The Urakami Incidents and the Struggle for Religious Toleration in Early Meiji Japan

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His heart swelling with pride, Father Petitjean gazed out the window of his residence at the facade of the new church. The cross atop the steeple glistened in the noonday sun. Just four weeks earlier the edifice had been dedicated. Erected on Oura Hill in the foreign concession in Nagasaki, it memorialized twenty-six martyrs who in 1597 had faced crucifixion rather than deny their Christian faith. The new church was built under treaty rights which permitted foreigners to erect houses of worship for their own religious needs. Its doors were kept locked because the entry of curious Japanese would incite repressive action on the part of the authorities.

It was 17 March 1865. Bernard-Thaddée Petitjean had labored for the past five years as a missionary in Naha and Nagasaki. He had developed a deep interest in the history of the suppressed Christian movement in Japan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He hoped to discover the martyrs' spiritual descendants who reportedly continued to embrace Christianity in secret defiance of the Tokugawa proscription of the foreign faith. Little did Father Petitjean realize that on this day his hopes would be realized.[1]

1. Information on the life of Father Petitjean is taken from J. B. Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean, 1829–1884 et la résurrection catholique au Japon au* XIX^e *siècle*. Accounts of his discovery of the Urakami Christians are found in Francisque Marnas, *La religion de Jésus ressuscitée au Japon dans la seconde moitié du* XIX^e

As the French priest lowered his gaze from the cross, he was startled to see a group of a dozen Japanese men, women, and children approach the church and try the door. Their inquisitiveness seemed to surpass that of the many curious onlookers who daily passed by, and Father Petitjean decided to go over and let them enter. They followed him to the altar of the church where he knelt to offer a brief adoration and pray for the souls of the visitors. Hardly had he begun to pray when three women stepped forward and knelt at his feet. In a low voice one of them said, "All of us share with you the same heart." The startled priest responded, "Indeed ? But where are you from ?" "We are from Urakami where nearly all believe as we." The spokeswoman then asked, "*Sancta Maria no gozō wa doko* ?" When the women requested to see the image of the Virgin Mary, Father Petitjean felt he was without doubt in the presence of the descendants of the ancient Christians of Japan.

The Christians of the village of Urakami, thus discovered by a French priest, raised their heads in a society still hostile to their faith. As recently as the preceding decade some Urakami residents had been executed for violating the anti-Christian proscription.[2] The remaining believers were yet to be subjected to two major incidents of persecution before 1873 when the tacit toleration of Christianity became government policy. The first incident arose during the waning months of the Tokugawa Bakufu. The second, a mass deportation, followed the Meiji

siècle, vol. 2, pp. 487 ff., Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, pp. 109 ff., and Johannes Laures, *The Catholic Church in Japan*, pp. 209 ff.

2. Grace Fox, *Britain and Japan, 1858–1883*, p. 483.

Restoration and is known as the Urakami *kuzure* ("destruction"). This study will focus on the Urakami incidents in a re-examination of the process by which the cause of religious toleration was advanced in the period 1867 to 1873. The political, intellectual, and diplomatic milieus which surrounded this development will also receive attention.

Before proceeding, the term "religious toleration" requires clarification. Religious toleration in an unrestricted sense may be defined as the right of every individual to embrace and practice the religious belief of his choice. An important application of this concept as it has developed in liberal societies is the ability of persons to perform religious activities free from interference by their government. Historically, societies have rarely achieved this ideal. At the time of the Meiji Restoration, certain of the very treaty powers demanding that Japan grant domestic religious toleration did not apply the principle at home. In the German Empire, for example, Chancellor Bismarck was trying to control the activities of the Catholic Church, and Jews were still denied freedom of worship. Japan therefore was not at all unique in imposing restrictions on religious practice.

The political philosophy which prevailed in Japan during the Meiji period held that individuals were subordinate to the state which could limit their freedom for national purposes. This concept underlies Article 28 of the Meiji constitution which granted subjects "freedom of religious belief," but did so only "within limits not prejudicial to peace and order and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects." Hence a number of religious faiths, including Islam, were banned until after

the Second World War. Nevertheless, the very constitutional statement of religious freedom and the wide support given this ideal in political treatises such as Itō Hirobumi's *Commentaries on the constitution of the empire of Japan* (1889) are firm indications of a liberal trend during the Meiji period.[3] Religious toleration in a more unrestricted sense did not achieve legal standing until the 1946 Constitution and the 1951 Religious Juridical Persons Law (*shūkyō hōjin hō*).[4]

The term "religious toleration," as applied throughout the following discussion of late Tokugawa and early Meiji events, should be understood in a relative sense. Full toleration was not achieved in 1873, but the cessation of the persecution of the Urakami Christians and the removal of the anti-Christian placards marked a significant step in Japan's gradual acceptance of freedom of thought. The granting to Christians of the tacit right to exercise their faith furthered Japan's process of transition from a nation with a tradition of seclusion to a modern state which actively ingested western ideas and institutions.

The relaxation of religious restrictions was not achieved without a struggle. The struggle took place simultaneously on two fronts. On the diplomatic front, Japan's initial suppression of the western faith became a major point of contention in her relations with the powers. The foreign envoys in the treaty ports repeatedly protested the persecution of Japanese Christians and endeavored to insert guarantees of domestic religious toleration into the treaties of commerce and friendship. At

3. Itō Hirobumi, *Commentaries on the constitution of the empire of Japan*, pp. 53–55.
4. Kawawata Yuiken, "Religious organizations in Japanese law," in *Japanese religion*, edited by the Agency for Cultural Affairs, pp. 161–162.

the time of the Iwakura Mission (1871–1873) the treaty powers used the treaty revision discussions as an opportunity to put pressure on the Japanese government to grant tolerance to Christianity. The second front on which the struggle took place was the domestic scene. There, Buddhists and western-influenced intellectuals called for a softening of the *saisei itchi* ("union of religious and political orders") policy which had elevated Shinto at the expense of other religions. The successful implementation of imported political ideas and technology subtly eroded the antiforeign convictions of the conservative forces of the Restoration. Furthermore, a stringent religious policy, chosen in 1868 for the sake of the political and spiritual unification of the people, lost its raison d'etre when the firm hegemony of the Restoration leaders was assured.

Both Japanese and western historians have emphasized the role of external pressures, and especially those at the time of the Iwakura Mission, in advancing the cause of Japanese religious toleration. This standard view is set forth in Otis Cary's classic *History of Christianity in Japan* (1909) where the author, rejecting the possibility that the events of 1873 can be attributed to any liberal spirit in the Japanese government, credits almost solely the representations made by foreign governments.[5] One of the clearest statements of the Cary thesis is by Daniel C. Holtom in *Modern Japan and Shinto nationalism* (1947) :

> The removal of the anti-Christian edicts at the beginning of the Meiji Era and the permission of freedom of propaganda to Christianity were not the unconditioned manifestation of religious toleration on the part of the Japanese government of the time. These things grew rather out of a political necessity created largely by pressure from Western powers and by Japan's willingness to compromise... It is plain that toleration

5. Otis Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, vol. 2, pp. 83–84.

> was eventually extended to Christianity as a means of securing favorable concessions from foreign governments.[6]

More recent writings give essentially the same interpretation. Abe Yoshiya, writing in the December 1968 issue of *Contemporary religions in Japan*, concludes that "the toleration of Christianity was due primarily to the governmental leaders' concession to the pressures from the Western powers." Domestic reaction against governmental policies is assessed by Abe as "a minor, and yet not negligible force that drove the government to give up a major policy contradicting religious freedom."[7] Professor Ueda Kenji of Kokugakuin University maintains a similar view in his chapter of the book *Japanese religion* (1972).[8]

The standard interpretation has, I believe, overstressed foreign pressures at the expense of important internal factors. In this study I intend to demonstrate that domestic developments set the direction of the trend toward religious toleration in Japan, that diplomatic efforts were significant only as catalysts in this process, and that the native movement for toleration had attained substantial momentum well before the departure of the Iwakura Mission.

The Urakami Incident of 1867

The Tokugawa setting. The harsh religious policies applied in Urakami had evolved in the early seventeenth century, the period when the Tokugawa Shogunate was established. Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, acting from political

6. Daniel C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto nationalism*, p. 72.
7. Abe Yoshiya, "Religious freedom under the Meiji constitution," part 1, in *Contemporary religions in Japan*, vol. 9, no. 4 (December 1968), pp. 318, 337–338.
8. Ueda Kenji, "Shinto," in *Japanese religion*, p. 31.

expediency, forbade Japanese citizens to espouse "the evil sect of Christianity." Past experience with militant Buddhist sects had taught Japan's new leaders the necessity of subduing potentially powerful religious groups. In addition, the Bakufu feared that the free activity of European Jesuit and Franciscan missionaires and prolonged commercial intercourse with Christion nations might enrich disloyal *han* ("daimyo domains") and provide them with access to foreign arms. The severity of the proscription policy was demonstrated in a period of bloody anti-Christian persecution which foreshadowed the 1836 proclamation of the Seclusion Code (*sakokurei*). By strictly limiting foreign contacts the Shogunate hoped to ensure domestic stability.

The Tokugawa effort to eradicate Christianity and the threat it posed to the *bakuhan* order was largely successful. By the mid-seventeenth century the throng of 300,000 converts claimed by Portuguese missionaires had been reduced to scattered pockets of hidden Christians (*kakure kirishitan*) located mostly in Kyushu. In some localities compulsory family registration entailed the practice of *fumie* ("trampling on an image tablet") as certification of the disavowal of Christianity. In 1664 the Bakufu ordered the posting of signboards advertising rewards for the apprehension of Christian believers. These famous *jōsansatsu* ("triple edict boards") were revived in 1868 and proved to be a source of irritation for western diplomats. Along with the strict prohibition of Christianity, the placards warned against robbery, murder, and arson.[9]

9. Umeda Yoshihiko 梅田義彦, "Shūkyōhō no hensen : meiji shonen kara shūkyō dantai hō chokuzen made" 宗教法の変遷～明治初年から宗教団体法直前まで

When comparing the early Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, one can detect a number of similar phenomena in the development and implementation of anti-Christian policies. One was the irritating behavior of the missionaries, whose evangelistic zeal was matched only by their audacity in flouting government restrictions on their residence, travel, and propagandizing. A second was the practice of punishing believers by deporting them to other provinces. The Urakami deportation of 1868 had a precedent in the early 1600s when Tokugawa Ieyasu exiled a number of Christians from central Japan to Dewa Province, Japan's rugged northeast frontier.[10] The most significant common phenomenon was the goal of political and social control which underlay the policy of religious regulation. Both the Tokugawa House and the leaders of the Meiji Restoration were concerned with establishing and maintaining their political and social dominance. It is important to note that Shinto and Buddhist institutions also were subjected to severe—though less devastating—restrictions in both periods.[11]

When in the 1850s the western nations forced open the doors of Japan to broader foreign intercourse, the intruders acted in awareness of Japan's historical sensitivity to religious interference. To facilitate his mission, Commodore Perry conveyed to the "Emperor of Japan" the assurance of President Fillmore that

[Changes in the religious law: From the early years of Meiji to the eve of the religious organizations law], in *Shintōshi kenkyū* 神道史研究, vol. 10 (1962), p. 40. See also H. Ritter, *A history of Protestant missions in Japan*, p. 30. A translation of the full text of all three edicts is given in Appendix A.

10. Charles R. Boxer, *The Christian century in Japan, 1549–1650*, p. 358.
11. George B. Sansom, *A history of Japan, 1615–1867*, pp. 37–38, 44; idem, *A short cultural history of Japan*, p. 427.

> the Constitution and laws of the United States forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations. I have particularly charged Commodore Perry to abstain from every act which could possibly disturb the tranquility of your Imperial Majesty's domain.[12]

Townsend Harris, America's first minister to Japan, was more forthright in expressing the propensity of the western powers to regard Japan as a legitimate field for evangelistic as well as diplomatic and commercial enterprise. On Sunday, 6 December 1857, he initiated the practice of Christian worship in his quarters, and afterward noted in his diary :

> The first blow is now struck against the cruel persecution of Christianity by the Japanese ; and, by the blessing of God, if I succeed in establishing negotiations at this time with the Japanese, I mean to boldly demand for Americans the free exercise of their religion in Japan with the right to build churches, and I will also demand the abolition of the custom of trampling on the cross or crucifix... I shall be both proud and happy if I can be the humble means of once more opening Japan to the blessed rule of Christianity.[13]

Harris tried repeatedly and without success to conclude an agreement with the Japanese respecting domestic religious toleration.[14]

Despite Harris' zeal, it was the Dutch who first reached an understanding with the Bakufu regarding religion in a convention signed 16 October 1857. In addition to fixing duty rates and forbidding the introduction of opium, it secured the right to practice "their own or the Christian religion" within Dutch buildings or burial grounds. These privileges were extended to other foreigners by the most-favored-nation clause.[15] Harris' commercial treaty, concluded on 29 July 1858, incorpo-

12. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 30.
13. Mario E. Cosenza, ed., *The complete journal of Townsend Harris*, pp. 465–468.
14. Payson S. Treat, *Diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, 1853–1895*, vol. 1, p. 296.
15. Payson S. Treat, *Japan and the United States, 1853–1921*, p. 35.

rated in its eighth article the provisions of the Dutch convention and expanded on the treatment of religion. That article reads :

> Americans in Japan shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and for this purpose shall have the right to erect suitable places of worship. No injury shall be done to such buildings, nor any insult be offered to the religious worship of the Americans. American citizens shall not injure any Japanese temple or *miya*, or offer any insult or injury to Japanese religious ceremonies, or to the objects of their worship. The Americans and Japanese shall not do anything that may be calculated to excite religious animosity. The government of Japan has already abolished the practice of trampling on religious emblems.[16]

The treaty also stipulated that revision of its provisions, if desired by either party, could take place after 4 July 1872.

