whose own darkness enables it to brighten its surroundings. So, too, there is a sense in which the images of God embedded in sacred texts and theological reflection are not mere objects of adoration but expressions of the irrepressible human desire for absolute

---

7. See Sermons 53 (Pf 88, Q 22, QT 23), and 60 (Pf 60, Q 48, QT 34). On the nature of the desert, see the poem, possibly authored by Eckhart, "The Grain of Mustard Seed," in M. O'C. Walshe, *The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart* (Crossroad, 2009), 14–16.

relativity, to be connected with everything, directly, always, and everywhere—for perfectly selfless love, if you will. The paradox of consciousness is that nothing less could satisfy us, once and for all, than to achieve what our skinbound consciousness denies us.[8]

Selfless action extends far beyond the Kingdom of Ends that Kant idealized for rational beings. It has much more to do with Jesus' notion of a "Kingdom of God" that is present within us and within all things around us. In the *Gospel of Thomas*, Jesus advises his disciples again and again that they need only open their eyes to encounter a truth that is secret and hidden to those who keep them shut.[9] As human beings, we experience that mystery most intimately as something we may call "the heart's desire," that elusive yet undeniably real part of ourselves which, for the most part, we are content with domesticating, civilizing, educating, and legalizing out of sight and out of mind of our everyday self.

<div align="center">III</div>

The first and most important thing that needs to be said about the heart's desire is too simple and too obvious to be stated directly and in the abstract. I prefer to draw on an archetypal image from the seventeenth century, of which Dostoyevsky once wrote: "If there is one book humanity must not forget to bring with it to face the Divine Tribunal in Final Judgment, it is *Don Quixote de la Mancha*, in whose pages Cervantes has delivered to us the very heart of who we are."[10] Popular affection for the story aside, the lantern-jowled madman unwittingly entangled in myths out of time that forever distort the real world about him is an image of our very own well-intentioned but misguided efforts to lead our lives away from the heart's desire. Caught between a past we cannot ever fully appropriate and a future whose uncertainties we cannot control, we are all of us, every soul of us on earth, tangled up in the story of Don Quixote. In the most basic sense, his sin is our humanity.

Quixote's adventures come to an end, we recall, when he is defeated in Barcelona by the Knight of the White Moon. En route to the contest, which was set up by villagers from his home town, he has two experiences that shake his convictions to the core. First, he comes upon a caravan transporting the statues of four

---

8. I take this to be the point of Nishitani Keiji's critical and mildly antagonistic essay "Impressions of Religion," in which he exposes the selfish side to Christian faith when it seeks to replace self-understanding with self-assurance or the mitigation of human reason by illusory beliefs. 『西谷啓治著作集』 (Sōbunsha, 1986–1995), 2: 163–82.

9. I have analyzed this point at some length in *Jesus' Twin: A Commentary on the Gospel of Thomas* (Crossroad, 2015).

10. The passage is from *The Diary of a Writer* (George Braziller, 1919), 836. For more on Dostoyevsky's reading of Cervantes, see Tamara Djermanovic, "Dostoyevski y Don Quijote: Poética y estética de una ilusión," *Anales Cervantinos* 47 (2015): 9–24.

figures mounted on horseback: St. George slaying the dragon, St. Martin dividing his cloak with a beggar, St. James Matamoros, patron of Spain, and St. Paul being struck down en route to Tarsus. Quixote reflects on the virtues of each as heroes of the same profession as he. He ends with the melancholic remark that whereas these men were doing "the will of heaven," he was only fighting "after the manner of men," which makes him wonder whether, "by a happy change in my fortune and an improvement in my understanding, I might perhaps take a better course."

A while on, Quixote falls out among a band of outlaws led by the infamous Catalan bandit Roque Guinart and comes to appreciate better just what the consequences of such an "improvement in understanding" might be. For three days and three nights he is held captive in the robber camp. At first we find him distraught at the fact that a man capable of attaining such fame as Guinart should so waste his life as an outlaw. He can only counsel him to take steps to heal his wounded conscience. The bandit listens patiently, as do the rest of the band whom Quixote lectures copiously on the dangers of their chosen profession. His words are of no avail. To the contrary, as Quixote comes to learn with what justice and rigid discipline the company of thieves is ruled, he grows perplexed. Whence such virtue, he wonders: Whence such generosity seldom equaled in that society that has named Guinart an outlaw? Slowly it dawns on him that he and the thief share the common dream of a just society, but with one important difference: Guinart does not seem to have gathered his dream from the bookshelf or fashioned it in accord with traditional philosophic and religious values. It is rather some inner prompting of the heart that has driven him to embrace the austere, day-to-day existence of a wandering outlaw.

After his defeat in Barcelona, Quixote turns back towards La Mancha in despair, his principles not abandoned voluntarily but taken from him by force. He resolves at this time to undertake the simple life of a shepherd in the hills, to roam about in exile from society, breathing the fresh air of freedom in search of a new myth of life. As it happens, he falls ill before he can undertake his adventure to the heart's desire. On his deathbed he repents of his conversion and reverts to trust in the only other kind of life he could have conceived: to have read *better* books which would have suggested *other* ideals to serve with the same total commitment. "Blessed be Almighty God," he cries out:

> "My mind is now clear, unencumbered by those misty shadows of ignorance that were cast over it by my bitter and continual reading of those hateful books of chivalry. I see through all the nonsense and fraud contained in them, and my only regret is that my disillusionment has come so late, leaving me no time to make any sorts of amends by reading those that are the light of the soul."

Immediately he disposes of his possessions, stretches himself full length in his bed, and faints for the last time.[11]

And so Cervantes closes his tale, reminding us that the tragedy of this frail caricature of a man whose mind was poisoned and whose conscience dimmed by years wasted in the reading of worthless literature is that he had connected to it through the medium of books and lost touch with deeper impulses that would have connected him to a greater reality. We are given to consider something more than a meaningless abyss that opens up when we come to at the end of our rational tether, swallowing up all our principles, laws, and conventions, something like an experience of emptiness from which we can look back and rediscover our connectedness to a world unencumbered by what is of value or disvalue to the everyday self. Such is the mystery to which nothingness opens our eyes and conventional thinking closes them.

The encounter with nothingness is a disturbance of the spirit so essential to our human condition that we can only agree again with Dostoevsky that the story of Don Quixote stands as a *vademecum* for humanity on its "journey to the heart." That journey does not aim at fashioning a clear idea of the world, of inflicting that idea back on the world, or even of rejecting all such ideas so as to revel in unrestrained enjoyment of the world. The journey has no other destination than the endurance of the search itself. Its aim is the *pursuit* of the heart's deepest desires, not their *fulfillment*, full aware that whatever we can know or do or hope, the heart itself remains forever unfathomable. It marks the point in life at which we renounce the desire to *lead* our life, like some intemperate animal at the end of a rope, for the desire to *follow* it. The question, "What shall I do with my life?" gives way to the uncertainty of wondering, "What might life want to do with me?" This quest, prompted by hope but ultimately hopeless, leads the journey into the desert and through the necessary darkness of a pessimistic wisdom and the constant threat of despair. Insofar as we can talk of an encounter with nothingness, it is experienced not as a noun or a verb but as an adjective or adverb, as quality to the connections that make up the things of life and the world—not unlike Eckhart's description of God as a *bîwort*,[12] a gloss on the inscrutable grammar of the ultimate reality we seek but can never find.

It is not hard to sympathize with Plato's resistance to the idea of *chōra* as pure, unspeakable emptiness. We want to give it attributes, to bring it down to earth, to make it accessible to mind and consistent with what we already know. By the same equally rational token, we want to make nothingness accessible through the categories of beingness. In some sense, we dislike mystery and metaphor, the unknowable

11. The relevant passages can be found in Chapters 58, 60, 67, 74, and 75.
12. See, for example, Sermon 67.

and the uncontrollable, as much as we dislike anything about our humanness. We know how deeply we long for eternity, but in the end we just want more time. We prefer secure fantasies of attainment to the insecurity of renunciation to the unattainable. Like Quixote, we may despise having our lives ruled by books, but when it comes down to it, we prefer to read books that tell us why there is more to life than books. There is nothing we can *do* about the incongruity, but neither can we afford to ignore it. At some point, the abstract metaphysics of *chōra* needs to be balanced by reflection on the inaccessible but indispensable and inexhaustibly intelligible heart's desire as more than the occasional temptation to hobble reason in the name of freedom. Little wonder that our poetry and literature direct our affections again and again to the outsider, the misguided, the unprincipled, the fool, the outlaw, the shepherd roaming in the hills, and the Samaritan.

