

The Psyche and the Experiential World

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The following essay is presented here by the author as a précis of his recent book, ユングにおける心と体験世界, [The Psyche and the Experiential World: A Study in C. G. Jung's Theory of Interpretation] published in the spring of 1991 with Shunjūsha of Tokyo.

As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman have made clear, the problems of the religiosity of the human person and the experience of meaning are inseparable.¹ Together they have proposed the idea of a “sacred cosmos” as religion’s way of witnessing to ultimate meaning.

On the one hand, this sacred cosmos has undergone a gradual process of relativization in the midst of the so-called processes of modernization and secularization, until it has virtually come to lack all sense of reality in the minds of contemporary men and women. On the other, the currents of “depth psychology” associated with Freudian psychoanalysis and its various offshoots have provided a kind of orientation and way to inner, immanentistic meaning for people living within secularized society.

In his 1966 book, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, Philip Rieff has presented a vivid portrait of the psychological culture that has come to full flower in the United States.² *Psychological man*, he argues, has risen in step with the decline of traditional religion and the growing awareness of the individual self. It represents a mode of modern human being that has experienced the split between individual self-consciousness and social order, and has come to find meaning within the bounds of

¹ Peter Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Thomas Luckman, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

² Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

personal, private, psychological experience.³ There is no denying the fact that an ever increasing number of men and women who have suffered the stress and crimp of living in today's world are turning for help not to organized religion but to psychotherapy. And this is the case not only in Europe and the United States but also in Japan.

It is in the light of this situation and climate of a depth-psychological culture that we need to consider the distinct contribution that C. G. Jung made to this climate in his treatment of the problem of human religiosity and the search for meaning. The analytical psychology he forged through his writing and practice gives us a classic example of *homo religiosus* in secularized society. For although he had been raised the son of a pious Protestant pastor, Jung found himself dissatisfied with the Christian faith and set out to recover the original spirit that infuses all religious ways.

In order to understand the importance of this adventure in religious meaning, I would like to consider what Jung understood as the basic religiosity of the human and its relationship to the experiential appropriation of meaning.

A Childhood Experience of God

We begin our account by recalling an unusual experience of God that Jung claims to have had as a young boy.⁴ It has to do with an extremely strange fantasy in which he saw God seated in a great golden throne, from under which a gigantic feces dropped down and pulverized the cathedral of Basel. Why should God himself destroy a structure erected as a testimony to the faith of those who worshipped him, and in such a manner? The answer is not clear, but had one entertained the thought deliberately, there would be no dismissing the feeling that a blasphemy had been committed.

If we examine the fantasy more closely, the image of God as an aged man seated on a golden throne and defecating is not an unlikely

³ See Peter Homans, *Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of a Psychology* (University of Chicago Press, 1979), 193-4. Homans treats Jung as *homo religiosus* at length in this book.

⁴ Aniela Jaffé, ed., C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 36-42. See also my essay ヨング心理学の原型 (プロトタイプ) - 神秘体験・心霊現象・心霊主義 [The Prototypes of Jungian Psychology: Mystical Experience, Psychic Experiences, Spiritism], 倫理学 7 (1980): 52-3. It is now known that in his early years, Jung was extremely interested in direct spiritual experiences, took part in séances, and read widely in the literature. At least from his years at university he had strong spiritistic tendencies.

one for a young schoolboy. But at the time he had the fantasy, Jung found it richly suggestive. When the image first began to rise in his mind, he resisted it vigorously as a sacrilegious thought, and for several days it left him alone. But in the end the fantasy returned with irresistible force until the child Jung eventually let go and allowed it to run its course. Like one on the point of a religious conversion, he abandoned his own subjectivity and cast himself into the arms of God. Far from feeling that he would suffer divine wrath for his vision, Jung tells us that at the time he had a sense of the closeness of divine grace.

Looking back at the experience, Jung himself has this to say:

I felt an enormous, an indescribable relief. Instead of the expected damnation, grace had come upon me, and with it an unutterable bliss such as I had never know. I wept for happiness and gratitude. The wisdom and goodness of God had been revealed to me now that I had yielded to His inexorable command.⁵

The main point of the experience lay in the manifestation of a pure divine act at the moment that he had come to pure acquiescence by sweeping aside all resistance and fear, come what may. It shows, in short, a unity of the pure passivity of the relative and the pure activity of the absolute, a revelation made manifest to an intuition freed of self.