Harris' treaty thus legalized the practice of Christianity by foreigners within the treaty ports. The Japanese rightfully interpreted this as a limited privilege which implied that the western religion was not to be propagated among the Japanese people, and that policy-making regarding religion outside the foreign communities continued to be the exclusive prerogative of the Japanese government.

During his negotiations with the Bakufu on the subject of repeal of the proscription of Christianity, Harris judged that the government's major fear was that such a concession would form a pretext for the conservative *tozama han* to overthrow the government and seize power.[17] The American minister was quite correct in his appraisal of the pressures to which the Shogunate was subjected. Here lies an important clue to understanding the process of struggle over religious policy which continued until 1873 : internal politics produced the bitter con-

16. Cosenza, *Journal of Townsend Harris*, Appendix 9, pp. 582–583.
17. Ernest E. Best, *Christian faith and cultural crisis*, p. 21.

flicts of the Bakumatsu and Restoration periods. Likewise, it was changes in domestic political exigencies which played the primary role in enabling a relaxing of the government's stringent policy between 1870 and 1873. The key to the gradual acceptance of religious pluralism lies in Japan's domestic politics, and foreign diplomatic pressure was ineffectual until the Restoration leaders had firmly established their control.

The unchanged policy of proscription severely irritated the clergymen who came in 1859 ostensibly to serve as chaplains in the foreign communities. The French concluded a commercial treaty in 1859 and under its provisions Father Petitjean and Father Joseph-Marie Laucaigne established themselves in the treaty port of Nagasaki.[18] These missionaries had to be careful to avoid overt evangelization and to restrict their contacts with the Japanese to secular pursuits such as the training of interpreters in western languages. Their motive remained, however, the dissemination of the gospel. The early missionaries were convinced that all western civilization and learning was permeated with Christian truth, and that the conscientious teaching of even the secular arts of the Christian world would disarm prejudice and recommend the religion of the Bible.

Missionary writings of the Bakumatsu period abound with accounts of persecution of their students and language teachers, government suppression of clandestine scripture and tract translation projects, and harassment by government spies. The Rev. Guido F. Verbeck later recalled, "We were regarded as people who had come to seduce the masses of the people from their loyalty to the god-country and corrupt their morals gener-

18. Laures, *Catholic Church in Japan*, pp. 208–209.

ally."[19] There was a constant threat of physical violence by antiforeign *rōnin* ("masterless samurai").[20] The strict enforcement of the proscription laws and the stringent limitations placed on the activities of the missionaires were widely reported in church journals in the United States and Europe. One example is the report of Dr. Samuel R. Brown of Nagasaki on the infeasibility of scripture translation. This article appeared in 1866 in the *Christian intelligencer*, a Reformed Church of America publication, and reads in part :

> Shall we print the Gospel ? The missionaries hesitate, fearing bloodshed. For, by the laws of Japan, whoever may be converted by reading the Word of God may be put to death with all his family.[21]

The awareness of Japanese religious intolerance resulting from such missionary reports was an important stimulus to the diplomatic efforts by the treaty powers between 1867 and 1873 to force Japanese religious toleration. This movement was further energized by the striking events which were about to take place in Urakami.

The arrests. During the two years following Father Petitjean's discovery of the hidden Christians, contacts between them took place on an increasing scale. Many other followers of *kakure kirishitan* revealed their identity to the priests.[22] They came

19. Guido F. Verbeck, "History of Protestant missions in Japan," in *Proceedings of the general conference of Protestant missionaries in Japan*, p. 749.
20. William E. Griffis, *Hepburn of Japan*, p. 109.
21. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 85.
22. Not all the *kakure kirishitan* ("hidden Christian") adherents were willing to identify with the foreign priests of Nagasaki. Despite repeated efforts toward reconciliation on the part of the missionaries, fear of persecution and the strength of their indigenous traditions prompted some to remain aloof from the revived church. Such groups are called *hanare kirishitan* ("separated Christians"), and an estimated 33,000 members still maintain their separate identity in Kyushu today (*Japan Christian yearbook, 1968*, p. 56). Kyushu University scholars have conducted extensive studies on the remaining *hanare*

not only from Urakami but also from other towns such as Ōmura and from the Gotō Islands. They reported the existence of Christian communities each with a thousand or more believers. The priests were amazed to find that the Christians had maintained the faith of their early Tokugawa forbears with surprisingly little deviation. Some leaders could recite Latin prayers verbatim. When the police grew suspicious of the Japanese flocking to the church on Oura Hill, official orders were issued to the effect that Japanese should not visit the church. Thereupon the priests renewed the policy of locking the church and met with Japanese visitors only in their residence during the night and early morning.

By the end of 1865 the priests were undertaking daring schemes to contact the Christians. At night Fathers Petitjean and Laucaigne made the four-mile trip north to Urakami, where they met with villagers in secluded places for evangelism and religious instruction.[23] Such trips violated the explicit provisions of the treaties limiting religious activity by foreigners to the treaty ports and by implication forbidding missionaries to travel outside those towns. In time the villagers grew so bold as to construct four temporary chapels in Urakami. They sent Japanese catechists to nearby communities including Ōmura, the seat of an antiforeign branch daimyo. Petitjean, who was consecrated Bishop of Japan in 1866, prepared a written catechism using terminology familiar to the *kirishitan* followers. The only overt opposition to the activities of the

kirishitan cells. Associate Professor of Sociology Suzuki Hiroshi predicts that due to population movements the sect faces extinction within the next decade.

23. Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, p. 149.

missionaries the first year was by Buddhist priests who resented the villagers' refusal to contribute to the reroofing of the village temple. They reported to the Nagasaki *daikan* ("shogunal representative"), Tokugawa Iwami no Kami, that the foreign priests were preaching to Japanese, but no punitive action was taken.[24] During 1867 fifteen new French priests arrived in Nagasaki and greatly increased the scope of missionary activity. Feeling secure in the protection of their foreign mentors, the Urakami natives began to make open professions of their faith.[25]

However, new conflict over the issue of legally required Buddhist rites was to end the period of calm. The Buddhist faith received official support during the Tokugawa period. The *kirishitan* believers, not averse to syncretism, had avoided extinction by maintaining outward adherence to the symbols of Buddhist affiliation. In accordance with the law, their families registered at temples and obtained the services of Buddhist priests for funeral rites. Some homes reverenced Buddhist images behind or inside which were concealed Christian symbols. Thus Kannon ("goddess of mercy") was worshiped as a convenient representation of Mary.[26] But Petitjean and his fellow missionaries now instructed the believers that even outward adherence to a pagan religion was not permissible for a Christian. By 1867 the Urakami Christians, at the mission-

24. Laures, *Catholic Church in Japan*, pp. 215–216. The port of Nagasaki was under direct shogunal administration, and consequently the *daikan* acted as a resident governor. Ōmura, on the other hand, was the seat of a branch daimyo of the shogun. Ernest M. Satow, *A diplomat in Japan*, p. 42.

25. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 483.

26. This practice is reminiscent of the syncretistic *honji suijaku* theory by which in the Heian period Shinto deities came to be classified as local manifestations of universal bodhisattvas. The *kakure kirishitan* followers were acting according to traditional Japanese religious patterns.

aries' urging, were refusing to call in the Buddhist priests for the burial of their dead. The village headman, caught between sympathy for the villagers and awareness of the strictness with which the Bakufu adhered to religious laws, tried to enforce Buddhist burials while at the same time requesting leniency on the part of the *daikan*.[27] His efforts gained time but ultimately failed.

The first repressive act occurred the night of 13 July 1867, when troops of the *daikan* entered Urakami by surprise. They pillaged one of the chapels, confiscating sacred objects. The headman was arrested, along with thirty other villagers who were found in the chapel and nearby. Father Laucaigne, who had been on an extended fifteen-day visit to Urakami, managed to flee to the hills undetected. Other villages were attacked simultaneously, and in all sixty-three Christians were taken first to the *oshōya* ("district headman") and then to the office of the *daikan*.[28] The *daikan* ordered their imprisonment for publicly professing a religion different from the eight sects authorized by law.[29]

Diplomatic pressures for the release of the prisoners. The missionaries were filled with consternation. Were not the 1858–1859 treaties of amity and commerce and the presence of foreign representatives in Nagasaki sufficient protection against a return to anti-Christian atrocities ? For the first time, the treatment of Japanese Christians became a subject of diplomatic remonstrance. The French and Prussian consuls in Nagasaki im-

27. Laures, *Catholic Church in Japan*, pp. 216–219.
28. Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, p. 193. The number arrested differs in various accounts from sixty-three to more than seventy.
29. Marnas, *La religion de Jésus*, p. 44.

mediately protested to the *daikan* that such disrespect for the religion of the west was contrary to the spirit of the treaties. The representatives of Portugal and the United States followed suit. The *daikan* replied that a national law had been broken and that amnesty could be granted only if the Bakufu so ordered. Petitjean appealed to French Minister Léon Roches in Edo for assistance. The Japanese authorities took notice that the agents of Christianity in time of trouble still appealed to their governments for help.

Since France was the recognized protector of Roman Catholics in non-Christian lands, Roches took more vigorous action than his colleagues in response to the arrest of the Urakami Christians. He discussed the matter with members of the Rōjū ("senior council") and found among them encouraging signs of toleration. Such a kindly response may have been motivated in part by a desire to prevent French and other foreign support of the Restoration advocates who were questioning the legitimacy of the Shogunate and who had already militarily challenged the Bakufu. Roches was convinced that the Rōjū would soon order the powers at Nagasaki to release the prisoners and return the confiscated religious objects.[30]

The American minister, General R. B. Van Valkenburgh, also played an active role in the diplomatic exchange. He stopped in Nagasaki, shortly after the arrests had taken place, while on a trip to the west coast of Japan. In a direct interview with Nagasaki officials on 29 July he expressed his regret at the occurrence and endeavored to induce them to release the prisoners. He could obtain no more than their promise

30. Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, pp. 200 ff.; Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 297.

that the prisoners would be treated well and that no more arrests would be made until instructions were received from the Rōjū.[31]

Contrary to the assurances given Van Valkenburgh, further arrests did occur. On 2 August an Urakami woman who declined the services of a Buddhist priest for the funeral of her mother was called before the *oshōya*. After standing unswervingly before her interrogators, she was imprisoned. The following day a Christian from another village was arrested.[32] When Van Valkenburgh discussed this matter with the officials on 8 August he was told that the arrested were apprehended as lawbreakers and not as Christians per se. However, on his return to Edo on 20 August Van Valkenburgh approached the Rōjū on the matter. Assuring them that he intended in no way to interfere in Japan's internal regulations, the American minister warned of the effect news of religious intolerance would have on the President of the United States and the leaders of other western powers. Assuming that his 8 August remonstrances to the Nagasaki authorities had been fruitful, he requested written assurance that the prisoners had been released and their property restored, and that "an absolute forgetfulness of the past may be considered as a guarantee against similar ill-advised acts for the future."[33] While Van Valkenburgh awaited the reply of the Rōjū, he wrote to Secretary of State Seward for confirmation of his policy.

Meanwhile, oppression continued in Kyushu. Petitjean's

31. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, pp. 294–295.
32. Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, p. 201.
33. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 295.

correspondence records that in a census conducted in Ōmura each citizen was asked to sign in blood that he was not a Christian. As proof all were required to drink water blessed by a Buddhist priest. In many villages there were outward recantations, but about 110 men, women, and children who refused to recant were imprisoned in Ōmura. On 8 September those imprisoned in Nagasaki, whose numbers had by now increased, were subjected to intense interrogation. Bowing under the pressure, twenty-one of them apostacized and were immediately released.