A World in the Unmaking
An Aesthetics for Fukushima

Alessandro Calefati

University of Calabria

Two concepts that unfold the imagination of catastrophe in general, and the triple disaster of Fukushima Daiichi in particular, are the concepts of a "world" and a world coming undone, or an "un-world." In order to address the problem that the disaster poses for us human beings—and I would like to emphasize "for us"—and for us as forms of human life, I begin by proposing a definition of the concept of "world." We could say that the world can be expressed in many ways. The world can have different meanings. The world can be the thing in itself, independent of any state of consciousness and any possibility of knowledge. But to say that the world is the "thing-in-itself" seems unsatisfactory for a very simple reason: in our linguistic acts we constantly refer to something as the world, and we seem quite sure of what we are referring to. It could then be said that we are "speculating" about the existence of the world, that when we try to refer to the world we are actually making a hypothesis in the form of "Although I know nothing about this world, I hypothesize that there is something, some phenomenon, that exists independently of my consciousness, autonomously." And yet, I believe that there is something more in our everyday relation to the world, a "certainty of knowing." What do we know? Or rather, what do we think we know about the world?

I would like to propose, via Jean-Luc Nancy (1997; 2007), that on an everyday level we believe that we know, feel, and see the "meaning" of the world. The world for us is nothing more than this framework of meaning in which we find ourselves. In a sense, the world is a kind of performance through which we encounter beings and events. The world is like a fixed imaginary, and this fixed imaginary is like a series of paths that have been carved out in the tunnel of our mind to guide our

imagination. Our ontologies, or perhaps our taxonomies of beings and events, always include in the world what we have already known and seen of the world, thus anticipating it. From this point of view, the world is also a kind of affectivity: in the face of the world, our senses, and with them our intellect, are at rest. To imagine inhabiting the world, then, is to imagine a sedentary form of life in which we assume that the world is available to us. To borrow from Didi-Huberman (2021, 23), we could say that "we are always imagining images of the world that was" because under normal conditions we see nothing while it is happening.

A second proposal I would like to develop in addressing the question of imagination in relation to catastrophe also comes from Jean-Luc Nancy, the term "un-world" (*immonde*):

> The world has lost its capacity to "form a world" [*faire monde*]: it seems only to have gained that capacity of proliferating, to the extent of its means, the "un-world" [*immonde*], which, until now, and whatever one may think of retrospective illusions, has never in history impacted the totality of the orb to such an extent. In the end, everything takes place as if the world affected and permeated itself with a death drive that soon would have nothing else to destroy than the world itself…. It is as if being itself—in whatever sense one understands it, as existence or as substance—surprised us from an unnamable beyond. It is, in fact, the ambivalence of the unnamable that makes us anxious: a beyond for which no alterity can give us the slightest analogy…. It is a question of owning up to the present, including its very withholding of the event, including its strange absence of presence: we must ask anew what the world wants of us, and what we want of it. (Nancy 2007, 34–35)

For Nancy, "forming a world" is first and foremost a capacity and secondly a capacity that we have lost. Why? Because it is precisely our tendency to form a world, to multiply the meaning of the world for ourselves, for everyone and everywhere, that produces its double: the un-world (*immonde*). A double exposure, as Nishitani would say,[1] that comes at us from an unnameable beyond and troubles us precisely because we cannot say of that particular experience that is the un-world (*immonde*): "Here is the world I knew!" Is this not a daily experience that we live, especially in these years when it seems that something—we

---

1. "One can see the Ginza, for instance, just as it is, in all its magnificence, as a field of pampas grass. One can look at it as if it were a double exposure—which is, after all, its real portrait. For in truth, reality itself is two-layered. A hundred years hence, not one of the people now walking the Ginza will be alive, neither the young nor the old, the men nor the women…. We can look at the living as they walk full of health down the Ginza and see, in double exposure, a picture of the dead" (Nishitani 1982, 51).

don't know exactly what—has escaped our control? I mean on a daily basis, from the most well-known problems of the geological era we now call the Anthropocene, to the disruption of everyday life experienced in the last three years due to SARS-COV-2 (CIMATTI 2022). This is what Nancy warns us about: we must rise to the level of the present, we should think about an "ontology of actuality"—to use FOUCAULT's words (1994, 577)—which means investigating what is "an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is both a historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and a test of their possible overcoming."

The Images of Catastrophe

Let's formulate another hypothesis: today it is impossible to approach the subject of an ontology of the present, which is entangled in the problem of the world and the un-world, without asking ourselves what role the imagination, and in particular images, play in this matter. The scopic regimes of the imagination at our disposal help us to feel what we see (METZ 1986), but also, and above all, what we do not see.[2] This "invisible", although it is not visible—i.e., it belongs to the sense of sight—does not mean that it reduces a general "touch" of the senses. Rather than seeing the invisible, the challenge of an ontology of actuality that poses the problem of imagining the un-world will be to experiment in the visible with a form of hapticity, of tactile affection.

In the spirit of Nancy, I am aware that what can be offered here is certainly not a solution to the problem posed by the loss of the "sense of the world." At most, I can clarify the anguished affection generated by the un-world, the monstrous and unnameable double of the world. Precisely because it is unnameable, it must be touched by the imagination.

The images in FIGURES 1–3, which I call "world images," are not all images of the Fukushima disaster. However, they could be. One image is from another disaster site, the Maldives tsunami in 2004. Yet such images are analogous to those of Fukushima. It is as if, faced with such images, our imagination is blocked and recognizes the disaster only by using an already available sense capable of organizing by analogy. In this sense, all disasters are analogous—NANCY (2015) states they are equivalent, like a currency—and the sense of these disasters is given to us precisely through such analogy. However, the catastrophes to which these images purport

2. Properly speaking, a "scopic regime" is a shared way of seeing. A classic example is the Albertian window through which Leon Battista Alberti codified the idea of three-dimensionality in Renaissance painting. It seems that codifying a way of seeing—whether programmatically, as in Alberti's case, or tacitly, as in contemporary art or advertising—means allowing the gaze to see a certain kind of entity while excluding others. A field of the invisible is thus established at the same time as a field of the visible. The decision about such a field of vision is where the political game within aesthetics is played.

FIGURE 1: CC BY 4.0 U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Philip A. McDaniel. Released by the US Navy ID 050102-N-9593M-040.

FIGURE 2: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 photo by whsaito. https://flic.kr/p/9y4Mxh

FIGURE 3: CC BY 2.0 photo by CECAR. https://flic.kr/p/bgGjaV

to refer are by no means similar or equivalent. To pose such an equivalence, so that similar disasters can be evaluated by analogy, is a para-economic desire. This is why I have defined this type of image as a "world image," that is, an image that provides "a composed and complete order (form) within which one might find a place, a dwelling, and the elements of an orientation" of meaning (NANCY 1997, 4). What happens in the face of disaster, then, is always a "meaningful" use of images that are already endowed with meaning for us.

But what do we grasp about the catastrophe through a meaningful use of such images of the world? We comprehend what we have always understood about catastrophe. It is as if, in the face of catastrophe, we retreat into an established form that can provide us with an already given meaning. If this form is that of equivalence, then the meaning given to the disaster can only be para-economic. It is all about damage assessment and quantification, forgetting the point at which a quantitative difference becomes a qualitative one.

There are other ways in which the disaster is affecting us as well. These "other ways" are what I call, borrowing from Nancy, the "un-world." The un-world is that which the sense of the world generally excludes from its horizon. It is what I call

the "invisible" in reference to Metz's scopic regimes. It is only possible to speak of the un-world, because there is simultaneously the sense of the world. It is only because there is a scopic regime, a common way of seeing, that there can be something that is withdrawn from it.

