The Conceptualization and Translation of *Jikaku* and *Jiko* in Nishida Kitarō

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Nishida’s notion of *jikaku* 自覚 appears in the second stage of his philosophical development, following his attempts to ground philosophy on “pure experience.” Beginning with *Intuition and Reflection in Jikaku* (1917), it finds a permanent place in his thinking. The term *jikaku* is particularly attractive for the study of translation because of its wide-ranging conceptual possibilities. In what follows I will focus my remarks on questions of translation between Japanese and French, but trust that they will contribute to the wider discussion of the translation of Japanese philosophical terms into Western languages.

The term *jikaku* 自覚 is made up of two Chinese characters: *ji*, which means “self,” and *kaku*, which means “awake.” The meaning of the term itself incorporates the significance of the word *jiko* 自己, which, together with *jikaku*, plays a major role in Nishida’s writings. *Jiko* is generally taken to be the equivalent of the French *soi* or *moi*, but these latter belong fundamentally to a system of personal pronouns whereas

1. 『自覚に於ける直観と反省』 in 『西田幾多郎全集』 [The collected works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), vol. II.
jiko belongs to a different grammatical system of terms designating the person. The fact that the self-referential phenomenon soi, moi, and other pronouns are grammaticalized differently than jiko complicates the already difficult conceptual and linguistic problems that face the translator. As a result, the work of interpretation, already an indispensable part of the process of translation, requires reflection not only on the context of the texts in which such words appear, but also on the question of traditional and trans-cultural usage. For what we have in Nishida is nothing less than a blend of cultural influences East and West converging in his notion of jikaku.

Jikaku is a philosophical neologism that Nishida first proposed as a translation of “self-consciousness.” Later as a result of conceptual criticism and elaboration of the equivalents of self-consciousness, jikaku came to join his core vocabulary, standing alongside such basic terms in Western philosophy as conscience de soi or Selbstbewußtsein. No doubt the Sino-Japanese word jikaku carries the terminological legacy of the terms jiko and the ishiki (意識, consciousness) that includes a variety of Buddhist theoretical uses. Hence the study of translation related to jikaku requires a comparative examination of jiko and soi (or moi) through a critical analysis of a selection of French translations of Nishida’s writings. As we will see, philosophical and linguistic problems are entangled in the process of translation from a source language to a target language.

Our study of translation in Nishida will emphasize the linguistic and terminological aspect of the different problems that arise, rather than focusing strictly on philosophical analysis. It will consist of reading different passages from Nishida’s works and analyzing the concepts of jikaku and jiko within the context in which they appear.

The notion of jikaku can be said, in brief, to represent a self-reflective mechanism that grounds the system of consciousness. In grappling with the question of logic in his philosophical project, Nishida went on from an early conceptualization of jikaku to forge his notion of basho, or “place,” to designate the logical aspect of the activity of consciousness corresponding to jikaku. These two concepts, both of which involve consciousness, developed in tandem as Nishida’s thinking evolved. In this sense, jikaku was reconceptualized again and again so that it could
serve as the indispensable and guiding thread that it was. We find it at work in Nishida’s critique of Kant, German idealism, and the neo-Kantians, and watch it take shape, step by step, as his thinking develops. It shows up also in his more practical speculations on the structure of the human world and the foundations of human relations, for example, in his analysis of the encounter of *watashi* 私 (I) and *nanji* 汝 (you). In 1944, just the year before he died, Nishida undertook a reappraisal of the notion of *jikaku*

How then can we hope to translate a concept as central as *jikaku*, one so stratified and working at so many and diverse levels? How could we ever hope to produce a single translation in French or English—or any language for that matter?

**The neologism *jikaku* as translation**

The term *jikaku* appeared long before *Intuition and Reflection in Jikaku* (1917), in fact even before the book that launched his philosophical career in 1911, *A Study of the Good*. I would point in particular to the use of the term in two texts written between 1904 and 1906, “A Lecture on Psychology” and “A Proposal for an Ethics.” Nishida took the psychology of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) as his guide in composing his “Lecture,” but even so, we can see hints of his original philosophical position there in germ.

