The Reshaping of Conscience

Challenges and Promises of Multiculturalism in American Education

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IN HIS GIFFORD LECTURES, given on the eve of the Second World War, Reinhold Niebuhr contended, "The great achievement of modern culture, the understanding of nature, is also the cause of the great confusion of modern man: the misunderstanding of human nature" (Niebuhr 1941, 93). For Niebuhr, arguably the most influential social thinker in the United States of the mid-twentieth century, the fateful misunderstanding was a naive, if fundamental, confidence in human virtue as the human capacity for goodness. The idealist Hegel, the materialist Marx and the romantic naturalist Rousseau all agreed on this essential premise for providing disparate utopian models for the post-Enlightenment West. Lacking in all of them, in Niebuhr's view, was the recognition of the human inclination toward evil. "The modern man is, in short, so certain about his essential virtue because he is so mistaken about his nature" (96).

What Niebuhr calls "the easy conscience of modern man" gave a new impetus to the existing Western assertion that history was purposive. Pivotal to the latter, as illustrated in the Book of Exodus, is the biblical view that redemption is historical and history redemptive. The alliance in the modern West between the old perspective on history and the new assessment of human nature fostered a renewed expression of the biblical exhortation that the chosen flock express its faithfulness not simply by being good stewards of the created order but also by becoming partners in the process of universal redemption. Affirming at once human virtue and human responsibility, the new alliance came to see evil either as ignorance of the mind or as passions of the body acting against the mind. Inimical to this new understanding was the biblical notion of the Fall, as in the Book of Genesis, that posits corruptibility as intrinsic to the human condition. The new alliance rejected the Protestant, particularly the Lutheran, assertion of total human depravation, which Luther saw as necessary for his emphasis on grace as the sole agent of redemption. Implicit from the beginning in so many branches of modern academe is the optimistic assertion of human virtue.

For Adam Smith, the pursuit of private interests is the way to collective welfare. When greed gets out of hand, the "invisible hand" will serve as a corrective from above. Freud's "Superego" counters the libidinous "Id." Darwin sees change in the biological order in terms of an inevitable progress toward higher forms of life.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN EDUCATION

Nowhere did the arousal of conscience, combined with a messianic vision of history, affect so many people as in American education since the nineteenth century. Motivations behind founding institutions of higher learning are many and varied. Some were founded to preserve a tradition, lest it be lost. Others were founded to spread a tra-

dition. These two motivations are matters of emphasis and assuredly not mutually exclusive. A tradition in danger must first salvage itself and then expand the sphere of its influence.

How English Puritanism preserved and spread itself through education in the New World serves as an illustrative example. The Puritans fled to Massachusetts to escape the despotism of Charles I and Archbishop William Laud of the Church of England. They found no better way to preserve their tradition than through the education of their clergy. The Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony started "New College in New England" in 1636 in a settlement named by the many Puritans who had been schooled in Cambridge in Old England. When it became "exceedingly and dangerously liberal" (Ferm 1957, 152), undermining its Calvinist theology and Congregational polity, the defenders of orthodoxy founded in New Haven Colony yet another new college to preserve a tradition under siege.

The other strands of Puritanism, Baptist and Presbyterian, followed the same pattern of thinking and behavior in founding colleges of their own in Rhode Island and New Jersey respectively. While the Puritans laid foundations in the English colonies for the education of their future leaders, particularly the clergy, the royalists also started colleges in the New World, as if to counter the rising tide of Puritanism, in the capital of Colonial Virginia (in 1699) and in New York (in 1754). They were both started by royal charter, but they were more intent on training secular rather than sacerdotal leaders.

These schools, founded in the colonies to preserve a tradition, educated men who then founded other schools to spread the same tradition in newer territories in the United States. Orthodox Congregationalists produced graduates who founded schools in the image of their alma mater and yet met the peculiar needs of the new age. After founding a college in New Hampshire in the eighteenth century to train clergymen for Native Americans, the Congregationalists went west in the nineteenth century to found new outposts in Ohio, Iowa, Minnesota, and finally California.[1] The founding of women's colleges in the nineteenth century, though largely confined to the Eastern Seaboard, was inspired by the same messianic vision to spread to women the best education then available to men.[2] The driving force behind the founding of these schools was a Protestantism that had been revitalized in the mid-eighteenth century by the Great Awakening and again in the early nineteenth century by the Second Great Awakening that spread westward to the ever expanding Frontier.[3]

In nineteenth century America, the unleashing of conscience, aroused by a messianic calling, not only brought into being colleges and universities in unprecedented numbers, but it also changed the nature and purpose of education from its European counterparts. The most salient difference was the freeing of education from the enclave of the privileged, secular or religious. The shift from the gentry to the populace can be seen as a reflection of a changing understanding of piety. It was a shift from the cloistered to the civic, from the contemplative to the active. The shift was a furthering of the primacy of the Word over the sacraments, a shift that was ultimately interpreted as the fulfillment of the Protestant proclamation of the "priesthood of all believers." In the process of this transition, education emerged as the means of joining the elect.