However, if Nancy is right, it is no longer possible to separate the "visible" or the represented—what I have called "the world"—from its monstrous double, the invisible or the impure. This is similar to what Latour writes about the "modern":

> Modernity is often defined in terms of humanism, either as a way of saluting the birth of "man" or as a way of announcing his death. But this habit itself is modern, because it remains asymmetrical. It overlooks the simultaneous birth of – things, or objects, or beasts – and the equally strange beginning of a crossed-out God, relegated to the sidelines. Modernity arises first from the conjoined creation of those three entities, and then from the masking of the conjoined birth and the separate treatment of the three communities while, underneath, hybrids continue to multiply as an effect of this separate treatment. The double separation is what we have to reconstruct: the separation between humans and nonhumans on the one hand, and between what happens "above" and what happens "below" on the other. (LATOUR 1993, 13)

In this sense, the simultaneous emergence of that hybrid which is the nexus of the world and the un-world is what we have to experience in the midst of our aesthetic experience. How does it happen? In a kind of dualism between culture and nature, we do not have a sense of the world on the one hand and an un-world that simply makes no sense on the other. On the contrary, we are always somehow entangled in this hybridization of meaning and agency, to which no meaning can be ascribed that belongs to us (human beings) alone. This is why Nancy writes, in a passage from *The Sense of the World*:

> Consequently, when I say that the end of the world is the end of the *mundus*, this cannot mean that we are confronted merely with the end of a certain "conception" of the world…. It means, rather, that there is no longer any assignable signification of "world", or that the "world" is subtracting itself, bit by bit, from the entire regime of signification available to us—except its "cosmic" signification as universe, a term that for us, precisely, no longer has (or does not yet have) any assured signification, save that of a pure infinite expansion. (NANCY 1997, 5)

FIGURE 4. Viking Eggeling, *Symphonye Diagonale*, video, 1924. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IF9tHNzHVC0

Let me attempt to analyze other images, which are not simply images in their directly visible sense (form, composition, and so on), but which present us with the complexity of their sensuousness. I would like to make it clear, however, that by the "complexity of the sensuosness" I mean something similar to an activity of hybridization that is internal to the image itself or that is the image itself. It is a hybridization between those sensory aspects of the image that are usually considered separate, especially the tactile and the auditory.

Let's think of Viking Eggeling and his *Symphonie Diagonale* in which geometric forms dance and transform silently on the screen. Although we do not hear any sound coming from the images, when we observe this dance of abstract and metamorphic forms we still perceive a sound. This sound is presented to us as imprinted in the visible. What is the meaning of this? The best answer is that it means nothing. However, that would not be an honest answer. It means nothing, and yet it means something in the recognition of the rhythm underlying these transforming images. Only meaning, if there is any, does not come from an image established and imprinted in memory, from "world images." Meaning, if there is any, comes directly from the contingent encounter between the metamorphosis of the image and the singularity of the perceiving body, which is also in transformation. This body and image are different from any other body and any other image in their encounter in the cosmos in terms of their conformation, their capacity for movement, and their access to a plane of the sensible. In this

FIGURE 5. Nishikawa Tomonari, *Sound of a Million Insects, Light of a Thousand Stars*, video, 2014. https://vimeo .com/117525500

sense, an image does not only contain its visible appearance. There is something else, something that is invisible, but which is also not to be regarded as inaccessible to perception in any other way. One could say, perhaps provocatively, that there is an alternative to the world we know and remember, one that is already taking shape. It is an alternative that is not in sight, and perhaps is not in sight of us.

The image in FIGURE 5, *Sound of a Million Insects, Light of a Thousand Stars,* has a lot in common with Eggeling's *Symphonie Diagonale*, although there are some important differences: In the summary to the video, the filmmaker Nishikawa Tomonari describes the creation of the image this way:

> I buried a 100-foot (about 30 meters) 35 mm negative film under fallen leaves alongside a country road, which was about 25 km away from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, for about 6 hours, from the sunset of June 24, 2014, to the sunrise of the following day. The night was beautiful with a starry sky, and numerous summer insects were singing loud. The area was once an evacuation zone, but now people live there after the removal of the contaminated soil. This film was exposed to the possible remaining of the radioactive materials.

What do we see in these moving pictures? You might say "nothing!" And yet we see something. What we see are speckles imprinted on the film, on a blue-green surface, and we "hear" the same speckles in the noise of the film reproduction. By analogy, we associate these speckles and noises with the title of the film: *The Sounds of Millions of Insects, the Light of Thousands of Stars in the Sky*. But this level of analysis, which dwells on the analogical and mimetic, is as if it makes us forget the possibility of analyzing the sensitive aspects of Nishikawa's operation. And what are these? Firstly, this film was buried 25 km from the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, in soil that, although declared decontaminated, retains, as Nishikawa states, the residue of its own radioactivity. It is as if the entire film had been "filmed" through these residues. It is as if, beyond the artist's gesture of placement, the creators of the film were the ground and the atmosphere. It is a "painting of the inorganic," similar to the "writing of light" that Anäis Tondeur achieved together with Michael Marder in their Chernobyl Herbarium (MARDER and TONDEUR 2016).

Perhaps the difference between the two operations lies in this act of burial in Nishikawa's work, where the invisible emerges in the darkest and most inaccessible place to the eye through direct contact with the ground and the air. Another difference lies in the possibility of perceiving the movement of the image in Nishikawa's audiovisual work, which is impossible in Tondeur's photography. In this sense, Nishikawa's footage seems to extend direct contact with the contaminated earth to our bodies, giving us access to a metamorphic plane excluded from Tondeur's mimesis. It is as if, through contact, it were demonstrating an uncontrollable metamorphosis into a form, into a sense of the world oriented towards us.

Nishikawa's work is indeed a "buried image." At the same time, it is—to use DIDI-HUBERMAN's (2002) term—an "unburied image": an image loaded with time, which allows us to imagine the anachronism of time because such an anachronism is directly imprinted on the body of the image. It is the earth, the ground—beyond any human subject—that charges the image with such anachronism, speckles the surface of the film, sensitizes aspects that were simply invisible until the world images of the Fukushima disaster were filmed: destroyed buildings, debris, waves. Nishikawa's work, by refusing to be reduced to a world image, is thus a sign of the alternative that is already taking shape under our gaze, but without looking at us as human beings, as human forms of life. It is an image of time that cannot be concentrated in one point, that cannot be stopped in the moment. It is as if, in front of Nishikawa's image, in contact with the concrete ground of Fukushima, all time is present at once, and the distinction between present, past, and future collapses. In this way, we are confronted not only with the invisible, but with the "un-world" itself: an invisible that is not only unseen, but also what we never wanted to see. Too big for us, it is not we who contemplate the unworldly, but it is it that involves us in its cosmic metamorphosis.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude with a small addendum, a question to which I have not yet found an answer and to which, as I mentioned at the beginning of this essay, there may be no answer at all. If the "world" is meaning, and if this meaning multiplies the "un-world"—that which deprives us of the possibility of this meaning causing embarrassment and generating anxiety—then images like those of Nishikawa help us to perform a fundamental imaginative operation in the face of catastrophe. Imagining catastrophes, which are not future because as Fukushima teaches us they are already happening before our eyes, is always an operation that, by destabilizing the sense of the world for us, leads us to question three central aspects of that "sense of the world" that is overturned along with the "world" itself: the measure of time, the availability of space, and the autonomy of the subject.

To imagine the Fukushima Daiichi disaster as a place where the unworldly is already happening is, in short, to radically reimagine a time, space, and subject that no longer have anything to do with a time, space, and subject for us alone. Time now operates on an inhuman scale. (Think of nuclear power and its effects, which last for radically inhuman times [Fongaro 2020]). Space is no longer habitable in its usual forms: it is becoming a "No Men's Zone." Subjectivity, far from being that of the autonomous modern subject, is now literally enmeshed in a sensitive cosmos, having to reckon with a non-human agency to which it literally cannot make sense.

