

Christoph KLEINE

Rethinking the Interdependence of Buddhism and the State in Late Edo and Meiji Japan

This article asks how the Buddhist paradigm of the interdependence between the Buddha's law and the ruler's law was modified over the centuries and reinterpreted by nineteenth-century authors in the face of rapid political, social, and epistemic changes. An analysis of relevant texts reveals continuities as well as discontinuities. While the paradigm's basic function of guaranteeing autonomy and protection to Buddhist institutions remained largely unchanged, remarkable transformations in the argumentation are evident. Despite, or because of, the precarious position of Buddhism in the early Meiji period, Buddhist authors from this era choose an apologetic strategy. With some slight differences, they emphasize almost exclusively the intramundane benefits of Buddhism and thus defend themselves against the accusation that Buddhism is solely relevant to otherworldly matters. The most radical innovation, however, is the assertion that all secular norms and rules of governance are ultimately Buddhist in origin.

KEYWORDS: *ōbō buppō*—secularity—religion and politics—apologetics—late Edo period

Christoph KLEINE is Professor for the History of Religions and Co-Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences at Leipzig University, Germany.

FOCUSING on the analysis of texts from the nineteenth century that explicitly deal with the relationship between Buddhism and the state, this article aims to elucidate the reconfiguration of epistemic and social structures in Japan during its transition to global modernity. It thereby seeks to better understand the conditions and prerequisites under which a modern Western knowledge system—the institutions that represent it, and the legal systems that privilege it—were appropriated in Japan. More concretely, this article addresses the question of which endogenous conceptual resources were available to local actors in the process of appropriating a specific form of “secularity” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Since in recent years a number of articles and monographs have been published that extensively deal with the appropriation of the concept of “religion” and the codependent formation of “secularity” in Meiji Japan, I confine myself to the sub-discourse around the paradigm of the “interdependence of the ruler’s law and the Buddha’s law” (*ōbō buppō sōi* 王法仏法相依). Whether or not this paradigm should be read as a direct precursor to a specific Japanese form of secularity is certainly open to debate. The focus of this article is on how the paradigm of the interdependence of the two nomospheres was reinterpreted against a background of massive sociocultural and political changes in the nineteenth century.¹ I assume that the relevant discourse ensured that this paradigm was made available as a conceptual resource for redefining the relationship between Buddhism and the state. Yet, at the same time, a disclaimer is in order: the extent to which this conceptual resource was actually used to create a specifically Japanese form of secularity cannot be clarified here. We simply do not know to what extent, by whom, and with what consequences the texts presented here were received.

My initial interest in the paradigm and its reinterpretation in the nineteenth century arises primarily from the context of the interdisciplinary research project “Multiple Secularities—Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities,” which has been ongoing at the University of Leipzig since 2016 (KLEINE and WOHLRAB-SAHR 2016; 2020). The starting point of the approach adopted in this project is the observation that in global modernity there are various modes of arranging

1. The term “nomosphere” is loosely based on Max Weber’s concepts of *Wertsphären* (spheres of value) and *Lebensordnungen* (orders of life): a socially, regionally, functionally, or situationally determined sphere within which certain rules, norms, and values are valid that may conflict with those of another nomosphere. A nomosphere thus comprises concrete, sometimes codified norms, but also a specific value orientation on the basis of which a rationalization of lifestyle takes place.

the relationship between religious and nonreligious fields of action, institutions, norms, discourses, and so on; hence, we are dealing with “multiple secularities.” Constructed as an ideal type for analytical purposes, we conceptualize “secularity” as interrelated epistemic and social structures in which religious and nonreligious matters are socially (institutionally, legally, organizationally, spatially, habitually, and so on) differentiated and conceptually (taxonomically, semantically, discursively, symbolically, and so on) distinguished by relevant actors in a binary scheme, whereby the corresponding boundaries can be variable, negotiable, controversial, or blurred (DESSI and KLEINE 2019, 1; KLEINE and WOHLRAB-SAHR 2020, 14).

In previous publications, I have emphasized the importance of the paradigm of the interdependence [and complementarity] of the ruler’s law and the Buddha’s law, which was widely accepted in medieval Japan (KLEINE 2013; 2018; 2019). As expected, the thesis I had formulated in a somewhat provocative manner, namely that this paradigm could be interpreted as a kind of blueprint for secularism in Japan, did not go unopposed (HORI 2016). In short, my thesis was that the binary distinction between two complementary nomospheres—that of the ruler (*ōbō* = secular?) and that of the Buddha (*buppō* = religious?)—provided a conceptual resource for the distinction and institutional differentiation between the religious and the secular in modernity.

As a specialist in medieval Japanese Buddhism, I had until then largely concentrated on sources from the Kamakura (1185–1333) and Muromachi (1336–1573) periods. I share this focus with the vast majority of researchers who have worked on the paradigm of the interdependence of the two “nomospheres” (the term I favor for translating the character *hō* 法 in this specific context). The available literature describes the paradigm as a doctrine of the state and regulatory system of the middle ages (KURODA 1986), as “orthodox conception of order in medieval Japan” (HISANO 2007, 663), and so on. Research on the paradigm of the two complementary and interdependent nomospheres accordingly concentrated on medieval sources.

In these sources, written primarily by Buddhist authors, the paradigm fulfills a dual function: on the one hand, it claims far-reaching autonomy for Buddhist institutions and, on the other, it emphasizes the responsibility of worldly power for the welfare of Buddhism. Accordingly, state institutions sought to protect the officially recognized Buddhist institutions from external and internal enemies without interfering much in their internal affairs. The protagonists of the paradigm wisely appeal to the self-interest of their addressees, that is, the representatives of worldly power; the general proposition is that only when Buddhism is doing well, is the nation doing well. However, Buddhism had to unfold as freely as possible and according to its specific intrinsic logic, that is, autonomously, in order to efficiently fulfill its social function. As concrete compensation for the

granting of autonomy—against the background of Chinese models of rule is a highly problematic matter—and patronage, the Buddhist institutions for their part performed state rituals and domesticated the people by means of moral instruction. They identified themselves as “Buddhism that protects the state” (*chingo kokka Bukkyō* 鎮護国家仏教). In other words, the interdependence of the two nomospheres was designed as a mutually beneficial constellation.

Although I had a vague idea that the *ōbō buppō* paradigm was largely in place in the Edo period and thus theoretically available as a conceptual resource to the Meiji reformers, I had not verified this with sources from that period. I would now like to remedy this shortcoming. In this article, I show that the guiding idea of the interdependence of the ruler’s law and the Buddha’s law was widely known in the nineteenth century and was perceived and used as a conceptual resource for the theoretical solution of the problem of how to shape the relationship between the newly formed state modeled on European concepts of a modern nation-state and the “religionized” Buddhist institutions. The paradigm of the complementary nomospheres cultivated and transmitted for centuries, I contend, was a powerful episteme that may have facilitated and shaped a path-dependent, culture-specific appropriation of Western models of legitimate governance based on the separation of state and religious institutions.

In this article, my main concern is to detect the continuities and discontinuities in the discourse on the interdependence of the two nomospheres. Although this paradigm certainly provided a *longue durée* epistemic structure, it underwent, unsurprisingly, some subtle changes between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries in accordance with altering sociocultural and political circumstances.

The Development of the Ōbō Buppō Paradigm up to the Nineteenth Century

A considerable number of publications have dealt with the *ōbō buppō* paradigm. However, there has yet to be a systematic analysis of how it changed over time. This lacuna conveys the impression that the paradigm is static and timeless, which is not the case.

Most of the earliest texts that address the relationship between the ruler’s law and the Buddha’s law simply stress the mutual dependence and responsibility of both nomospheres. If one nomosphere declines, the other cannot prosper. Both nomospheres protect and respect each other and provide for their mutual well-being (KLEINE 2013; KURODA 1996). A very early and somewhat paradigmatic formulation of the relationship between the ruler’s law and the Buddha’s law can be found in an “Appeal to the landlord, Tōdaiji 東大寺, from the managers and inhabitants of the Akanabe 茜部 estate in Mino Province.”

