The Reversibility vs. Irreversibility Debate

The Legacy of Takizawa Katsumi

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Takizawa Katsumi (1909–1984) is one of the most important, if currently uncelebrated, figures in modern Japanese thought. In the more than sixty-two recovered letters (see NKZ 18–19; Sakaguchi 2003) he wrote to Takizawa, Nishida Kitarō strongly praised him with phrases such as “no one has grasped my thought to the degree that you have” (NKZ 18: 473) and “Even though for such a long time people have not understood my thinking, now you have understood me!” (NKZ 18: 577–8). Further, in discussion with Takizawa, Nishida also shared what were perhaps his clearest statements regarding Heidegger and God (TKC 2: 521–2, etc.). D. T. Suzuki himself recalled Takizawa’s favored place among Nishida’s students (Akizuki and Yagi 1990, 90–91), and Suzuki’s own disciple, Akizuki Ryōmin, became a devoted student of Takizawa, even characterizing Takizawa as “one who has religiously embarked on true experience” so that Akizuki “could not help but reverently clasp his hands together in the Buddhist manner” (Akizuki 1996, 181).

Although Takizawa’s depth of understanding was thus recognized in Buddhist circles, he made perhaps an even bigger impact among major Christian thinkers. Karl Barth, whom Pope Pius XII called “the most important theologian since Thomas Aquinas” (Torrance 1987, 68), openly expressed his high regard for Takizawa’s grasp of the Christian
tradition. Takizawa, who himself became one of Barth’s “favorite students” (Furuya 1997, 94), took up an ongoing correspondence with the theologian, from which 73 letters have been preserved (Hoekema 2004, 107). Takizawa is unique among Japanese philosophers for his acknowledged depth of mastery of Nishida’s philosophy and Barth’s theology, as well as of Buddhism and Christianity. He even wrote best-selling works on the novels of Natsume Sōseki. However, despite Takizawa’s contributions as a skilled commentator, his greatest contributions were in the area of critical and original philosophical thought. Further, even though he wrote more than thirty books, he was never content to remain a mere armchair academician, but eventually committed himself to radical activism. For instance, in 1969, shortly after conducting a series of public protests, he gained national attention by discussing social reform in the pages of the Asahi Journal with the Marxist student group, Zenkyōtō 全共闘, shortly after it had debated the rightist author Mishima Yukio on similar topics.

Takizawa’s major philosophical contribution was the location of a moment of unidirectional dependence or “irreversibility” (fukagyaku 不可逆) in the relationship between the absolute and contingent phenomena, that is to say, between Nishida’s ultimate place or topos (basho) and the finite individuals encompassed within it, between God and creatures, between the Buddha and sentient beings, and between nirvāṇa and samsāra. Takizawa thus recognized a third relational aspect in the dyadic logical connective established in modern Japanese thought by Nishida’s “contradictory self-identity” (mujunteki jikodōitsu 矛盾的自己同一) and D. T. Suzuki’s logic of “is/is-not” (soku hi 即非), which both manifest only the two aspects of unity and differentiation.

From 1936 on, Takizawa charged that Nishida’s philosophy fatally lacks a relational “irreversibility” that would clearly distinguish right from wrong through the recognition of a guiding moral and soteriological standard, a standard to which all individuals and nations are accountable and which shatters bourgeois escapism by calling all beings to awakened moral action. Evidently, Nishida’s response to Takizawa’s critique was the introduction of “inverse response” (gyakutaiō 逆対応) in 1945, a relational notion that Nishida himself characterizes in terms of the Barthian Word of God (NKZ II: 397, 427–8, 442, 444) and by which the absolute
is evidently recognized as that infinite and infallible ground on which finite and fallible individuals are irreversibly dependent for existence, moral direction, and soteriological transformation.

From 1950 on, Takizawa characterized the “irreversibility” whereby the absolute is specifically related to human beings, in terms of what he called the primary and secondary “contacts” (sesshoku). Whereas in the “primary contact,” human beings are universally connected to the absolute whether they know it or not, in the “secondary contact,” human beings acknowledge their irreversible dependence on the absolute already provided by the “primary contact,” and are soteriologically transformed, necessarily engaging the world in awakened, moral action. Takizawa explained the Christian “Christ” and Buddhist “original enlightenment” in terms of the “primary contact,” and the Christian incarnation or salvific faith and Buddhist “incipient enlightenment” in terms of the “secondary contact.”