A few days later a special envoy from the Shogunate arrived in Nagasaki to investigate the murder of two drunken British sailors from the H.M.S. *Icarus*. Petitjean persuaded the French consular agent, Mr. Lèques, to approach him and request that the assurances given Roches in Edo be kept. The interview was a failure. The shogunal envoy promised the release only of the prisoners who recanted. He in turn asked Lèques to forbid the French priests from mingling with the people. Lèques agreed to pass this information on to the priests but declined to force them into compliance. The French agent was in effect refusing to enforce treaty regulations. Concerning the assurances made to Roches, the envoy claimed they had been made by the Rōjū but not ratified by the Shogun and were therefore unenforceable. As consolation, Lèques received the promise that the prisoners would not be put to death.[34] On 16 September an official pronouncement

34. According to Sir Ernest M. Satow, it was the intention of the Ōmura officials to execute all the Christians, but they were restrained by the Shogun's representatives in Nagasaki. The Ōmura daimyo planned to induce all the daimyo of Kyushu to demand the punishment of the Shogun for

threatened the imprisonment of any Japanese who entered the church in Nagasaki. Five days later Bishop Petitjean sailed for Yokohama to confer directly with Roches.[35]

Meanwhile, Van Valkenburgh had received a communication from Seward on this matter which was sent prior to Seward's receipt of Van Valkenburgh's request for confirmation. In response to requests by the Foreign Committee of the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Evangelical Alliance of the United States, Seward on 9 September 1867 had sent instructions to the American minister to cooperate with the British minister in seeking the modification of Japanese anti-Christian laws. On receiving Van Valkenburgh's note, Seward promptly sent another communication approving the minister's actions and instructing him to join with the representatives of all the treaty powers in an appeal for the repeal of the law which prohibited Christianity.[36]

Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister, had become aware of the Urakami arrests in September on a visit to Nagasaki. Though he himself took no stand, his secretary Ernest M. Satow took the opportunity to warn the Nagasaki officials that his government would be displeased to hear of the persecution.[37] Parkes informed the British Foreign Office about the situation. Lord Stanley of the Foreign Office suggested that he offer gentle advice to the Bakufu authorities :

what the Ōmura leader interpreted as the tacit relaxation of the proscription policy. This indicates the high level of resentment of the Kyushu elite against the Shogunate for its inability to expel the foreigners. Satow, *Diplomat in Japan*, p. 276.

35. Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, pp. 204–207.
36. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, pp. 295–296.
37. Satow, *Diplomat in Japan*, pp. 275–276.

> You may point out in a friendly way that religious zeal is more likely to be inflamed than subdued by persecution and that although it may not suit the Japanese system openly to recognize the profession of Christianity by the natives it would be better to tolerate the exercise of their religion within certain limits rather than acquire throughout Europe and America the reputation of persecuting the faith accepted in those continents and so incur the ill will of all civilized nations to whose feelings religious persecution is now abhorrent.[38]

The Meiji government, instituted the following January, was more attentive to the demands of internal political consolidation than to foreign advice and did not take this recommendation to heart. A real policy change would have to wait until the Meiji oligarchy felt secure in its power. The failure of stringent religious policies and the rise of domestic demands for religious freedom would then force Japan to consider the argument that the tacit toleration of Christianity would contribute to Japan's acceptance as an equal in the modern world.

In the final weeks of the Bakufu, French Minister Roches effected a diplomatic settlement securing the release of the prisoners. In his discussions with the Rōjū, Roches had begun to understand the strains under which the Shogun was operating. The Bakufu itself favored a temporizing attitude toward Christianity but was hampered by internal political considerations. Its liberality irritated the antiforeign party which was strongly represented among the daimyo and samurai of Kyushu. Some of the daimyo had vowed absolute adherence to the fundamental laws against the foreign faith, and an official proclamation of tolerance or amnesty at this time would have been premature and injurious to the hegemony of the Shogunate.[39] Roches and

38. Stanley to Parkes, 23 October 1867, quoted in Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 484.
39. Treat, *Japan and the United States*, pp. 96–97 ; Arthur S. Hardy, *Life and letters of Joseph Hardy Neesima*, p. 186.

the Rōjū reached a compromise solution. The Shogun agreed to the prisoners' release on condition that they be placed under police surveillance and that Catholic missionaries be prohibited from communicating with them. The Shogun underscored his demand by sending a letter to Napoleon III asking that the propaganda of the priests be stopped. Some sources claim that the Nagasaki prisoners were required to outwardly deny the faith before they were granted freedom, and that the Ōmura prisoners were not released. Roches ordered that no French priests go to Urakami, and warned Petitjean that future flouting of the laws of Japan would lead to grave persecution which he could probably do nothing to ameliorate. Despite the Shogunate's attempt to appear uncompromising, dissident daimyo, in another effort to embarrass the Shogun in his relations with the west, condemned the release of the prisoners as a violation of the laws of the nation.[40]

Significance of the Urakami incident of 1867. The Urakami incident of 1867 was an important learning experience in Japan's renewed contact with the west. The aggressive missionary work of the French priests demonstrated that the west was interested not only in commerce and friendship, but also in disseminating its own religion in a non-Christian land. Culturally speaking, the west was not willing to live and let live. Westerners of the nineteenth century would break civil laws and overstep treaty rights for the sake of Christian propagation, just as many Portuguese Jesuits in the seventeenth century had remained in Japan after the first decrees banning their presence.

40. Treat. *Diplomatic relations*, p. 297 ; Fox, *Britain and Japan*, pp. 483–484 ; Chaillet, *Mgr. Petitjean*, p. 207 ; Laures, *Catholic Church in Japan*, p. 220.

Christianity was part of the self-image of the west, and any offense to the faith was to provoke defensive diplomatic reaction. Perhaps this realization would have been less disconcerting had it not been for the thousands of Japanese who responded to the leadership of the priests. These followers of the rediscovered *kirishitan* were a threat from within who, by calling forth the sympathies of the treaty powers, could with impunity disregard the ancient laws of Japan. This lesson was remembered by the Meiji leaders who in their drive to establish hegemony brought to bear against the Urakami Christians measures more severe than their shogunal predecessors.

Perhaps this new learning experience was best utilized by the dissident daimyo and samurai activists in the western *han.* Already seething with rebellion due to economic and status deprivation, these *tozama* houses seized on the Urakami episode as striking evidence of the Shogunate's inability to prevent foreigners and their evil ideas from spreading among the masses and misdirecting citizen loyalty. There were those who genuinely embraced a policy of expelling the barbarians, while others, less antiforeign at heart, publicized the Shogunate's failure in an effort to undermine its power. The incident reinforced the conviction of the most extreme conspirators that no intercourse with the west could be tolerated, and that only a return to an emperor-centered system could give the people sufficient unity and moral strength to maintain national independence and cultural purity. The Urakami incident of 1867 therefore contributed to the Meiji Restoration by bringing into sharp focus the rivalry between the Shogun and the western *han.*

The Urakami episode reflects more than the pre-Restoration domestic polarization. The course of the diplomatic settlement was very much in line with the realities of Bakumatsu foreign relations. It was not by accident that the entreaties of French Minister Roches finally brought the release of the prisoners. Roches had engineered a policy of French support for the Bakufu against its domestic adversaries. This policy took the concrete form of moderated French pressure for treaty rights and the supplying of military artillery for the campaign against Chōshū.[41] Roches was successful in gaining Bakufu favor. His ultimate aim was increased trade with Japan, but his policy paid dividends in the Bakufu's acquiescence to his demand for the release of imprisoned native Christians. The British representatives at the time were playing a different game. Diplomatic historians differ as to whether British Minister Parkes maintained a neutral position or actually supported the anti-Bakufu elements in the western *han*.[42] In either case, Parkes was not in a strong position to request favors from the Shogun. Parkes' secretary, Satow, was openly anti-Bakufu. During his 1867 visit to Nagasaki, Satow sought to manipulate the situation to the Bakufu's disadvantage. He claims to have encouraged the several Kyushu daimyo to join in a general manifesto against the government.[43] The United States in the pre-Restoration days vacillated in its attitude toward the Bakufu,

41. William G. Beasley, *Select documents on Japanese foreign policy, 1853–1868*, pp. 78–79, 274–277; Ernest L. Presseisen, *Before aggression*, pp. 3–8.
42. Grace Fox holds the view that Parkes was neutral (opinion obtained in personal conversation, March 1971). Beasley, on the other hand, stresses Parkes' subversive cultivation of personal ties with Restorationists. Beasley, *Select documents*, p. 84.
43. Satow, *Diplomat in Japan*, p. 276.

and Van Valkenburgh's remonstrances served only to increase the volume of western diplomatic protest.

The Bakumatsu diplomatic configuration was to have reverberations in the post-Restoration Urakami *kuzure*. The French were naturally at a disadvantage. It is quite conceivable that when the Meiji government, acting primarily for domestic political reasons, ordered repressive measures against the Urakami Christians, they were in part taking revenge against the French who had blown wind into the sails of the sinking Bakufu and who had championed the cause of the adherents of the *kirishitan*. Harry Parkes, in contrast to the French, entered the Meiji Era in a strengthened diplomatic position. He was able to play a far more effective role when Urakami again became a focus of diplomatic concern.

The Meiji Restoration and Religion

Saisei itchi. The release of the Urakami prisoners in the fall of 1867 was one of the last official acts of the Tokugawa Bakufu. On 3 January 1868, a coalition of court nobles and lower and middle samurai from the western *han* captured the imperial palace and carried out the Meiji Restoration. As backing for their political goals, the Restoration leaders promoted the concept of the emperor as the only legitimate sovereign, whose power had been wrongfully usurped by the shogun. They proceeded to utilize the mystique of the restored emperor and Shinto institutions as means to create national unity. In this process a policy of religious control was reaffirmed and competing religious ideologies suffered.[44]

44. For discussions of the early Meiji utilization of religion for purposes of

Shinto nationalism was an effective tool used to meet the enormous challenges which faced the new regime in 1868. The first challenge was the need to establish an incontrovertible claim to legitimacy. Throughout all of Japan's recorded history the institution of the emperor had been utilized for this purpose. Tokugawa Ieyasu had taken great pains to verify his blood relationship to the court and to have his title of Shogun sanctioned by the emperor. A second challenge came from the decentralizing forces which threatened to prevent national unity. The various *han* still enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, and many of those who supported the Restoration simply envisioned it as a reorganization along feudal lines.[45] There existed a potential polarization between those who advocated reforms following western models and the conservative party which called for the complete rejection of all foreign influences. The inner circles of Restoration leadership feared that without a strongly unified political system and intense national loyalty the divided nation could not maintain her independence. Thirdly, the foreign menace hung over Japan. The example of China's subservience and the boldness of the treaty powers' demands made it apparent that Japan's position was precarious. Many of the Restoration leaders reacted to this threat in accordance with their samurai values. It was their conviction that Japan was morally superior to the west, and that any program of military defense would have to be

political control see Walter W. McLaren, *A political history of Japan during the Meiji era. 1867–1912*, pp. 30 ff.. Muraoka Tsunetsugu, *Studies in Shinto thought*, p. 203, and Robert A. Wilson, *Genesis of the Meiji government in Japan, 1868–1871*, pp. 10–15.

45. Wilson, *Meiji government*, p. 22.

undergirded by rededication to traditional principles of national polity. One is impressed by how much the writers of that day stressed the necessity of "moral government." To the Restorationists, the Japanese state was to be not only a political entity but also the embodiment of the spiritual aspects of Japanese culture.

To meet the demands of political legitimacy, national unity, and moral renewal, the natural solution chosen by the Restoration leaders was to build the new order around the person o the emperor. The imperial concept held an unchallenged position in the folklore and daily lives of the masses. And just as the emperor had been restored to his rightful status, so Shinto should be restored to its rightful position as the old imperial religion.[46] Robert A. Wilson describes the choice as follows :

> The new government was an imperial government, and its growth in status and power had to be in concert with increasing prestige for the imperial institution. There could be no better agency than the native faith, which held that the emperors were human descendents of the gods, to bring the Japanese to a higher loyalty than that demanded by the feudal relationship of master and retainer. Here was an additional technique for willing general acceptance of the new government in a still largely feudal society.[47]

Members of the court, under the leadership of Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjō Sanetomi, were heavily represented in the groups which met in the first months of 1868 to formulate the political structure.[48] They were assisted by scholars steeped in the Shinto Revival tradition of Kamo Mabuchi (1697–1767) and Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843). It was Mabuchi who had

46. H. Byron Earhart, *Japanese religion : Unity and diversity*, p. 73.
47. Wilson, *Meiji government*, p. 22.
48. Ibid., pp. 9–33.

heralded Japan's remote past, revealed in the *Man'yōshū*, as "the perfect age, an age of august majesty long ago," when "imperial rule filled out in all its plentitude."[49] The institution builders ostensibly looked to legendary antiquity, to the reign of Emperor Jinmu, for the model of government. In that ideal age the religious and state orders had been united (*saisei itchi*). Clues to that system were sought in Japan's oldest extant legal document, the Yōrō Code (718). The Yōrō Code provided the model for departmental organization and precedent for ranking the Jingikan ("office for Shinto") highest in the new government.[50]

On 5 April 1868, the day before the issuance of the Charter Oath, the Emperor proclaimed that the form of government would be based on the "imperial rule of Jinmu Tennō."[51] A final paragraph appended to the Charter Oath displays the *saisei itchi* philosophy typical of many imperial proclamations of the early Meiji period :

> In order to perform the greatest reformation in our history, I will lead the nation in giving an oath to the *kami* of heaven and earth and will establish the national polity to pave the way for our nation's security. Ye subjects shall bear this in mind and shall fully coöperate to fulfill this will.[52]

The Meiji leaders took steps to popularize the imperial symbol. November 3, the Emperor's birthday, was made a national festival. On 1 November 1869, an imperial pardon was issued to all those who had opposed the Restoration movement.[53]

49. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, p. 121.
50. Wilhelmus H. Creemers, *Shrine Shinto after World War II*, p. 30.
51. Floyd Hiatt Ross, *Shinto : The way of Japan*, p. 127.
52. Ibid.
53. William D. Hoover, "The development of national consciousness in early Meiji Japan" (Master's thesis, University of Michigan, 1965), p. 41 ; Hoover's

Breaking with custom, the boy emperor himself visited Kamo and Ise Shrines.[54] Shinto ceremonies became rites of the state and shrines were designated public corporations (*kōhōjin*). Shrine offerings from the national treasury were presented by officers of the Imperial Household Department.[55] Shinto ascendency was reinforced by every possible symbol.