Grace comes upon one who has let go of self-will and submitted to God in all simplicity. Only when one so graced identifies with the will of God in a sense of absolute interior spontaneity is there an experience of ultimate meaning.

It was obedience which brought me grace, and after that experience I knew what God's grace was. One must be utterly abandoned to God; nothing matters but fulfilling His will. Otherwise, all is folly and meaningless.⁶

Clearly for Jung it was living in divine revelation and fulfilling the will of God that gives shape to the meaning of life. When all is said and done, the meaning of human life comes only through relationship to God. Moreover, nothing was of greater moment for Jung than the meaning of one's own life. Put the other way around, the quest for meaningfulness seems to have been what brought him to God. Nor can all of this be isolated from Jung's own life work. His letters speak elo-

⁵ *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 40.

⁶ *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 40.

quently to the point: “[My] *raison d’être* consists in coming to terms with that indefinable Being we call ‘God.’”⁷

When we speak here of *God*, it is not in the sense of an ontological entity that the word is to be understood. For Jung, to discuss God at the metaphysical level was counter-productive; he preferred to address the question at the level of actual experience. God was always the God that appeared in Jung’s own experiential world, in the reality of the psyche accessible to his own experience. Roughly speaking, he defined the God of his experience as “a superior will in my own psychical system.”⁸

Jung’s experience of God is moreover symbolic of the fact that in his own unconsciousness the Church had ceased to play the role of importing ultimate meaning that it played as an institution in Western society. While his own ultimate meaning remained forever rooted in God, it was not in a God bound to established authority and tradition but in a God who works immediately and freely on human persons. In other words, what concerned him was not the Church as a community of believers that mediated between the divine and the human, but the establishing of the God-human relationship itself. Such a position brings to mind at once the trend towards “privatizing” of religion that has come to the fore in the contemporary world. This development is foreshadowed in Jung’s way of taking religion – to borrow a Kantian turn of phrase – as a *quid iuris*, namely human religiosity, more seriously than religion as a *quid facti*, namely the fact of the established institution.

The Innate Religious Dimension of the Human

The question of meaning and its related question of God is tied indissolubly with Jung’s view of the human, so much so that we might even say that for him *anima naturaliter religiosa* – the soul is by nature religious.⁹ The problem is to know just what this might mean in the con-

⁷ Letter dated 13.3.1958. *C. G. Jung Letters* (Princeton University Press, 1975), 1:424.

⁸ See J. W. Heisig, *Imago Dei: A Study of C. G. Jung’s Psychology of Religion* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 90. Because he had a strong attachment to the label “scientist,” when he spoke of God he did so in a rather restricted sense, namely as the idea or experience that people of all times and ages have referred to as God. In other words, “God” referred always to a part of experience or tradition, never to a being said to exist in reality.

⁹ *Psychology and Alchemy*, vol. 12 *Jung’s Collected Works* (Princeton University Press, 1971; hereafter, CW), 14. Numbers refer to paragraphs in the *Collected Works*. Jung is consciously paraphrasing the dictum of Tertullian, *anima naturaliter christiana*.

crete. To do so, we would do well to pull the phrase apart into its component elements.¹⁰

To begin with, in Jung the terms *soul* and *psyche* are ambivalent in the extreme. Behind his standpoint of “psychic reality” lay an understanding of *psyche* in the broad sense as encompassing the entire symbolic world of experience and in the narrow sense as the totality of conscious and unconscious mind. The *soul* is used broadly in the same sense as the notion of *psyche*, but in its more restricted sense refers to the higher notions of *anima* and *animus*, or the *persona* of the unconscious, the archetype of the opposite sex that each individual bears in his or her unconscious. On this understanding, the notion of the *soul* may be said to signify in a more general sense the totality of human subjectivity as an amalgam of conscious and unconscious mind.