In conclusion, living in contact with catastrophe, experiencing this contact as *con-tact* (a form of touch capable of making a common space tangible), can only force us to confront these three problems. It is urgent to try to deal with them, because it is about an aesthetics, an ontology, a politics, and even a religion, which today seems to have lost its traditional ability to interpret the meaning of human existence on earth.

References

Cimatti, Felice. 2022. *Assembramenti*. Orthotes.

Didi-Huberman, Georges. 2002. *L'Image survivante. Histoire de l'art et temps des fantômes selon Aby Warburg*. Les Éditions de Minuit.

Didi-Huberman, Georges. 2021. *Sentire il grisou*. Orthotes.

Fongaro, Enrico. 2020. "Forget the Unforgettable or Recall the Unrecollectable? How to Commemorate Fukushima's Nuclear Disaster (If Time has Gone out of Joint)." In *Fukushima, Northeastern Japan and the Conceptualization of Catastrophe*, Christopher Craig, Enrico Fongaro, Andreas Niehaus, eds., 29–50. Mimesis International.

Foucault, Michel. 1994. *Dits et* écrits*, tome IV (1980–1988)*. Gallimard.

Latour, Bruno. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*, Harvard University Press.

Marder, Michael, and Anaïs Tondeur. 2016. *The Chernobyl Herbarium: Fragments of an Exploded Consciousness*. Open Humanities Press.

Metz, Christian. 1986. *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema*. Translated by Celia Britton, Annwyl Williams, Ben Brewster, and Alfred Guzzetti. Indiana University Press.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1997. *The Sense of the World*. University of Minnesota Press.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. 2007. *The Creation of the World or Globalization*. State University of New York Press.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. 2015. *After Fukushima: The Equivalence of Catastrophes*. Fordham University Press.

Nishitani, Keiji. 1982. *Religion and Nothingness*. Translated by Jan Van Bragt. University of California Press.

Persons and the State
"Personality" in Nishida Kitarō's Zen no kenkyū

Joseph Henares

Princeton University

The following was the basis for a presentation at the Permanent Seminar on Nishida Kitarō, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, on 10 September 2023. Joseph Henares is currently writing his dissertation on the meaning and use of the concept of jinkaku *in modern Japan.*

Most scholarship dealing with Nishida Kitarō's (1870–1945) seminal 1911 monograph *An Inquiry into the Good* (*Zen no kenkyū* 善の研究) focuses on its first two sections, entitled "pure experience" (*junsui keiken* 純粋経験) and "reality" (*jitsuzai* 実在).[1] Despite evoking the title of the monograph, the third section, entitled "the good" (*zen* 善), has received comparatively less attention. This paper focuses on this third section, paying special attention to the influence of the British dealist philosopher T. H. Green (1836–1882) on Nishida Kitarō's conception of *jinkaku* 人格 as "personality." Here, Nishida reinterprets Green's individualist-personalist understanding of personality by granting personality to various levels of "social consciousness," including the state. After a brief discussion of the historical context behind Nishida's writings on personality, this paper compares Green's writings on "personality" in *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883) with Nishida's writings on *jinkaku* in *Zen no kenkyū* and offers a close reading of the latter in order to shed further light on Nishida's view of the relationship between the state and the individual.

T. H. Green and Japanese Philosophy

Thomas Hill Green was an idealist philosopher who served as White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University from 1878 until his death. Although he is today often overlooked in survey courses on the history of philosophy,

1. Christopher Goto-Jones, *Political Philosophy in Japan* (Routledge, 2005), 51.

Green was an important historical figure for the discipline. Politically, he played an important part in the late nineteenth-century "New Liberalism" movement that rejected *laissez-faire* economics, and philosophically he took a leading role in the rise of Kantian and Hegelian idealism in Britain before the turn of the twentieth century.[2] Green had a significant impact not just on Japanese philosophy, but on Japanese society as a whole. His philosophy was introduced to Japan by Nakashima Rikizō (1858–1918),[3] who was appointed chair of ethics at Tokyo Imperial University in 1893 and whose students included luminaries like Takayama Chogyū, Ōnishi Hajime, and Nishida Kitarō.[4] Across Japan, scholars discussed the "Green school" of philosophy and ethics, and questions on Green's thought were asked at the annual government examinations for certificates to teach morality in elementary and middle schools.[5] Green has thus been described by one source as "unquestionably the most *popular* Western thinker at the turn of the century."[6]

Green's philosophy took its most mature form in his posthumously published magnum opus *Prolegomena to Ethics*. Here, Green argued that one's experiences necessarily require the existence of a self-conscious mind. He argued further that reality must be conceived as "a single and unalterable order of relations," which is conceived by an eternal consciousness—described in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as a self-conscious corporate agent[7]—that includes all of the finite systems of relations that are within the minds of individual persons.[8] Green believed that this eternal consciousness was necessary for objectivity, it was present and operative in the consciousnesses of individual persons, and the growth of knowledge in individual persons was the result of the operation of this eternal consciousness in each individual person. Green's philosophical position, thus, is a version of absolute idealism.[9]

As Richard Reitan has demonstrated, Green's writings, translated into Japanese, became important within the context of the discourse of "personalism" (*jinkakushugi* 人格主義) in Japan.[10] This was largely because of the influence of

---

2. For a classic overview of Green's influence in Britain, see Melvin Richter, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age* (Harvard University Press, 1964). For an overview of the British Idealist movement that Green inspired, see W. J. Mander, *British Idealism: A History* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

3. Atsuko Hirai, *Individualism and Socialism: The Life and Thought of Kawai Eijirō* (Harvard University Press, 1986), 90. Richard Reitan argues that "Nakashima" is the correct rendering of 中島 in *Making a Moral Society* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010).

4. Reitan, 84, 87.

5. Hirai, 90.

6. Hirai, 90–91.

7. David Brink, "Thomas Hill Green," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, eds., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/green.

8. Thomas Hill Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Clarendon Press, 1906), xii.

9. For a more detailed analysis of Green's stance, see Brink, "Thomas Hill Green."

10. Reitan, 121.

personalist philosopher Nakashima. His essay "Concerning the British Neo-Kantian school," serialized in 1892 and 1893, focused on Green's thought. Nakashima largely followed Green, claiming that all phenomena exist because of their relation to some other phenomena, and that there must be an "eternal consciousness" that makes these relations its "eternal object." The good, for personalists like Nakashima, was understood as the realization of the self or the personality in unity with absolute spirit, a process that was often rendered in Japanese by personalists as *jinkaku jitsugen* 人格実現 (personality realization) or *jiga jitsugen* 自我実現 (self-realization).[11]

On a global level, "personalism" is a slippery term. The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* mentions that personalism has "many different versions," which make it "somewhat difficult to define as a philosophical and theological movement." Additionally, the entry claims, "It is, in point of fact, more proper to speak of many *personalisms* than one personalism."[12] However, according to Reitan, "personalism" (*jinkakushugi*) in Japan could be described as "a form of philosophical idealism centering on the moral cultivation of the personality of an individual."[13]

Although it was centered on the moral cultivation of the individual, personalism connected the individual to society at large and to the state by conceiving of the "person" as both individual and social. Outlining the state of personalist discourse in Japan before the turn of the twentieth century, Reitan writes,

> For philosophers of personalism in 1890s Japan, the "person" was not merely individual, but social as well. Drawing upon an epistemology that brought together subject and object, self and other, personalism reconfigured utilitarian conceptions of the person as an isolated, socially atomistic individual, putting forward instead the view that the person was both individual and social. To the extent that a person could both actualize their own unique potentialities and cultivate a self-awareness of their sociality, he or she realizes "the good." The good of the self, in this view, is the good of the other. The state, in personalist thought, was the space within such "self-realization" took place. The primary function of the state was to facilitate the individual's social actualization by creating the conditions necessary for

11. Reitan, 87–88.

12. Thomas D. Williams and Jan Olof Bengtsson, "Personalism," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/personalism. This *Stanford Encyclopedia* article emphasizes that discourse about "personalism" in the West is often intertwined with Christian theology. This is particularly significant in Green's case, as his philosophy was often interpreted as an attempt to push forward an intellectually defensible version of Christianity in the wake of the spread of "higher criticism" from Germany and the rise of agnosticism. For more details, see Mander, *British Idealism*.