One must not infer from the revival of *saisei itchi* that the Meiji leadership was reactionary. On the contrary, it turned out to be highly transformative. The nature of the return to tradition was partially symbolic and highly utilitarian. Reinstituted classical structures stood the best chance of broad public acceptance. The rapid winning of public support was essential at this moment in Japan's history when internal disunity could have invited foreign incursion or given Tokugawa loyalists a chance to regain power. A great deal of revolutionary potential was present in the leaders' very appeal to classical structures. One term associated with Emperor Jinmu's reign was *hyakudo kōshi* ("complete renovation").[56] By emulating this spirit, far-reaching political and social innovations could be sanctioned. As Harry D. Harootunian has well argued, the oligarchs, under the guise of traditional symbols, ushered in changes which were not traditional but modern.[57] S. N. Eisen-

source is William E. Griffis, *The Mikado : Institution and person* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1915), pp. 144–145.

54. Creemers, *Shrine Shinto*, p. 32.
55. Umeda, "Shūkyōhō no hensen," p. 36 ; Creemers, *Shrine Shinto*, p. 33.
56. Umeda Yoshihiko 梅田義彦, "Shūkyōhō ni tsuite : edo bakufu kara meiji seifu e" 宗教法について～江戸幕府から明治政府へ [Legal provisions governing religion from the Edo period to the Meiji period], in *Shintō shūkyō* 神道宗教, no. 26 (November 1961), p. 37.
57. Harry D. Harootunian, *Toward restoration*, p. 404.

stadt similarly maintains that it was the Meiji elite's valuing of symbol above content of belief that enabled them to be flexible and transformative.[58] Hence the *Seitaisho* (known as the Constitution of 1868), which followed the Charter Oath and was ostensibly modeled after the Yōrō Code, evidenced the influence of western political forms in its delineation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions.[59] The oligarchs appealed to tradition to justify the use of the modern institutions of monetary taxation and universal military conscription.

Innovative policies and national enlightenment, fostered by the center, gradually produced an environment in which it was difficult to maintain the policy of religious control. Religious intolerance was one of the first victims of the process of traditionally sanctioned change.

The religion of the Restoration leaders. The simultaneous emphasis on traditional religious symbols and modern innovations leads one to question the sincerity of the religious beliefs of the Restorationists themselves. Did they who so deliberately proclaimed the emperor's rightful rulership accept as true the myths concerning his divine ancestry and the founding of the Japanese nation ? Or, did they simply utilize Shinto for political purposes ? This question has puzzled historians as far back as McLaren, who mused, "It is impossible to decide how far that watchword of the royalists, 'Exalt the emperor,' was dictated by genuine loyalty or by shrewd political opportunism."[60] Evidence suggests that the oligarchs were not religious in the

58. Statement in lecture at the University of Michigan, November 1970.
59. Wilson, *Meiji government*, p. 39.
60. McLaren, *Political history*, p. 48.

western sense. Religion to them was not a body of truth to be embraced exclusively or for its own sake. Shintoists they were, but only to the extent that the functions of Shinto best expressed their sense of Japaneseness and patriotism. The difference between the doctrinaire Hirata and the oligarchs was that the latter's beliefs were more secularized and utilitarian. To National Learning's emphasis on the primacy of the Son of Heaven they added the mission of increasing national power.[61] The Meiji leaders were eager to raise the emperor as the symbol of the nation and even to reinforce his position through ceremony and the promotion of Shinto institutions; but these acts were functions of national need. Subsequent actions by these men characterize them as practical manipulators of religious institutions. In 1870 Ōkuma Shigenobu, one of the first officers of the Jingikan, proposed the promulgation of a new conglomerate national faith based on the tenets of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity.[62] While in Berlin, the Iwakura Mission inquired concerning the advisability of making Christianity the official religion of Japan.[63] Fukuzawa Yukichi perhaps was close to the practicality of the Restorationists when he wrote in 1885, "We mean by professed belief what we profess to believe, apart from the question of what may be our religious doctrine."[64] Floyd Ross sums up well the relation of the leaders to the beliefs they promoted :

61. Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa religion*, p. 186.
62. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 311. See also Ray F. Downs, "Christianity and nationalism in Meiji Japan" (Master's thesis, University of Michigan, 1958), p. 20.
63. Ritter, *History of Protestant missions in Japan*, p. 50.
64. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 173.

> One idea dominated the thinking of the Meiji government leaders—a government controlled from the top and centered in reverence for the emperor. To achieve this end they were willing to engage in a great deal of compromising. Most of the men deciding religious policies were not interested in religion as such, and probably most of them would not even have called themselves religious persons.[65]

The religious aspect of the Meiji Restoration therefore was the product of a combination of moral idealism and practical realism. Through their religious policies the oligarchs sought to make the idea of national polity widely known to the people. They utilized the imperial mystique to legitimize their regime and to draw the nation together spiritually. In so utilizing religion they were acting in accordance with the historical precedents of the Emperor Shōmu's proliferation of *kokubunji* ("provincial temples") and the Tokugawa policy of temple registration. Clearly, religion was used to reinforce the political order. Inherent in this policy lay the potential for a sudden shift, when warranted by political exigency, in the direction of toleration.

The Jingikan. The first institutional expression of *saisei itchi* was the revival of the Jingikan ("office for Shinto"). The temporary governmental structure set up after the Restoration, the Shichika, ranked the Jingijimuka the highest of its seven administrative offices in accordance with the Yōrō Code. The name of the Shinto office was changed to Jingijimukyoku and then to Jingikan when the *Seitaisho* was promulgated in June 1868.[66] That event was preceded by the following directive:

> Whereas the restoration of imperial rule is founded upon the achievements initiated by Emperor Jimmu, and whereas the nation is being restored to a policy of general renewal and unity of worship and administration,

65. Ross, *Shinto*, pp. 132–133.
66. Wilson, *Meiji government*, pp. 21–41.

> it is ordered that, first of all, the Jingikan shall be revived, and further that rites and sacrifices shall thereafter be performed.[67]

The Jingikan was theoretically of higher rank than the Dajōkan ("executive council"), but in actual practice the Jingikan was subject to Dajōkan supervision. The Dajōkan senior official, the *udaijin*, was always a courtier of higher rank than the Jingikan head, the *haku*.[68] The civil service ranking of Dajōkan officers was also consistently higher than that of their Jingikan counterparts.[69] The elevation of the Jingikan was, therefore, more symbolic than real. The *haku* was charged with responsibility for controlling festivals, maintaining custody of the imperial tombs, superintending personnel in shrines, and managing general affairs relative to the Shinto faith.[70]

The Jingikan was thus given a symbolic status in line with the exalted position of the imperial institution. Its frequent restructuring, however, reflects both the institutional instability of the period and the gradual downgrading of the status of this office. Between 1868 and 1873 the office in charge of Shinto affairs underwent at least four major alterations concurrent with sweeping reorganizations of the government structure. McLaren's comment well describes the fluid state of official organs and policies :

> Changes in the principles as well as the organic institutions of the government occurred with a frequency that was bewildering even to those directly concerned. Principles which it was impossible to apply were enunciated in grave documents and straightway forgotten.[71]

67. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, p. 204.
68. Wilson, *Meiji government*, pp. 67–72.
69. Robert M. Spaulding, Jr., who has done major research on the Meiji civil service, is the source of this information.
70. Wilson, *Meiji government*, p. 71.
71. McLaren, *Political history*, p. 67. The various government offices in charge of religious affairs are shown in Appendix B.

In such a period of instability it was difficult for the government to maintain consistent policies for the ascendancy of Shinto and the control of religion. The ferment in the society was fertile soil in which ideas of change could grow.

Shinbutsu bunri and the failure of government policy toward Buddhism. One religious policy which the leaders attempted to implement was the separation of Shinto and Buddhism (*shinbutsu bunri*). Since the Heian Period a Buddhist-dominated, syncretistic faith called *ryōbu shintō* had so controlled the religious scene that by the Tokugawa period it was hardly possible to distinguish the indigenous Shinto cult from imported Buddhism.[72] The Meiji government endeavored to purify Shinto from Buddhist syncretistic influences and undo the position of status to which Buddhism had risen under the Bakufu. However, this attempt at religious tampering was fraught with frustration and proved abortive. *Shinbutsu bunri* was to create deep domestic reverberations and mark a turning point in official religious policy.

The initial separation order was issued by the Jingijimuka on 4 April 1868 and read as follows :

> Whereas at present the imperial rule is being restored, and the nation cleansed of all abuses, it is ordered that at large and small shrines in the various provinces those intendents who wear Buddhist garb, and those persons called shrine monks and the like, shall return to secular life.[73]

This order was followed in a few days by one from the Dajōkan which requested the removal of Buddhist statues and implements from Shinto shrines and the renaming of those shrine-temples (*jingūji*) which had Buddhist names.[74] Buddhist tem-

72. Creemers, *Shrine Shinto*, p. 30.
73. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, p. 204.
74. Creemers, *Shrine Shinto*, p. 32.

ples were cut off from government funds and had to return many of their land holdings to public ownership. The *terauke* ("temple registration") system was discontinued and the task of citizen registration was turned over to local officials. In some extreme cases Shinto funeral services replaced the Buddhist ceremonies.[75] Through the separation of Shinto from Buddhism the Meiji leaders hoped to weaken one of the symbols of the Tokugawa system as well as to placate radical nationalist and antiforeign groups.[76]

However, extremists seized the *shinbutsu bunri* movement and carried it far beyond the government's intentions. Under the slogan "abolish Buddhism and destroy its icons" (*haibutsu kishaku*), bands of hoodlums, sometimes led by Shinto priests, burned temples, beat Buddhist priests, and wantonly destroyed Buddhist objects of art. Some icons were sold for a pittance to become the nucleus of western museum oriental collections.[77] Fearing widespread civil disorder, the government had to issue a restraining decree only one month after the initial call for *shinbutsu bunri*.[78]

The effort to separate Buddhism and Shinto failed miserably. Many Buddhist priests simply renounced their vows and became Shinto priests overnight. Their continued presence perpetuated the former syncretistic practices.[79] For Buddhism the effort to repress it was a blessing in disguise, for Buddhist leadership was shaken out of its complacency as priests of

75. Ibid., p. 33.
76. Kun Sam Lee, *The Christian confrontation with Shinto nationalism*, p. 34.
77. Earhart, *Japanese religion: Unity and diversity*, p. 77.
78. Umeda, "Shūkyōhō ni tsuite," p. 38.
79. Earhart, *Japanese religion: Unity and diversity*, p. 77.

various sects united to fight the separation directives. The priests had the support of broad segments of the masses for whom religion was a virtually inseparable blend of Buddhist and Shinto elements.[80]

The *shinbutsu bunri* effort was abandoned in 1870 when the government shifted to a policy of enlisting Buddhist priests for the propagation of Shinto ideology. The doctrines to be promulgated went under the name of *taikyō* ("great teaching"), an artificial creed which amounted to a restatement of Hirata Shinto. With eleven officially assigned sermon themes, the Shinto and Buddhist joint propagandists were to preach the Three Principles of Instruction which stressed respect for the kami, patriotism, and honor to the Emperor.[81] The system of joint propagation failed from the start. Buddhists of the Shin sect in particular would not tolerate the imposition of Shinto rites and doctrines. Fukuda Gyōkai (1806–1888), a Jōdo priest, was outspoken in his opposition. In his *Sanjō no guben* [A humble appraisal of the Three Principles of Instruction] he declared that it was impossible for him, a person who had chanted the name of Buddha for decades, to suddenly change his ways because of some government order and speak only of "reverence for the kami and love of country."[82] Priests who did preach *taikyō* failed to stick to the official themes, and the people tired of the excessive propaganda. In 1873 the government admitted the failure of its attempt to elevate Shinto as a religion at the expense of Buddhism. The official announce-

80. Lee, *Christian confrontation*, p. 34.
81. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, pp. 205–208.
82. Ibid., pp. 222–223.

ment of the discontinuation of *taikyō* propagation came in May 1875. From then on Shinto was emphasized more as a cult of patriotism and less as a religion.[83]

The government's admission of failure in the elevation of Shinto over Buddhism signified the declining effectiveness of the general policy of strict religious regulation, and marked a significant early step in the trend toward religious toleration. Muraoka Tsunetsugu correctly asserts, "The failure of this religious indoctrination policy was certainly associated with the trend toward official recognition of the principle of religious freedom, which soon came to be pressed."[84] Tanaka Jirō, former dean of the University of Tokyo Department of Law, concurs by saying that the order for the joint propagation of *taikyō* gave rise to demands for religious freedom.[85] The government's attempts to regulate Buddhist institutions and popular beliefs produced such a commotion that they became counterproductive to the leaders' ultimate goal of the spiritual unity of the people. The protests of some Buddhist intellectuals actually called for the separation of religion and state. One example is Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911), an adherent of the Honganji School of Jōdo Shinshū and a member of the Iwakura Mission. In December 1872 he sent a petition to the government insisting that joint propagation be discontinued. He criticized the Three Principles of Instruction for confusing government and religion, and protested that failure to revere

83. Hori Ichirō and Toda Yoshio, "Shinto," in *Japanese religion in the Meiji era*, Kishimoto Hideo, ed., p. 92.
84. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, pp. 227–228.
85. Tanaka Jirō, "The Meiji and present constitutions compared," in *Religion and state in Japan*, International Institute for the Study of Religions, p. 63.

the kami did not imply failure to love one's country.[86] Though Shimaji's advocacy of church-state separation was advanced for his time, the policy of Shinto indoctrination was hardly compatible with the *kaikoku* ("open country") spirit of the 1870s. The demands of the times forced the government to soften its policies. The effects of this trend eventually extended even to the despised "evil sect" of Christianity and its oppressed Urakami followers.