In the present age, the *ōbō* and the *buppō* correspond like the two wheels of a cart or the two wings of a bird. If one should be lacking, then the bird could

not fly, nor could the cart run. Without the Buddhist law, how should the *ōbō* exist? Without the *ōbō*, how should the *buppō* exist? Accordingly, because the [Buddhist] law prospers, the *ōbō* flourishes greatly.

(HI 3: 834; KURODA 1996, 277)

In the early Kamakura period, it is predominantly representatives of the established and officially recognized Buddhist institutions who seek help from the state institutions against heterodox movements, specifically the Pure Land or *ikkō senju nenbutsu* 一向専修念仏 movement initiated by Hōnen 法然 (1133–1212) who emphasized the mutual dependence of the Buddha's law and the ruler's law. Jōkei 貞慶 (1155–1213), on behalf of the Kōfukuji 興福寺 clergy, addresses the authorities in his famous *Kōfukuji sōjō* of 1205 thus:

The Buddha's law and the ruler's law are as body and mind: each should see to their mutual well-being, and they should be well aware of [their mutual responsibility for] the rise and fall [of both]. In these times the doctrine of Pure Land (*jōdo hōmon* 淨土法門) has begun to arise and the activities of the exclusive cultivation of the main practice (*senju yōgyō* 専修要行) [of calling upon the name of the buddha Amida] to flourish. But can we also say that these are times when the imperial power (*ōka* 王化) has been restored?... The eight doctrinal traditions (*hasshū* 八宗) are declining. Time and again how the government of the world is in disarray! What we wish is... that the Buddha's law and the ruler's ways (*ōdō* 王道) would forever harmonize heaven and earth.

(KI 3: no. 1586, 261; adapted from MORRELL 1987, 86–87)²

The clergy of Enryakuji 延暦寺 make a similar argument in 1225 in a petition against the *ikkō senju nenbutsu* movement, the *Sanmon sōjō*. They are, however, more explicit with regard to the immediate causes of the problems that arise when the Buddha's law is weakened:

The Buddha's law and the ruler's law protect and support each other. They are like the two wings of a bird and they resemble the two wheels of a cart.... Through the vital energy (*seiki* 精氣) of the Buddha's law, the vital energy of the spirits and gods (*kishin* 鬼神) grows. When the spirits and gods have vital energy, the five grains have abundant vital energy. When the five grains have vital energy, social relations are in order and people enjoy prosperity. For this reason, one sincerely worships the Buddha's law and does not turn away from the ruler's law. The four-wheel-turning (*shi rintēn* 四輪轉) sagely kings jointly protect the land. When the Buddha's law faces decline, the spirits and gods lack the taste of the law and instead absorb the vitality of the plants and consume the energy of the grains. Since this is the food for social relations, [people's]

2. I have slightly amended Morrell's translation for the sake of terminological consistency and consulted the *Jōdo Shinshū seiten* edition (ARIKUNI 2005) for the reconstruction of characters missing in the *Kamakura ibun* version.

hearts [as a consequence of shortage of food] are no longer sincere. Those who refuse to honor the three jewels (*sanbō* 三宝) of buddha, dharma, and sangha are eternally lost in the three poisons (*sandoku* 三毒) of greed, hatred, and ignorance.... When the single-hearted and exclusive [*nenbutsu*] practice is banned and the practice of the eight [orthodox] doctrinal traditions prospers, the Buddha's law and the ruler's law will prosper for ten thousand years. The gods of heaven and the gods of earth will jointly pacify the realm. The community of monks cannot bear the grief of the demise of the law (*hōmetsu* 法滅).

(KI 5: 275–276)

In other words, the well-being of the nation, social peace, and political stability depend on superempirical forces, which turn their backs on a country where the Buddha's law faces decline. It is therefore in the best and intrinsic interest of the state to prevent anything that weakens Buddhism—for example, heterodoxies or political figures who threaten particular Buddhist institutions.³

A similar argument had already been offered by Enchin 円珍 (814–891), who is quoted in an 1184 letter to Minamoto no Yoritomo 源 頼朝 (1147–1199) by the priests of Onjōji 園城寺 as follows:

It is my principle to abide by our ruler and ministers. Should the ruler and ministers sever their ties with our order, the country will decline, the ruler's law will lose its authority, the heavenly gods will forsake them, the earthly gods will despise them, and there will be chaos at home and abroad, and confusion far and near. At such a time the ruler and his ministers will worship in reverence my Buddhist law. If they fail to do so, the capital will be visited by chaos. If they return to my teachings, there will be peace throughout the land.

(SHINODA 1960, 283)

Accordingly, the famous abbot of Enryakuji, Jien 慈円 (1155–1225), in his rather pessimistic historiography, the *Gukanshō* of 1221, had interpreted Japanese history largely in terms of the relationship between the ruler's law and the Buddha's law:

It was during the reign of Emperor Kinmei 欽明 (r. 539–571), that the Buddha's law was first introduced to Japan.... We can see that this country has been protected and preserved by the Buddha's law since that time.

In 587 Prince Shōtoku (at the age of sixteen) and Great Imperial Chieftain Soga [no Umako 蘇我馬子] (d. 626) had agreed that [Mononobe no] Moriya 守屋 (d. 587), who was displeased with the introduction of the Buddha's law, should be attacked and killed. Then Prince Shōtoku and Soga [no Umako] began to promote the Buddha's law, which has flourished until this day.

3. For example, the *Heike monogatari* (1: 297–302) quotes the letters of the clergy of Onjōji, or Miidera 三井寺, to the brothers of Enryakuji and Kōfukuji in the hope of receiving support from them against the threatening attack on their temple by Taira no Kiyomori 平 清盛 (1118–1181).

The ruler's law was henceforth to be protected by the Buddha's law. Those events occurred in order to manifest the principle that, after the introduction of the Buddha's law to Japan, the ruler's law could no longer be preserved without the help of the Buddha's law...

Japan was later subjected to various disturbances, but the ruler's law and the Buddha's law protected each other. The ministerial house [of Fujiwara] did nothing to destroy this fish-in-water coalescence, and the country did extremely well. Deterioration gradually increased, however, and the ruler's law and the Buddha's law have now almost been destroyed.

(*Gunkanshō*, 137, 147; BROWN and ISHIDA 1979, 26, 35)

Authors in the Kamakura period primarily stressed the state's responsibility for the well-being of the Buddhist institutions. State institutions benefited from protecting and supporting the Buddhist institutions, because as long as the Buddha's law represented, maintained, and transmitted by the Buddhist institutions flourishes the gods are pleased and willing to protect the country against pernicious demons that might bring about all kinds of disasters.⁴

A remarkable shift in the interpretation of the *ōbō buppō* paradigm occurred in the Muromachi period, especially in writings representative of the Ikkōshū 一向宗, which later came to be known as Jōdo Shinshū. A statement with regard to the paradigm can be found in Zonkaku's 存覚 (1290–1373) *Haja kenshō shō* completed in 1344:

The Buddha's law and the Ruler's law are a single law with two aspects (*ichisō no hō* 一雙ノ法), like the two wings of a bird or the two wheels of a cart. It is untenable that even one should be lacking. Therefore, one protects the Ruler's law by means of the Buddha's Law, and one reveres the Buddha's law by means of the ruler's law... For this reason, after being born again and again within the six realms, being now born in a human body is something we should be extremely happy about. We depend on the grace of the sovereigns... The recent imperial grace has been a great blessing. Whether attached to the intramundane (*seken* 世間) or to the extramundane (*shusse* 出世), we look up to beg for grace and favors. How could we disregard the Ruler's law? All the more so with practitioners of the exclusive Buddha-recollection (*senju nenbutsu no gyōja* 専修念仏ノ行者), who, wherever they may live, when they drink even a single drop or receive even a single meal, believe that in general it is thanks to the favor of the nobles [of the capital and the warrior leaders of] the Kantō, and know that specifically it is due to the grace of their local lords and estate stewards.