In his conceptual definitions of religion, Jung was less concerned with religion as a social system than with the attitude of the individual. For Jung, “religion, as the Latin word denotes, is a careful and scrupulous observation of what Rudolf Otto aptly termed the *numinosum*, that is, a dynamic agency or effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will.”¹¹ Elsewhere he writes: “Religion, as the careful observation and taking account of certain invisible and uncontrollable factors, is an *instinctive* attitude peculiar to man.”¹² When human beings are grasped and controlled by some such *numinosity* in religious experience, it is not something the subject *does* but rather something that *is done* to one. In many cases, Jung’s allusions to religion as natural or instinctive amount to saying that it is inborn in the human individual. Hence his comprehensive claim that “the soul is by nature religious” seems to imply that the human subject is equipped with an innate disposition to revere the *numinous*.

It can be shown that already in his early period, Jung was grappling with this problem of human religiosity. In the recently published series of talks he gave to a students’ association known as the Zofingia Society in 1898, one comes across the odd phrase “causal instinct” in

¹⁰ See my essay, 「魂は本性的に宗教的である」というユングの命題について [On Jung’s Dictum, *Anima naturaliter religiosa*], 宗教研究 61/4:42-53.

¹¹ *Psychology and Religion*, CW 11:6.

¹² *The Undiscovered Self*, CW 10:512. Jung’s notion of instinct is notoriously ambiguous. The *psyche* itself, insofar as it is innate, is even referred to as instinct. We see this in the fact that the Old Wise Man is taken as an archetype of the *psyche*, and as such qualifies as something instinctive.

connection with a discussion of human religiosity.¹³ According to Marie-Louise von Franz, one of Jung's leading disciples, the term comes from Eduard von Hartmann, author of *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*, where it does not mean—as the words themselves suggest—instinct possessed of causality, but an instinct that impels humans to search for the causes of things. In this sense, humans seek meaning, and seek it in its ultimate form, because of an eradicable disposition to seek it, a drive that gives one no rest until the question of the teleological meaning of the things of life has been asked. It is then less a matter of the law of cause and effect than of an intentionality towards a final cause. To cite the words of the university student Jung:

Man wants to know why and what for, just as he wants his own actions and those of his fellow men to have a purpose. Man is a Prometheus who steals lightning from heaven in order to bring light into the pervasive darkness of the great riddle. He knows that there is a meaning in nature, that the world conceals a mystery which it is the purpose of his life to discover.¹⁴

At first glance, Jung's notion of the causal instinct calls to mind the opening lines of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, "Humans by nature desire to know." But where Aristotle's words refer basically to the drive for learning and knowledge, Jung's causal instinct is broader in scope. It is rather like a kind of impulse to search for a knowledge of things that transcends the world of episteme. Through this passionate desire for knowledge, the human being asks after the meaning of the world and a *raison d'être* for being alive, not satisfied with what the realms of philosophy and science can deliver but pressing on to ultimate meaning in the realms of myth and religion.

Hence for Jung the "causal instinct" is the inclination that gives rise to myth and religion. So long as the human person is so inclined, myth and religion will ever and again come to birth:

¹³ These lectures were published as an appendix to Jung's *Collected Works* (Princeton University Press, 1982; hereafter CWA). Recent studies suggest that Jung should be placed in the tradition of Hartmann, Schopenhauer, and Schelling. His fundamental idea that all unconscious contents are projections means that the unconscious is known as part of the experiential world. Structurally, his thought seems remarkably close to idea that the psyche is invisible nature and nature is visible psyche, an idea that figures prominently in Schelling's philosophy of identity. See Detlev v. Uslar, "Die Aktualität Schellings für Tiefenpsychologie und Psychotherapie," Ludwig Hasler, ed., *Schelling: Seine Bedeutung für eine Philosophie der Natur und der Geschichte* (Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1981), 163ff.

¹⁴ CWA, 194.

In every healthy, reflective person the simple need to satisfy the principle of causality develops into a metaphysical longing, into religion. When the first man asked: why? and tried to investigate the reason for some change, science was born. But science alone does not satisfy anyone. It must be expanded into what DeWitte calls a philosophy “full of faith and enthusiasm, which alone merits the exalted name of wisdom.” Every genuine philosophy, as the complete expression of metaphysical desire, is religion. Religion is the mother who receives her children with loving arms when they flee to her terrified by the confusion and the “merciless tumult of nature stripped of its gods,” and driven to despair by the shattering enigma of existence.¹⁵

Thus the metaphysical desire that leads to religion is inseparable from the disposition to seek meaning. In the end, in order to live a fully human life, one must needs give life an ultimate meaning, and this cannot but take the form of myth and religion. The lack of such meaning can only land us in affliction.