The renewal of the proscription of Christianity. The Japanese leadership was particularly hesitant to grant toleration to Christianity for several reasons. First of all, there was fear of the conservative, antiforeign element. Reacting against the modernizing tendencies of progressive government leaders, this faction became increasingly assertive in 1868. Individuals sometimes resorted to violence. Yokoi Shōnan, a liberal advocate of religious freedom, was assassinated for his views in early 1869.[87] Christianity bore great symbolic significance to the conservatives and the masses as a whole, and the government dared not alienate them by lifting the proscription.

Secondly, by its very nature the Christianity of the missionaries was scarcely amenable to the Shinto-oriented policies of the post-Restoration regime. The religion of Jesus favored conversion rather than syncretism and encouraged the follower to be critical of his society rather than conform to it.[88] The Japanese convert had to take a radical leap from his own tradition. The conflict between Judeo-Christian monotheism and

86. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, pp. 225 ff.; Hori and Toda, "Shinto," p. 73.
87. Wilson, *Meiji government*, p. 66; Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 68.
88. Robert N. Bellah, "Values and social change in modern Japan," in *Asian cultural studies*, no. 3 (October 1962), pp. 52–56.

the Shinto pantheon is obvious. As a Meiji official remarked in 1868, "To permit the instruction of the people in Christianity would mean the introduction of a second son of God, and it would never do to have two in the same country."[89]

In the third place, Japanese who embraced the western faith tended to be those who stood over against the new political order and were least secure in it.[90] Just as the Christians of *tozama han* were perceived as a threat by the Tokugawa House, so *rōnin* and former Tokugawa retainers, who most eagerly sought out the instruction of the missionaries, were feared as the potential nucleus of a future foreign-supported uprising. Furthermore, a large concentration of Christians in one area such as Nagasaki could exacerbate the problem of regional loyalty which the oligarchy was attempting to overcome.

A fourth factor behind the feeling against Christianity was the anti-Christian apologetic writing which appeared in 1868 and increased in the early 1870s. Much of this work was the product of Buddhist priests, themselves fired up as a consequence of the *haibutsu kishaku* movement. Verbeck cites a pamphlet entitled "Tales of Nagasaki: The story of the evil doctrine" which appeared in that port in 1868. It accused the Urakami Christians of immoralities and violations of fundamental loyalties and defended their imprisonment. A translation of this writing by Sir Ernest M. Satow was forwarded to the United States through diplomatic channels and appears in the *Diplomatic correspondence of the United States for 1868.* It became another source of information for the American government

89. Ritter, *History of Protestant missions in Japan*, p. 19.
90. Best, *Christian faith and cultural crisis*, p. 175.

concerning religious intolerance in Japan, and was later recalled when diplomatic efforts were exerted to hasten domestic toleration.[91]

Considering the widespread antipathy toward Christianity, it is not surprising that on 7 April 1868, the Dajōkan ordered the reposting of the triple signboards (*jōsansatsu*) which bore a reiterated proscription :

> The evil sect of Christianity is hereby strictly prohibited as in times past.[92]

The occurrence of this order just three days after the *shinbutsu bunri* decree indicates that it was one aspect of the broader policy of religious control. The proscription was published in the *Official Gazette* and immediately drew protests from the foreign consuls. Perhaps most galling to them was a sign erected 22 April near the foreign residences in Yokohama which read :

> Since the abominable religion of the Christians is strictly prohibited, each person is obligated to inform the proper authorities of all persons who appear suspect. Reward will be given for such information.[93]

On 14 May an order went out to the various *han* warning of the resurgence of Christianity and giving an indication of the type of repressive measures that were soon to strike Urakami. The order read :

> During the recent revival of imperial rule, Christianity has begun to spread again and is likely to do great harm to the state. We cannot allow this to continue. Bring the leaders together and explain to them the error of their ways. If they repent, destroy all Christian books and images and have them swear allegiance before the Shinto gods. If they

91. Verbeck, "History of Protestant missions in Japan," p. 749; this pamphlet is also quoted in Francis O. Adams, *The history of Japan from the earliest period to the present time* (London : H. S. King and Company, 1874–1875), vol. 2, p. 144.
92. Umeda, "Shūkyōhō ni tsuite," p. 42.
93. Marnas, *La religion de Jésus*, p. 107.

> refuse to repent, we have no recourse other than to exile the rest to forced labor in other clans. After a number of years, when they have lost every trace of their faith and when they have manifested complete repentance, they may go home.[94]

On 24 May, United States Minister Van Valkenburgh and French Minister Roches submitted a joint complaint to the commissioners for foreign affairs. Sir Harry Parkes had received word of the renewed proscription while in Osaka to present his credentials to the new emperor. He and Satow tried to have the term "Christian" deleted. The diplomats argued that the law offended the sensitivities of the western peoples who believed in Christianity and might adversely affect Japan's international reputation. They were told that popular hostility to Christianity remained so intense that not to denounce it would be tantamount to approval. The active proselyting by the French priests in Nagasaki was given as further reason for the revived ban. The consuls at Nagasaki remonstrated to local officials who replied on 31 May that they must strictly enforce the law.[95]

In response to the foreigners' remonstrances the Dajōkan did make a superficial change in the offensive wording of the placards. On 26 May it ordered the separation of the words "evil sects" and "Christianity." The Dajōkan statement reads as follows :

> While the Christian sect, on which a decree was issued some time ago, has been strictly prohibited for a long time, evil sects are also strictly prohibited. Thus it will not do to make the mistake of confusing the two. The decree has been reformulated as on the attached document. You are to post this quickly after checking it.

The reformulated proscription stated :

94. Hori and Toda, "Shinto," p. 53.
95. Treat, *Diplomatic relations,* pp. 322-323.

> The sect of Christianity is hereby strictly prohibited as in the past. Evil sects are hereby strictly prohibited.[96]

The Meiji government had in fact outlawed other sects, such as the *yamabushi* and some Nichiren groups.[97] But the change in wording in no way altered the treatment of Christians, especially in Urakami where repression was again on the rise.

Thus in an effort to maintain national unity and placate the conservative party, the Meiji government affirmed the Tokugawa proscription of Christianity. The foreign representatives devoted much of their attention to the issue of the treatment of Christianity, though matters concerning neutral rights, steamships, and trade privileges also occupy many pages in the diplomatic records. If Payson J. Treat's coverage is a fair indication of this problem's relative weight, we may safely assert that toleration for Christianity received more attention from the treaty power representatives than any other single issue in the period from 1868 to 1870.[98] Within the subject area of the persecution of Christians, the Urakami *kuzure* was the incident of greatest notoriety.

The Urakami *kuzure*

Urakami Village had been a source of trouble since the very beginning of the Restoration. The Christians released from prison by the Shogunate had used their freedom to actively propagate their beliefs. Citizens of Nagasaki reported riotous agitation among the villagers.[99] Urakami residents refused to

96. Umeda, "Shūkyōhō no hensen," pp. 39–40.
97. Umeda, "Shūkyōhō ni tsuite," pp. 39–40.
98. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, pp. 294–360.
99. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 485.

contribute labor for a new shrine ordered built in the village. The government feared that the Christian movement, if unchecked, would spread dissension to other areas.

The deportation order. When, in February 1868, the Restoration government extended its hegemony to Kyushu, imperial authorities under newly appointed Nagasaki Governor Sawa Nobuyoshi conducted an investigation of the Christian situation. Inoue Kaoru, an aide to the governor, was one of those most vindictive in handling the issue. Kido Kōin, another notable Restoration leader, journeyed to Nagasaki to lecture the heads of Christian households on their duties as Japanese. Kido proposed to the Dajōkan on 25 April that native Christian leaders be beheaded and that their followers be removed from their villages. However, under the more moderate urging of Shinto scholar Fukuba Bisei, the Dajōkan was persuaded that exile alone should be employed.[100]

An 8 June 1868 decree by the imperial government ordered the deportation of some 4,010 Christians from Urakami to thirty-three western *han*. It stated :

> The Christian religion being strictly prohibited by the law of the empire, the violation of this law is considered a serious matter. Therefore, after the people shall have been placed in charge of the daimyo, care should be taken to induce them to renounce their evil ways, and if there be any who refuse to repent severe punishment must be inflicted.
>
> These people shall be rigidly excluded from social intercourse until it shall have been proved that their hearts are purified.
>
> They shall be employed as laborers on ground requiring improvement, such as mines, coal mines, etc.
>
> They shall live in forests. For a period of three years one ration for each person per day shall be allowed to the daimyo.[101]

The daimyo were to send agents to Nagasaki to receive groups

100. Abe, "Religious Freedom," pp. 303–306.
101. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 324.

of deportees. They were ordered to treat the Christians kindly unless gentle persuasion failed to produced recantation.[102] The tactic of dispersing a potentially disloyal element calls to mind the Tokugawa measure of assigning threatening daimyo to *han* located away from their power bases and surrounded by dependable *fudai* vassals.

The Urakami *kuzure* took place in two stages. The initial deportation order of 8 June 1868 was applied to only 120 Christians. A second order in January 1870 was more forcefully carried out and resulted in the exile of 3,300 more Urakami villagers. The diplomatic community in Japan continually protested the harsh uprooting of the Christians. Foreign governments and citizen groups directed their complaints to the Iwakura Mission during its journey abroad. During this time domestic pressures for religious toleration were gathering momentum. The following discussion deals with these participants in the struggle for religious toleration and assesses their roles in the eventual release of the Urakami exiles.

Diplomatic pressure for religious toleration. In July the 120 victims of the first deportation were sent by steamer to Chōshū, Fukuyama, and Shinano. The foreign consuls, including the Russian representative in faraway Hakodate, were unanimous in protest.[103] However, there were some among the foreign representatives who recognized that the action of the Meiji government was not totally without reason. Harry Parkes thought it quite understandable for the "highly sensitive" Japanese nation

102. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 485.

103. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 486; Kamikawa Hikomatsu, *Japanese-American diplomatic relations in the Meiji-Taisho era*, p. 71.

to oppose the political character of the Catholic teachings.[104] The charges that the French priests were overstepping their bounds were mostly true. While the deportees were boarding a steamer at Nagasaki, the dauntless Petitjean was smuggling ten Japanese youths aboard another ship to be taken to Shanghai to study for the priesthood![105] Furthermore, the heroic image of the Urakami Christians was becoming tarnished. Van Valkenburgh, in writing to his government on 8 July, expressed the misgivings of Protestant foreigners concerning the piety of the villagers :

> There appears to be no doubt that, under pretense of professing Christianity, those people, who belong to the humblest and most ignorant classes, neglected their avocations, held so-called religious meetings at night, when often gross licentiousness prevailed ; and hard labor in isolated places is the means adopted to cure them from immoral practices.[106]

In the fall of 1868 news came of mass arrests and torture of Christians in the Gotō Islands west of Nagasaki. Trouble began on the island of Hisakashima on the pretext that Shinto and Buddhist objects had disappeared from homes whose antecedents were known to be Christians.[107] Harry Parkes, by now the most influential foreign representative in Japan, believed that at this time religious toleration would do more than anything else to win sympathy for Japan among the treaty powers. He conferred with government officials in December and obtained their promise to show clemency to native Christians.[108] On 27 January 1869 he was assured that envoys

104. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 492.
105. Laures, *Catholic Church in Japan*, p. 222.
106. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 324.
107. Marnas, *La religion de Jésus*, p. 128.
108. Parkes won this concession in spite of his ungentlemanly decorum. At the meeting he erupted in violent fits of temper. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 431 n.

would be sent to the Gotō Islands to stop persecutions there. Van Valkenburgh sent an American chargé, Mr. Portman, to Nagasaki to investigate the situation. He returned in late April to report tranquility in both Urakami and the Gotō Islands.[109] Momentarily the foreign representatives relaxed in the hope that the repression of Christianity was on the wane. However, the next month Bishop Petitjean reported that some 430 Christians had been arrested in the Gotō Islands and that seventeen had died from starvation, cold [?], and torture. The new French minister, Maxime d'Outrey, laid this report before his colleagues. Van Valkenburgh was skeptical about the validity of Petitjean's report but joined the other ministers in a letter of protest on 18 May.[110]