13. Reitan, 120–121. Green's "personality" was translated into Japanese as *jinkaku*.

this to take place. That is, it functioned as the means to bring about
the end of self-realization. If the state stifled this process, it was not
fulfilling its purpose.[14]

Thus, late nineteenth-century Japanese personalist discourse represented the indi-
vidual person as aiming for self-realization in society, aided (ideally) by the state,
which lays the groundwork for this self-realization.

However, Reitan notes that the personalist language of Green's works would
later be used to buttress the "national morality" (*kokumin dōtoku* 国民道徳) ideol-
ogy propounded by Inoue Tetsujirō that would come to be the "dominant form
of moral inquiry among *rinrigaku* 倫理学 academics in early twentieth-century
Japan."[15] According to Reitan, "national morality" began to "coopt the philosophy
of personalism to legitimize the suppression of 'dangerous thought'" around the
time of Inoue Tetsujirō's famous discourse on national morality in 1911, which
would later be published as *Kokumin dōtoku gairon* 国民道徳概論 in 1912.[16] This
work was followed by the publication of more than fifty scholarly works on
"national morality" in the next decade.[17]

Reitan notes that personalism carried within it a crucial ambivalence that
allowed for its exploitation by national morality discourse. On the one hand,
personalism emphasized the self-actualization of the individual; but on the other
hand, it asked the individual to preserve the state (which is understood as the space
of self-actualization) by obeying the laws of the state. This is in line with the thought
of Green, who believed that individuals should judge for themselves whether laws
were truly serving the common good. If they concluded that they were not, then
these individuals were entitled to resist through legal channels.[18] However, pro-
ponents of national morality forced the acceptance of the idea that the state was
to be preferred over the individual. Reitan argues that they supported their posi-
tion through an expansion of the meaning of "personality." As Reitan recounts,

> [I]n national morality thought, the ideal of "complete personality"
> referred not merely to the self-realization of the individual, but to
> the realization or perfection of the state as well. This was because the
> state also possessed personality, one that national morality scholars
> identified with individual personality by drawing upon the subject-
> as-object philosophy of personalism.[19]

---

14. Reitan, 121.
15. Reitan, 115.
16. Reitan, 120.
17. Reitan, 115.
18. Reitan, 122.
19. Reitan, 123.

In other words, Reitan argues that in national morality discourse, the state is not merely the entity that sets the conditions for the self-realization of individual persons, as it is in personalism. The state itself has personality and thus *is* a person. As a result, the good of the state-person can and should be privileged over the good of mere individual persons. In Reitan's words, "Whereas personalism posited the state as merely a means to the end of individual self-realization, national morality prioritized the completion of the state."[20]

Personality in T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883)

The move by national moralists to grant personality to the state lacks precedent in Green's work. In his magnum opus, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883), Green understands personality to be a quality of individuals and not of the state. This is clearly shown in sections 180–190, which form the beginning of chapter 2, "Characteristics of the Moral Ideal." Green helpfully devotes section 180 to a summary of his argument up to this point:

> Let us pause here to take stock of the conclusions so far arrived at. It will be convenient to state them in dogmatic form, begging the reader to understand that this form is adopted to save time, and does not betoken undue assurance on the part of the writer. Through certain media, and under certain consequent limitations, but with the constant characteristic of self-consciousness and self-objectification, the one divine mind gradually reproduces itself in the human soul.[21]

In this way, Green succinctly summarizes his argument. The divine mind, which for Green is equivalent to the aforementioned "eternal consciousness," reproduces itself in the souls of human beings. As a result, these souls are self-conscious (that is, they are aware of themselves) and are able to self-objectify (they are able to make themselves the objects of their consciousness).

In section 182, Green makes clear that self-consciousness and self-objectification are necessary for what he calls "personality":

> It is clearly of the very essence of the doctrine above advanced [the doctrine that the divine mind reproduces itself in the human soul] that the divine principle, which we suppose to be realising itself in man, should be supposed to realise itself in persons, as such. But for reflection on our personality, on our consciousness of ourselves as objects to ourselves, we could never dream of there being such a

20. Reitan, 124.
21. Green, 206–207.

self-realising principle at all, whether as implied in the world or in ourselves. It is only because we are consciously objects to ourselves, that we can conceive a world as an object to a single mind, and thus as a connected whole. It is the irreducibility of this self-objectifying consciousness to anything else, the impossibility of accounting for it as an effect, that compels us to regard it as the presence in us of the mind for which the world exists. To admit therefore that the self-realisation of the divine principle can take place otherwise than in a consciousness which is an object to itself, would be in contradiction of the very ground upon which we believe that a divine principle does so realise itself in man. Personality, no doubt, is a term that has often been fought over without any very precise meaning being attached to it. If we mean anything else by it than the quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself, we are not justified in saying that it necessarily belongs to God and to any being in whom God in any measure reproduces or realises himself. But whatever we mean by personality, and whatever difficulties may attach to the notion that a divine principle realises itself through a qualifying medium in the persons of men, it is certain that we shall only fall into contradictions by substituting for persons, as the subject in which the divine self-realisation takes place, any entity to which self-consciousness cannot intelligibly be ascribed. If it is impossible that the divine self-realisation should be complete in such persons as we are or can conceive ourselves coming to be, on the other hand in the absence of self-objectification, which is at least the essential thing in personality, it cannot even be inchoate.[22]

In this lengthy passage, Green implies that personality is the "quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself," and that it thus includes self-consciousness and self-objectification. Consequently, "personality" for Green is a kind of self-reflexive awareness that only persons can have; hence, the term "personality." Even though nonhuman animals can feel and think to some degree, it is only persons who can consciously become objects to themselves.

For Green, the moral life is the fulfillment of a divine idea—the aforementioned "eternal consciousness"—in the human spirit. However, Green makes it clear that the human spirit cannot fulfil this divine idea apart from in individual persons. As Green aptly writes in section 184, "Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person."[23]

22. Green, 208–209.
23. Green, 210–211.

Crucially, later in section 184, Green explicitly rejects the claim that a "national spirit" could exist as such, as an entity that could be metaphorically said to exist "in the ether," separate from individual persons. As Green writes,

> Nor, unless we allow ourselves to play fast and loose with the terms 'spirit' and 'will,' can we suppose a national spirit and will to exist except as the spirit and will of individuals, affected in a certain way by intercourse with each other and by the history of the nation…. It would seem that it [a national spirit] could only mean one of two things; either (a) some type of personal character, as at any time exhibited by individuals who are held together and personally modified by national ties and interests which they recognise as such; or (b) such a type of personal character as we may suppose should result, according to the divine idea of the world, from the intercourse of individuals with each other under the influence of the common institutions which make a particular nation, whether that type of character is actually attained or no. At any rate, if a 'national spirit' is held to be a form in which an eternal Spirit, in the only sense in which we have reason to think there is such a thing, realises itself, then it can only have its being in persons, though in persons, of course, specially modified by the special conditions of their intercourse with each other.[24]

Thus, for Green, a national spirit cannot exist as an independent entity. However, a "national spirit" could be said to exist as a "personal character" that appears in the various individuals who live in a given nation, as a result of national ties or common national institutions. Nevertheless, a national spirit can never be self-conscious or self-objectifying, and thus, a national spirit can never have personality.

In accordance with this line of thinking, Green claims that human spiritual progress is meaningless unless it refers to "a progress of personal character and to personal character." This is because, as Green notes in section 185, the human spirit "cannot develop itself according to its [divine] idea except in self-conscious subjects." Consequently, Green writes in the same section,

> The spiritual progress of mankind is thus an unmeaning phrase, unless it means a progress of personal character and to personal character— a progress of which feeling, thinking, and willing subjects are the agents and sustainers, and of which each step is a fuller realisation of the capacities of such subjects. It is simply unintelligible unless understood to be in the direction of more perfect forms of personal life.[25]

24. Green, 211–212.
25. Green, 212–213.

When Green says that the human spirit can only realize itself—thereby fulfilling the divine idea of man—in and through persons, he is also affirming that "realization and fulfilment can only take place in and through society."[26] As Green writes in section 190,

> Without society, no persons: this is as true as that without persons, without self-objectifying agents, there could be no such society as we know. Such society is founded on the recognition by persons of each other, and their interest in each other, as persons, i.e. as beings who are ends to themselves, who are consciously determined to action by the conception of themselves, as that for the sake of which they act.[27]

Thus, in Green's view, society and individual persons exist in a symbiotic relationship, sustaining each other. While it is obvious that society needs the self-objectifying agents that are individual persons, it is also true that, as Green pithily puts it, "[w]ithout society, no persons."[28] This is because Green believes that it is only through participation in society that people learn to regard themselves as persons.