This reading of Jung’s thought accords with the view of neurosis we find in his late thought: “A psychoneurosis must be understood, ultimately, as the suffering of a soul which has not discovered its meaning.”¹⁶ The discovering of meaning in life may be considered a matter of grave moment for human existence.

In Jung’s middle period, the question of human religiosity was often treated in terms of what he called “the religious function” of the psyche. The first time he introduced the term in a 1944 essay introducing his book *Psychology and Alchemy*, it was clearly synonymous with the idea that the soul is by nature religious.¹⁷

The religious function of the psyche refers first of all to the intentionality towards the absolute and unconditional. Seen experientially, this disposition towards the divine and the highest good has as its object a symbolic complex—the highest constellation of psychic energy—which takes shape in different individuals as symbols that are not always religious in the normal sense of the word. One person’s God may be his “belly” (see Phil. 3:19), another’s money, and yet another’s learning or power or sex.¹⁸ This point is of particular importance. In-

¹⁵ CWA, 181.

¹⁶ “Psychotherapists or the Clergy,” CW 11:497.

¹⁷ “Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy,” CW 12:14. See Heisig, *Imago Dei*, 35–36.

¹⁸ *Psychological Types*, CW 6:64.

deed, for Jung even ideologies can be called religious.¹⁹ Simply put, the point is that humans are possessed of an intentionality to affix ultimate meaning in one form or another.

Secondly, this human intentionality is a properly psychic need, which means that the religious function is a necessary structural component of the psyche. In a more or less highly differentiated form it belongs to the makeup of all of us. The assignation of ultimate meaning is an internal demand that is part and parcel of human life itself. In his declining years Jung had this to say:

Man positively needs general ideas and convictions that will give a meaning to his life and enable him to find his place in the universe. He can stand the most incredible hardships when he is convinced that they make sense; but he is crushed when, on top of all his misfortunes, he has to admit that he is taking part in a "tale told by an idiot."²⁰

From this perspective, finding meaning to life is the functional goal of religious symbols.²¹

Thirdly, the religious function entails the activity of harmonizing, in symbolic form, the relationship between ego-consciousness and the collective unconscious, thus preserving the health of the psyche. In this connection, the meaningfulness of a particular religion for psychology lies in the extent to which it formalizes the symbol-forming activity of the religious function, and within that framework sets free an innate human spontaneity. By the same token, religious dogma, though distinct from the religious function as such and serves to maintain psychic health by protecting the individual from the perils latent in direct religious experience of the numinous.

In his late writings, Jung speaks of the "religious instinct for wholeness."²² That is, the human person is disposed to seek psychic integration and to heal the inner dividedness of the psyche. The texts themselves do not allow us to make a direct link between Jung's idea of the religious function and what he called the "transcendent function," but here we have a clear clue for pursuing such a connection.²³

¹⁹ "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious", CW 7:326.

²⁰ "Symbols and the Interpretation of Dreams," CW 18:566.

²¹ CW 18:567.

²² "Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth," CW 10:653.

²³ J. Heisig, 超越的機能の超越 — ユング思想における宗教的機能・本能と東西宗教問題をめぐって [Transcending the Transcendent Function: The Religious Function and Instinct in Jung Thought and the Problem of Religion East and West] ブシケ 6 (1987): 89.

Roughly put, the idea of the transcendent function refers to a spontaneous, unconscious activity that coordinates the various functions of the psyche—thought, feeling, sensation, intuition—and thus transforms the oneness of consciousness by uniting the opposites of conscious and unconscious mind into a single totality.²⁴ Alternately, Jung speaks of this activity as the process of individuation. For him individuation refers to the process whereby the sociologically constituted individual comes to grips with the elements of collective mind to become a psychological individual. The psychological individual is one who has actualized the psyche as a single totality of conscious and unconscious mind. For Jung, the human person is naturally disposed to the actualization of such a whole individuality, and when alienated from this tendency falls into psychic illness.