The interplay between religion and education that encouraged an awakening of the populace was most explicit among institutions founded by Protestant denominations. With a history of separatism, their need for putting down and spreading roots was greater than that of the old establishment, particularly during their formative period in a

nation that was also in its infancy. Public universities were also an expression of the same ideal. Public education may even be seen as furthering the earlier Protestant model in that a democratic idealism born of religious aspirations was now moving beyond sectarian boundaries. In this sense, "civil religion" represents an evolution of sectarian religion. The Civil War undoubtedly fueled the urgency of equality and democracy, especially outside of the Confederate South. The causal link between Puritanism and Lincoln's "Emancipation Proclamation" can be found in his stated indebtedness to the Congregational minister Leonard Bacon of New Haven, who had written a tract called "Slavery Discussed" in 1846.[4] In the context of nineteenth century America, private education and public education were parallel movements, shaped by a shared idealism.

There is a tension between egalitarianism and elitism implicit in the enactment of the Niebuhrian "easy conscience of modern man." The American vision of education was meant for all who were able and willing. And yet, the vision was conceived in the peculiar context of the age in which that vision was implemented. This tension does not point to two alternatives, one of which is chosen against the other, such as the ongoing debate between Universalism and Calvinist Predestination among the heirs of the early Puritans, who respectively argued for the salvation of all or only the elect. Rather it points to an inherent tension, caused by the "easy conscience," that sought to serve the causes of universalism and particularism: universal redemption through education and joining the ranks of the elect. These two distinct urges that equally compelled American education in the nineteenth century served to confirm the prejudices of the times more often than to reform them.

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT RESPONSES TO NON-WESTERN CULTURES

The inherent tension has many painful ramifications. Among them is the persistent premise that neither salvation nor civilization are possible without Christianity. At the Council of Trent, convened by the Roman Catholic Church in the sixteenth century to rebut the Protestant indictment, both camps of the Western church insisted on the exclusivity of their ways as strength.

It was not until 1965, when the Second Vatican Council concluded, that the Roman Catholic Church admitted to the possibility of salvation outside its own church. "Anonymous Christian" was the phrase then used to suggest such a possibility (Rahner 1974). Raimundo Panikkar's reference made in the wake of the Council to a Hindu as an "anonymous Christian" can mean little more than calling a Hindu a pseudo-Christian, a second-class citizen in Christendom (Panikkar 1981).[5] It can easily be received as a backhanded compliment to the Hindu, and overlook the possibility that such an equation is loathsome to the Hindu who knows the independent integrity of his or her tradition. With their unrelenting emphasis on the uniqueness of scripture, the Protestants allowed no possibility outside their version of Christianity. The claim of biblical inerrancy has done much to foster this Protestant exclusivism.

Qualified and patronizing though it may be, the move by Vatican II to reach out to other faiths is not without noteworthy precedents. The Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci set sail for China in 1582 with the grand design of converting a nation with a history and civilization no less than those of the best of the West. Ricci took the Jesuits' policy of "accommodation" seriously to the point of learning the Chinese language, culture, and religion. By the early seventeenth century, Jesuit missionaries in China had carried this policy to the point where they used the

Chinese *T'ien* or "Heaven" for the Latin *Deus* and incorporated Chinese ancestral veneration into the Mass celebrated in the Chinese vernacular. The ensuing polemic against the Jesuits in China, particularly by the Jansenite wing of the Roman Catholic Church, led to the eventual attempts at suppressing the Jesuits, including one by Pope Clement XIV in 1773. As vividly chronicled in Jonathan Spence's biography, Ricci was received more warmly by the Chinese than by his church for his uncanny retention of memory and Western gadgetry, in spite of his religion (Spence 1984).[6]

The same pattern unfolded in Japan. At the height of the Warring States period in 1549, Francis Xavier, a student of Ignatius Loyola, reached the southern shores of Japan with the hope of converting the country from the emperor on down. The Jesuits who followed Xavier dazzled the Japanese with what they had brought with them to Japan, including weapons. To the Japanese, the Jesuits exhibited the cultural refinement and military prowess of the West, no doubt instilling in them awe and fear.

There is little question that among the Jesuits were some who conspired with the colonizers from Spain and Portugal. Some even advocated a military take over of Japan by the West to quicken their missionary conquest (Cooper 1973; Elison 1973). The feudal authorities in Japan were aware of escalating colonial activities in other parts of Asia and in Latin America. No sooner had the Tokugawa clan emerged victorious in 1600 in the Battle of Sekigahara, in no small measure owing to the firearms acquired from the Portuguese, than it imposed a policy of systematic isolation, especially from the West. They had a legitimate fear of the missionaries who might again upset the internal security of Japan. The Tokugawa regime, therefore, sought to expunge Christianity by expelling the missionaries and torturing Japanese converts until they recanted. By the mid-1600s, every visible vestige of the Western religion had disappeared from Japan.[7] The isolationist policy continued for over two-and-a-half centuries with the exception of the Island of Deshima in the Port of Nagasaki, where the Dutch merchants resided and traded with their Japanese counterparts.