Green believes that proper self-consciousness of one's personality required the recognition of one's own personality by another. As he writes later in section 190,

> Some practical recognition of personality by another, of an "I" by a "Thou" and a "Thou" by an "I," is necessary to any practical consciousness of it, to any such consciousness of it as can express itself in act…. But we know that we, who are born under an established system of family ties, and of reciprocal rights and obligations sanctioned by the state, learn to regard ourselves as persons among other persons because we are treated as such. From the dawn of intelligence we are treated, in one way or another, as entitled to have a will of our own, to make ourselves the objects of our actions, on condition of our practically recognising the same title in others. All education goes on the principle that we are, or are to become, persons in this sense.[29]

In other words, people learn to regard themselves as persons because other people treat them as persons. Through the existence of "others" in society, thus, individuals are able to conceive of themselves as persons.[30]

In sum, then, Green's stance is an individualist-personalist one, one that ascribes personality—defined as the special kind of self-consciousness and self-

---

26. Green, 217–218.
27. Green, 218.
28. Green, 218–219.
29. Green, 218–219.
30. Green, 218–219.

objectification that persons have—only to individuals. For Green, the divine idea—the eternal consciousness—can be fulfilled not in a "national spirit" or a state, but only in individual persons. These persons need society, because society allows individuals to recognize their own personality through their interactions with other persons. Yet at the same time, although Green argues that persons are in some sense dependent upon society in order to actualize personality, he never makes the case that society *is* a kind of personality. On the contrary, society exists primarily in order to set up the conditions for the mutual flourishing of individual persons.

Personality (*jinkaku*) in Nishida Kitarō's *Zen no kenkyū* (1911)

As Yukiyasu and others have shown, Nishida Kitarō's *Zen no kenkyū* was influenced by Green's philosophy.[31] In 1895, shortly after his 1894 graduation as a *senka* student from Tokyo Imperial University, Nishida published his first article, which was entitled "Guriin shi rinrigaku no taii" グリーン氏倫理学の大意. In this article, Nishida attempted to summarize Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* for a Japanese audience.[32] As Yukiyasu emphasizes, even before this point, Nishida had shown interest in Green's thought. One of Nishida's professors at Tokyo Imperial University was Nakashima, the personalist philosopher who introduced Green's thought to Japan, and it is thought that Nishida attended a lecture course taught by Nakashima in 1893.[33] Around this time, Nishida also mentioned Green in a passage in one of his letters, which Yukiyasu translates as follows: "I am reading Part I, *Prolegomena to Ethics*. This book is congenial to me, and it seems to me that I am very interested in it."[34] Consequently, when Nishida wrote the pieces that would be published in 1911 as *Zen no kenkyū*, he did so against the background of his previous exposure to Green's thought. In fact, according to Yukiyasu, there are points in books 2 and 3 of *Zen no kenkyū* that are patterned off "Guriin shi rinrigaku no taii."[35] For example, he points out that while Green understood the self as a unity constituted by desire, intellect, and will in *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Nishida understood *jinkaku* as a unity of desire (*ganbō* 願望), thought (*shisō* 思想), and will (*ishi* 意志) in *Zen no kenkyū*.[36]

31. See Yukiyasu Shigeru, "Nishida Kitarō to T. H. Guriin," *Nihon tetsugaku-shi kenkyū: Kyoto daigaku aigakuin bungaku kenkyū-ka nihon tetsugaku-shi kenkyūshitsu kiyō* 9 (2012): 1–22 and Yukiyasu Shigeru, *Kindai Nihon shisōka to igirisu risōshugi* (Hokuju shuppan, 2007). For earlier work on Nishida and Green, see Takeuchi Yoshitomo, *Nishida Kitarō* (Kindai Nihon no shisōka 7) (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1966) and Mizuno Tomoharu, "Risōshugi-teki risei-teki shinkō," *Hikaku shisō kenkyū* 27 (2000): 66–72.
32. Reitan, 88.
33. Yukiyasu, *Kindai Nihon shisōka to Igirisu risōshugi*, 108.
34. Yukiyasu, *Kindai Nihon shisōka to Igirisu risōshugi*, 370.
35. Yukiyasu, *Kindai Nihon shisōka to Igirisu risōshugi*, 109.
36. Yukiyasu, *Kindai Nihon shisōka to Igirisu risōshugi*, 109.

In order to shed light on Nishida's stance toward the individual and the state, it is particularly important to focus both on the ways in which Nishida's stance on *jinkaku* is similar to Green's view of personality and on the ways in which it differs from Green's view. In fact, Nishida's stance on personality as expressed in *Zen no kenkyū* is one that Reitan attacks during his critique of national morality. Like the partisans of national morality, Nishida too goes beyond Green's individual conception of personality and claims that personality can be ascribed to the state. However, as I will argue later, this does not mean that Nishida was himself a partisan of the national morality movement.

Like Green, who holds an individualist-personalist conception of personality as the self-consciousness and self-objectification that individual persons have as a result of the presence of the eternal consciousness in them, Nishida understands *jinkaku* as a force that exists both within individual consciousness and within the deepest recesses of reality itself. However, Nishida develops a view of personality that leads to the ascription of personality to the state and beyond. At the beginning of chapter 25, Nishida identifies "the good" with the actualization of personality through the satisfying of the demands of personality.

> As I stated earlier, the good refers to that which satisfies the internal demands of the self. Because the greatest demands of the self—that is, the demands of personality [*jinkaku*]—are the fundamental unifying power of consciousness, to satisfy these demands and thereby actualize personality is for us the absolute good. The demands of the personality are the unifying power of consciousness and, at the same time, an expression of the infinite unifying power at the base of reality; and so to actualize and fulfill our personality means to become one with this underlying power.[37]

Nishida refers back to his statements at the end of chapter 24, where he argues, "If we regard this unifying power [the unifying power of consciousness] as the personality of each individual, then the good resides in the maintenance and development of personality as this unifying power."[38] Once again, Nishida's invocation of "personality," like Green's, ties individual persons to a deeper and more fundamental reality. As he writes at the end of chapter 24, "[I]f we assume that phenomena of consciousness are the only reality, then our personalities are the activity of the unifying power of the universe. In other words, our personalities are the particular

---

37. Nishida Kitarō, trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives, *An Inquiry into the Good* (Yale University Press, 1990), 132.
38. Nishida, 130.

forms in which the sole reality—which transcends the distinction between mind and matter—manifests itself according to circumstances."[39]

In chapter 25, Nishida then explains how people can become aware of the demands of personality:

> We can be aware of the demands of the whole personality only in the state of direct experience prior to deliberative discrimination. In this state, personality is the voice of a type of internal demand that emerges from the depths of the mind and that gradually envelops the mind as a whole. Conduct that takes personality itself as its goal is conduct that accords with this demand.[40]

Thus, Nishida holds that we should be able to access this "state of direct experience" in order to be aware of the "demands of the whole personality."

This Zen-like "state of direct experience" is to be understood as characteristic of the "true unity of consciousness." As Nishida writes in chapter 24,

> The true unity of consciousness is a pure and simple activity that comes forth of itself, unhindered by oneself; it is the original state of independent, self-sufficient consciousness, with no distinction among knowledge, feeling, and volition, and no separation of subject and object. At this time our true personality expresses itself in its entirety. Personality therefore is not found in mere reason or desire, much less in unconscious impulses; like the inspiration of a genius, it is an infinite unifying power that functions directly and spontaneously from within each individual.[41]

In Nishida's view, personality is a unifying power that springs up from within each individual, and it is to be identified with pure experience and the "pure and simple activity" of the primordial unity of consciousness. As Nishida writes later, personality is both "the unifying power of consciousness" and "the unifying power of reality."[42] It is both subjective and objective, tethering each individual to a fundamentally distinction-less level of reality.