A short section of the “Lecture,” intended as an outline of Western psychology, is set aside for the concept of *jikaku*. The following extract is taken from this section:

Ce que l’on appelle “conscience de soi” (*self-consciousness*) n’est qu’une sorte de sentiment qui accompagne cet acte unificateur [de la conscience]. Ce sentiment est constant tel que l’est l’acte unificateur. En ce point naît l’idée de l’identité personnelle (*personal identity*). Pour cette raison, c’est sûrement après le développement de l’acte

2. 『善の研究』 NKZ I.
3. 『心理学講義』and 『倫理学草案』
4. See MUTAI Risaku 務台理作, 『後記』[Postface], NKZ XVI, 664–9.
aperceptif et de l’acte de volonté que l’on obtient un \textit{jikaku} suffisant. À l’origine, ce que l’on nomme “soi” n’est pas fixé, et l’idée et le sentiment, obtenus à partir du fait que nous agissons en permanence comme centre unificateur de la conscience, sont associés étroitement au sentiment de soi et en font partie. Ainsi s’explique l’individualité de chacun.

Nishida sets the term “self-consciousness” in parentheses after \textit{自己の意識}, which is literally rendered as \textit{conscience de soi} in French. \textit{自己の意識} or “self-consciousness” is “a kind of sentiment” and is constant. On the other hand, \textit{jikaku} originates in the development of an “apperceptive act” and an “act of the will”. Nishida notes two aspects of self-consciousness here: “personal identity,” which means self-identity, and \textit{jikaku}, the result of personal identity being accompanied by an act of consciousness. This self-identity is none other than the constant, unchanging self. \textit{Jiko} or self seems to ground the act of consciousness.

In his “A Proposal for an Ethics” Nishida indicates “self-consciousness” as a translation for \textit{jikaku}.

[…] comme l’acte unificateur de l’intention est la forme fondamentale de la conscience, un acte unificateur identique se répète dans tous les phénomènes mentaux. On appelle \textit{jikaku} (self-consciousness) ce dont il est pris conscience quand cet acte devient clair et évident. Ce que l’on nomme \textit{jiko} (self) désigne cette unification. Si quelqu’un qui a suffisamment développé \textit{ce jikaku} prend conscience du fait que son acte mental est son propre acte, on l’appelle une personne”.

5. NKZ XVI, 135. Unless otherwise indicated, the French translations are my own.
In this passage, the notion of *jikaku* is clearer than in the foregoing. The two aspects of *jikaku* or self-consciousness, namely, an act of unification (統一作用) and identity (同一), are linked. The repetitive act provides the guiding thread and the manifest fact of this repetition is called *jikaku*. Nishida then gives a very brief definition of *自己* as a translation of the self: the unification of the repetitive act. *人格* or person is here defined as “one who has sufficiently developed this *jikaku*” and “is conscious (aware) that one’s mental acts are one’s own.” In this context, *人格* is involved in identity.

Nishida seems to be distinguishing between two levels in self-consciousness: *自己意識* and *jikaku*. It is interesting to note here that Nishi Amane, a pioneer in the translation of Western philosophical terms into Sino-Japanese terms during the Meiji era, in 1873, proposed 自覚意識 as a translation for self-consciousness.7

**EASTERN SOURCES**

As Sueki Fumihiko has pointed out, when we consider the historical context in which modern Japanese philosophy established itself during the Meiji era in relation to Buddhism, Zen was particularly favored by intellectuals like Natsume Sōseki and Hiratsuka Raichō. For “Buddhism is… a thorough investigation of the individual.”8 This is also a very important question in philosophy and naturally attracted philosophers at the time like Nishida who were pursuing conceptualizations of

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6. NKZ XVI, 169.
7. He uses the term “セルフコンシウスニス” in his 『生性発蘊』 in 『西周全集』I: 125. This translation appears in a passage of 『哲学編 性理学 (psychology)』 where he also treats the notion of “reflection” (省察).
the modern Japanese individual resulting from the aggressive policy of Westernization.