(SSZ 3: 73; adapted from KURODA 1996, 283)

4. This line of argumentation is also well documented in Nichiren's 日蓮 (1222–1282) *Risshō ankoku ron* 立正安国論 (T 2688, 84.203–208).

What is new in this passage is the motif of gratitude towards the blessings from the state. A devout Buddhist is required to submit to the state authority, since it can provide the material basis to practice Buddhism. A certain individualization is also apparent here. Faith and practice are already beginning to be understood as something private, which can have a tension with the demands of public life. In cases where there is a conflict between the pious Buddhist and the loyal subject within one person, he or she should obey the laws of the ruler.

Roughly a century later, Rennyo 蓮如 (1415–1499), the powerful “second founder” of Jōdo Shinshū, further developed this apologetic approach. In order to avoid conflicts with local authorities, in his letters to the community he repeatedly emphasizes the “primacy of the ruler’s law” (*ōbō ihon* 王法為本), a phrase that would later become a motto guiding intramundane conduct within Jōdo Shinshū.

You must never slight the estate stewards (*jitō* 地頭), saying that you are a person who reveres the Buddha’s law and has attained true faith (*shinjin* 信心). Meet your public obligations (*kuji* 公事) in full without fail. People who comply with the above exemplify the conduct of *nenbutsu* practitioners (*nenbutsu gyōja* 念仏行者) in whom true faith has been awakened (*shinjin hottoku* 信心発得) and who aspire to [birth in the Pure Land in] the afterlife. They are, in other words, ones who faithfully abide by the Buddha’s law and the ruler’s law.

(T 2668, 83.783c12–22; ROGERS and ROGERS 1996, 74)

Despite its individualizing tendency, which implicitly presupposes a clear distinction between private (oriented towards extramundane goals) and public (oriented towards mundane goals) spheres, the quotation still suggests an equal position of both nomospheres. Furthermore, the motif of gratitude owed by a believer to the worldly authorities, which is strongly emphasized in later texts, is only found here in rudimentary form.

In another letter Rennyo goes a step further, however. Most notably, he brings in a new distinction based on an inside-outside metaphor.

First of all, outwardly take the ruler’s law as fundamental (*ōbō o moto to shi* 王法ヲ本トシ).... Do not slight the provincial military governors (*shugo* 守護) or local landowners (*jitō* 地頭), but meet fixed yearly tributes and payments to officials in full. Besides that, take [the secular Confucian principles of] humanity and justice (*jingi* 仁義) as essential. Inwardly (*naishin* 内心), rely single-heartedly and steadfastly (*isshin ikkō* 一心一向) on Amida Tathāgata for [birth in the Pure Land in] the afterlife (*goshō* 後生).

(T 2668, 83.794a28–b6; adapted from ROGERS and ROGERS 1996, 99)

One thing that is noteworthy in this context is that the Muromachi-period representatives of the Jōdo Shinshū tradition seem to be particularly interested in the relationship between Buddhism and the state and the *ōbō buppō* paradigm.

One obvious explanation for this trend, which continued into the nineteenth century, may be the precarious situation in which Honganji 本願寺 and its followers found themselves during the Muromachi period. They lacked official imperial recognition, they continued to be antagonized by the older, established Buddhist institutions, and they were involved in various uprisings in the provinces, which came to be known as *ikkō ikki* 一向一揆 (KASAHARA 1962; INOUE 1968; DAVIS 1974; PAULY 1985). This earned Jōdo Shinshū followers a reputation, not entirely unjustifiably, as having a propensity for subversion and insubordination. Rennyō wanted to dispel this impression and at the same time domesticate his community. In that regard, the situation that Buddhists found themselves in during the Meiji Restoration was not entirely dissimilar.

The paradigm of the two interdependent nomospheres underwent a renaissance in the latter half of the nineteenth century. This is not surprising. When social structures are reorganized, epistemic structures, as a rule, become questionable. This typically causes a “cultural lag” (OGBURN 1923, 200), which requires an adaptation or replacement of the existing epistemes and “plausibility structures” (BERGER and LUCKMANN 1967, 174–190). It was therefore necessary to redefine the relationship of Buddhist institutions to the reorganizing state institutions. This was done under extremely difficult conditions. In the late Edo period, Buddhist institutions were already suffering a considerable loss of prestige. They were exposed to attacks from nationalist ideologues who propagated an emperor-centric Shinto and rejected Buddhism as foreign and un-Japanese. Buddhism was considered backward, anti-modern, and irrational. Buddhist priests were often despised as corrupt henchmen of the Tokugawa regime. Thus, in the eyes of many, Buddhism stood for both a foreign worldview and the old, repressive, and outdated order.

The consequences of this conflict are well-known, and I only briefly hint at them here. With the fall of the Tokugawa regime, a wave of anti-Buddhist measures and campaigns was launched, especially the transformation of mainly Buddhist-administered places of worship into Shinto shrines, known as the “separation of buddhas and kami” (*shinbutsu bunri* 神仏分離) and the campaign under the motto “abolish the Buddha; destroy Śākya[muni]” (*haibutsu kishaku* 廃仏毀釈) (KETELAAR 1990). On top of this came the potential competition from Christianity, which was legalized under pressure from Western powers. The texts analyzed below (*Sankairi* 山海里, *Gojō ichibu gobunshō kōwa* 五帖壹部御文章講話, and *Ofumi kōwa* 御文講話 by Shingyō 信暁 [1774–1858]; *Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 眞宗王法為本談 by Fukuda Gidō 福田義導 [1805–1891]; and *Buppō obō rinyoku gi* 仏法王法輪翼義 by Hakoya Tokuryō 藐姑射德令 [d.u.]) respond to this precarious situation. They are thus written at the critical juncture when the old order was perishing, and a new order was emerging. In particular, Fukuda, whose *Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* was published about ten years after the campaigns mentioned above, must have experienced the imminent danger to his religion

rather strongly. Accordingly, all texts analyzed below, especially those written after 1868, are decidedly apologetic. They aim to prove the central importance of Buddhism for state and society—and for this they make extensive use of the ideology of the interdependence of the Buddha’s law and ruler’s law.

Mountains, Seas, and Countries: Shingyō’s Sankairi

Shingyō addresses various Buddhist themes in his work written towards the end of the Edo period. In chapter 147 he discusses the “fact that priority should be given to the ruler’s law” (*Sankairi* 1: 320–323). The tenet giving priority to the ruler’s law (*ōbō ihon setsu* 王法為本説) in Jōdo Shinshū is traditionally attributed to Rennyo. In this respect, the title of this chapter represents a rather conventional and orthodox position for a cleric of this denomination. However, it is also misleading, because, according to Shingyō, the primacy of the ruler’s law applies only within a very limited framework.

Shingyō first emphasizes the inseparability, albeit not the identity, of both nomospheres. He points out, however, that the concept of inseparability is actually Buddhist and that the “ruler’s law” refers to the way human beings live within the world (*tenchi no mama* 天地のまゝ) (*Sankairi* 1: 320). In doing so, he assigns to Buddhism both the authorship of, and the sovereignty to, interpret this concept.

In Shingyō’s view, the Buddha’s law teaches people how to live in a world governed by the ruler. Therefore, the Buddha’s law and the ruler’s law cannot be separated. In other words, the normative foundation on which the social order, and thus a stable and legitimate rule, is built was established by none other than the Buddha. Here we can already glimpse a tendency that is made much more explicit by Fukuda, namely a comprehensive claim to authority by Buddhism on questions of worldly morals as the basis for an orderly society and a stable governance. Shingyō refers to authoritative Buddhist scriptures to support Buddhism’s claim to authority over secular ethics. As a Jōdo Shinshū follower, the arguments provided by the *Sūtra [on the Buddha] of Immeasurable Life* are of utmost relevance. This most authoritative text not only provides an otherworldly-oriented soteriology, that is, salvation by birth in the buddha land of Amida, but also deals with the establishment of a “harmonious order of the world” (*tenka wajun* 天下和順) or “great peace in the world” (*tenka taihei* 天下太平).⁵ Shingyō quotes the following passage from the sutra:

Wherever the Buddha comes to stay, there is no state, town, or village which is not blessed by his virtues. The whole country reposes in peace and harmony.