This is an important difference from Green, who never endorses the possibility that one might access a "direct experience" of the "true unity of consciousness" prior to deliberation. For Green, even though the "eternal consciousness" realizes itself in individual persons, individual persons are limited in their comprehension of this "eternal consciousness." It is likely, that Nishida's innovation stems from his

---

39. Nishida, 131.
40. Nishida, 133.
41. Nishida, 130–131.
42. Nishida, 136.

experience with Zen practice. As Yukiyasu has observed, Nishida departs from Green's thought when he draws on his own experiences with Zen in order to make claims about the ways in which the individual can access a deeper reality.[43]

In chapter 26, Nishida, like Green, stresses the ontological importance of the individual person. For Nishida, personality—which he defines as both "the unifying power of consciousness" and "the unifying power of reality"—is first actualized in individuals. He argues that what gives an individual ultimate satisfaction is "the actualization of the individuality of the self," which he understands as "the displaying of one's distinctive characteristics in practice." These distinctive characteristics are "unique characteristics that cannot be imitated by others," and thus each person's realization of individuality allows each person to be "an indispensable part of the evolution of the universe." In addition, in a crucial passage, Nishida claims the following:

> I hold that the good of the individual is most important and that it serves as the basis of all other goods. Truly great people are so not because of the greatness of their achievements, but because they have displayed great individuality. If one climbs to a high place and yells, one's voice will probably carry a long way because the place is high, not because the voice is loud. I believe that people who thoroughly express their own unique characteristics are greater than those who forget their duty to themselves and heedlessly run around for the sake of others.[44]

Thus, Nishida claims unambiguously that "the good of the individual is most important" and that it "serves as the basis of all other goods."[45] In this way, he is in line with individualist philosophers like Green and Immanuel Kant, who famously held that rational human beings should always be treated as ends in themselves, and never as a means to an end.

Like Green, Nishida also conceives of the individual as being fundamentally linked to society. For Nishida, however, society's role is more than just to serve as the space that sets up the conditions for the self-realization of individual persons, as it is for Green. This can be seen in Nishida's conception of the "social consciousness" and its various stages, to which I now turn. Drawing on Aristotle, Nishida suggests that people are social animals. Using biological imagery, Nishida claims that "physical bodies are not entirely individual" because they "originate in the cells

---

43. Yukiyasu, *Kindai Nihon shisōka to Igirisu risōshugi*, 114, 116, 118.
44. Nishida, 137.
45. Nishida, 137.

of [their] ancestors." He then states, "When humans live in communities, a social consciousness necessarily functions to unify the consciousness of the members."[46]

For Nishida, this "social consciousness" is important because it generates cultural systems and standards for action and because it is the basis for the generation of the "distinctive characteristics" of individuals.

> Language, manners, customs, social systems, laws, religion, and literature are all phenomena of this social consciousness. Our individual consciousnesses emerge from and are nurtured by it, and they are single cells that constitute this great consciousness. Knowledge, morality, and aesthetic taste all have social significance, and even the most universal learning does not escape social convention. (It is for this reason that at present each nation [*shokoku* 諸国] has its own academic tradition.) The distinctive characteristics of an individual are simply variations that derive from the social consciousness at their base. Even the most original genius cannot step beyond the scope of this social consciousness; in fact, such a person is one who most displays the deepest significance of the social consciousness. (Christ's relationship to Judaism is one example of this.) In short, anyone who stands absolutely unrelated to the social consciousness has the consciousness of the insane [*kyōjin no ishiki* 狂人の意識].[47]

Thus far, everything that Nishida has suggested about the social consciousness is in line with what Green has said about "national spirit." For Green, the "national spirit" cannot exist as an independent entity, but it can exist as a "personal character" that can appear in the various individuals of a nation as a result of national institutions or national ties. Thus, the language, manners, customs, social systems, laws, religion, and literature of a given nation could generate a "national spirit" in the form of a "personal character" that would appear in the nation's individual citizens but would not exist as an independent entity.

However, Nishida then provides signs that he is moving beyond Green. Nishida's stance on the social consciousness is that it is a "living reality" because it has a unique character that arises from its unity. Thus, Nishida writes:

> [W]e encounter conflicting opinions about whether communal consciousness exists in the same sense as individual consciousness and can therefore be seen as a single personality. Høffding and others deny the existence of a unified consciousness. Høffding states that a forest is a collection of trees and that if the forest were divided there

46. Nishida, 138.
47. Nishida, 138–139.

would no longer be a forest; likewise, a society is a collection of individuals, and there is no independent existence called a society that stands apart from individuals. We cannot say, however, that there is no unity simply because unity no longer exists after the dissection of the whole. If we analyze individual consciousness, we do not find a separate, unifying self. But because there is a unity upon which a unique character arises and various phenomena are established, we consider this unity a living reality. For the same reason, we can view social consciousness as a living reality.[48]

In this passage, Nishida advances nothing that is necessarily in conflict with Green's stance on the "national spirit." Nishida acknowledges that society has no independent existence beyond the individuals that make it up. However, he begins to suggest an expansion of the concept of personality that is unsupported in Green's writing by raising the question of whether communal consciousness can "be seen as a single personality."[49]

At this point, Nishida links the social consciousness with altruism and with a non-individualistic conception of the self and of personality.

Because our individual consciousnesses are parts of such a social consciousness, most of our demands are social. If we were to remove all altruistic elements from our desires almost nothing would remain. This is clear when we see our desire for life as caused primarily by altruism. We find greater overall satisfaction in the satisfaction experienced by what the self loves and by the society to which one belongs than in personal satisfaction. Fundamentally, the center of the self is not limited to the interior of the individual: the self of a mother is found in her child, and the self of a loyal subject is found in the monarch. As one's personality becomes greater, the demands of the self become increasingly social.[50]

Nishida's view that a mother's self is found in her child and that a loyal subject's self is found in the monarch implies that the self is not limited merely to the individual; instead, the self can be found in the objects of one's altruism and love. As personality becomes greater, the demands of the self become greater and more social precisely because of the social bonds of altruism and love that are thus generated. This is an original point that Nishida is making, one that lacks a precedent in Green.

48. Nishida, 139.
49. Nishida, 138–139.
50. Nishida, 139.

Nishida then delineates three levels of social consciousness that go beyond individual consciousness. The smallest and most immediate level is that of the family, in which "the sexes complement each other and can thereby bring about the development of a complete personality." The next level is that of the state (*kokka*),[51] which Nishida claims "unifies the entirety of our conscious activity and expresses a single personality." The third level of social consciousness, "a social union that includes all humankind," one prefigured in Pauline Christianity and Stoic thought, is not yet in existence. Until this time has come, however, Nishida holds that the state is "the greatest expression of unified communal consciousness."[52]

Nishida makes explicit his rejection of Green's individualist-personalist understanding of the word "personality" in a lengthy passage in which he describes the goal of the state. The 1990 translation of this critical passage is reproduced here, with one caveat. The critical word *kokka* 国家 has been rendered as "state," not "nation":

> The development of social consciousness is not limited to the small group of the family. Our mental and physical life can develop in all of the various social groups. At the next level beyond the family, the state [*kokka*] unifies the entirety of our conscious activity and expresses a single personality [*jinkaku*]. Many theories have been set forth concerning the goal of the state. Some people consider the essence of the state to be the power of sovereignty and think that the purpose of the state is to ward off enemies on the outside and protect life and property of the people on the inside. (Schopenhauer, Taine, and Hobbes hold this opinion.) Others consider the essence of the state to be the individual, and see the harmonious development of individual personalities as constituting its purpose. (This is the type of theory advanced by such people as Rousseau.) But the true goal of the state is not something material and passive as outlined by the former group, and the personality of an individual is not the foundation of the state as maintained by the latter. We individuals are entities that have developed as cells of one society. The essence of the state is the expression of the communal consciousness that constitutes the foundation of our minds. In the context of the state, we can accomplish a great development of personality; the state is a unified personality, and the systems and laws of the state are expressions of the will of this communal consciousness. (This theory was set forth in antiquity by Plato and Aristotle and in modern times by Hegel.) To exert ourselves for