Takizawa’s thesis of the irreversible dependence of contingent phenomena on the absolute generated a lively debate among Christian and Buddhist thinkers, philosophers of religion, and associates of the Kyoto School. The debate pitted Takizawa’s “absolute irreversibility” thesis against an “absolute reversibility” proposed by Abe Masao. The germ of the irreversibility vs. reversibility debate can be seen as early as 1935 and 1936, when Takizawa brought Karl Barth’s thesis of divine-human unreversibility (Unumkehrbarkeit) into critical contact with Nishida Kitarō’s thesis of the absolute contradictory self-identity of all things within the absolute basho or all-embracing place.

The fully developed debate was prompted by Takizawa’s 1950 work, Buddhism and Christianity, which criticized Hisamatsu Shin’ichi’s Zen “atheism” for lacking sufficient discernment of the irreversible dependence of the enlightened ego on the true self for soteriological guidance. Further impetus was added to the debate by Takizawa’s ongoing discussion with the Protestant theologian Yagi Seiichi—a discussion prompted by Takizawa’s 1965 criticism of Yagi’s own insufficient discernment of the transcedent absolute on which salvific experience is based.

Although Yagi responded quickly to Takizawa in 1967 and produced book-length works addressing Takizawa’s criticism, it was not until the late 1970s that Hisamatsu’s disciple, Abe, responded to Takizawa’s 1950
criticism of Hisamatsu Zen. Abe’s response was foreshadowed by Hisamatsu’s world tour of 1957 to 1958. Further, Hisamatsu’s markedly bipolar account of the true self in 1958, and the establishment of the FAS Zen Society in 1960 by Hisamatsu and Abe, appear to constitute a significant response to Takizawa’s 1950 criticism. In particular, the FAS aim to create a “suprahistorical history” that is not to be equated with this world “just as it is” (sono mama), exhibits significant alterations to the traditional Buddhist standpoint, thereby addressing the concerns of Takizawa’s critique of Hisamatsu.

The high point of the reversibility vs. irreversibility debate occurred in 1981 when Abe called on the Protestant Yagi, the Catholic Honda Masaaki, and the Rinzai Zen master Akizuki Ryōmin, to dialogue on the issue. The results appeared in 1981 as Buddhism and Christianity: Seeking a Dialogue with Takizawa. In opposition to Abe’s “absolute reversibility” thesis, Akizuki strongly affirmed Takizawa’s “absolute irreversibility,” and Yagi and Honda pursued a middle-way position affirming both reversibility and irreversibility. Takizawa’s colleague, the Buddhistic phenomenologist Suzuki Tōru, affirmed a version of Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis in other publications.

While the leading Kyoto School figure of the time, Nishitani Keiji, touched peripherally on the debate by questioning the validity of Akizuki’s “trans-individual” thesis, Ueda Shizuteru observed the debate with intense interest, though “suspending judgment” on the question. The reverberations of the reversibility vs. irreversibility debate also extended to process thought, as Takizawa’s colleague Nobuhara Tokiyuki developed a synthesis of Whiteheadian and Takizawa philosophy in the 1980s—a project continued by Tanaka Yutaka in the 1990s. In these efforts, Nobuhara and Tanaka followed Takizawa by demonstrating an especially keen interest in the asymmetrical, irreversible relationality between contingent phenomena and ultimate reality. Tanaka explicitly linked Takizawa’s ontological irreversibility to Whiteheadian temporal irreversibility. In this way he broadened the reverberations of Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis by relating it to the work of Charles Hartshorne and Steve Odin, who themselves had criticized what they perceived to be an East Asian Buddhist and Kyoto School insensitivity to temporal irreversibility (the irreversibility whereby the future is irreversibly dependent on
the past for attaining determinacy, and all effects are irreversibly dependent on their respective causes for being initiated). Abe himself, even in dialogues with process thinkers in the 1990s, continued to maintain his thesis of the “absolute reversibility” of all things, stressing universal mutual dependence (Abe 2003, 106–11). Although Abe’s reversibility thesis can be clearly seen in his English writings, he never, to my knowledge, cites Takizawa directly or examines the arguments for irreversibility that had prompted his own thesis of universal, reversible, mutual interdependence.