There are admittedly traces of Mahāyāna Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian ideas in Nishida’s background, as his writings and his diaries amply attest. Furthermore, he passed his boyhood years in the company of his mother who was a follower of the True Pure Land sect of Shinran. Nishida read the important Chinese classics and was proficient at writing kanbun as were other cultivated persons of his generation.

This historical and cultural background is reflected in his philosophy as well. As has often been pointed out, the influence of Buddhism, and especially Zen, is suggested frequently in his writings, beginning with his choice of terminology such as jikaku. The difficulty for non-specialists is that his citations of original Buddhist texts are few, and even when he is quoting he often does so without clearly indicating the fact, let alone provide the reader with reference, author, source, and other bibliographical data. For example, in a passage concerning “absolutely contradictory self-identity” (zettai mujunteki jikōdōitsu 绝对矛盾的自己同一), famous verses of Dōgen appear and are followed by several expressions in Sino-Japanese, all without precise reference.9

Consequently, rather than track down Nishida’s Buddhist citations or allusions to the original texts of Dōgen, I would opt to concentrate on another aspect, the linguistic resonances of the Buddhist term jikaku. My remarks will not draw on philological verification and analyses of Zen literature as it appears in Nishida, but will rather attempt a reflection, through linguistic analysis, on the relationship between Zen logic

9.「図式的説明」[Diagrammatic explanations], NKZ IX, In this connection, I would cite a remark by James W. Heisig: “What is peculiar to Nishida, though, and far from convention, was the fact that he could lift whole phrases and sentences from his reading in order to wrestle with the ideas, often without indicating whom he was citing or from where. During his struggles with neo-Kantian thought this is marked: there are times when one simply does not know if it is Nishida or someone Nishida is citing whose view is being discussed. For the philosophical reader this must be kept in mind when reading Nishida’s own work, even in translation, since most translators either have not bothered to track down Nishida’s sources or were not aware of what was going on.” Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 36.
and Nishida’s logic. In so doing, I am presupposing as a background his spiritual experience of sitting in Zen meditation (zazen).

Nishida applied himself assiduously to the practice of Zen, above all during the ten years from 1896 to 1906 when he taught at what was then the Fourth High School, a period dominated by intense personal study. He continued his practice of Zen until he was named to a post at Kyoto Imperial University and published his first book, *A Study of the Good* in 1911. Simply put, this practice of “sitting” was part of a general spiritual formation that included his engagement with philosophy. It was not intended as a profession of Buddhist faith. Through this experience Nishida came face to face with what he saw as a profound contradiction between Zen and philosophy, the one advocating thinking, the other not-thinking. According to Ueda Shizuteru, they symbolize respectively East and West, Zen as a concrete form of Buddhism being one of the pillars of Eastern culture, philosophy being the intellectual foundation of two and a half millennia of European history. What Nishida set out to do was take the bold step of entering into the confrontation and synthesizing these two irreconcilable traditions.10

As for the choice of the term *jikaku* to translate “self-consciousness” in the two texts treated above, given the dates of their composition (1904–1906), which falls in the midst of his intense spiritual practice, we may suppose that Nishida’s practice of sitting in Zen meditation had something to do with its introduction as a philosophical idea.11


11. Nishida acknowledges his ambitions to reconcile philosophy and Zen in a 1943 letter to Nishitani Keiji. Letter 1738 in *NKZ* xix, 224–5. Translated freely, it reads: “Nothing would make me happier than if you would kindly have a look at the essay in [思想] [Thought] and understand it. Really the whole reason for writing it is that you younger scholars will understand what is written there and carry it further. If I am told that Zen is in the background, I could not be more in agreement. I am not myself and never was knowledgeable in Zen, but as people have come completely to misunderstand Zen, I have come to think that the life of Zen has to do with truly grasping reality. Such a thing may be impossible, but I want somehow to connect it with philosophy. This has been my desire since my thirties. Since I am talking to you I can say it, but when ordinary students who are ignorant of such things talk to me of Zen I resist it with every fiber of my being. They know nothing of Zen and nothing
Jikaku and jiko in Buddhism

For the term jikaku, Nakamura Hajime’s the 仏教大事典 Buddhist Lexicon gives two definitions: “to awaken oneself” (自分できとること) and “to open one’s eyes to the truth, to awake” (真理に目覚め、さとること).