The innate intentionality and spontaneous inclination to self-actualization has become a subject of some discussion. Jung himself speaks of this unconscious intentionality as “creative fantasy,” by which he means not mere fantasizing but the potential and the activity of the imagination. “The psyche creates reality every day,” writes Jung. “The only expression I can use for this activity is *fantasy*.”²⁵ This broad use of the term thus refers to the potentiality for experience in general. (This connection between fantasy and experience is drawn from Kant’s theory of productive imagination; it is not made in Jung’s own writings.)

Actually, Jung himself considered innate, creative fantasy as bridging the irreconcilable gap that separates subject and object, inner and outer.²⁶ Creative fantasy plays a leading role then in the transcendent function and the individuation process, which means that it may also be considered the pivotal element in the working of the religious function.

Seen in terms of reflective consciousness, therefore, Jung’s idea of the religious dimension of the human refers to the innate disposition to awe before the numinous, while seen in terms of the spontaneity of the unconscious it refers to the working of an encompassing, creative fantasy that integrates conscious and unconscious mind. Viewed from another angle, the assignation of meaning within the framework of the

²⁴ “The Transcendent Function,” CW 8:131.

²⁵ *Psychological Types*, CW 6:78.

²⁶ CW 6:78.

ultimate totality wrought by creative fantasy constitutes a religious posture for the individual subject.

The Place of Religiosity in Jungian Psychology

This brings us to the question of the relationship that the religious dimension of the human discussed above has to Jung's overall scholarly enterprise. Does religiosity embrace psychology, or is it no more than an object ultimately eclipsed by the psychology that studies it?

Insofar as it is a question of the relationship between active fantasy and analytical psychology, we can only think of it in terms of "psychic fact" or "psychological truth." In recognizing that science must maintain a standpoint apart from feeling and fantasy, Jung envisioned psychology as entailing an integration of the antithesis between theory and therapeutic praxis and insisted that to do so it must bring creative power and will into its service.²⁷ This view of the psychological enterprise is rather broadly cast and he himself was the first to admit that it did not qualify as science in the strict sense of the word. It was, as he says, "a psychological activity of a creative nature in which creative fantasy is given prior place."²⁸ Psychology must at the same time contribute to the quality of life, and this also entails the collaboration of creative fantasy.

Hence Jungian psychology gives clear precedence to creative fantasy rather than to academic concerns. In this sense it is less concerned with objectifying religiosity for analysis than being brought directly into the problematic circle of human religiosity. In other words, religiosity is seen to work causally in human life and at the same time to offer a purpose to human life. Making a similar point, Heisig turns the medieval understanding of philosophy as the handmaiden of theology to characterize psychology for Jung as the *ancilla religionis*.²⁹

As this becomes clear, the hermeneutic side of Jung's thought necessarily arises within the wider problematic of his treatment of human religiosity. For patients and the like seeking "absolute meaning" through a relationship to the totality of the psyche as a conceivable to-

²⁷ CW 6:81-3.

²⁸ *Psychological Types*, CW 6:84.

²⁹ See J. Heisig, 人生後半と宗教体験 — ユングにおける宗教の必須条件 [Religious Experience and the Second Half of Life: The Conditions for the Possibility of Religion for Jung], *ブシケ* 2 (1983): 62.

tality, Jung held out a way to discover “the meaning of life.” In this sense, the structural assumptions about meaningfulness latent in his interpretative practice cannot be passed over. On the one hand, frequent failures in *petitio principii* are in evidence, while on the other there is no denying the significance of his practice as a therapeutic method. To be sure, the engagement in—or, to use the Heideggerian term, the “pro-ject” towards—meaningfulness is part of what makes life human. One thinks here, for instance, of an early essay of Jung, “On the Significance of Number Dreams,” in which he analyzes a dream whose only content was “Lucas 137” (see ch. 2). One cannot but be struck by the way he forces his argument, but when one takes into consideration the fuller context, it is clear that his undertaking is far from meaningless.³⁰

The Appropriation of Meaning and the Privatization of Religion

We may now turn to clarifying the paradoxical relationship in Jungian psychology between individual meaning and collective meaning. The collective meaning contained in the archetypal symbolism of things like myth is psychologically meaningless as far as its surface content goes, and it is only when it has been appropriated into the experiential world of the individual that it becomes meaningful. The paradox, then, is that collective meanings need to be privatized to be meaningful.