5. This formulation is found, as Shingyō notes, in another version of that sutra, the *Muryō shōjō byōdō kaku kyō* 無量清淨平等覺經 (T 361, 12.298b2–11).

The sun and the moon shine with pure brilliance; wind rises and rain falls at the right time. There is no calamity or epidemic, and so the country becomes wealthy, and its people enjoy peace. Soldiers and weapons become useless; and people esteem virtue, practice benevolence, and diligently cultivate courteous modesty. (*Sankairi* 1: 321; INAGAKI 1994, 304; T 360, 12.277C13–15)

Shingyō takes this passage as proof that the Buddha also provides intramundane benefits. For this reason, he claims, the sutra is also known as the “Sutra on the Human Way” (*nindōkyō* 人道經) (*Sankairi* 1: 322).⁶ In addition, the author stresses the necessity of maintaining a hierarchical social order. In accordance with Zonkaku and Rennyō, he maintains that citizens owe the country gratitude (*kokuon* 国恩)—that is, worldly authorities (*shugo* 守護) such as proprietary lords (*ryōshu* 領主) and estate stewards (*jitō* 地頭)—for the grace (*megumi* 恵) bestowed to preserve this order and to provide for material well-being, just as one should be grateful for the blessings of heaven (*tenon* 天恩) without which nothing can prosper in the fields. Finally, the “great benefits granted by the Buddha” (*butsu no daion* 仏の大恩) must be remembered. When one listens to the principles of the Buddha’s law, the blessing of the virtuous merits of the law automatically unfolds in one’s heart, which in turn allows one to enjoy the benefit of a “harmonious order of the world” as mentioned in the sutra.

Contrary to what Shingyō initially suggests, he does not intend to establish an identity of the Buddha’s law and the ruler’s law, the latter being based on the “ordering principle of heaven” (*tenri* 天理), but rather to establish a complementarity or unity with regard to a specific, purely intramundane purpose, namely peace, social order, and material well-being. The extramundane dimension of Buddhist soteriology, which is traditionally prioritized in Pure Land Buddhism, is not considered here at all. In this respect, Shingyō deviates from Rennyō, who in his statement about the primacy of the ruler’s law emphasized the different areas of responsibility of the two nomospheres:

With regard to the observance of humanity, sincerity, etiquette, wisdom, and trustworthiness, the law of the ruler comes first; deep in the heart, one should take as a basis true faith in the other power of the original vow.

(T 2668, 83.793a19–21)

By thus assigning the cardinal virtues (*gojō* 五常) of Confucianism—humanity, sincerity, etiquette, wisdom, and trustworthiness—to the ruler’s

6. This term apparently goes back to the Chinese title of the version translated by Zhi Qian 支謙 at the beginning of the Wu dynasty (222–265), which is *Amida sanya sanbutsu satsurō butsudān kado nin dō kyō* 阿彌陀三耶三仏薩樓仏檀過度人道經 (T 12, no. 362). The short title “Sūtra of the Way of Men” is highly misleading because the preceding characters 過度, which indicate that the sutra is about “overcoming the way of men” (that is, of human existence [*kodo nindō* 過度人道]) are deliberately omitted.

law, Rennyō had established a model of two complementary normative systems. The mundane ruler's law determined by Confucian ethics, must be obeyed even by those who personally prioritize Buddhist ethics. In his view, the ruler's law, enables people to lead a good life in this world, while the Buddha's law empowers people to overcome this world. Shingyō, on the other hand, does not emphasize the soteriological, extramundane but the social, mundane benefits of the Buddha's law. This slightly modified interpretation of the benefits of the Buddha's nomosphere is, as we shall see below, further advanced by writers of the Meiji period. It is fair to say that Shingyō virtually "secularizes" the Buddha's law in its relation to the ruler's law by referring to it exclusively with regard to its capacity to solve intramundane, or "secular," problems while remaining silent on the main task of Buddhism, namely extramundane salvation.

*Discussing the Primacy of the Ruler's Law in Jōdo Shinshū:
Fukuda Gidō's Shinshū ōbō ihon dan*

The most exhaustive and innovative treatment of the *ōbō buppō* paradigm in the nineteenth century is provided in the two-volume book *Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* by Fukuda Gidō.⁷ Fukuda had already been engaged in political discourse prior to the Meiji Restoration.⁸ In his discussion of governance by the ruler's law (*ōbō seiron* 王法政論), Fukuda deals with the position of the "ignorant scholar-bureaucrats biased towards the gods" (*kyokujū hekishin no anja* 局儒僻神ノ暗者) who think that the Buddha's law is of no use for the governance of the country by the ruler's law because it represents a supramundane nomosphere (*shussehō* 出世法). Especially in the context of the Meiji Restoration, he maintains, it is important to realize that the Buddha's law is immensely useful for governing the country. The crucial point that Fukuda wants to make is one already emphasized by Shingyō. The nomosphere of the ruler is by no means based on an independent doctrinal foundation of secular, or at least non-Buddhist, provenance. Rather, the rules for good governance originate from the Buddha himself.

He frequently emphasizes that good government and national welfare depend on Buddhism. The "elimination of the seven disasters" (*shichinan* 七難) and the "generation of sevenfold happiness" (*shichifuku* 七福) all depend on faith in the Buddha's law. Critics of Buddhism, both in China and Japan, contend that Bud-

7. For further information on Fukuda Gidō, see NAKASHIMA (1970; 1973).

8. By 1866, Fukuda, in his capacity as head of the Takakura Gakuryō 高倉学寮, the main educational institution of the Ōtani wing of Jōdo Shinshū in Kyoto, had already appealed to the government in Edo by submitting a memorandum entitled *Treatise on the Pace of the Expulsion of the Barbarians* (*Jōi chisoku ron* 攘夷遅速論). Fukuda's anti-Christian position is also evident in his *Shinshū ōbō ihon dan*, which was written eleven years later.

dhism, which is based on a celibate, monastic life, destroys human relations (*jinrin* 人倫) and disregards filial piety (*kō* 孝). The followers of the Buddha live parasitically, which basically makes them traitors to their country (*kokuzoku* 國賊) (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 26). However, these arguments of the pseudo-scholars are fundamentally flawed, as Fukuda tries to show with the help of Confucian classics. In his defense of Buddhism, he propagates a kind of hierarchical inclusivism according to which the non-Buddhist teaching systems (above all, Confucianism) can only be a preliminary stage or starting point. He counters the argument of the Buddhists' alleged irresponsibility towards their families and ancestors by pointing out that it is ultimately the Buddha's law that terminates the cycle of birth and death, which then of course makes the concern for the deceased ancestors obsolete. This is to say that Buddhism cultivates a higher form of filial piety by focusing not only on the intramundane well-being of one's parents but on their salvation. Furthermore, as practitioners of the Buddhist path depend on clothing, food, and housing, which can only be provided by a well-functioning state, it is only natural that the Buddha propagates the law to protect the country (*gokoku no hō* 護國ノ法) (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 26).