In response to diplomatic protests, the Japanese government typically denied the accusations as false rumors or claimed that those arrested were detained not because they were Christians but because they were disloyal subjects who fomented civil disorder. The Japanese clearly disliked the foreigners' diplomatic assertiveness on behalf of Japanese Christians. This feeling is evident in a discussion with British and French ministers in Osaka in 1869 recorded by Ōkuma Shigenobu in his *Sekijitsu no monogatari* [Tales of former times] :

> Sir Harry Parkes: "Japan will be doomed if persecution continues."
> Ōkuma: "The day when we blindly follow the commands of foreigners will surely be the time of our nation's destruction... You think that what you desire can easily be done, but it is not so... We dare not add another to the many things that are disturbing our country."
> (At this point the French minister threatened to bring his country's navy to the assistance of the Christians.)
> Ōkuma: "Your threat shows how good reason we have to fear Chris-

109. Ibid., pp. 341–342.
110. Ibid., p. 343.

> tianity; for as soon as trouble arises, there is instantly talk about gunboats."[111]

While rumors of fresh persecutions were coming from the Gotō Islands, the Kōgisho, the official deliberative assembly, was holding its first session. Part of the debate dealt with official policy toward Christianity. The Kōgisho had no legislative powers and its influence was inconsequential, but the record of what transpired gives some indication of the changing attitudes of Meiji political elites. The voting at the session displays the wide divisions of opinion in official circles on religious toleration and shows a decline in domestic support for a hard-line policy. Cary claims that liberal members of the assembly asked Rev. Verbeck to prepare a paper in favor of religious toleration for presentation at the session.[112] A proposal to continue the ban on Catholicism (probably implying all Christianity) was passed by 164 votes out of 227 members present. However, fearing the complications sure to arise with foreign nations, the body rejected by an overwhelming vote (189 to 22) a motion to suppress Christianity by the relentless use of capital punishment.[113] A few supported a proposal that all foreigners entering the country be required to trample on the cross, but this motion also failed by a large margin.[114] Many of the speakers recommended education rather than persecution as the means to suppress Christianity, while an open hearing was given the idea that to offend the foreigners'

111. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 311. See also Downs, "Christianity and nationalism," p. 20.
112. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, pp. 69–70.
113. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 488; Wilson, *Meiji government*, p. 53.
114. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 70.

faith was to injure treaty relations.[115]

The hopes of toleration advocates received their last setback in January 1870. In that month the heads of 700 Christian families were brought before the governor at Nagasaki. Harry Parkes was in Nagasaki at that time, but even he could do nothing to prevent a subsequent order from Tokyo exiling 3,300 more Urakami Christians to nineteen *han*. The reasons given for this act were that foreign missionaries were operating outside Nagasaki and that Christian villagers had refused to follow local customs. Much to the chagrin of Protestant missionaries who witnessed the deportation, American and European ships were used to carry the exiles.[116]

In the aftermath of this final dispersion a very significant split occurred between the hasty assumptions of a new American representative and the seasoned views of Harry Parkes. Charles E. DeLong had replaced Van Valkenburgh on the inauguration of President Grant in 1869. The appointment of this inept diplomat was actually an act of political exile.[117] His career in Japan was to begin with an unduly harsh judgment of Japanese policy. DeLong's report to Washington on the January deportation interpreted it as evidence that the Meiji oligarchs were returning to a policy of *jōi* ("expel the barbarians") :

> Hence, we have in this government one impliedly and expressly pledged to hostility to foreigners and the Christian faith ; and from such a government, so intended and so committed, I can see no hopes of effecting aught for important or general good relative to this subject by simple remonstrances...[118]

115. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 489.
116. Ibid., p. 489.
117. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 353.
118. Ibid., p. 358.

On the strength of DeLong's communication, the State Department sought an exchange of views with the other treaty powers. France as usual was especially interested in the protection of the Christians and concurred with DeLong that strong action was warranted. The British, on the other hand, had the benefit of Harry Parkes' prophetic insight that restraint in the long run would prove to be the best policy. He perceived that Japan had already committed herself to a course of adoption of western ideas. It was only a matter of time, he believed, before that course would result in a decline in the persecution of Christianity.[119] That trend could be hastened by circumspection on the part of foreign missionaries and consuls. Parkes' view prevailed among the treaty powers. DeLong conveyed a mild request for amnesty to Sawa Nobuyoshi, the former imperial governor of Nagasaki who was now Foreign Minister.[120] This note was followed on 9 February by a four-power memorandum agreeing to restrain missionaries from preaching outside the foreign settlements, and even offering to punish those who did, provided the deportees would be returned. Although this offer was not accepted, the government began to send home exiles who recanted and no further arrests were made.[121] From this point on there was a sharp decline in the number of references to Christianity in American diplomatic correspondence.[122]

The domestic trend toward religious toleration. Though only apostate Christians were returned to Urakami in 1870, there were

119. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 492.
120. Kamikawa, *Japanese-American diplomatic relations*, p. 71.
121. Treat, *Diplomatic relations*, p. 360.
122. Ibid., p. 369.

signs of a softening in the Japanese government's attitude toward Christianity. The government took pains to point out that the deportees had sufficient housing and were not required to perform extraordinarily heavy work. When a report of the mistreatment of exiles in Kanazawa and Toyama was received in Tokyo, the government issued a reprimand.[123] Grace Fox quotes a memorandum of a conversation between Parkes and an unnamed Japanese minister in January 1870 which illustrates the gradual change in attitude which was taking place in ruling circles. The minister said :

> Although the Mikado's Government must not lay itself open to the charge of being faithless to its political trust, we are far from treating Christianity in a persecuting spirit. We are well aware that Bibles and prayer books are being extensively circulated : that these books are read by many of our own officers, and I believe it is possible to purchase them in book shop. No attempt has been made to check the circulation of these scriptures and we have employed several missionaries as teachers of languages and we are well aware that they teach other things besides philology but we do not undertake to be keepers of men's consciences... I may even tell you that I have studied the tenets of Christianity and approve them. They appear to me to be superior to those of Shintoism, Buddhism or Confucianism, but at the same time the high aims of Christianity may be perverted, and as taught by the Roman Catholic priests we think it is open to grave objections. England thought the same at one time and found it necessary to interdict the Romish faith. We can hardly be blamed for doing the same for reasons which are not dissimilar to those which then actuated England. On the contrary, we consider we have reason to complain of the French Minister or the French Government for not repressing the mistaken zeal of these priests, and thus exposing us to danger.[124]

These evidences of a softening attitude toward the alien religion appeared nearly two years before the departure of the Iwakura Mission in late 1871. It is the standard contention of many scholars, both Japanese and western, that the rebuffs received by the Iwakura Mission in its discussions on treaty

123. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 495.
124. Ibid., p. 491.

revision constituted the major stimulus to the toleration of Christianity in Japan. While it must be granted that the Japanese were sensitive to the criticisms leveled at their policies during the treaty negotiations, the above view ignores the evidence that the course in the direction of toleration was to a large degree previously set, and that the movement was propelled by developments in Japanese politics and society.

Since the Restoration certain liberal intellectuals had been calling for freedom of religious expression. Their ranks were small at the outset but swelled after the failure of *shinbutsu bunri* and after emulation of the west came more into vogue. A pioneer was Yokoi Shōnan, counsellor to the daimyo of Echizen and a *san'yo* ("councilor") under the *Seitaisho*. Yokoi had sent two nephews to the United States to study in 1866 and had obtained a copy of the Bible in Chinese from Shanghai. He urged that men should be left free to follow whatever religion seemed true to them. His liberal views provoked his assassination in 1869.[125] Another early advocate of toleration was linguist and Confucian scholar Nakamura Masanao (1832-1891). Nakamura traveled to England in 1868 where he was inspired to translate Samuel Smiles' *Self help*. In an August 1871 note to the Shizuoka office of the Board of Shinto Missionaries (Senkyōshi) he criticized the *saisei itchi* policy and argued that government and religion should be kept apart.[126] Nakamura was one of the first scholars to argue that Japan must adopt the spiritual foundations of the west as well as copy its institutions.[127] He even argued that the emperor be baptized

125. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, pp. 68–69.
126. Ibid., pp. 74–75; Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, pp. 223–224.

and become head of a Japanese church !"[128] Although Fukuzawa Yukichi favored no faith in particular, "his espousal of Western civilization," writes Muraoka, "may be said to have increased respect for Christianity, or at least to have contributed to the correction of the view that it was a perverted faith."[129]

To many Japanese who went abroad it seemed obvious that the west's recognition of Japan as a civilized nation was hindered by the religious differences between Japan and the west and Japan's treatment of native Christians. Mori Arinori, Japanese chargé d'affaires in Washington, addressed a memorial to Sanjō Sanetomi in November 1872. It recommended in part that "the imperial government of Dai Nihon make no law prohibiting, either directly or indirectly, the free exercise of conscience or religious liberty within its domains."[130] Although the time of Mori's memorial indicates the stimulus of the negotiations of the Iwakura Mission on treaty revision, perhaps a deeper source of Mori's espousal of toleration lay in his own favorable experience in a Swedenborgian community in New York.[131]

Strange as it may seem, there were liberal voices within the Shinto hierarchy itself. Ōkuni Takamasa, Kubo Sueshige, and Fukuba Bisei were progressives who called for the importation

127. Robert S. Schwantes, "Christianity versus science: A conflict of ideas in Meiji Japan," in *Far eastern quarterly*, vol. 12 (1953), p. 124; George B. Sansom, *The western world and Japan*, p. 457.
128. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 499.
129. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, p. 211.
130. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 81.
131. An account of Mori Arinori's religious experiences in the United States is found in Ivan Hall, "Mori Arinori: The formative years," in *Papers on Japan*, vol. 3, pp. 52–124.

of western ideas and technology for the enhancement of imperial glory. Fukuba held an office in the Jingikan. He regarded alien religions such as Buddhism and Christianity as acceptable variations of kami traditions [a modern application of *honji suijaku* ?]. He showed great concern for the humane treatment of arrested Christians. Fukuba was finally ousted in a power struggle between conservatives and progressives within the Shinto officialdom, but such struggles served only to weaken Shinto ascendancy.[132]

One factor that hastened toleration for Christianity was the realization among the governing elites of the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism and the styles in which they were propagated. In the early years the Protestant missionaries, though not innocent of violations of the laws forbidding evangelization, were definitely more restrained in their activities than the aggressive French priests of Nagasaki. The valuable contributions of the Rev. Guido Verbeck as an advisor to the government helped to create a new image of Christianity as a religion of piety and restraint. Niijima Jō, a Christian then studying in the United States, reported evidence of the reconsideration of Christianity within Japanese leadership circles. His letter of 21 March 1871, referring to a conversation with Chargé Mori, says, "He told me also of the present internal movement among the higher classes concerning Christianity. They begin to see a vast difference between the Protestant and Catholic religions."[133] A quotation from liberal Meiji politician Shimada Saburō, though overly laudatory,

132. Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, pp. 219–221.
133. Hardy, *Life and letters*, p. 102, letter from Niijima to a Mrs. Flint.

attests to the influence of the lives of early missionaries in undermining religious prejudices :

> When the country entered upon its new era, the reactionary spirit against Christianity still retained its old prejudice. Fortunately the missionaries and educators, whom the United States sent to Japan about this time, and their sincerity and kindness produced on the minds of our countrymen a profound impression, such as tended to completely remove the suspicions hitherto entertained toward the Christian religion... The sincerity and patience of these early messengers of the Gospel seldom failed to inspire respect in those who were brought into contact with them. In fact, they were a living testimony, completely dispelling whatever prejudice remained against Christianity in the bosoms of our countrymen, who were naturally led to the conclusion that after all there could be nothing hateful or dreadful in a religion which could produce such men.[134]

Missionary correspondence of the 1871-1873 period, though still complaining about the proscription of Christianity and the continued exile of the Urakami Christians, evidences a distinct optimism and anticipation of toleration. In 1859 the American Bible Society had sent a Bible to Dr. J. C. Hepburn for presentation to the emperor of Japan. Hepburn prudently postponed the presentation for thirteen years. In October 1872 he was confident that the Bible would be graciously received. On the occasion of the presentation he wrote, "The reception of this book is a striking evidence of the great changes which have taken place in the government, and the important advance which they have made during these years toward full toleration of Christianity and liberty of conscience."[135]

The individuals, ideas, and correspondence cited in the foregoing paragraphs illustrate the domestic trend toward a more favorable treatment of Christianity. This tolerant attitude grew to significant strength by 1872. Such evidence makes

134. Treat, *Japan and the United States*, p. 99.
135. Takaya Michio, ed., *The letters of Dr. J. C. Hepburn*, p. 122.

untenable the contention of Otis Cary and other writers that in 1873 "the attitude of the government suddenly changed" in response to the demands of the treaty negotiations.[136] In the absence of a previously developed trend toward toleration it would have been political folly for the government to remove the edict boards in 1873, despite the external diplomatic pressure. The Iwakura Mission, however, did give the movement a sense of urgency. Hence we turn to the relation of the Iwakura Mission to the struggle for religious toleration.