Jung’s own childhood experience of God is paradigmatic here. If it was indeed an experience of God, why did he not teach others what had been revealed to him in that experience? Or why did he not become the founder of a new sect? The question is too important to set aside.

In actual fact, Jung speaks of having had a taste of divine revelation and yet the idiosyncratic imagery of the experience only increased his sense of inferiority. According to the account in his autobiography, he thought himself a devil, a swine, the most depraved of men. But he took a certain consolation from a passage in the New Testament in which it says that the reprobates are those chosen by God. “It made a lasting impression on me that the unjust steward was praised, and that Peter, the waverer, was appointed the rock upon which the Church was

³⁰ CW 4:146–53.

³¹ *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 41.

built.”³¹ Alienated from others, he found himself in sympathy with the alienated. In fact, throughout his life, Jung felt himself a solitary and was reluctant to speak to others of his inner experiences. (His memoirs, published posthumously, are the only exception.) For this reason, he elected to privatize his revelatory experience.

The stress on the internalization and appropriation of personal experience runs throughout Jung’s work and is particularly clear in his position regarding the relationship between the individual and institutions.³² For him, one loses one’s individuality in becoming part of a group. He warns against being reduced to the level of a single unit in a social organization and forfeiting one’s dignity as an individual:

The bigger the crowd the more negligible the individual becomes. But if the individual, overwhelmed by the sense of his own puniness and importance, should feel that his life has lost its meaning – which, after all, is not identical with public welfare and higher standards of living – then he is already on the road to State slavery and, without knowing or wanting it, has become its proselyte.³³

The loss of dignity through collectivization can take place not only in the context of secularized society but also in religious organizations. For Jung, “religion” has always to be kept strictly distinct from a “creed.”³⁴ Confession of a particular creed entails belonging to a definite religious organization, and hence provides a position of worldly authority – albeit an authority grounded on another world – from which to resist the state in secular society. A creed confesses to society at large of one’s basic adherence to a definite religious organization, and as such belongs to this world. Religion, in contrast, “expresses a subjective relationship to certain metaphysical, extramundane factors.”³⁵

In the case of traditions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, the meaning and end of religion consist in the relationship of the individual to the divine, whereas in traditions like the Buddhist, they are seen to consist rather in a relationship to a path to individual liberation. For Jung the original meaning of religion lay in such relationships and not in affiliation with a particular religious organization in secular society.

³² *The Undiscovered Self*, CW 10:488–504.

³³ CW 10:507.

³⁴ CW 10:507.

³⁵ CW 10:507.

To be buried in a religious group often amounts to no more than a secular phenomenon of collectivism. In this regard Jung writes:

To be the adherent of a creed . . . is not always a religious matter but more often a social one and, as such, it does nothing to give the individual any foundation. For this he has to depend exclusively on his relation to an authority which is not of this world. The criterion here is not lip service to a creed but the psychological fact that the life of the individual is not determined solely by the ego and its opinions or by social factors, but quite as much, if not more, by a transcendent authority. It is not ethical principle, however lofty, or creeds, however orthodox, that lay the foundations for the freedom and autonomy of the individual, but simply and solely the empirical awareness, the incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the "world" and its "reason."³⁶

On Jung's model, to become religious therefore does not mean being content with affiliating oneself to an institutional religion, but establishing an immediate and mutual relationship with the transcendent — "a superior will" — and being conscious of what one is doing.

Metaphorically speaking, religion implies the incarnation of God in each individual. This does not mean of course that one becomes God and becomes incarnate in one's own inward parts, but that in a state of pure passivity one effectively becomes aware of oneself as "temple of God" (2 Cor. 6:16) in the true sense of the term.