Fukuda then further elaborates on his hierarchical inclusivism.⁹ Confucius and Laozi had in reality been “bodhisattvas of a deep level” (*jin'i no bosatsu* 深位ノ菩薩) and “messengers of the Buddha” (*butsu no tsukahi* 仏ノ使). The Confucian “path of humanity and righteousness” (*jingi no michi* 仁義ノ道) had originally been expounded by none other than the Buddha himself. Likewise, the Buddha had taught the “five treasures” (*gozō* 五藏), which are identical with the “five cardinal virtues” of Confucianism: (1) the treasure of humanity (*jinzō* 仁藏), (2) the treasure of righteousness (*gizō* 義藏), (3) the treasure of etiquette (*raizō* 礼藏), (4) the treasure of wisdom (*chizō* 智藏), and (5) the treasure of trustworthiness (*shinzō* 信藏).¹⁰

Obviously, Fukuda here takes up the old theory of the correspondence of the “five cardinal virtues” (of Confucianism with the “five commandments” (*gokai* 五戒) of Buddhism. However, he goes beyond the establishment of a mere normative compatibility by claiming that the “five cardinal virtues” were taught directly by the Buddha himself. In fact, the Buddha knew everything that all wise men had to say about good and bad teachings, and Laozi 老子, Kongzi 孔子

9. The concept of “hierarchical inclusivism,” or “superiorism,” means that one belief system does not reject another but integrates it, yet assigns it a subordinate position within that system. We find this strategy in Christianity in relation to Judaism, in Islam in relation to Christianity and Judaism, and so on. In the traditional categorization of the Buddhist teachings known as *kyōsō hanjaku* 教相判釈 this strategy is frequently applied (KLEINE 2009).

10. Fukuda refers here to a *Sūtra on the Factors of Enlightenment* (*Dōhonkyō* 道品經), which is quoted in the *Explanation of the Treatise on the Mahāyāna* (*Shaku makaen ron* 釈摩訶衍論; T 1668, 32.593a16–19) attributed to Nāgārjuna.

(Confucius), and Yanzi 顏子 (Yanhui 顏回) were all messengers of the Buddha (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 28). This leads him to the central statement that summarizes his interpretation of the paradigm of the interdependence of the nomospheres of the ruler and the Buddha:

For this reason, it is clear that the path of humanity and righteousness is originally a teaching of the Buddha (*bussetsu* 仏説). Similarly, the ruler's law for the government of the country (*ōbō kokusei* 王法国政) is a teaching of the Buddha.
(*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 28)

Thus, pseudo-scholars of his time who perceive only the extramundane aspect of Buddhism (*shusse no kyō* 出世ノ教) and ignore the Buddha's teachings relating to governing the world (*chisei no hō* 治世ノ法) are fundamentally wrong (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 28). Moreover, those who claim that the Buddha's law harms the land and exploits the people are all sinners. For Fukuda, there can be no doubt that peace and happiness (*anraku* 安楽) in the present and the future depend on the power of the Buddha (*butsuriki* 仏力) (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 42).

With regard to the domestication of the populace by means of Buddhist teachings, Fukuda addresses the question of the ontological status of hells and paradises and whether these are only temporary pedagogical tricks to attract the attention of children and to calm and tame the hearts of people. Fukuda argues in a way that resembles Kant's concept of "regulative Prinzipien," which are content with the possible practical use of supernatural objects (*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, 87); regardless of the question of whether hells and paradises are real, they fulfill an important function as regulative principles. Even if one assumes that hell and paradise (*jigoku gokuraku* 地獄極楽) are not real, Fukuda states, it is still reasonable to believe in the Buddha's law with all one's heart and assume that one goes to hell if one does evil and enters paradise if one does good with a sincere mind. People are automatically appeased in this way, and when people convert to this teaching, peace and harmony reign in the empire. Thus, for the sake of a stable and peaceful rule, it is reasonable to propagate the "path of promoting good and punishing evil" (*kanzen chōaku no michi* 勧善懲悪ノ道) and convert to Buddhism, which promotes a spirit of humaneness (*jīnshin* 仁心) (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 1: 44).

Fukuda opens the second volume once again with the statement that the three paths of Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism (*shin ju butsu no sandō* 神儒仏ノ三道) are teachings for the promotion of good and the rebuke of evil. However, of the three teachings, Buddhism is the original source (*kongen* 根源), and Shinto and Confucianism had only emerged from the Buddha's law. Confucius is just a manifestation (*kegen* 化現) of the bodhisattva Judō 儒童 who spread the Buddha's law in the east, emphasizing above all the principle of humaneness (*jīngi* 仁義). The Grand Shrine of Ise, that is, Amaterasu, on the other hand, is

a “manifest trace” (*suijaku* 垂迹) of the bodhisattva Kannon, who is a “split-off body” (*bunshin* 分身) of the buddha Amida (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan 2: 1*).

Fukuda contends that only the Buddha’s law fully grasps the principle of cause and effect of good and bad, while Shinto is confined to cause and effect within the three worlds and six spheres of birth (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan 2: 2*). He thus addresses objections to the Buddhist doctrine of cause and effect and karmic retribution based on the observation that bad deeds do not always have negative consequences for the perpetrator and, conversely, good deeds do not always pay off for the benefactor. Only Buddhism does in fact offer a plausible explanation for such apparent violations of the law of cause and effect by showing that retribution can also occur in a later existence. Since the fruits of good deeds can sometimes only be harvested in a later existence, one must pursue the path of good deeds in this life. Only Buddhism, he claims, explains in all clarity the principle of the sequence of cause and effect, without which promotion of the good and rebuke of the bad is impossible (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan 2: 5–6*). Finally, Fukuda emphasizes once again that the Buddha’s law is the root or trunk (*buppō wa hon nari* 仏法本也), while Shinto and Confucianism are the branches or offshoots (*shin ju wa matsu nari* 神儒末也). Only if the root of Buddhism is strong can Shinto and Confucianism be strong (*Shinshū ōbō ihon dan 2: 8*).

In summary, Fukuda is mainly concerned with the following issues: Buddhism is immensely useful for the pacification of society and the stabilization of temporal domination and, therefore, cannot be reduced to an extramundane soteriology for faithful individuals. The public morality propagated by Buddhism does not only correspond to mundane ethics, as it is particularly shaped by Confucianism; in fact, the Buddha’s law is the origin of all ethics. Consequently, all the authoritative traditions of East Asia—Confucianism, Daoism, and Shinto—are merely offshoots of Buddhism. The tenet reiterated in the title of Fukuda’s book that the ruler’s law should be given priority with regard to the intramundane order does not mean that the Buddha’s law is secondary. On the contrary, the ruler’s law itself represents merely one aspect—the intramundane aspect, so to speak—of the all-encompassing the Buddha’s law, which ultimately comprises both the intramundane and the extramundane.

On the Meaning of the Buddha’s Law and the Ruler’s Law Being like Wheels or Wings: Hakoya Tokuryō’s Buppō ōbō rinyoku gi

The text opens with the usual phrases: the Buddha’s law and ruler’s law are a “nomic couple” (*sō no hō* 双ノ法), like the two wings of a bird or the two wheels of a cart. If one were missing, the other would be inoperable. For this reason, Zonkaku also writes in the *Haja kenshō shō* (549–550), as Hakoya later emphasizes, one protects the ruler’s law by means of the Buddha’s law, and one reveres

the Buddha's law by means of the ruler's law. However, Hakoya takes an unusual step following this opening passage. He historicizes Zonkaku's text by placing it in the context of the persecution of the *nenbutsu* movement, deemed heretical by the established priesthood of the "gate of the holy path" (*shōdō mon* 聖道門), the *yamabushi* 山臥, and the yin-yang masters (*onmyōji* 陰陽師), and so on. A major argument against the movement was that the *nenbutsu* practitioners were destroying the Buddha's law and disregarding the ruler's law (KLEINE 1996). As a result, since the time of its foundation by Hōnen there had been various bans on the *nenbutsu* movement. Against the background of this persecution, Zonkaku had written his work especially for proprietary lords and estate stewards. Accordingly, the old title of the text had been *Haja kenshō mōshijō* 破邪顯正申し狀, indicating that it was meant to be a petition to the authorities.