The Iwakura Mission. When the Iwakura Mission sailed into San Francisco Bay on 15 January 1872, it was greeted by a nation which knew little of Japan other than some vague notions about the Mikado and the notorious Urakami *kuzure.* In addition to the diplomatic communications already discussed, the foreign community in Japan was an important channel through which the American government and people learned about Urakami and religious intolerance in Japan. Articles mentioning these problems appeared regularly in the *Japan weekly mail* and *The far east* and found their way to America. The Protestant missionary community communicated both to the government and to the various mission boards. Daniel C. Greene of the American Board was able to convey the feelings of missionaries through his brother-in-law, Evarts Boutell, who at various times held the positions of Attorney General, Assistant Secretary of State, and United States Senator.[137] Presbyterian missionaries Christopher Carrouthers, David Thompson, and J. C. Hepburn addressed a letter to their board on 17

136. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan,* p. 97.
137. Ibid., p. 81.

June 1871, six months before the departure of the Iwakura Mission. They noted the approach of negotiations on treaty revision and asked board officials to urge the United States government to take action on behalf of "the full toleration of Christianity" in Japan. They called for a harder line of protest against the Urakami deportation :

> In the year 1868 4100 persons were banished from the vicinity of Nagasaki to various parts of the empire to be used to clear land, or to work in the lime pits... These persons, Catholic converts, whose banishment occurred so long ago, are still in confinement and as far as we know no vigorous efforts have been made by Christian governments to secure their release. The foreign ministers, on the ground, have protested firmly against this course it is true, but they have not been sufficiently supported by the home governments....

The letter goes on to describe reports of inhumane treatment of Christian prisoners, and concludes :

> Hence we petition you to use your influence...with the U. S. government to sustain the decided course which our present minister appears ready to take, and to send out full instructions to him. We are anxious that this be done speedily, inasmuch as the revision of the existing treaty will take place within a year from now and it is most desirable to have an article securing religious toleration in the revised treaty.[138]

A subsequent letter from J. C. Hepburn qualifies the above request by denying that it advocated armed interference.[139]

Immediately prior to the Mission's departure in December 1871, Iwakura Tomomi expressed to the British chargé the official stand on religious freedom for Japanese. There could yet be no freedom of religion, he said, for throughout Japanese history toleration had been associated with disturbance and bloodshed. To recognize the Christians would be fatal to political stability. The government had to teach the people that the emperor was of divine descent, and the Christian belief in

138. Takaya, *Letters*, p. 113.
139. Ibid., p. 114.

one God was contradictory to this.[140] Iwakura's public position made political sense. It was necessary that leaders departing on the Iwakura Mission assure the conservative factions of the nation that in the western capitals they would not sell Japan short. It was also astute not to give any ground before treaty revision was discussed with the treaty powers.

However, there are strong indications that in 1871 the Meiji leaders were actually more amenable to religious toleration than they were willing to admit publicly. In that year Kido Kōin and Itō Hirobumi intimated to Ernest M. Satow that the anti-Christian prohibition might be lifted soon.[141] The researches of Marlene Mayo and Albert Altman have convincingly demonstrated that the leaders realized, before the Iwakura Mission's departure, that Japan's bargaining position in regard to treaty revision was weak, and that domestic legal and social reforms would have to precede serious treaty negotiations. Sanjō Sanetomi argued that one of the purposes of the Mission should be to affirm to the treaty powers Japan's intentions to reform.[142]

The Rev. Jonathan Goble, a Baptist missionary who accompanied the Iwakura Mission on its voyage to California, attested to the strength of the ideal of toleration among the leaders at the outset of the Mission.[143] Goble published a letter in San

140. Marlene Mayo, "The Iwakura Embassy and the unequal treaties, 1871–1873" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1961), p. 181.

141. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 499.

142. Mayo, "Iwakura Embassy," p. 2; Albert Altman, "Guido Verbeck and the Iwakura Embassy," in *Japan quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 2 (January–March 1966), p. 56.

143. Goble had been a missionary of the American Baptist Free Missionary Society since 1860. His introduction to Japan had come in 1853 as a

Francisco and New York newspapers reporting on his shipboard conversations with Mission leaders and calling on churchmen to press the issue of toleration with the Japanese envoys. Goble described the Urakami *kuzure* and the anti-Christian edicts, but criticism was displaced by the anticipation of a policy change:

> There are officers of this [Iwakura] Embassy especially charged with the duty of learning all they can of the peculiar doctrines and customs and usages of Christianity. These officers, as well as the Chief Ambassador, on their passage across the Pacific, have frequently expressed their belief that at no distant day all restrictions against Christianity in their country would be removed and entire freedom of conscience in matters of religion would prevail... It is believed that the Japanese Government have no desire to prosecute native Christians now, but only do so to make a show of opposition merely to keep parties quiet who are not yet fully enlightened in regard to their relations with the outside world, and so to keep the peace.[144]

The above evidence undermines the long standing interpretation that the emissaries were jolted into recognition of the need for domestic reforms, including the desirability of religious freedom, by the remonstrances made to the Iwakura Mission during treaty negotiations.

The experiences of the Iwakura Mission did, however, increase the sense of urgency with which the Meiji leaders approached domestic reforms. The Japanese went abroad desiring their new state system to be recognized as equal to others. They were frustrated by the low view of their government held in the west. Equality to the Embassy meant equality among nations, a concept Japan had long stressed in her rela-

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member of the Perry Mission (Best, *Christian faith and cultural crisis*, pp. 22–28). Cary (*History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 52) claims that the wheeled contraption constructed by Goble to transport his sickly wife was the model from which the first *jinrikisha* were copied.

144. Jonathan Goble (letter to the editor), *New York times*, 20 February 1872, p. 8 : 4.

tions with China. To Americans equality had an additional dimension which had its focus in the individual : expansion of his opportunities for trade and freedom to exercise his own faith. To many foreigners the issue of freedom of religion and expression was as charged with emotion as tariff autonomy and consular jurisdiction were to the Japanese.[145] The emissaries were asked repeatedly about the Urakami Christians and about the imprisonment of Ichikawa Einosuke, the Japanese language teacher of Congregational missionary O. H. Gulick. Ishikawa's death in prison in November 1872 gave rise to more pointed inquiries.[146] As early as their stop in Salt Lake City the Embassy members began to discuss among themselves the need to hasten the anticipated change in religious policy.[147] One indication of impending change was the willingness of the Mission to grant amnesty to Niijima Jō who had left Japan unlawfully and converted to Christianity in the United States. In exchange for his services as an interpreter Niijima demanded and received written permission to teach Christianity when he returned to Japan.[148]

In the discussion in Washington on the principles of treaty revision, Secretary of State Fish insisted that an article on religious freedom be included in any new treaty. In a draft presented by Fish on 13 March 1872 that demand read :

> Recognize the freedom of speech, press, and conscience, and observe the principle of religious tolerance. No persecution on account of religious belief. No indignities to be offered to the ceremonials or to the symbols

145. Mayo, "Iwakura Embassy," pp. 14, 186.
146. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 73.
147. Saba Wataru 佐波 亘, ed., *Uemura Masahisa to sono jidai* 植村正久と其の時代 [Uemura Masahisa and his era], vol. 2, p. 326.
148. Jerome D. Davis, *A sketch of the life of Joseph Hardy Neesima*, pp. 30–31.

of any religious faith or creed...[149]

Iwakura asked if the desired religious freedom was to apply just to foreigners in Japan, or to Japanese citizens as well. Fish replied, "Without desiring to interfere in your internal affairs, we nevertheless think it desirable in the common interest that everybody in your government, or resident in your country, should have liberty to think as he pleases."[150] In their response to Fish's list of demands the Japanese continually insisted that the religion of a nation's citizens did not constitute a proper subject for a trade treaty.[151]

In May 1872 when Itō Hirobumi and Ōkubo Toshimichi returned to Japan to obtain higher credentials, they expressed the desire of the leaders of the Iwakura Mission to see at least a tacit change in religious policy. Their three recommendations for reform at this time were : (1) local administrative reforms which would make feasible broader travel rights for foreigners ; (2) legal reforms which would hasten an end to extraterritoriality ; and (3) removal of the anti-Christian signboards. The third recommendation read :

> Although the practice of foreign religions is clearly prohibited by the laws of Japan, we should remove the regulations which forbid this from the public noticeboards. When foreigners read them, they think of us as barbarous people who have no respect for religious freedom and they therefore deny us equal rights.[152]

The Iwakura Mission's experiences in Europe reinforced the sense of urgency for the easing of religious restrictions. While the Embassy was crossing the Atlantic, the Evangelical Alliance,

149. Mayo, "Iwakura Embassy," p. 173.
150. Ibid., p. 182.
151. Ibid., p. 191.
152. Ibid., p. 220.

which represented British missionary interests, met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Granville and asked for action on behalf of persecuted Japanese Christians.[153] When reports of new persecutions appeared in London and continental newspapers, some Frenchmen went so far as to call for a refusal to extend an official welcome to the Mission. In the French Parliament Count Dessbassayns de Richemont rose on 7 December 1872 to decry the "odious and inhumane" treatment of Catholics in Japan. The unrest this provoked among the legislators was calmed only by the promise of the French foreign minister to impress upon the Mission "new concepts of humanism and toleration."[154]

On disembarking in Britain the Embassy was greeted by Sir Harry Parkes who was home on leave. He still advocated foreign restraint with regard to Japanese domestic religious policies. He was remarkably successful in helping Lord Granville and the missionary organizations to understand the Japanese position. Fox describes Parkes' arguments as follows :

> To meet Japanese intolerance with foreign intolerance seemed to him a questionable principle which was likely to revive Japan's traditional animosity towards foreigners. His confidence in the effectiveness of friendly remonstrances still held. Any change in the religious feeling of Japan had to come as a result of a change in the convictions of the people as well as the government of Japan. Parkes believed this would happen if not impeded by ill-considered acts offensive to the existing national faith and feeling.[155]

So persuasive was Parkes that the Church Mission Society concluded that force should not be used against Japan even if "the cause of Christ should for a season be delayed."[156] In

153. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 497.
154. Saba, *Uemura Masahisa*, p. 326.
155. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 497.
156. *Church missionary intelligencer*, March 1872, pp. 74–79, quoted ibid.

his discussions with the Embassy, Granville mildly urged a more liberal religious policy for the sake of improving Englishmen's attitudes toward Japan.[157]

While in Berlin the Mission consulted with Professor Rudolph Gneist on the advisability of introducing Christianity as a state religion in Japan. The professor advised against it, stating that no religion could be effectively enforced by decree. Gneist's viewpoint was reinforced by the troubles Bismarck was then having with the Catholic Church. German writer H. Ritter asserts that even though the Embassy's question was prompted by considerations of political advantage, "this inquiry indicated the essentially changed current of thought in influential circles, and it was this change of thought which took the edicts against Christianity from the public noticeboards."[158]

Correspondence from members of the Mission stressed that Japan's image in the eyes of Europe would be improved markedly by the release of the Urakami Christians and the effecting of some sort of religious toleration. At this time the petition of priest Shimaji Mokurai was sent enjoining the government to cease controlling religion and to abandon the promulgation of *taikyō*.[159] After an anti-Japanese demonstration by Belgian Catholics, Itō Hirobumi sent a telegram to his government requesting the release of the exiled Christians and the withdrawal of the edict against Christianity.[160] Before the Embassy reached Japan in mid-September 1873, the government at home had taken action in that direction.

157. Ibid.
158. Ritter, *History of Protestant missions in Japan*, p. 50.
159. Hori and Toda, "Shinto," p. 73 ; Muraoka, *Shinto thought*, pp. 225 ff.
160. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 498.

In summary, what was the role of the Iwakura Mission in the advancement of religious toleration in Japan ? The experiences of the Mission caused its members to urge that energy at home be immediately devoted to domestic reforms. The envoys became painfully aware that religious intolerance placed a blight on Japan's image abroad. But before the Embassy left the homeland, awareness had existed of the need for legal and social reforms as prerequisites to Japan's acceptance as an equal nation. Similarly, the trend toward religious toleration had gathered significant domestic strength by 1871. The Iwakura Mission brought these tendencies to a head and made concrete action imperative. Had it not been for the prior domestic realization that policy changes were necessary, the demands of the treaty powers and the recommendations of the Iwakura Mission might have fallen on deaf ears or given rise to renewed antiforeignism.