This paradigm of the temple of God is Jesus Christ, and Jung in fact refers to religious incarnation as a *Christificatio multorum*.³⁷ The term *Christificatio* only appears three times throughout Jung's collected writings, but the idea behind it is scattered throughout his thought.³⁸ For Jungians, the meaning of the term is generally interpreted to mean what is normally called the *imitatio Christi*.

For Jung, the imitation of Christ means that just as Jesus faced the temptations of the devil in the desert and overcame them, so each individual has to do battle with the shadow and choose the good.³⁹ This is in fact the first stage in the individuation process in which our sub-

³⁶ *Answer to Job*, CW 11:758.

³⁷ *Answer to Job*, CW 11:758.

³⁸ *On the Psychology of the Unconscious*, CW 7: 43; *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, CW 14/2:195.

³⁹ See his letter to Victor White of 24.11.1953. *Letters* 2:135.

jectivity is awakened from the slumber of an unconscious, undifferentiated state and splits good from evil. The opposition between the two, at first taken to be something external to oneself, must be then internalized:

The reality of evil and its incompatibility with good cleave the opposites asunder and lead inexorably to the crucifixion and suspension of everything that lives. Since "the soul is by nature Christian," this result is bound to come as infallibly as it did in the life of Jesus: we have all to be "crucified with Christ," i. e. suspended in a moral suffering equivalent to veritable crucifixion.⁴⁰

As long as we are at the level of ego-consciousness, our subjectivity splits good and evil apart and leaves us no choice but to put up with the bitter struggle between them. For Jung the imitator of Christ in this way becomes one with the anguish of the crucified.

Jung took the life of Christ as a model for giving meaning to the internal struggle between good and evil. That is, our psychological torment is not our own private problem but nothing less than an imitation of Christ. Paul's statement, "It is no longer I that live but Christ that lives in me" (Gal. 2:20) expresses just what Jung means by becoming one with the anguish of the crucified.

Internalizing the struggle between good and evil is an acknowledgement of one's own sinfulness. But the appropriation of this awareness does not necessarily mean that one belittles oneself and stands in judgment against oneself. For it is precisely *as sinners* that we must imitate Christ:

Christ espoused the sinner and did not condemn him. The true follower of Christ will do the same, and, since one should do unto others as one would do unto oneself, one will also take the part of the sinner who is oneself. And as little as we would accuse Christ of fraternizing with evil, so little should we reproach ourselves that to love the sinner who is oneself is to make a pact with the devil. Love makes a man better, hate makes him worse—even when that man is oneself.⁴¹

Along with acknowledging oneself as a sinner, one must accept oneself and be reconciled with oneself. Jung took up this question of the need

⁴⁰ "Introduction to the Religion and Psychological Problems of Alchemy," CW 12:24.

⁴¹ CW 12:37.

⁴² CW 11:133.

for self-reconciliation in his Terry Lectures, *Psychology and Religion*⁴² (see ch. 6).

As the above has made clear, the true meaning that collective mystical symbolism like the life of Christ has for us is not exhausted by merely *knowing* about the symbol but by our appropriating it as an inner fact. Myth is more than a mere human cultural product; it is the bedrock that undergirds meaningfulness in human life. It is only natural that we should find Jung speaking in his autobiography of “the myth of my life.”⁴³ In the last analysis, the true value of Jungian psychology may lie in its ability to stimulate us to experience the inner reality that engages the whole person. If this is so, Jung’s aim and intent was to provide a framework for religious experience, to lead people to ego-less intuition, and so aid each one in living out his or her life’s myth.

Ego-Consciousness and the Psychological Cosmos

From everything that has been said so far, it is clear that we need to rethink ego-consciousness. That is, ego-consciousness itself needs to be seen as subjectivity and as the locus for the disclosure of meaning.⁴⁴ There is an activity in consciousness that articulates things and makes their meaning patent. As Jung writes in a letter, “Without the reflecting consciousness of man the world is a gigantic meaningless machine, for in our experience man is the only creature who is capable of ascertaining any meaning at all.”⁴⁵ Or again:

Nobody seems to have noticed that without a reflecting psyche the world might as well not exist, and that, in consequence, consciousness is a second world-creator, and also that the cosmogonic myths do not describe the absolute beginning of the world but rather the dawning of consciousness as the second Creation.⁴⁶

Since what is not articulated may be thought to lack meaning, the ac-

⁴³ *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 3.