Hisamatsu and Abe Masao: Fas Zen

Early on in their careers, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi and his disciple Abe Masao were concerned that Buddhism address the real problems of life. Spurred on by the urgent crisis facing wartime Japan, the two thinkers joined students of the Kyoto University Young Men’s Buddhist Association on 8 April 1944 to establish the Gakudō Dōjō, or Society for the Study of the Way, whose purpose was to consider how Buddhism might effectively engage the contemporary world. The Gakudō Dōjō concluded that neither a return to the “original Buddhism” (konpon bukkyō 根本仏教) of Siddhartha Gautama nor a generalization of widely held doctrines constituting a “common Buddhism” (tsūbukkyō 通仏教) could be tailored to the needs of the contemporary world. Rather, Hisamatsu and Abe agreed that the only movement capable of genuinely addressing human problems is a “fundamental Buddhism” (kongen bukkyō 根源仏教), based not on historical manifestations but on a formless, foundational reality grounding awakened historical activity.

From as early as 1948, Hisamatsu acknowledged: “during the war... Zen had turned opportunistic and, rather than become a master (shū 主) of circumstances, tended to have its mind snatched by circumstances, thus rendering it easy to manipulate” (cf. Heisig and Maraldo 1995, 21). To guard against this pitfall, the Gakudō Dōjō embraced the “oneness of learning and practice” according to which “practice without learning is blind and learning without practice is powerless.” Its aim was “critical study and struggling practice.” In July 1951, one year after
Takizawa had responded to Hisamatsu’s charge that Zen Buddhism was out of touch with the problems of real life, the Gakudō Dōjō publicly announced its “Vow of Humanity,” a call to work toward social reform based on religious awakening. The conviction, shared by Hisamatsu and Abe, that Buddhism must eschew escapism, engage society, and attain a global viewpoint, was a major impetus that led to Hisamatsu’s worldwide tour in 1958 and 1959, as well as to the transformation of the Gakudō Dōjō into the Fas Zen Society (fas kyōkai fas協会) in 1960. Most likely, Takizawa’s 1950 criticism of Hisamatsu Zen was also a major impetus for this development.

The acronym FAS represents what Hisamatsu and Abe take to be the three basic dimensions of human existence—self, world, and history—which correspond to goals of the FAS Society. “F” stands for the “formless self” (musō no jiko 無相の自己, katachi naki jiko 形なき自己) or the “depth” of human existence. The corresponding goal is to “study the self” (kōji kyūmei 向自分究明) as the source of all world changing wisdom and compassion. “A” stands for the “standpoint of all humanity” (zenjinrui no tachiba 全人類の立場), the “breadth” of human existence. Its corresponding goal is to “study the world” (sekai kyūmei 世界究明), excluding no one. In focusing on humanity, FAS Zen represents a new viewpoint within the history of Buddhism, which in East Asia, and especially in Dōgen’s thought, has focused on all beings (shitsuu 悉有), including “mountains, rivers, grass, trees” and so on. Holding that “from the standpoint of all beings, or even from the standpoint of all sentient beings, the issue of history does not appear,” the FAS Society “concluded that within this problem of human beings is contained the problem” of all beings without exception. Hisamatsu called this view the “new humanism.” Finally, “S” stands for “creating a suprahistorical history,” the “length” of human existence. Its corresponding goal is to “study history.” In proposing a viewpoint that “transcends” history—that is to say, transcending the way things are at present in order to open up insight into the way things should be—FAS Zen goes against the grain of traditional Zen, which tends to affirm reality “just as it is.”

The three dimensions represented by the FAS acronym correspond remarkably to the three relational dimensions constituting Takizawa’s own account of the “inseparable-nonequatable-irreversible” divine-
human archrelation: The “F” of the “formless self” corresponds to the “inseparability” by which the finite self is immediately connected to the absolute and indeed to all things. This relational dimension grounds religious existence. The “A” of “all humanity” corresponds to “non-equatability” among finite selves, whereby the plurality of humanity and the individuality of each human self is realized. This relational dimension grounds sociopolitical existence. And the “S” of “creating suprahistorical history” corresponds to the divine-human “irreversibility” whereby fallible human history is distinct from and irreversibly accountable to the guidance of the infallible “suprahistorical” standpoint of the absolute. This relational dimension grounds the interrelation of religious and sociopolitical existence whereby the former irreversibly directs the latter.