If Christopher Columbus's "discovery" of the New World signals anything on which most can agree, it would be that it marks a dramatic shift in the nature of the relationship between the East and the West; more specifically between the white, Christian West and the rest of the world, particularly Asia. Columbus's original intention was to reach the capital city of Yuan China, which two centuries earlier his greatest hero Marco Polo had visited and depicted in glowing, if sometimes amusingly hyperbolic, terms. Dreamer that he was, Columbus believed that the earth was round and that by sailing westward he could reach the East more directly and easily than tracing eastward Marco Polo's footsteps on land. Not knowing the existence of the Pacific, however, Columbus remained convinced all his life that he had come very close to landing in China. Having hopelessly been lost en route to his intended destination, he accidentally reached a land, which he did not know was the "New World."

Columbus's intent behind his attempted journey to the East is, and will continue to be, a matter of intense debate (Kodera 1992, 18-19). What followed the event of 1492 was, however, the white, Christian West's attempts to colonize and Christianize the rest of the world. Slave trade, genocide, venereal disease, and destruction of the land became as much integral parts of the post-Colombian history of the world as the acquisition of silk, porcelain, and spices from Asia, cotton and tobacco from the Americas, and slaves from Africa.

Before Columbus's journey, as illustrated by his dream of reaching Cathay where

Marco Polo had been warmly welcomed by the Khan, the West had been plagued by fascination for the East. We now know that Columbus's dream was quite ill informed, for the Yuan Dynasty of the Khan had ended over a century before his time. Since the days of the Silk Road a millennium earlier, the fascination, in fact, had been mutual. Suddenly, however, soon after Columbus, the Western attitude toward Asia, as toward Africa and the Americas, changed. Now it was willful conquest, whether by sword or Bible, rooted in an unshakable conviction in the superiority of the white, Christian West.

When the two Roman Catholic superpowers of the Iberian Peninsula lost power in the late sixteenth century to two Protestant nations farther to the north, Holland and Britain emerged as the greatest colonial powers whose global domination did not cease until the present century. Their operative mind-set has been the claim of Western superiority: the superiority of the "white race," Western Christianity, and European culture and civilization. The non-white, non-Christian parts of the world acquiesced in the claim by aspiring to become all that the West represented. Thus, the domination of the West has persisted.

The global conquest by the West not only of the East but also of Africa and the Americas would not have been possible without two Chinese inventions: the compass and gunpowder. They were put to purposes of conquest that the Chinese may not have intended. The bellicosity of the West energized itself with a sense of purpose acquired from the Bible. In other words, the biblical understanding of history as purposive now took on an earthly, hegemonistic character. Redemption became synonymous with conquest. A triumphalism inherent in Christian ecclesiology gave impetus to Western colonialism. Western colonialism provided a Christianity already in disarray in the sixteenth century with a new avenue not simply for survival but for domination. For good or ill, the Christian West was indeed a resurrection of the Roman Empire.

The brute force with which the Christian West subjugated the rest of the world in the sixteenth century gave way to more refined, and yet no less effective, subtler measures. Invaders were replaced by soldiers; soldiers by officers. Conquest began with a military takeover that, in turn, solidified their domination by cultural influence. Military conquest is swift but may be short-lived. Cultural influence can be more enduring and pervasive.

The transplanting of Western education has endured longer, and better, than practically all else that the West has brought to the non-Western parts of the world, particularly to Asia, in the last five centuries. There is, however, a marked difference in the mind-set and the pattern of behavior between the two bearers of Western education. The Jesuits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw fit to accommodate the indigenous culture, even if more as an instrument of conversion than out of genuine respect. The Protestants of the succeeding centuries, most notably of the nineteenth century, went to Asia to impose what they regarded as a superior Western religion and culture.

In the nineteenth century, the Protestant missionaries, who sailed from New England and farther south on the Eastern Seaboard, journeyed for several months to China, Korea and Japan and were more eager to start schools than churches. The purpose of their mission was ostensibly to educate the non-white natives in Western culture with a premium value placed on that of northern Europe and North America (Lutz 1971; Carlson 1976; West 1976; Reed 1983).

In part, the preference for founding schools rather than churches was because the Protestant missionaries were welcomed by the host countries to enlighten the Asians educationally and culturally but not to convert them religiously. For reasons cited

already, Japan in particular had grown wary of Christian missionaries. The most compelling reason rests with the nature of nineteenth century American Protestantism, which took it upon itself to redeem the world through education. In the United States, especially in the former English colonies, colleges and universities served as the vehicles of awakening and conversion. New theological vision was shaped more in the academic institutions than in the ecclesiastical.