These concise definitions are expanded by Suzuki Daisetsu. The doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhist, whatever the sect, is founded on spiritual enlightenment. The notion of覚 (kaku) is inseparable at the roots from the notion of “Buddha” 仏陀, which means “to be awakened,” as is clear from the Sanskrit etymology of budh, to awaken, to awaken oneself. In quest of the state of the Buddha “who awakened himself and is detached from a life of relativity and constraint,” individuals endeavor to attain to perfect enlightenment themselves. The Buddha exercises this preoccupation with liberation through the practice of meditation. In order to attain to enlightenment—that is, to reality and truth—the Buddhist monk seeks to overcome attachment to thinking and speaking in terms of a dualistic logic and to transcend the prejudices of conventional thinking. When the Buddha awakened, “his whole existence came into question.” The distinction between the question and the questioner, between self 自己 and non-self 非自己, disappear, leaving only an “unknowing without discrimination.” Taking leave of thinking in dichotomies, the awakened comes to a wisdom that restores meaning to the individual and to all other relative forms of knowledge.

The term自己 is also a key-term in Buddhism. The Buddhist Lexicon defines it as “one’s self, itself (自分自身のこと), the original self (本来の自己), the self possessed of Buddha nature from birth (生まれながらに仏性をもっている自己).” Jiko is itself a translation of the Sanskrit ātman, a term implying a substantial self. As Suzuki notes in this connection, prior to attaining wisdom and overcoming the opposition between self and non-self, knowledge is blinded by the illusion of this substantial self or ātman.

of philosophy. As if X and Y were the same thing. Since I think they misread my philosophy and misunderstand Zen, I want by and by to give further thought to the standpoint of philosophy and the standpoint of religion. In order to clarify section III of my essay, I am slowly composing something about the relationship between “the structure of the historical world” and jikaku….
Although no mention is made in the Buddhist Lexicon of the linguistic character of jiko, we may point out two uses of the term: the pronominal and the conceptual.

**THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF JIKAKU**

*Problems of French translation*

Let us consider some problems of rendering the terms jikaku and jiko into French. Nishida scholars have proposed any number of translations for jikaku, among them conscience de soi, réalisation de soi, prise de conscience, and éveil à soi. The variations reflect the interpretative problem caused by the polysemy of the term itself. But even before that, there are problems of a more linguistic nature that need consideration.

I begin by citing a sentence near the beginning of *Zen no kenkyū* in a published French translation:

1. Expérimenter, c’est un connaître où les faits réels se présentent tels qu’ils sont, un connaître que nous pouvons acquérir en nous soumettant à la réalité des faits, en abandonnant tous nos artifices (intellectuels).¹²

Here is my suggested translation:

Faire une expérience signifie “connaître le réel tel quel”. C’est connaître conformément au réel, en écartant complètement tout le travail du soi.

経験するといふのは事実其侭に知るの意である。全く自己の細工を棄てゝ、事実に従うて知るのである。¹³

Note that the translator turns the term jiko into the possessive adjective nos (our). Also, in the original text jiko is accompanied by a particle (の) used to designates possession. The translator interprets the expression as belonging to the first person plural. The absence of the term, soi

¹³. NKZ I: 9
or moi, which would indicate the presence of the term jiko in the second
sense of the original, seems to pose a problem. We need a French equiv-
alent of jiko in the translation because Nishida mentions the knowledge
of “the fact” (事実) as such (其侭) is in order to distinguish it as a par-
ticular kind of knowing. The term jiko then appears to mark that “fact.”
Nos artifice (our work) 細工 and artifices du soi (the work of the self) are
not the same.

A second example consists of two translations of an extract from
Nishida’s essay “I and You” (私と汝), first published in 1932.

2. 1. Que je vois l’absolument autre en moi signifie inversement que
je me vois en voyant cet absolument autre et c’est par là que ma
subjectivité parvient à se constituer.\textsuperscript{14}

2. 2. Que je voie l’autre absolu dans mon moi signifie que je me voie
moi-même en voyant l’autre absolu, c’est ainsi que s’établit la
conscience de soi individuelle.\textsuperscript{15}

And my translation of the same passage:

Voir dans le soi l’absolument autre signifie a contrario que je me vois
moi-même en voyant l’absolument autre. En ce sens se réalise notre
jikaku individuel.