Indeed, the FAS proposal of a suprahistorical standpoint directly addresses Takizawa’s 1950 criticism of Zen Buddhism for failing to distinguish the fallible movements of history from a critical vantage point transcending history. Zen in general, and Hisamatsu in particular, tend to be so preoccupied with the awakening experience and the active subject of nothingness, he argued, that the finite is reduced to the infinite, and any impetus for social reform is correspondingly lost. The establishment of the FAS Society by Hisamatsu and Abe was a resounding reply to the criticism by Takizawa. In 1970, one year after Takizawa himself had vigorously protested various sociopolitical ills, the FAS Society issued its own “Postmodernist Manifesto” aimed at “the construction of a new world in the postmodern age.”

Hisamatsu: The Bipolar Structure of Awakening

Hisamatsu Shin’ichi himself never directly addressed Takizawa’s charge that Hisamatsu Zen reduces the finite to the infinite. Hisamatsu confided in private to his disciples that “if he had had a discussion with Takizawa, he would have made it a dispute rather than a dialogue.” Hisamatsu also explained in private to his colleague Yagi Seiichi that “Takizawa did not know the real unity of the transcendent within the human self” (Yagi 1987, 5). But developments in Hisamatsu’s life and thought following Takizawa’s 1950 critique are characterized by significant alterations that
The Reversibility vs. Irreversibility Debate

in effect were a response to Takizawa. Related to Takizawa’s impact on Hisamatsu was the fact that, during Hisamatsu’s 1957 to 1958 world tour, Takizawa seems to have arranged for him to meet with Karl Barth, having written Barth at least twice to explain Hisamatsu’s position (Hoeke 2004, 110–11). Takizawa’s critique of Hisamatsu was, of course, largely inspired by Barth. In 1958, Hisamatsu described the structure of awakening as follows:

The fundamental subject that is absolute nothingness can never be static, but is constantly active…. There is the self that has activity and the self that appears through activity. By “appearing through activity” I mean that that which has no form comes—through activity—to have form, and that only this can be said to be true form. In awakening, therefore, two aspects may be discerned: the process or direction of attaining freedom from what has form and of awakening to the self-without-form; and the process in which, through its activity, the self-without-form comes to assume form. (Hisamatsu 1982, 51; translation slightly altered)

Hisamatsu’s bipolar account of awakening constituted by the formless self that expresses itself in “true form” is remarkably parallel to Takizawa’s appeal to the divine-human relationship constituted by the unconditional “primary contact” that expresses itself concretely in the manifold forms of the conditional “secondary contact.”

Hisamatsu’s eventual characterization of nothingness or Nichts in personalistic terms via the German masculine article der, instead of the more common neutral das—a personalization reinforced by referring to the activity of nothingness as the “way of the absolute subject” in 1970—also corresponded to Takizawa’s practice of referring to the absolute in personalistic terms, using, for example, the Japanese personal pronoun kare, “he.”

Regarding these distinct features of Hisamatsu’s absolute the general FAS Zen practice of referring to the “Formless Self” using capital letters in English, the Rinzai Zen Buddhist Nishimura Eshin concluded that Hisamatsu and his followers had strayed from the essence of Buddhism, claiming in 1984 that “from the standpoint of Zen, all these things are mistaken” (Yagi 1986, 107–8). Hisamatsu’s move toward a more person-
Alistic, active, and universal absolute distinct from unenlightened egos who are still attached to finite, fallible forms, and Hisamatsu's apparent, corresponding alterations to his original position of an “atheism” (1949) grounded in an apparently localized “Eastern nothingness” (1939) more evocative of traditional Zen thought, collectively suggest the impact of Takizawa’s 1950 critique of Hisamatsu Zen.

Abe: “Absolute Reversibility”

Although Hisamatsu never responded directly to Takizawa’s 1950 criticism, his disciple, Abe Masao, did. Hisamatsu was widely recognized in Japan and Germany as an authority on Zen, while Abe earned a comparable reputation among anglophone scholars, such that it has been said that “since the death of D. T. Suzuki in 1966 he served as the main representative of Zen Buddhism in Europe and North America” (Cobb and Ives 1990, xiii). Indeed, Abe was a guest professor at several American institutions, including Haverford College, Columbia University, University of Chicago, Princeton University, Claremont Graduate School, Purdue University, and Gustavus Adolphus College. Regarding the key role that Abe played in introducing the West to modern Japanese philosophy, James Heisig notes:

> During the 1980s the Kyoto school can be said to have enjoyed its greatest blossoming in the west…. It is no accident that this period coincides with the concentrated decade of teaching that Abe Masao, who studied with Tanabe and who is one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the thought of Nishida and Nishitani, spent in the United States (Heisig 2001, 22).