The Second Great Awakening had been fostered by Timothy Dwight, President of Yale University, in the early nineteenth century. Its strong Calvinist urge for immediate conversion and personal salvation was translated in 1810 into the formation of the "American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions" by the students of Williams College.

Commodore Matthew Perry of Newport, Rhode Island, reached Japan in 1853 to persuade the Tokugawa regime to open up the country, but the seventeenth Tokugawa shogun showed the greatest reluctance in accepting missionaries. Even after power was peacefully transferred from the shogun to the Meiji Emperor in 1868, freedom of faith was not granted until several years later. When government restrictions were lifted, missionaries from the United States chose to concentrate on founding schools more than churches.

By the end of the nineteenth century, virtually every major Protestant denomination had started its own school in Japan.[8] Within a decade after the first year of modern Japan, Americans were invited to Japan to start government schools. William Smith Clark, a graduate of Amherst and president of Massachusetts Agricultural School, became the first President of Sapporo Agricultural School in 1876, though he served for only a year. Captain LeRoy Lansing Janes, a West Point graduate and Civil War officer, started the Kumamoto School for Western Learning in 1871, where he remained for five years. To the consternation of the Japanese, however, both Smith and Janes, though laymen, brought to Japan an explicitly evangelical, Protestant vision of education for modern Japan. It was from the students of these American educators that the first indigenous leaders of Japanese Protestantism were to emerge: Uchimura Kanzō and Nitobe Inazō from the first graduating class of Sapporo Agricultural School and Ebina Danjō and Kozaki Hiromichi from the Kumamoto School for Western Learning (Notehelfer 1985).

These examples illustrate how American Protestantism sought to redeem, through education, the non-Western, non-Christian, and non-white world. They may have known how the European Jesuits had met formidable opposition from Japan's feudal lords who had legitimate fears of Western colonialism. No record exists that indicates American Protestants' intentional avoidance of the same fate. It is known, however, that the diplomatic missions of Matthew Perry and Townsend Harris in the 1850s aimed at persuading the Tokugawa shogunate to open the country to the West, lest Japan fall further behind the leading Western powers. And yet, the two U. S. envoys, particularly Harris, had designs to send Protestant missionaries to Japan.

The earliest American missionaries to Japan were already working in China, awaiting the full treaty that Harris was to sign in 1858 with the seventeenth Tokugawa shogun. They had even begun studying Japanese with Japanese expatriates in the port cities of the South China Sea who were forbidden by Japan's policy from returning to their home land.[9] Though their knowledge of the language was scant, one of the missionaries translated John's Gospel into clumsy, somewhat amusing Japanese prose.[10] The Harris Treaty was understood by the Japanese as a commercial treaty, but Harris understood it to be more.

Unlike the European Jesuits three centuries earlier, the American Protestants were intentionally not accommodationists. Their intent was to expand and impose Western, Christian, and white values. Why was imposition a matter of greater concern than accommodation? Theologically, the nineteenth century Protestant missionaries were no more triumphant than the Jesuits of an earlier era. Politically, the situation had changed. Largely through aggressive colonialism, the West had already triumphed, subjugating much of the rest of the world to itself. They perceived little need for accommodation. Protestant missionaries of the nineteenth century can be seen both as the beneficiaries of Western colonialism and as promulgators of the same hegemonist enterprise.

Secondly, when missionary zeal unfolds itself in the context of education, the principal audience is the young whose intellectual and cultural curiosity for the unknown demands from the educator a lesser degree of deference to their own tradition. The missionary educators were accorded a strong sense of respect by Japanese students, who had learned from Confucianism the importance of venerating the learned, to say nothing of those more advanced in age. Thirdly, when Japan made a decision in 1868 to do away with three centuries of feudal isolationism, the government made a concerted effort to emulate the West, even to the point of willingly relinquishing parts of their own tradition. Christian missionaries who offered opportunities for Western education were received with overflowing enthusiasm. The supply and the demand had rarely congealed as well as they did in early modern Japan. With a Confucian heritage even stronger than Japan, Korea also eagerly received missionaries, largely from the United States, in the second half of the nineteenth century.[11]

THE POWER ELITE AND THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

Those who stayed behind the frontier were no less busy, establishing a power base. Many astute observers analyzed the rise and the nature of the power structure in the United States. After Max Weber claimed the causal relationship between Calvinist Protestantism and the rise of capitalism in early modern Europe, Thorstein Veblen offered a probing analysis of the rise of the "leisure class" in late nineteenth century America (Weber 1958; Veblen 1899).

In the mid-twentieth century, C. Wright Mills offered his poignant diagnosis of the "power elite" in the United States. He even offered a conspiratorial view of American society, dominated by the entrenched elite, which derives power from its pecuniary prowess and is destined by its "organized irresponsibility" to have a corrupting influence not only on itself but also on the society at large. "Commanders of power unequaled in human history," said Mills, "they have succeeded within the American system of organized irresponsibility" (Mills 1956, 361). The Northwest became the breeding ground for the rest of the United States for the uniquely American powerful elite, which represents an inextricable tripartite alliance of religion, education and money.