51. The Abe and Ives translation of *Zen no kenkyū* and Goto-Jones's *Political Philosophy in Japan* both translate *kokka* as "nation." In contrast, this paper translates *kokka* as "state."
52. Nishida, 139–141.

the sake of a state is to exert ourselves for the sake of the development and perfection of a great personality. Moreover, when a state punishes an individual, it does so neither for revenge nor for the safety of society, but because personality possesses an inviolable dignity.[53]

This passage contains a rejection of Green's individualist-personalist understanding of personality. After considering the stance of thinkers like Rousseau who, like Green, "consider the essence of the state to be the individual and see the harmonious development of individual personalities as constituting its purpose," Nishida rejects this stance by writing that "the personality of an individual is not the foundation of the state." For him, the essence of the state is neither the power of sovereignty nor the individual, but is instead the expression of the aforementioned "communal consciousness." Hence, Nishida writes that "[t]he essence of the state is the expression of the communal consciousness that constitutes the foundation of our minds." Because the state expresses the communal consciousness, he argues that it is through the state that "we can accomplish a great development of personality," and he reiterates that the state is a "unified personality," whose laws are expressions of the will of the communal consciousness. As a result of its possession of this "unified personality," the state has a right to punish individuals who might endanger the state's personality. Thus, in sum, Nishida has taken "personality," which was for Green a means of delineating the special kind of self-consciousness and self-objectification that is characteristic of persons, and turned it into something that can adhere to various levels of social consciousness, including the state. In this specific case, Nishida's stance that the state can have "personality" is indeed a position that he shares with national moralists.

However, this raises several further questions about Nishida's position on individuals and their relationship to the state. On the one hand, Nishida writes, "I hold that the good of the individual is most important and that it serves as the basis of all other goods."[54] On the other hand, if individuals are "entities that have developed as cells of one society,"[55] then it becomes unclear how one ought to defend prioritizing the "personality" of individuals over the "personality" of the state, which is "the greatest expression of unified communal consciousness."[56] This is a complex issue, and it appears to be linked to what Yukiyasu suggests is a tension in *Zen no kenkyū* between the good of the individual and the good of society.[57]

53. Nishida, 140–141.
54. Nishida, 137.
55. Nishida, 140–141.
56. Nishida, 139–141.
57. Yukiyasu, "Nishida Kitarō to T. H. Guriin," 12.

That being said, I would disagree with the claim that Nishida ought to be numbered among the national moralists merely because he applies the concept of "personality" to the state. Even though Nishida goes beyond Green in applying "personality" to social groups like the family, state, and still-unrealized social union of humankind, it appears that Nishida's conception of the "personality" of the state is in line with Green's writings on the "national spirit." As mentioned before, Green held that the "national spirit" could refer to a personal character that individuals exhibit as a result of national ties or the influence of national institutions. While Nishida discusses the state as a "single personality" or a "unified personality," he does so within the context of a discussion of the various levels of social consciousness. As mentioned above, the phenomena of social consciousness that Nishida lists explicitly are language, manners, customs, social systems, laws, religion, and literature. These phenomena can be interpreted as being part of Green's "national spirit," manifesting themselves in individuals because of national ties and national institutions. For example, when Nishida asserts that "the systems and laws of the state are expressions of the will of this communal consciousness," one could interpret this statement as meaning that state laws and state systems make up part of the "national spirit" that applies to individual human beings within the state. Because of this, although Nishida goes beyond Green to say that the state is a "single personality" or a "unified personality," the substance of his thought on this point could in fact be interpreted as remaining squarely within the bounds of Green's philosophy.

Additionally, the apparent conflict in Nishida's thought between the good of the individual and the good of society hearkens back to what Reitan suggests is a tension within Japanese personalism. As mentioned before, Japanese personalism emphasized individual self-actualization while at the same time urging that individuals should obey the laws of the state, the space of self-actualization. From a Japanese personalist lens, it seems non-contradictory to say, as Nishida does, that "the good of the individual is most important" and that individuals are "cells of one society." After all, as Green emphasized, the individual person and society are mutually dependent upon each other. Thus, despite taking a national moralist position in advocating that the state has personality, Nishida's thought otherwise seems to fit firmly within the bounds of the Japanese personalism inspired by Green.

Conclusion

By means of the expansion of the concept of personality to make it adhere to the "social consciousness," which progresses from the individual to the family, the state, and an as-yet-unrealized post-state social union, Nishida rejects Green's individualist-personalist understanding of "personality." In doing so, Nishida

advances a conception of the state-as-personality, an intermediate stage on the way to a greater social union of humankind. Nishida made this move at the dawn of the twentieth century, when the discourse of national morality was also taking the vocabulary of personalism and using it to empower the state by granting "personality" to the state. However, at the same time, Nishida's understanding of the "personality" of the state seems to be coherent with Green's position on the "national spirit," and this suggests that Nishida's thought is more personalist than national-moralist.

Bibliography

Brink, David. "Thomas Hill Green." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022), Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, eds., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/green.

Goto-Jones, Christopher. *Political Philosophy in Japan*. Routledge, 2010.

Green, Thomas Hill. *Prolegomena to Ethics*. 5th ed. Clarendon Press, 1906.

Hirai, Atsuko. *Individualism and Socialism*. Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986.

Mizuno Tomoharu 水野友晴. "Risōshugiteki riseiteki shinkō" 理想主義的理性的信仰. *Hikaku shisō kenkyū* 27 (2000): 66–72.

Mander, W. J. *British Idealism: A History*. Illustrated edition. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Nishida Kitarō. *An Inquiry into the Good*. Translated by Masao Abe and Christopher Ives. Reprint edition. Yale University Press, 1992.

Reitan, Richard M. *Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan*. Illustrated edition. University of Hawai'i Press, 2009.

Richter, Melvin. *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age*. Edited by Peter Johnson. UNKNO, 1997.

Williams, Thomas D., and Jan Olof Bengtsson. "Personalism." In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2020, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020.

Yukiyasu Shigeru 行安 茂. *Kindai Nihon shisōka to igirisu risōshugi* 近代日本思想家とイギリス理想主義. Hokuju shuppan, 2007.

Yukiyasu Shigeru. "Nishida Kitarō to T. H. Guriin" 西田幾多郎とT.H.グリーン. *Nihon tetsu gakushi kenkyū: Kyoto Daigaku daigakuin bungaku kenkyūka nihon tetsugakushi kenkyūshitsu kiyō* 9 (2012): 1–22.

Institute Staff

April 2022–March 2023

SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOWS

Enrico Fongaro
Kim Seung Chul
Matthew D. McMullen
Moriya Tomoe, *Director*
Saitō Takashi

ASSOCIATE RESEARCH FELLOWS

Liang Xiao Hong
Nishiwaki Ryō

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Tim Graf

JUNIOR RESEARCH FELLOWS

Ishihara Yamato
Suemura Masayo

PROJECT RESEARCH FELLOW

Josko Kozic
Rebecca Moccia
Gerald Nelson, Jr.
Jacynthe Tremblay

SPECIAL RESEARCH FELLOW

Reinhold Bernhardt
Antonio D. Sison

RESEARCH ASSOCIATES

Fukahori Ayaka
Gotō Haruko
Alena Govorounova
Hashimoto Hiroaki
Hioki Naoko
Hoshino Sō
Inutsuka Yū
Iseki Daisuke
Iwamoto Akemi
Kawakami Tsuneo
Kobayashi Naoko
Kurata Natsuki
Kurita Hidehiko
Naitō Rieko
Okuyama Michiaki
Park Yeonjoo
Sakai Yūen
Tiziano Tosolini
Rocco Viviano

FELLOWS EMERITUS

James W. Heisig
Paul L. Swanson