In response to Takizawa’s claim that the “archrelationship” between ultimate and contingent reality—in Buddhist terms, between nirvāṇa and samsāra—must be inseparable, non-equatable, and irreversible, Abe affirmed with Takizawa that this relationship must be “not-two, not-divided” (funi furi 不二不離) as well as “not-one, not-equal” (fuichi fusoku 不一不即). Despite the oneness and difference between the ultimate and the phenomenal, Abe countered Takizawa’s thesis of divine-creaturely irreversibility by insisting that this ultimate relationship is fully
and absolutely “reversible,” each is dependent on the other. Abe maintained this to the end, consistently referring to Takizawa’s view of irreversibility as a sign of ignorance (無明 mumyō).

Noting that Takizawa’s view was inspired primarily by Christian theology, Abe argued as early as 1977 that even the core of Christian theology affirms divine-human reversibility in recognizing the ability of finite human beings to move the infinite will of God through prayer or through disobedience. Abe extended the reversibility of all relationships even to time and causality, claiming that, according to the Christian doctrine of atonement, a future cause can influence a past effect, such that an act of divine forgiveness can negate a prior sinful act. According to Abe, only insofar as divine self-negation is accomplished through the “kenotic” concept of God that Paul alludes to in writing that “Christ emptied himself (Phil 2: 7), can “religions of grace” like Christianity “overcome” a subordinationist, hierarchical divine-human irreversibility by means of an all-encompassing, all-affirming reversibility, and thereby attain the highest religious realization exhibited in “religions of enlightenment” like Buddhism (Abe 2003, 111–12).

In numerous English publications during the 1990s, Abe argued for the reversibility of all relations, including temporal directionality. But despite Abe’s vigorous engagement with Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis from 1977 to 1981 in Japan, to my knowledge, Abe never, in any of his numerous English publications, mentions Takizawa’s name or seriously considers arguments in favor of irreversibility.

While criticizing Takizawa and Christianity from the standpoint of FAS Zen Buddhism, as early as 1963 Abe appealed to Christians and Buddhists to cooperate in addressing their common adversaries: scientism, Marxism, and nihilism. In 1964, a year after Abe had argued for Buddhism as a solution to problems of the modern world, the process philosopher Charles Hartshorne penned a critique of Abe charging that he had failed to recognize the “one-sided dependence” of the abstract on the concrete, and of all actualities on the “absolute principle” of “creativity”—a dependence that is clearly not “symmetrical.” Hartshorne’s comments were included, along with other critiques of Abe, in the pages of the journal Japanese Religions (vol. 3, 1963). Abe responded to each of his critics except for Hartshorne, whose insistence on asymmetrical, irrevers-
ible dependence in the ultimate relationship was surprisingly reminiscent of Takizawa’s own irreversibility thesis.

Early in 1980, while Abe was a guest lecturer at the Claremont School of Theology, he borrowed several of Takizawa’s books from Nobuhara Tokiyuki, a former student of Takizawa’s and currently working under John B. Cobb, to better acquaint himself with Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis. In 1981 Abe collaborated with the Protestant Yagi Seiichi, the Catholic Honda Masaaki, and the Rinzai Zen master Akizuki Ryōmin, in a book entitled Buddhism and Christianity: Seeking a Dialogue with Takizawa, which gathered together the responses of all four thinkers to Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis and to one’s another. Abe did not back down from his position of “absolute reversibility,” although he did show greater sensitivity to the arguments raised against him by Yagi, Honda, and Akizuki. Before facing his critics head on, Abe admitted:

Zen Buddhists must realize that their reversible autonomy is never a mere point of destination; it is nothing other than the point of departure. If this is taken merely as a destination, reversible autonomy will immediately fall into anarchic self-indulgence, and, moreover, one will become a devil assuming the title of “absolute being” for himself. Reversible autonomy must be grasped as the point of departure for establishing all ethics, culture, and history…. At that point, they first comprehend the meaning of the divine normativeness in Christian theistic faith. Herein, the irreversibility between God and human beings is also first embraced by reversible autonomy. (Shore 1998, 8)

Thus despite Abe’s sensitivity to the critiques leveled against his position of “absolute reversibility,” he did not alter his original position.