It is the sociologist E. Digby Baltzell who traces the ultimate sources of power in the United States to religion and education. For Baltzell, a "Protestant Establishment" is the repository of the greatest power. And its breeding grounds are the bastions of the Protestant Establishment, particularly the "elite schools" of the Northeast, that define the peculiarly American structure of power. He resonates in part the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer who in the late nineteenth century "scientifically proved" the Anglo-Saxons' "natural fitness" to rule the world. In Baltzell's view, however, the evolution of

aristocracy and caste in the United States is more closely linked to formation than the genes. When race enters into the picture as another criterion for power, the Protestant Establishment loses its fluidity, without which power would be out of reach for those of the "wrong race."

This is where Baltzell's indictment of the Protestant Establishment becomes most trenchant. He exposes the Protestant Establishment's prejudice, exclusivism, and resistance to change, all of which have become increasingly isolated in light of the growing diversity of the American populace and the rise of American Catholics and Jews. He regards the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants not only as an anachronism but also as a divisive force in the leadership required to keep the United States a vital and vibrant presence in the world (Baltzell 1966). The viability of the American power structure would have to depend on its ability to guard itself against too close an affiliation with a certain race. For, without it, the Protestant Establishment would ensure its own demise.

The power structure in the United States, even without its domination by white Anglo-Saxons, begs further scrutiny for its own good as long as it retains its alliance with the nineteenth century vision of education. American education stands today at a crossroads, facing its own paradox and wondering in which direction to go. The paradox of American education stems from the tension between its essential ingredients: generosity and hegemony. Its generosity reaches out, but it does not reach within itself as easily. Its conscience seeks to change others, but not itself as comfortably. Its vision is farsighted but often blind to its own needs. A drive for domination stands in the way. In the last two centuries, the two Great Awakenings infused a sense of urgency in the messianic vision for the whole world, and it chose education as its chief vehicle. In the nineteenth century, colleges and universities were founded with the westward expansion of the Frontier from New England to the plains of the Midwest, California and the Pacific Northwest, to the Hawaiian Islands, and eventually to Asia. The "easy conscience of modern man" responded in the affirmative to the New Testament exhortation to spread the Good News to the end of the earth. And yet, those whose impulse is for domination leave little room for self-reflection and self-transformation. The generosity of the modern person's "easy conscience" may be benign by itself. Not as benign, however, is its drive for hegemony and expansion, in short, its triumphalism.

The paradox of American higher education can be traced to two sources. One is the diverse, if not conflicting, beginnings of American history. Some, like the Pilgrims, came to escape what they regarded as an oppressive society, seeking freedom in the New World. Others, like the Puritans, came to salvage and promulgate an existing tradition. Whether they came for freedom or for expansion of existing influence, however, the newcomers oppressed and replaced the natives. Of the newcomers, the earlier ones dominated those who came later. Outside of New England, the same dynamic has been at work in those parts of the United States that can be labeled New Spain, New Holland, and New France, as well as much of the rest of the Americas.

The other source of paradox is inherent in the theology that inspired the founding of colleges and universities across the United States and beyond. On the one hand, its impulse was to be expansive and inclusive. On the other, however, its purpose was to nurture the exclusive. The tension between them is universalism versus predestination, egalitarianism versus elitism, responsibility versus privilege. Of particular significance is the place of Calvinism in the Second Great Awakening that rendered urgent the spread of the Good News, wrapped in education,

and yet with an implicit exclusivism in that certain people were predestined to be among the elect. Calvinism compounds the paradox in that human effort, such as through education, is ultimately futile, if the elect are predetermined, as it were, "before time."

The paradox inherent in American higher education has come to manifest its ills in the twentieth century as the social dynamics in the United States, particularly in the second half of the century, have served to widen the discrepancy between the idealism of American higher education and the reality of its fruit. As the educated elite has become more isolated from the rest of the society, the erstwhile idealism of American education has, rightly, been called into question. The conscience that shaped the idealism for education in the past century has come to work against the best of its original intent. The generosity of nineteenth century Protestantism has succeeded in establishing an educated elite, but the educated elite has come to serve less the cause of others than their own. Hence, the elite has become elitist, alienating itself from the rest. In order to steer the future course of American higher education, the time is now ripe for reevaluating the purpose of education. This urgent need requires a fundamental reshaping of conscience itself.

THE PROMISE OF MULTICULTURALISM

No social reality has rendered more urgent the reshaping of conscience than the demographic change in the United States and its ramifications in the second half of the present century. "Multiculturalism" is the operative term coined to refer to the demographic change not simply as a quantifiable fact but also as a complex of meaning, pregnant with warnings, with challenges, and yet also with promises. Multiculturalism has confronted the monopoly of power by a few who may have inherited rather than achieved their positions of power, urging in turn a wider and fairer sharing not only of rights but also of responsibilities in the process of creating a fundamentally different human community.