This passage is concerned with jikaku insofar as it is grounded in the
interpersonal relation between I and You. Neither subjectivité nor con-
science de soi seem to me suitable translations of jikaku. At the time
Nishida was writing this essay, jikaku was certainly apart of his techni-
cal vocabulary, making it impossible to render it simply conscience de soi

\textsuperscript{14} L’Entre, [French translation of KIMURA Bin 木村 敏『あいだ』 by Claire Vin-
cent (Grenoble, Editions Jérôme Millon, 2000), 131.

\textsuperscript{15} Écrits de psychopathologie phénoménologique [selected writings of KIMURA Bin],

\textsuperscript{16} NKZ VI: 406–7.
(self-consciousness). The dynamism of human relations he is arguing for is based on communication between I and You, each of whom function as jikaku.

As for the term jiko, both translators propose to translate it as moi because this term renders what is grammatically a simple personal pronoun. But elsewhere in their translation, they use the term soi to render jiko. But elsewhere in their translation, they use the same term moi to render what is grammatically a simple personal pronoun. In the two translations, the first person of the subject “I” introduces the emphatic form of the first personal singular pronoun, moi-même, and the reflexive pronoun me. But the moi of dans mon moi in 2.2. is not a pronoun but a noun. Is it not impossible to adopt soi in place of moi? There seems to be no grammatical continuity between jiko and watashi (I) in words designating the person. The expression 私の自己 is possible in Japanese, while mon soi seems to offend common usage in French. Hence both translators propose moi.

To understand just how Nishida conceived of jikaku, it is necessary to analyze a variety of texts. For example, consider the following passage from Intuition and Reflection in Jikaku 『自覚にけ於る直観と反省』 (1917). In his preface to the work Nishida speaks of his project concerning jikaku and its conceptual system, indicating his intention to think of reality (実在) in terms of jikaku. He then has this to say of the word:

The jikaku that I propose is not like what the psychologists call jikaku, but it is like the jikaku of the “transcendental self” or Tathandlung of Fichte. I think it was the appendix of Royce’s The World and the Individual, vol. 1 that suggested to me this idea.17

As the above passage indicates, Nishida’s jikaku system was inspired by Kant, Fichte, and Josiah Royce (1855–1916).18 He saw the “self-representational system” of Royce as complementing the gradual unfolding of the self-reflective act of consciousness. Royce’s idea that the self reproduces itself (自己が自己を写す) implies an infinite process of unifying.

17. NKZ II: 3.
Nishida was interested in the idea of an “infinite series” (無限の系列), for which Royce gives as an example of the attempt to make a perfect copy of the map of England from within England. Drawing such a map cannot leave out the self’s reproduction of itself insofar as the self who is copying the map needs also to describe its own action as well as itself. Thus the action of reproducing oneself carries on forever and can never be completed. Nishida explains in the following passage on jikaku.

Le soi se réfléchit, c’est-à-dire se recopie, ce n’est pas qu’il se recopie en s’éloignant de lui-même (ou de soi-même) comme on recopie la dite expérience sous forme de concept, mais c’est se recopier à l’intérieur de soi. La réflexion est un fait intérieur au soi. Ainsi, le soi s’ajoute quelque chose. La réflexion est à la fois connaissance de soi et acte d’auto-développement. La véritable identité de soi ne consiste pas en identité statique, mais en développement dynamique. Je pense que notre idée inébranlable d’histoire individuelle se fonde là-dessus.

The essence of the idea lies in the expression 自己が自己を反省する, the self reflecting on itself. This is a formula that will change forms as Nishida progresses in his conceptualization of jikaku, as, for example, in the phrases 自己が自己に於て自己を見る (the self sees itself in itself) and 自己の中に自己を見る (seeing the self within the self). Note how the term jiko is repeated.