Tacit religious toleration and the release of the Urakami exiles. During the absence of the Iwakura Mission, native support for the toleration of Christianity had been growing. Vice Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru, formerly a harsh proponent of anti-Christian measures, now led the movement for the adoption of more permissive policies. In February 1872 he petitioned that some three thousand exiled Christians be released either to establish homes in the prefectures where they were detained or to return home.[161] In Hakodate there appeared to be de facto tolerance as native converts of the Russian Orthodox Church attended services without interference by authorities.[162]

161. Ibid., p. 499.
162. Ibid., p. 500.

On 24 February 1873 the Dajōkan ordered the anti-Christian signboards taken down. This act was one of several reforms undertaken before the return of the Iwakura Mission in violation of the agreement among the oligarchs that no major changes would be enacted during the Embassy's absence.[163] Still fearful of deep-seated anti-Christian prejudice, the government approached the issue of Christianity with caution. It called for the removal of the placards merely on the basis that their content was already general knowledge. The Dajōkan order to local officials read as follows :

> From now on, in order that the people may have thorough knowledge of them, official proclamations shall be posted in a convenient location for thirty days. Continue to publicize proclamations in your jurisdiction as you have in the past. The signboards which have been posted until now, because their content is common knowledge, shall be taken down.[164]

Though the proscription of Christianity remained on the lawbooks, the removal of the signboards marked the beginning of a policy of tacit toleration. It was followed on 14 March by an order releasing the 1,938 Christians still in exile. By July they had been repatriated. According to British calculation, seventeen percent of the original deportees had died in exile.[165]

Reactions to the removal of the signboards varied from rejoicing among the missionaries to skepticism in Europe.[166] The years following 1873 were marked by an influx of new missionaries and open preaching by Japanese evangelists. Persecution of native believers still took place, but such occurrences diminished with time and stemmed from local citizen and

163. Mayo, "Iwakura Embassy," p. 328.
164. Umeda, "Shūkyōhō ni tsuite," p. 43.
165. Fox, *Britain and Japan*, p. 501.
166. Marnas, *La religion de Jésus*, p. 249.

Buddhist opposition rather than national policy. By the time the Meiji constitution was conferred, the government was willing to state a qualified provision for religious freedom.

Some elements in the diplomatic and missionary community who had pressed the issue of toleration for Christianity claimed for foreigners an undue share of the credit for the change in government policy. One such assertion was made, not surprisingly, by United States Minister Charles DeLong, who wrote to Jonathan Goble in November 1873 :

> No particular man or government is entitled to the credit of having obtained these results. They are the fruit of the earnest labor of foreign representatives at this court, Christian missionaries in this empire, and Christian statesmen and gentlemen abroad who had access to the [Iwakura] Embassy and improved the opportunity they enjoyed.[167]

Though their role as catalysts should not be disregarded, these foreigners reaped where seed had been sown and watered by Japanese who believed that a degree of religious toleration would serve the best interests of their native land.

Conclusion

The story of the Urakami Christians from their discovery in 1868 to their return from exile in 1873 spans the period when the crucial struggle for religious toleration was waged in Japan. The villagers found themselves in conflict first with the anti-Christian proscription policy of the Tokugawa Bakufu, and secondly with the Shinto ascendancy at the time of the Restoration. A transformation in official thinking with regard to religions took place during this short period. Initially, the concept of religious freedom was not even a debated issue in

167. Cary, *History of Christianity in Japan*, p. 84.

governing circles; by 1873 a gradual movement in favor of toleration had evolved among Japanese intellectuals and governing elites, and religious toleration was tacitly endorsed. During these five tumultous years, the fate of the Urakami Christians significantly stimulated the struggle for toleration.

The events which took place in Urakami played an important role in the formation of Japan's image of the west. She observed that the propagators of Christianity would overstep treaty rights for the sake of the faith, and that the west regarded freedom for its religion as a measure of civilization. The Restoration forces capitalized on the audacity of the French priests in Nagasaki and the Shogunate's inability to control them as evidence of the need to replace the old regime with more effective government. To the west, on the other hand, the Urakami persecutions were notorious indications that Japan was still barbarously hostile to Christianity and therefore ineligible for admission to the family of modern nations. The harsh treatment of native Christians helped provoke the treaty powers to demand thoroughgoing legal and social reforms as prerequisites for treaty revision.

One theme that recurs in Japanese history and is applicable to the period under consideration is the subservience of religious policies to political goals. In both the Bakumatsu and Restoration periods a domestic political struggle underlay the Urakami persecutions and hindered the regime in power from relieving the hardships of the Christians. In 1867 the tottering Shogunate dared not, by lax treatment of Christian lawbreakers, give a pretext for revolt to the antiforeign western daimyo. The Meiji leaders utilized the mystique of the emperor and at-

tempted to unify the functions of state and religion. In an effort to further national unity and placate conservative factions, they dealt stringently with the Urakami Christians and approached the issue of toleration with great caution. These internal political realities provide the key to understanding the government's religious policies. It follows that toleration could not be achieved until the progressive leadership of the Meiji government had reduced the threat to its hegemony by conservative and antiforeign forces.

Domestic factors provided the major impetus for the movement toward religious toleration. The success of the adoption of western ideas and technology in various fields reduced the level of antiforeignism in the country. As early as 1868 there appeared liberal intellectuals who called for the separation of state and religion. By 1870 the failure of the government's measures against Buddhism led the leaders to consider the wisdom of a more permissive religious policy. The most important domestic factor leading to religious toleration was the strengthening of the effective authority of the oligarchs. The achievement of a relatively high level of national unity permitted a relaxation of the emphasis on traditional Shinto polity and allowed the leaders to respond to the demands of the treaty powers. By 1871, before the departure of the Iwakura Mission, the trend in the direction of religious toleration was so strong that discerning diplomats and missionaries as well as some government leaders were anticipating the removal of the anti-Christian edicts. Efforts by foreigners in behalf of Japanese domestic religious freedom had their greatest catalytic effect after 1871.

In the struggle for Japanese religious toleration the year 1871 appears to be a watershed. Until that year it was in the national interest for the oligarchs to go along with the public aversion to Christianity. Political expediency was defined in terms of strengthening the hegemony of the center. By 1871 Japanese voices calling for religious toleration were of sufficient strength to warrant recognition. In that same year the government demonstrated its achievement of domestic political stability by sending a large delegation of its key leaders overseas. Japan was now in a position where her leaders could attend to foreign demands. Political expediency after 1871 came to be defined both in terms of domestic control and international equality. With the foundation already laid by domestic change, the added pressure of treaty power demands tipped the scales in favor of the tacit acceptance of religious toleration.

APPENDIX A

Text of the three permanent edicts issued in 1664 and reiterated in 1868, and publicized by means of the *jōsansatsu* ("triple edict boards") :

First permanent edict :

Everyone must follow the path of the five great duties. It is necessary to have compassion on aged widows and widowers, as on orphans and the sick. To kill your fellow-man, to set fire to houses, and to steal things from others are evil acts which must not be committed.

Second permanent edict :

The formation of coalitions for any purpose whatsoever is strictly forbidden, whether to present a petition or to force a resident to leave the town or locality. Those who become aware of the formation of such coalitions should without delay inform the local authorities, and a reward will be given.

Third permanent edict :

The evil sect of Christianity is hereby strictly prohibited as in times past.

SOURCE: Francisque Marnas, *La religion de Jésus ressuscitée au Japon dans la seconde moitié du* XIX^e *siècle*, vol. 2, pp. 107–108.

APPENDIX B

Government offices in charge of religious affairs, 1868–1877:

Jingijimuka 神祇事務科 Shinto affairs section	January–February 1868
Jingijimukyoku 神祇事務局 Shinto affairs bureau	February–April 1868
Jingikan 神祇官 Office for Shinto	April 1868–August 1871
Minbushō shajigakari 民部省社寺掛 Ministry of civil affairs, section of shrines and temples	July 1870–October 1870
Minbushō Ji'inryō 民部省寺院寮 Ministry of civil affairs, temple office	October 1870–July 1871
Ōkurashō kosekiryō shajika 大蔵省戸籍寮社寺課 Ministry of finance, office of census registration, shrines and temples section	July 1871–March 1872
Jingishō 神祇省 Ministry of the Shinto religion	August 1871–March 1872
Kyōbushō 教部省 Ministry of religion	March 1872–January 1877

SOURCE: Wilhelmus H. Creemers, *Shrine Shinto after World War II*, pp. 212–213.

APPENDIX C

Full text of the letter from the Rev. Jonathan Goble to San Francisco and New York newspapers. The text below is as the letter appears in *The New York times*, 20 January 1872, p. 8 : 4.

Thomas W. BURKMAN

THE JAPANESE EMBASSY

Card from a Missionary Accompanying it to the Churches of San Francisco

The following card is published in the San Francisco papers of Jan. 20 :

San Francisco, Jan. 19, 1872

To the Patrons of all the Churches and all the Members of the "Ministerial Unions" of San Francisco :

Dear Brethren :

Having recently arrived in your city in company with the Japanese Embassy, I desire to lay before you certain facts, and ask your cooperation for the accomplishment of certain purposes, in which, I trust, we all have and feel a common interest. This Embassy is commissioned by the Government of Japan to inquire into and learn all it can about all the institutions and religions, as well as the arts and sciences of the various Christian nations to which it is accredited, and officers are appointed for the various especial purposes and objects of these inquiries. Among these there are officers of this Embassy especially charged with the duty of learning all they can of the peculiar doctrines and customs and usages of Christianity. These officers, as well as the Chief Ambassador, on their passage across the Pacific, have frequently expressed their belief that at no distant day all restrictions against Christianity in their country would be removed and entire freedom of conscience in matters of religion would prevail. They are, for this reason, now anxious to obtain light and information upon this subject wherever they may travel, and it seems to me to be a good opportunity for leading men in all the churches in the various cities through which they may pass to lay before them their views, and to petition the Embassador [*sic*](who is also the Prime Minister of Japan) for the speedy repeal of the old edict against Christianity. It is believed that the Japanese Government have no desire to prosecute native Christians now, but only do so to make a show of opposition merely to keep parties quiet who are not yet fully enlightened in regard to their relations with the outside world, and so to keep the peace.

It was, no doubt, entirely for this reason that about two years since, some 8,000 native Christians [a figure given by some Roman Catholic sources], living in a village near Nagasaki, Japan, were exiled from their homes, and distributed in various provinces of the Empire, and kept in close confinement, at hard labor. It is also frequently reported that these exiles are subjected to very hard and cruel torture in order to force them to return to their old faith.

Would it not be well, then, if you, brethren of the Ministerial Union here in San Francisco, the first Christian city that has had the privilege of receiving this interesting Embassy on its way to the various nations and peoples of Christendom, should come forward on behalf of the churches you represent, and make your formal petition to this Embassador, the Prime Minister of the Empire, asking for the liberation of those brethren in bonds, and for the repeal of the old edict against Christianity. You can, in this connection, also inform them that our Government gives perfect freedom of conscience to all sects and classes, and that in thus asking the Japanese Government to repeal its edict and to release those who are in bond for conscience-sake, we do not desire to interfere in any way with the political institutions of their country, but only to invite them to adopt the principles of freedom that they now find in successful operation among ourselves. If, at your meeting on Monday next, you can all agree upon concerted action, I hope your petition may be received with favor, and also that the example that you may set may be followed by the representatives of the churches in other cities, as the Embassy moves on eastward.

May God direct in all that appertains to this very important matter, is the prayer of

Yours in Christ,

J. GOBLE
A. B. F. Mission, Yokohama, Japan

Glossary

bakuhan 幕藩
daikan 代官
Dajōkan 太政官
fudai 譜代
Fukuba Bisei 福羽美静
Fukuda Gyōkai 福田行誡
Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉
fumie 踏絵
haibutsu kishaku 廃仏毀釈
haku 伯
hanare kirishitan 離れ切支丹
Hirata Atsutane 平田篤胤
honji suijaku 本地垂迹
hyakudo kōshi 百度更始
Ichikawa Einosuke 市川栄之助
Inoue Kaoru 井上馨
Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文
Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視
Jingijimuka 神祇事務科
Jingijimukyoku 神祇事務局
Jingikan 神祇官
jingūji 神宮寺
jōsansatsu 定三札
kaikoku 開国
kakure kirishitan 隠れ切支丹
Kamo Mabuchi 賀茂真淵
Kannon 観音
Kido Kōin 木戸孝充
Kōgisho 公議所
kōhōjin 公法人
Kubo Sueshige 久保季茲
Man'yōshū 萬葉集
Mori Arinori 森 有禮
Nakamura Masanao 中村正直
Niijima Jō 新島襄
Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信

Ōkuni Takamasa 大国隆正
oshōya お庄屋
Rōjū 老中
ryōbu shintō 両部神道
saisei itchi 祭政一致
sakokurei 鎖国令
Sanjō no guben 三條の愚辨
Sanjō Sanetomi 三條實美
sanyo 参与
Sawa Nobuyoshi 澤 宣嘉
Seitaisho 政體書
Sekijitsu no monogatari 昔日の物語
Senkyōshi 宣教使
Shichika 七科
Shimada Saburō 島田三郎
Shimaji Mokurai 島地默雷
shinbutsu bunri 神仏分離
shūkyō hōjin hō 宗教法人法
taikyō 大教
terauke 寺請
Tokugawa Ieyasu 徳川家康
Tokunaga Iwami no Kami 徳永石見守
Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉
tozama han 外様藩
udaijin 右大臣
Urakami 浦上
Urakami *kuzure* 浦上くづれ
yamabushi 山伏
Yokoi Shōnan 横井小楠
Yōrō 養老

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