The demographic change in the United States of America has unfolded in tandem with the crises in the rest of the world. The history of immigration to the New World has been, and continues to be, a mirror of natural, social, and political calamities. Famines, earthquakes, oppressive regimes, and military aggressions have driven the victims, actual and potential alike, to the shores of the New World. When the tide of fortune changed, the victimizers of yesteryear have also sought refuge in this same New World. Slaves from Africa remained in servitude since the earliest known slaves were forcibly brought to Virginia even before the arrival of the Pilgrims in Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1620.

Starting over a century earlier, the native inhabitants of the Americas were subjected to wanton pillage and carnage at the hands of those who had followed Christopher Columbus. The annual celebration of Thanksgiving is, to the Indians who helped the original Pilgrims survive the first winter, testimony to a fiction designed to bury the history of bloody genocides that ravaged New England and beyond. Repentance would be a more fitting commemoration of the actual history than thanks.

The history of Asian immigration to North America shares many parallels with that of the Africans. Instead of the cotton and tobacco plantations of the South, Asian laborers were brought to the pineapple plantations of Hawaii and to railroad construction on the West Coast and the desolate plains farther inland.

From as early as the 1830s until the mid-twentieth century, Asians came to the United States as laborers in the employ of white Americans. In Hawaii, the plantation owners who brought in Asian laborers were

often the descendants of Protestant missionaries from New England. The irony of this fact is poignantly conveyed by a common expression: "They came to do good, but ended up doing well."[12] In the second half of the century, however, wars have been the major catalyst for Asian immigrations to the United States. Nearly all wars that the United States has fought after the First World War have been against people of color, and many of them Asian: the Japanese, the North Koreans, and the North Vietnamese. Political turmoil in other Asian countries, like the Philippines, the People's Republic of China, and Cambodia, produced many who wanted, or needed, to flee their homelands. But the old immigration law made it very difficult for Asians to immigrate to the United States, while welcoming immigrants from Europe. The Immigration Act of 1965 opened the gate wide. The new immigration law was made possible by the first Roman Catholic President of the United States, though he did not live to see it enacted. It allowed a quota of 20,000 immigrants for each country of the world, plus the entry of family members of U. S. citizens and "permanent residents" on a non-quota basis. Asians took advantage of the new Immigration Act more than anyone else.

As a result, Asian Americans have become the fastest growing ethnic minority in the United States. In the decade of the 1970s, the Asian population increased by 143 percent, compared to 38 percent for the Hispanics, the second largest increase. In 1960 there were only 877,934 Asians in the United States, comprising but a half of one percent of the total population. Twenty-five years later, they numbered over five million, or 2.1 percent, an increase of 577 percent compared to 34 percent for the general population. The 1990 Census shows that the "Asian and Pacific Islanders" represent nearly 4 percent of the total U. S. population. In California, over a quarter of San Francisco's population is Asian, mostly Chinese, but the largest Asian population of the state is Filipino. In Hawaii, Asians constitute a clear majority. New York City has the largest Chinese community outside China *(Asia Week,* 1991; Takaki 1989).

The success of some Asian immigrants and refugees in the last decade has labeled Asians as a "model minority." The label is a new symptom of an old problem. It is given by the white society which defines assimilation in white terms. Placing on the pedestal those Asians who succeeded in the world of the whites is honoring passivity, even a loss of Asian identity.

Secondly, patronizing flattery of Asians can be, and is, used against other minorities. "Why can you not be like the Asians?" is a condescension of non-Asian minorities in the United States.[13]

Thirdly, the flattering label ignores the fact that many Asians continue to languish at the bottom and on the fringe of American society, struggling with a language and a culture that are new and strange to them. In fact, violence against Asians has seen a disproportionately large increase in recent years in most American cities. It is an outlet for a resentment of the success of some Asians in the United States and of hostility to the prosperity of some Asian countries, especially Japan. Asian faces remind some non-Asian Americans of the enemies they fought in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Demonization of Asians contributes to a sentiment that Asians are foreign, and not American. And yet, the violence can also be seen as a continuation of the victimization of the most helpless, which is what many Asians still are; particularly those who have arrived most recently.

The power and prestige of the United States in the twentieth century have been built up not only by the uncanny business acumen of those who brought in cheap labor from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean but

also by those who were too powerless and too hungry to resist their oppressors. The unbreachable gulf between the powerful and powerless in the last few centuries continues today in the relationship between management and labor in U. S. industry. The presumption of an adversarial relationship between the two camps has inevitably caused the degeneration of a once sacrosanct individualism into a sanctification of individual greed. The growing trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan has prompted the United States to examine the Japanese system, where the presumption is a sharing of power and sacrifice between management and labor, and hence lifetime employment as a norm. Some have urged the United States to emulate Japan's model as a way out of the present crisis. Others have pointed to the weakness of Japan's symbiotic, and insular, model as reminiscent of its feudal past and stifling individual talent. The debate that continues in the United States between the two models is, at a deeper level, a somber reexamination of its own past and a quest for a new vision.