As other members of the debate would note, Abe’s view seems to assume an underlying irreversibility between ultimate and phenomenal reality in which the latter is dependent on the former but not vice versa (Akizuki 1996, 295). Even at the height of his enthusiasm in arguing for the reversibility of all relations, Abe characterized “religions of awakening” such as Buddhism as figuratively realizing an “infinite sphere” encompassing within itself the “infinite circle” of the only partially awakened “religions of grace” such as Christianity, which are impeded by an
immature attachment to a subordinationist irreversibility (Abe 2003, 109, 113–4). What Abe apparently did not notice is that his own thesis affirms such a subordinationist irreversibility by holding that the infinite circle is irreversibly dependent on the infinite sphere. That is to say, Abe’s sphere can encompass the circle, but not vice versa. In numerous other contexts, the assumption of an ultimate \(ir\)-reversibility seems to underly his insistence on the ultimate reversibility of all relations.

**Akizuki and Nishitani on the Trans-Individual**

While Hisamatsu and the FAS Zen Society indirectly opposed Takizawa’s divine-human irreversibility thesis, and while Abe opposed the thesis directly, the Rinzai Zen master Akizuki Ryōmin, a disciple of D. T. Suzuki, who has been called “the most influential exponent of Zen in the modern world” (Williams 2004, 37), came out in strong support of Takizawa’s thesis. Akizuki continued to hold this view after Takizawa’s death through an ongoing dialogue with one of Takizawa’s critics, Yagi Seiichi. This dialogue ended up producing no less than six books between 1984 and 1990. Recognizing an irreversible dependence of contingent phenomena on a transcendent ground, Akizuki argued, goes against the grain of the common East Asian Buddhist account of a symmetrical and mutual dependence between form and emptiness. Nevertheless, he embraced the notion of an irreversible dependence of the former on the latter, “in spite of the danger that his Zen mastership thereby became dubious to some Zen Buddhists” (Yagi 1987, 8).

Akizuki was no stranger to controversy. His iconoclastic manner was characterized in a 1950 article in *Newsweek* as out to “break the formalism that constricts Zen and expose the false masters” and thereby “revive the real spirit of Zen.” To shake Zen tradition out of its lethargy, Akizuki even threatened to publish the secret answers to hundreds of the Zen kōan. He proclaimed a “New Mahāyana” and published a book on the subject that described his vision of reform for contemporary Buddhism (Heisig 1990, vii).

For Akizuki, Takizawa’s thesis of the irreversible dependence of contingent phenomena on a transcendent ground for moral direction and
soteriological transformation provided the perfect vehicle for critiquing the current state of Zen Buddhism. Noting that Zen practitioners too often consider their individual experience of awakening an ultimate standard by which to assess everything else, Akizuki considered the irreversibility thesis a deterrent to “wild fox Zen” (*yako zen* 野狐禅), the dangerous sophomoric state of those who, having learned a little, consider themselves to have learned everything. Thus Akizuki insisted that the superficial Zen account of “reciprocity” (*egosei* 不回互性) between the absolute and the contingent be rigorously assessed from the call to emerge irreversibly from emptiness to form, from *nirvāṇa* to *samsāra*, and from the Buddha to ignorant sentient being, in which each of the two relatives faces the other in strict “nonreciprocity” (*fuegosei* 不回互性) (Honda 1993, 47).

Akizuki saw in Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis an implicit, necessary “cross section” of the idea of unity in diversity expressed in Nishida’s formula “absolute contradictory self-identity” and in D. T. Suzuki’s logic of is/is-not (Akizuki 1996, 392). In this way he took up Takizawa’s cause by trying to adjust it to a Buddhistic context. Religion, he claimed, has to do with the relationship between the “trans-individual” (*chōko* 超個)—God or Buddha—and “individuals” (*ko* 個) who are irreversibly dependent on the trans-individual. The irreversible dependence of fallible individuals on an infallible trans-individual provides a critical standpoint from which to distinguish genuine claims to enlightenment from the bogus, as well as to provide a constant and thoroughgoing impetus to struggle for reform at the individual and social level. In this way, the irreversible relationship between the individual and the trans-individual plays a necessary and practical role in the actualization of Buddhist wisdom and compassion.