Hakoya argues that the Buddha's law is misunderstood as aiming only at the liberation of living beings from the cycle of birth and death, while the ruler's law is a system of norms that deals with the cultivation of the individual, the order of one's own family, the government of the nation, and the pacification of the world. In ancient India, he claims, the ruler's law was part of the Buddhist teaching. There, the ruler's law was represented by the figure of the holy wheel-turning king (*tenrin jōō* 轉輪聖王). Concerning the origins of morality in this world, Hakoya makes a similar argument to Fukuda: the rules of the ten kinds of wholesome behavior (*jūzen* 十善),¹¹ composed of the five cardinal virtues; humaneness, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness), and the five virtues (*gotoku* 五德)¹² did not exist before the Buddha appeared in the world. Therefore, one may say that the Buddha's law integrates both the nomosphere of the ruler and the nomosphere of the Buddha.

Although the Buddha's appearance in the world was ultimately for the sole purpose of liberation from birth and death, this does not mean that Buddhism does not teach intramundane norms (*seken no hō* 世間ノ法). These intramundane norms, Hakoya maintains, aim to control the personality (*mi o osame* 身ヲ治メ), control the world (*tenka o osame* 天下ヲ治メ), and assure rebirth as a human being or as a god in the next life. Although the sutras do in fact speak about filial piety and highlight the great sin of irreverence towards one's parents, in order to overcome birth and death one must ultimately cut off affective bonds with other people (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 58).

Here, Hakoya seems to reveal an inclination toward celibacy and abstinence quite unusual for a Jōdo Shinshū cleric. In contrast to Fukuda, Hakoya empha-

11. In Buddhism the "ten kinds of wholesome behavior" are usually defined as not killing, not stealing, not committing adultery, not lying, not speaking divisively, not speaking harshly, not speaking idly, not being stingy and greedy, not being envious, and not having wrong views (from the *Jō agon kyō* 長阿含經, T 1, 1.37a17–19).

12. It is unclear which "five virtues" are meant here since numerous lists exist.

sizes the incompatibility of the worldly lifestyle and the Buddhist way of life. His position seems to be rather close to the medieval interpretation of the paradigm of the two nomospheres, as he emphasizes the autonomy of a “religious” field, which requires a different set of norms than worldly conduct, while at the same time underlining the intramundane benefits of Buddhism. In Hakoya’s view, if one wants to preserve the path of the five human relations, one cannot cultivate the Buddha’s path. If one devotes him- or herself to the Buddha’s law, he or she cannot pursue the path of the five human relations according to the ruler’s law. Hakoya continues by explaining the difference between the rules for monks and for lay practitioners. He concludes that the paths of the Buddha’s law and the ruler’s law are indeed different. However, one cannot practice the Buddha’s law without the protection of the ruler’s law. Only through the authority of the sovereign and his ministers can Buddhism survive and, accordingly, the eight officially recognized houses and nine traditions (*hakke kushū* 八家九宗) of Buddhism in Japan have all been characterized as “state-protecting.” Buddhism repays the benefits it receives from the state. And the ruler’s law has always used the Buddha’s law to pacify the hearts of the people. With the authority of the Buddhist teaching, all superhuman forces from Brahma and Indra to the four kings of heaven and down to the spirits of the earth, all the gods and spirits of heaven and earth as well as all buddhas and bodhisattvas, protect the state. Consequently, at the beginning of each year, the rites of Shinto and Buddhism are performed at the imperial court to pacify the world and the people, thus demonstrating that the Buddha’s law and ruler’s law respect each other (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 59).

Following this rather conventional explanation, which emphasizes the complementarity—yet fundamental difference—of the two nomospheres, Hakoya also discusses the specific views of Jōdo Shinshū on the Buddha’s law and the ruler’s law based on explanations of the *Sūtra of Immeasurable Life*. As far as the Buddha’s law is concerned, Jōdo Shinshū is characterized by the view that the average person is completely subject to his or her passions. As a layman, by reciting the *nenbutsu* he or she achieves liberation from birth and death via rebirth in the Pure Land. As far as the ruler’s law is concerned, monastics and lay people alike must observe the ruler’s law and the laws of the nation and practice the path of filial piety and brotherly love as well as the principle of humaneness in their own person. Therefore, to keep the ruler’s law means to protect one’s own person from evil. These explanations of the Buddha are completely consistent with Shinto and Confucianism, Hakoya claims (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 59–60).

In contrast to Fukuda, who argues solely on the basis of an intramundane “purpose-rationality” (*Zweckrationalität*; WEBER 1985, 565–567), Hakoya, in discussing the ethics endowed by the Buddha, also emphasizes the consequences of moral action in the afterlife. The promotion of the good is rewarded in this

life and in the next, for example, by overcoming the world, birth in a heaven, or nirvana. Since Buddhism teaches the moral foundations of life in the world and a corresponding model of sanctions, it is the Buddha's law that directly protects the ruler's law. Therefore, the Buddha's law and ruler's law are like the two wheels of a cart (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 62).

While it is obvious to Hakoya that the functionality of the ruler's law depends on the normative power of the Buddha's law, he does not deny Buddhism's inverse dependence on a functioning ruler's law. Thus, he refers to the "dependence of the human world on the physical" (*jinkai eshin* 人界依身). It is difficult to be reborn as a human being. Therefore, one must treasure the existence as a human being and regard it as a rare opportunity. One owes this life not only to one's parents but also to the grace of the state, which is a "contributory condition" (*zōjōen* 増上縁) for existence as a human being. Therefore, the ruler's law is characterized as the path of the five social relations and the five cardinal virtues on which existence as a human being and the subsistence of the person depend. One must therefore take the opportunity provided by parents and the state to follow the Buddha's path that facilitates liberation from birth and death. Here, too, Hakoya's otherworldly, soteriological orientation becomes evident. In *Jōdo Shinshū*, lay people, who are the main subject of Amida's original vow, strive for birth in the Pure Land while at the same time following the path of the five human relationships and the five cardinal virtues. For even if one aspires to be born into another world, one is not even for a single moment separated from the ruler's law during one's life in the human world. Accordingly, it is the joint duty of monastics and lay people to protect the physical body. If one does not keep the "physical ruler's law" (*mi no obō* 身ノ王法), one's own body dies and consequently one's family becomes extinct. And if the state does not work, what kind of Buddhism should one believe and practice? Without the ruler's law, says Hakoya, one cannot believe and practice the Buddha's law. Therefore, people who are firmly established in their faith must observe the ruler's law and practice the Buddha's law. Depending on the "wheel of the ruler's law" (*ōbō no rin* 王法ノ輪), the wheel of the Buddha's law may turn and vice versa as Hakoya repeatedly emphasizes (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 63).

During his lifetime, Hakoya maintains, many simple-minded men and women are born in a Buddhist country but still do not practice the *nenbutsu* and do not aspire to the next life. And yet they fear hell into which they may fall if they commit great evil deeds in this life because they have heard of the torments of hell from childhood. Thus, the Buddha's law, with its teachings on the future effects of present causes, supports control by the ruler's law (*ōbō no sei* 王法ノ政) by causing fear. According to Hakoya, this is the meaning of mutual support of the two wheels in terms of cause and effect in the three times of past, present, and future (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 66). In Hakoya's view, the extramundane

soteriological orientation of Pure Land Buddhism is not only compatible with a life in accordance with the ruler's law but is almost a prerequisite for it. If a Jōdo Shinshū follower does not base his or her actions on the aspiration to be reborn in the Pure Land, he or she cannot protect the ruler's law as it is represented by the present Meiji government (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 67).