The structure of inequity that has sustained the prosperity and self-confidence of the United States has not been limited to racism. Sexism and classism have also been accomplices in the injustice of historical and institutional discrimination that multiculturalism now exposes and confronts. The natural impulse of those who have been the beneficiaries of the old system is to consider the challenge as a threat, debunking the system to replace it with chaos. Those who have been relegated to the periphery of the centers of power in the United States see this as an opportunity for change.

With the steady erosion of power and influence of "white America" comes not only a wishful projection into a better future that may never be on the rise, but also a return to the better days of the past that are no more. This is why multiculturalism portends both acceptance and resistance, globalism and tribalism. Parallel to multiculturalism are the pro-environmental movements that focus on the fragility of our common habitat, transcending boundaries over which shortsighted humans quarrel. Deference to the United Nations, if little more than a diplomatic expediency, can be a last resort to otherwise insoluble international disputes. At the same time, one witnesses the ascendancy of nationalism and fundamentalism as a means of mobilizing people against their foes. The Balkanization of the world is an instinctive response to threat.

Before human behavior can be changed, the human mind must be changed. But the human mind can change only with a change of heart. For genuine change must be willed and not forced. Platitudinous though it may sound, it remains true that in human experience a journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step forward. And yet, each step must be guided by a sense of direction if it is to cover a long distance. Whether it is popular or not, multiculturalism holds a clue to a fundamental reordering of human society. It can be a catalyst for transforming a crisis into an opportunity. For the global human community cannot continue with the ever widening gap between the powerful and the powerless, between the people of surplus goods and those of surplus people, just as it cannot divide itself into ever growing numbers of special interest groups.

An important part of taking the first step in the right direction is avoiding wrong steps. One must guard oneself against misconceptions of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism can be misconstrued as allowing any and every option. Multiculturalism is not the same as an invitation to anarchy that lacks cohesion and results in chaos. If one were to suggest some standard, the standard is often one chosen by the most powerful and coercive, serving their own particular interest and imposing these on others. Moreover,

some of the powerless acquire power by conspiring with the powerful and in turn becoming oppressors of the powerless of which they were originally part. The powerful even solicit potential turncoats to create the appearance of power sharing but in reality they solidify their monopoly of power. That is how inequity and injustice perpetuate themselves. Multiculturalism cannot be a mere appendage to the continued domination of the powerful. A minor adjustment on the surface or on the fringe is little more than lip service designed to satisfy the powerful. If another is to suggest some common denominator to affirm both particularities and solidarity, the common denominator is the most that everyone can agree on, which is usually little. Areas of disagreement thus remain unaddressed. Agreeing to disagree leaves the critical issue unaddressed. The coercive approach may bring peace but without justice. The minimalist approach may produce justice but without peace.

The critical issue at hand is whether it is possible to affirm both particularities and unity. Union is a sum of its parts, but unity requires an intentionality on the part of all partners to strive together toward creating an organic, cohesive whole. Unity, when achieved, serves to affirm each particularity in ways that they cannot affirm by themselves. Unity affirms at once the particular and the whole, one and many with reciprocity in between. Unity and diversity must, therefore, be the dual aims of multiculturalism. These dual aims become possible when each constituent group shares not only similarities and but also differences.

How can we achieve an authentically multicultural human community? How can multiculturalism be a principle, a commitment designed to transform the system as a whole, and not just the surface or the periphery? How can it be a source of promise for all, and not for some? How can it awaken in all a sense of responsibility as well as rights? How can multiculturalism appeal to the noble in the human soul and not uncover the base instinct for revenge and self-promotion at the expense of others?

Of countless specific measures to be taken, education holds the greatest promise for bringing to fruition the challenges and promises of multiculturalism. Education can and must deal with the reordering of values, which begins with the reshaping of conscience. The human inclination toward evil makes a multicultural community necessary, but it is conscience that makes such a community possible.

Then, what kind of education can reshape human conscience? It must be a fundamentally new multicultural education both in content and intent. First of all, it must be designed to foster genuine respect for each other's differences. Multicultural education must be cross-cultural and comparative. The diversification of curriculum must not stop at the level of allowing historically and socially marginalized groups to study their own culture to help affirm themselves. When a multicultural curriculum is a mere appendage to the established one, the marginalized remain on the margin without power sharing. Cross-cultural curriculums must foster the learning of each other's traditions. Multiculturalism must be the modus operandi for the whole. For example, the history of Native Americans ought not be only for Native Americans. Similarly, Native Americans ought to study American history from the vantage point of the Europeans who came to America. The painful past must be recovered so that the pain may be healed.