Nishida’s purpose is to step over the question of self-objectification to remove the opposition between two aspects of the self, namely, the thinking self (考える自己) and the thought self (考えられる自己). He turned to Kant’s notion of “pure apperception” but found that its intellectualism left him unsatisfied, yielding no more than an “intel-

19. NKZ II: 16.
20. NKZV: 387, 43.
lectual *jikaku*” (知的自覚), as he called it. In search of reality, a search that began with his pursuit of the concept of pure experience, Nishida tried to extend the meaning of knowledge to include experience that is immediately given prior to the cognitive split of subject and object. To make this experience intelligible, he tried to think of an object that is *not* opposed to a knowing subject. This is what he had in mind in the opening sentence of the passage just cited: “The self reflects on itself, that is to say reproduces it... It is a reproduction of the self within itself.”

His claim that “the reflection is a fact within the self” means that self-reflection is a fact that is not objectifiable. In *jikaku*, self-reflection adds something to the self, namely, knowledge, while the act of self-reflection is objectified and repeated again and again within the self. This is “the act of the self-unfolding.” At the same time, he argues that “true self-identity is a dynamic, not a static, identity.” By including self-development Nishida means to differentiate *jikaku* from the psychological notion of self-consciousness. This infinite self-reflection guarantees true self-identity both in the act of self-reflection and in the individual history that is constructed through the continuity of acting.

This brings us to the linguistic question. The construction 自己が自己を反省する (the self reflects itself) adopts *jiko* both as grammatical subject (自己が) and as grammatical object (自己を). The correspondence of the subject with the object rests on the unity of the reflecting *jiko* and the reflected *jiko*. The repetition of the term *jiko* represents the self-reflectiveness of the *jikaku*. It almost sounds as if Nishida were translating into Japanese the French phrase *le soi se réfléchit*. But there is a referential problem here: the French *se* of the verb *se réfléchir* is a pronoun. What of the *jiko* of *jiko ga* and *jiko o*? As I have read the passage, the first is a noun while the second remains ambiguous as to grammatical classification. It seems to be both a noun and a reflexive pronoun. When the term *jiko* is a noun, it designates a concept. Oddly, standard Japanese dictionaries such as the *Kokugo daijiten* (Shōgakkan) and Iwanami’s *Kōjien*, as well as Sino-Japanese dictionaries, only list a number of (*onore おのれ、ore われ、jibun 自分、jishin 自身*) without providing further information on grammatical classification and usage. Clearly there is further room for exploration of the linguistic nature of the term *jiko*.

In Nishida’s texts the uses of *jiko* are not what we could call ordinary
Japanese. He created them as part of a distinctive philosophical idiom. The expression *jiko o* is both meant to be conceptual and to serve as a reflexive pronoun. As a concept, *jiko o* is what is being objectified. As a reflexive pronoun, the correlation of *jiko ga* and *jiko o* introduces a unification of subject and object. As we have noted, in the endless act of *jikaku*, the stages of the objectification are included, and for this reason, we conclude that the Japanese term *jiko* expresses precisely what Nishida had in mind by the notion of *jikaku*.

**Conclusion**

In the foregoing we have argued on two fronts. The first has to do with the relation between Nishida's *jikaku* and Buddhist enlightenment. We have seen that they are structurally comparable in that each deals with a process aimed at the obliteration of the distinction between subject and object, or self and non-self. The substantial self is included in Nishida's system of *jikaku*, not simply left out. Self-reflection is an evolving process, proceeding step by step from the substantial self to the non-self.

Secondly we raised the linguistic question of the status of *jiko* and found it to be a grammatically ambiguous term. It is not simply a philosophical ambiguity, but one reflected in everyday Japanese usage. The synonym, *jibun* 自分 differs here, since its grammatical status as a reflexive pronoun is fixed. The ambiguity of the term *jiko* is complicated by its function as a translation of the Sanskrit *ātman*, on the one hand, and of the English *self* on the other hand. I would argue that Nishida's use of *jiko* in the creation of various expressions represents a genuine contribution to the modernization of the Japanese language, in addition to contributing to the connection between Buddhism and Western philosophy. In so doing he shared in the tradition that views philosophy as a unity of East and West.