Hakoya deplors the fact that during his time it was mainly the clerics of the *nenbutsu* schools, and especially of Jōdo Shinshū, who ate meat, took wives, and no longer practiced austerities. And yet, it was they who through their moral instruction as good advisors (*zenchishiki* 善知識) guided the laity so that they did not abandon the path of the five human relations and the five cardinal virtues. In the latter days, the Buddha's law can only be spread by the power of the ruler's law. Furthermore, Hakoya warns, if there are many evil people in the world and devils and demons (*akuma kishin* 惡魔鬼神) are constantly bombarding the nation with disasters, such calamities, he maintains, cannot be controlled by humaneness alone. Without the power of the buddhas and gods, Māra cannot be stopped. In order to defeat the invisible devils and demons, the holy path of the Buddha offers prayers for the protection of the state. One can tame them by reciting the miraculous Mahayana scriptures. When practitioners of *nenbutsu* say "Namu Amida Butsu," the four great kings of heaven and the incomprehensible faith in the power of the original vow unite, according to Hakoya. Those who have true faith and thus recite the *nenbutsu* cannot be approached by devils and demons. So, if contemporary practitioners of the *nenbutsu* protect themselves and their families, and if they correct their hearts while thinking only about their own future in the hereafter, national prosperity and security of the people will be the natural result (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 68).

With regard to the political affairs of the Meiji period, Hakoya contends, it has always been said that the Buddha's law and the ruler's law are like two wheels. But evil or false doctrinal traditions (*jashū* 邪宗) from abroad, such as Christianity, corrupt the true law. They are an enemy of the nation. The transmission of this evil tradition, he claims, has deceived the ignorant people like fox and badger spirits (*kori* 狐狸) through various "demonic arts" (*majutsu* 魔術). Whoever puts faith in this false doctrine can no longer correct his or her mind. Since this false law (*jahō* 邪法) is accompanied by a false god (*jashin* 邪神), those who believe in it do not approach people who practice the true law, be it the true law of the Buddha, Shinto, or Confucianism. Therefore, the false law and the false god cannot enter households where lay people believe in the Buddha's law and where they put up Buddha images. For this reason, Hakoya writes, everyone who professes to follow the Buddha's law should criticize these false teachings from the standpoint of the true law (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 69). Thus, according to Hakoya, the priests of Jōdo Shinshū, who are primarily counseling ignorant, uneducated lay people, have tirelessly propagated faith in the Buddha's

law, taught the norms of the true law, and in this way ensured that people do not succumb to belief in the evil tradition of Christianity (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 69).

In order to preserve the path of the two nomospheres, one must regard oneself as a preserver in the first place. The people who act as preservers of this path, Hakoya maintains, are first and foremost the priests of Jōdo Shinshū who carry on the heritage of the patriarchs to whom they selflessly serve. For Hakoya, there are no strictly private matters for the laity either (*watakushi ni arazu 私ニ非ズ*). In other words, all individuals must act publicly and for the common good. The concern of the ruler's law for the people in the present is to prevent national disasters. Not one person, says Hakoya, who believes in the Buddha's law does not enjoy the benefits of the state. *Nenbutsu* practitioners of Jōdo Shinshū can cultivate the Buddha's law within themselves and make it flourish in their hearts only because they obey the power that protects the law of the state (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 86).

In conclusion, Hakoya emphasizes once again that Rennyō had upheld the doctrine of the interdependence of the Buddha's law and the ruler's law as a cardinal principle (*mune* 旨). If this principle is not upheld, the *nenbutsu* will not be propagated in the future, and those who do not preserve it are enemies of the buddhas and the patriarchs. Therefore, Jōdo Shinshū clerics must understand and propagate the principle of the interdependence of the Buddha's law and ruler's law (*Buppō obō rinyoku gi*, 88).

Conclusion

The paradigm of the two nomospheres has always served the function of defining the relationship between Buddhist and state institutions and guaranteeing protection and autonomy to the former. It is obvious that the texts from the nineteenth century analyzed here are likewise concerned with the readjustment of the relationship between Buddhist and state institutions in a context of rapid social, political, economic, and cultural transformations. The position of Buddhism had become precarious; on the one hand it was considered by Shinto nativists and nationalists as foreign and un-Japanese and, on the other hand, by modernists as backward, irrational, and superstitious. Moreover, with the legalization of Christianity, which was quite attractive for some members of the national elite, a potential competitor arose that had to be fought off. Thus, it was vital not only to emphasize the compatibility of Buddhism with the new secular order but, even more, to prove its unconditional usefulness with regard to the primary purpose of national peace, social order, and general prosperity.

Shingyō, Fukuda, and Hakoya contended that peace, social order, national security, and material prosperity are the common goals of both nomospheres. But, the ways to achieve these goals differ. The ruler's law employs military force

and punishment, the Buddha's law moral instruction, and ritual. More importantly, however, whereas peace, order, security, and prosperity are the final goal for the ruler's nomosphere, for the Buddha's law this is only an intermediate goal in the sense that these intramundane benefits provide the prerequisite for achieving the final, extramundane goal of the Buddha's nomosphere, that is, liberation from the cycle of birth and death. However, whereas Fukuda hardly mentions the extramundane orientation of Buddhism, this is a significant factor for Hakoya. In this sense, Hakoya is more in line with his medieval forerunners. It is worth noting that to some extent the authors of the nineteenth century are closer to writers of the Kamakura period in their argumentation than they are to Rennyo. While Rennyo had stressed the distinction between private and internal belief in the Buddha's law and public outward compliance with the ruler's law, Shingyō, Fukuda, and, to a lesser degree Hakoya, emphasize the public intramundane dimension of the Buddha's law; such emphasis is akin to the writings of the Kamakura period. There is, however, one crucial difference: unlike their early medieval predecessors, the early modern authors do not just claim that Buddhism unfolds its intramundane benefits by force of manipulating transcendent powers and moral instruction. They go a step further by claiming in a holistic manner that all morality—whether mundane or supramundane—originates from the Buddha. The attribution of certain qualities, responsibilities, functions, and the correlation of the two nomospheres with other concepts is relatively conventional, but more elaborate than in medieval texts. It is crucial to note that, contrary to the common rhetoric of unity, both nomospheres are very clearly distinguished from each other. Their relationship is not one of identity, but of complementarity.

One thing that is striking, but not really surprising, is that all of the nineteenth-century texts I could identify that deal explicitly with the paradigm of the two nomospheres are found in the writings of Jōdo Shinshū authors. Representatives of the tradition were among the most engaged intellectuals in the nineteenth century and especially in the Meiji period (DENECKERE 2014; KRÄMER 2015). They dealt very intensively with questions of the modernization of Buddhism and its compatibility with a modern state and society. That they also resorted to the paradigm of the two nomospheres is hardly surprising. Rennyo had provided the blueprint here, and indeed the situation of the Jōdo Shinshū in Rennyo's time was quite comparable to that in the Meiji period. In both cases, the clergy had to respond to feared or actual attacks from secular authorities.

The authors are quite conservative in their writing style and argumentation. They largely confine themselves to traditional terminology, and the concepts being discussed are mostly borrowed from premodern Buddhist discourses, although they are sometimes subject to an innovative reinterpretation. An influence of Western knowledge systems, categories, and taxonomies are not evident

in these writings. For example, the term *shūkyō* 宗教 does not appear anywhere as a translation for the European term “religion,” although it is likely that at least Hakoya was familiar with it. Such conceptual conservatism is not surprising since the authors see their task—and that of Buddhism—in forming a bulwark against Western epistemes. They strive to preserve the traditional epistemic structures, although at that critical juncture they find themselves at social structures that are beginning to change at a rapid pace. This resulted in a cultural lag, that is, a simultaneity of the non-simultaneous, resulting from a gap between the altered “material conditions” and the “adaptive culture,” which according to William OGBURN (1923, 203) typically “do not synchronize exactly with the change in the material culture.” Buddhist authors deliberately used the paradigm of the interdependence of two nomospheres as a conceptual resource to define the relationship between the radically transformed state institutions and the not-quite-as-radically-transformed Buddhist institutions. It remains unclear whether they themselves were aware of normative secularist concepts such as the separation of politics and religion (*seikyō bunri* 政教分離), and thus aspects of modern secularity. In any case, the authors give no explicit indication that they have taken Western concepts of a conceptual distinction between the religious and the secular, and corresponding institutional differentiations, into account.

REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS

- HI *Heian ibun* 平安遺文. 11 vols. Ed. Takeuchi Rizo 竹内理三. Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 1965–1980.
- KI *Kamakura ibun* 鎌倉遺文. 52 vols. Ed. Takeuchi Rizō. Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 1971–1997.
- ssz *Shinshū shōgyō zensho* 真宗聖教全書. 5 vols. Ed. Shinshū Shōgyō Zensho Hensanjo. Ōyagi Kōbundō, 1941.
- T *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經. 85 vols. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡辺海旭, eds. Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1934.

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Buppō ōbō rinyoku gi* 仏法王法輪翼義. Hakoya Tokuryō 藐姑射德令 (d.u.). In *Meiji Bukkyō zenshū* 明治仏教全集, ed. Tokushige Asakichi 徳重浅吉, 57–88. Shunyōtō, 1935.
- Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1793.

- Gunkanshō* 愚管抄. Jien 慈円 (1155–1225). In *Nihon koten bungaku taikei, Shinsō han* 日本古典文学大系新装版, Okami Masao 岡見正雄 and Akamatsu Toshihide 赤松俊秀, eds. Iwanami Shoten, 1992 [1967].
- Haja kenshō shō* 破邪顕正抄. Zonkaku 存覚 (1290–1373). In *Shinshū kana shōgyō* 真宗仮名聖教, 529–565. Shiji Senkō Shoin, 1889.
- Heike monogatari* 平家物語. 2 vols. In *Nihon koten bungaku taikei* 日本古典文学大系 32–33, Takagi Ichinosuke 高木市之助 et al., eds. Iwanami Shoten, 1959–1960.
- Kōfukuji sōjō* 興福寺奏状. Jōkei 貞慶 (1155–1213). In KI 3, no. 1586.
- Sankairi* 山海里. 3 vols. Shingyō 信暎 (1774–1858). Shudōkan, 1892.
- Sanmon sōjō* 山門奏状 (*Enryakuji sōjō* 延暦寺奏状, *Enryakuji daishu ge* 延暦寺大衆解). Anonymous. KI 5: 271–276.
- Shinshū ōbō ihon dan* 真宗王法為本談. Vols. 1–2. Fukuda Gidō 福田義導 (1805–1891). Nishimura Kurouemon, 1877.
- Sūtra [on the Buddha] of Immeasurable Life (Muryōju kyō* 無量壽經). Trans. Saṃghavarman (third century). T 360, 12.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- ARIKUNI Tomomitsu 有国智光, ed.
2005 *Jōdo Shinshū seiten* 浄土真宗聖典. Shūnan. www.yamadera.info/seiten/seiten_index.htm.
- BERGER, Peter L., and Thomas LUCKMANN
1967 *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. The Penguin Press.
- BROWN, Delmer M., and Ichiro ISHIDA, trans.
1979 *The Future and the Past: A Translation and Study of the Gukanshō, an Interpretative History of Japan Written 1219*. University of California Press.
- DAVIS, David L.
1974 *Ikki in late medieval Japan*. In *Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History*, John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass, eds., 221–247. Yale University Press.
- DENECKERE, Mick
2014 Shin Buddhist contributions to the Japanese enlightenment movement of the early 1870s. In *Modern Buddhism in Japan*, Hayashi Makoto, Ōtani Eiichi, and Paul L. Swanson, eds., 17–51. Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture.
- DESSI, Ugo, and Christoph KLEINE
2019 Introduction: Secularities in Japan. *Journal of Religion in Japan* 8: 1–8. doi.org/10.1163/22118349-00801009
- HISANO Nobuyoshi 久野修義
2007 Buppō to ninpō 仏法と人法. *Shirin* 90: 663–699.

HORII, Mitsutoshi

- 2016 Critical reflections on the religious-secular dichotomy in Japan. In *Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion*, Frans Wijsen and Kocku von Stuckrad, eds., 260–286. Koninklijke Brill NV.

INAGAKI, Hisao

- 1994 *The Three Pure Land Sutras: A Study and Translation*. Nagata Bunshōdō.

INOUE Toshio 井上鋭夫

- 1968 *Ikkō ikki no kenkyū* 一向一揆の研究. Yoshikawa Kōbunkan.

KASAHARA Kazuo 笠原一男

- 1962 *Ikkō ikki no kenkyū*. Yamakawa Shuppansha.

KETELAAR, James E.

- 1990 *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution*. Princeton University Press.

KLEINE, Christoph

- 1996 *Hönens Buddhismus des Reinen Landes: Reform, Reformation oder Häresie?* Religionswissenschaft 9. Peter Lang.

- 2009 Pluralismus und Pluralität in der japanischen Religionsgeschichte: Am Beispiel nonkonformer buddhistischer Bewegungen des 13. Jahrhunderts. In *Mauss, Buddhismus, Devianz: Festschrift für Heinz Mürmel zum 65. Geburtstag*, Thomas Hase, Johannes Graul, Katharina Neef, Judith Zimmermann, and Heinz Mürmel, eds., 189–216. Marburg: Diagonal-Verl.

- 2013 Religion and the secular in premodern Japan from the viewpoint of systems theory. *Journal of Religion in Japan* 2: 1–34.

- 2018 The secular ground bass of pre-modern Japan reconsidered: Reflections upon the Buddhist trajectories towards secularity. Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities—Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities,” no. 5. https://www.multiple-secularities.de/media/workingpaper_5_kleine_web.pdf (accessed 26 September 2022).

- 2019 Formations of Secularity in ancient Japan? On cultural encounters, critical junctures, and path-dependent processes. *Journal of Religion in Japan* 8: 9–45.

KLEINE, Christoph, and Monika WOHLRAB-SAHR

- 2016 Research programme of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities—Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities.” Working Paper Series of the CASHSS “Multiple Secularities—Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 1. www.multiple-secularities.de/media/multiple_secularities_research_programme.pdf (accessed 26 September 2022).

- 2020 Comparative secularities: Tracing social and epistemic structures beyond the modern west. *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 32/4: 1–30.

- KRÄMER, Hans M.
 2015 *Shimaji Mokurai and the Reconception of Religion and the Secular in Modern Japan*. University of Hawai'i Press.
- KURODA Toshio 黒田俊雄
 1986 Chūsei bungaku no ōhō to Buppō 中世文学の王法と仏法. *Nihon bungaku* 35/4: 64–71.
 1996 The imperial law and the Buddhist law. *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 23: 271–285. doi.org/bgmq
- MORRELL, Robert E.
 1987 *Early Kamakura Buddhism: A Minority Report*. Asian Humanities Press.
- NAKASHIMA Hōshō 中島法昭
 1970 Fukuda Gidō no baai (kindai Shinshū shisōshi bunken kenkyū) 福田義導の場合 (近代真宗思想史文献研究). *Shinshūgaku* 43: 43–47.
 1973 Shinshū ni okeru Shintō kokkyōka seisaku e no taiō: Fukuda Gidō no baai 真宗に於ける神道国教化政策への対応—福田義導の場合. *Shinshū kenkyūkai kiyō* 4: 18–29.
- OGBURN, William F.
 1923 *Social Change with Respect to Culture an Original Nature*. Appleton and Comp.
- PAULY, Karl Ulrich Wolfgang
 1985 Ikko-Ikki: Die Ikko-Aufstände und ihre Entwicklung aus den Aufständen der bündischen Bauern und Provinzialien des japanischen Mittelalters. PhD dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität.
- ROGERS, Ann T., and Minor L. ROGERS, trans.
 1996 *Rennyō Shōnin Ofumi: The Letters of Rennyō*. BDK English Tripiṭaka Series. Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai and BDK America.
- SHINODA, Minoru
 1960 *The Founding of the Kamakura Shogunate 1180–1185: With Selected Translations from the Azuma Kagami*. Columbia University Press.
- WEBER, Max, ed.
 1985 *Gesammelte Aufsätze Zur Wissenschaftslehre*. With the assistance of Johannes Winckelmann. J. C. B. Mohr.