Second, a tolerance and respect for each other's heritage are more effectively addressed by focusing on shared questions than answers. There are certain questions that have been shared by different cultures and that have remained unchanged over time. What is the human condition? Why suffering? What is the nature and destiny of his-

tory? What propels a person to strive for beauty, goodness, and truth? What, if anything, lies ahead of death? These perennial questions endure longer than the answers. Answers differ not only from culture to culture but also from time to time, even in the course of one individual's life.

Furthermore, questions open people's hearts and minds not only to potential answers but also to others on a similar quest. Answers, on the other hand, easily close them, dividing people into disparate camps, each claiming the rightness of their own view. The quality of questioning, of search, better determines the content of a civilization than that of the solution. If for no other reason, search is a process, probing further and deeper, while answer ends that process. Tolerance and respect require the openness and meekness of a person on a quest, and suffers much from the determination of a person of unswerving conviction. This is why questions are unitive and answers are divisive. All three great scriptural traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—can come together in their common quest for justice and redemption. They part company, and even become enemies to each other, with their disparate solutions. The same applies to other instances of historic feuding: Jews and Arabs, Muslims and Sikhs, Protestants and Catholics, Serbians and Croatians, Koreans and Japanese.

Third, multicultural education must ultimately aim toward the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and sanctity of life, both individual and corporate. Whether in history or chemistry, literature or architecture, economics or physics, the ultimate questions that must be addressed are how to prevent the destruction of human and other lives and their habitats and how to bring out the best of human potential, such as justice and compassion. Multicultural education must be a humanistic education that refuses to reduce life to matter, the quality of life to quantity.

NOTES

[1] They refer to Dartmouth (1769), Oberlin (1832), Grinnell (1846), Carleton (1866), and Pomona (1887). What is now the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, California, was founded in 1866 as the first Congregational seminary west of the Mississippi.

[2] After Mary Lyon started Mount Holyoke Female Seminary 1837, the Boston lawyer Henry Fowle Durant and his wife Pauline founded Wellesley College in 1875 to educate women as a vocation to service, as illustrated by the College motto: *Non ministrari sed ministrare* (Not to be ministered unto, but to minister.) Though neither was for the training of ordained clergy, religious motivation was key to the early history of both schools.

[3] Noteworthy is the importance of New England Congregationalism, particularly of Yale, in these two Great Awakening movements. Jonathan Edwards (1703-58), Congregational minister in Northampton, Massachusetts, was a fervent believer in Calvinist "predestination." Timothy Dwight (1752-1817), a Congregational minister and President of Yale, revived the Great Awakening by calling for a return to Calvinism.

[4] Leonard Bacon was minister of the First Church in New Haven from 1825 until his death in 1881.

[5] Panikkar was a student of Karl Rahner who contributed to the Second Vatican Council the notion of the "anonymous Christian." See Raimundo Panikkar, *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecumenical Christophany* (1981).

[6] An earlier book by Spence shows how the emperor was educated by the Jesuits not because of their religion but because of their learning. See *Emperor of China: Self Portrait of Kang Hsi* (New York: Vintage, 1975).

[7] See William Johnston's preface to his English translation of Endō Shūsaku's novel on this topic: William Johnston, trans. *Silence* (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle, 1969).

[8] For example, Dōshisha, founded by the Japanese convert Joseph Niishima in Kyoto, and Baika Women's College were supported by the Congregationalists; Meiji Gakuin and Japan's first School for the Deaf by the Presbyterians; Kanto Gakuin by the American Baptists and Seinan by the Southern Baptists; Aoyama Gakuin and Kwansei

Gakuin respectively by the Methodist Episcopal and the Southern Methodist Churches; Kyushu Gakuin by the Lutherans; Rikkyō (St. Paul's) and Heian Women's College (St. Agnes) by the Episcopalians.

[9] Particularly Malacca, Penang, Macao, and Canton.

[10] The translation was published in 1837 by Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff, a Prussian sent to China by the Netherlands Missionary Society. *Nihon kirisutokyō kyōiku-shi: jinbutsu hen*, edited by Kirisutokyō gakkō kyōiku dōmei (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1977), 6. Apparently, there was some collaboration among the missionaries from Britain, Holland, and the United States, particularly within the same denomination.

[11] Most notable of the schools founded by Protestant missionaries in the late nineteenth century are Yonsei and Ehwa. The latter is today the world's largest women's university.

[12] A case in point is the Grove Farm Plantation on the Island of Kauai, owned by the Wilcox family who originally came to Hawaii as missionaries from Connecticut.

[13] Setting one minority group against another has a precedent. In the 1850s in Hawaii, Chinese laborers were used to set an "example" for the Hawaiian workers. The managers hoped that the Hawaiians would be "naturally jealous" of the foreigners and "ambitious" to outdo them. To repress mass revolt, the plantation owners emphasized the ethnic diversity of the laborers. This is why the Chinese, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Filipinos, and the Portuguese worked side by side on Hawaiian plantations. See Takaki, 1989.

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