⁴⁴ Samuels et al., *Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 2.

⁴⁵ Letter to Erich Neumann dated 10.3.59, *Letters* 2:494.

⁴⁶ Letter to Pastor Tanner, 12.2.1959. *Letters* 2:487.

⁴⁷ Tarutani Shigehiro 垂谷茂弘, 個体化における他者と世界の問題 [The Other in Individuation and the Problem of the World], 宗教哲学研究 5 (1988):78-95.

tivity of articulation that the world brings to birth in consciousness is of the greatest importance.⁴⁷

To understand Jung, the fundamental place he accords ego-consciousness belongs less on the level of particular, subjective individuals than on a cosmic level. In other words, Jung's system contains a monadistic superstructure. As the foregoing has shown, appropriation—in the sense of one's *taking hold* of one's own experience—is crucial. In the matter of the shadow, for instance, meaningfulness does not consist in understanding at the level of intellect but in experiencing one's own shadow immediately. Accordingly, it is up to each person to create his or her own world of experience and become intimate with it on a personal level. By articulating the meaning of one's experiences, one in effect recreates one's own "psychological cosmos."⁴⁸

It may also be mentioned here, without entering into too much detail, that the problem of the "synchronistic phenomena" also belongs to the discussion of the individual's giving meaning to life in the sense that unappropriated phenomena of this sort lack meaning (see ch. 3, 6). It is not a question here of the world as such but of the appropriated world of individual experience.

It should not be overlooked in this connection that the framework of Jung's thought underwent a fundamental conversion as a result of his argument for synchronicity as a principle of acausal meaningful connection. The principle does not speak of meaning as coincident with conscious experience but as a pointing to a particular entity all its own. That is, it speaks of the spontaneous appearance in the phenomenal world of an *unus mundus* transcending space and time (see ch.3).

Looking at it from a different angle, it would seem that the experience of meaning in the individuation process belongs to a different level from the experience of meaning in synchronistic phenomena. In contrast to the *centripetal* way of individuation where meaning is always something intuited as intra-psychic, for the *centrifugal* way of synchronicity meaning is intuited as a trans-psychic existing in its own right. In the former, the experience of harmony is that of a unity achieved at the solipsistic level of the psyche and its world of experience. In the latter it is rather a question of an experience of awe that brings together the macrocosm of the actual world with the microcosm

⁴⁸ Higuchi Kazuhiko 樋口和彦, 「永遠の少年」元型・女神の元型 [The Archetypes of the *Puer Aeternus* and the Goddess] (Tokyo: Sannō, 1986), 14–6.

of the psyche. In this sense, the latter is closer to the experience of the *numinosum* that characterizes religion for Jung (see ch. 6).

Conclusion

For Jung the fullness of human life is inseparable from the question of ultimate meaning. The “pro-ject” of meaningfulness, the conviction that human life has a meaning, lay at the core of his psychological enterprise. Giving meaning to the things of life is in no sense a mere trifling with abstract concepts. It is something that each person must appropriate in “the experiences of life.”⁴⁹ Jung made this clear both through the centripetal path of the individuation process and in the centrifugal path of synchronicity. This latter strategy delivers one of the intuition that meaning is no longer something that we humans give to the world but something latent in the world itself, something waiting to make itself manifest at the opportune time and place. This was the gist of Jung’s final vision of the *unus mundus* of ultimate meaning. In this sense, the *unus mundus* represents the final crystallization of Jung’s project for meaning (see Conclusion).

The immanentistic side to Jung’s thought does not stop at the inner world of the psyche but breaks through the disposition to the inner life in a kind of “immanent transcendence” to still deeper inwardness. His efforts to overcome psychologism were ultimately what give his thought its abiding uniqueness and fascination.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ “Is Analytical Psychology Religion?”, William McGuire, ed., *C. G. Jung Speaking* (London: Pan Books, 1980), 107–9.

⁵⁰ Concerning the problem of the discovery of the intentionality of self-overcoming as applied to the self-understanding of depth psychology itself, see Ira Progoff, *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956). I have commented further on this in an afterword to my Japanese translation of this book.