Akizuki had no difficulty with Buddhism’s acknowledging this irreversible relationship. Provided it not lead to a “re-joining,” or *religio*, of what was originally separate, as “religions of salvation” like Christianity hold, this relationship can be seen as the essence of “religions of awakening” whereby contingent selves are “awakened to the original self” (Akizuki 1994, 23). The freedom entailed in this awakening is not the freedom of dualistic Western ideas of liberation from external controls, but rather what Eastern spiritual traditions refer to as existence “on one’s
own” (mizukara ni yoru 自らに由る) or “autonomous existence” (jiyūjizai 自由自在) (AKIZUKI 1996, 305). Thus he further stressed the unity of this relationship as a person’s becoming “an individual of the trans-individual in one breath.” At the same time, he insisted, the irreversibility needs to be viewed as something “functional” that only has meaning “from the standpoint of thought,” but which on no account should be taken as “substantial” when viewed “from the standpoint of existence” (AKIZUKI 1994, 29–30; 1996, 392).

In contrast to Akizuki’s affirmation of the trans-individual and the similar FAS affirmation of the formless self as the ground of enlightenment, Nishitani Keiji proposed a more cosmological interpretation of the universal relativity and dependent arising (pratītya-samutpāda) of emptiness (śūnyatā): the nonsubstantiality of all individuals (YAGI 1994, 16). For Nishitani, enlightenment is not born of awakening to the presence of an active subject within oneself, but of an immediate intuition of the fact that all individual existences are what they are as a result of a radical interdependence.

While followers of Takizawa acknowledged the depth of Akizuki’s views, others were skeptical of including Takizawa’s thesis in a Buddhist worldview. Among these latter was Shibata Shū who questioned the soteriological efficacy of a trans-individual whose ontological status is as tenuous as Akizuki implies (SHIBATA 2001, 85–6). If Akizuki’s trans-individual, or even the FAS formless self, is not ontologically real, he asked, how can it guarantee an ontologically real enlightenment?

Suzuki Tōru: beings paradoxically connected to emptiness

Suzuki Tōru was a Buddhist critic of Nishida who, in addition to adopting the idea of a “life-world” from the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, largely adopted Takizawa’s idea of the irreversible dependence of contingent phenomena on a transcendent ground as a basis for moral direction and soteriological transformation. In his formulation, “beings paradoxically connected to emptiness” are in a relational bond that is “not-one, not-different, not-reversed, and not-substantial”
fuichi fui fugyaku fujitsu 不一・不異・不逆・不実). The addition of “not-substantial” to Takizawa’s description was intended to indicate that the absolute is not to be recognized as a “substantialized creator” capable of producing finite individual substances as “creations.” Suzuki saw contingent phenomena as connected to the absolute in a threefold dialectic of presence-opposition-relation (seihantai 正反対), wherein the two terms of a relationship are initially mediated by a non-dual presence embedded in a paradoxical opposition. Thus their union subsumes each in such a way that, as contingent phenomena, they are always and irreversibly dependent on the absolute. This absolute, in virtue of its nonsubstantial character, is best viewed as an “emptiness.” In this model of unidirectional dependence, the correct response of finite beings to the guidance of emptiness is truth, goodness, beauty, and love, and the incorrect response is falsehood, evil, ugliness, and hatred (SHIBATA 2001, 71–80).

Turning Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis against itself, Suzuki raised harsh criticisms against Takizawa’s wartime application of the idea to the irreversible dependence of the Japanese on the unifying and moral force of the emperor. Shibata Shū stepped in to defend Takizawa, noting that the use of the idea was an error in judgment due to the immature stage of the idea’s development. It was the same defense that Takizawa himself would suggest in later statements of regret for his wartime enthusiasm for Japanese nationalism (KOBAYASHI 2000, 97). Shibata attributed Suzuki’s criticism to a misunderstanding of irreversibility as a superficially paradoxical connection among contingent phenomena on the same ontological level, while Takizawa’s mature position centered on a radical paradox in which all contingent phenomena—including the Japanese emperor or any worldly leader, movement, or policy—are on a completely different ontological level from that of the infinite absolute (KOBAYASHI 2000, 91, 147–9).

Questions may be raised concerning the moral and soteriological efficacy of Suzuki’s own version of a thoroughly nonsubstantial emptiness as the ground on which finite beings are said to be irreversibly dependent. As was the case with Akizuki’s ontologically tenuous trans-individual on which an ontologically robust enlightenment purportedly depends, Suzuki’s nonsubstantial emptiness seems to require a more solid ontological
ground for the truth, goodness, beauty, and love that he sees entailed within the absolute.

**Yagi Seiichi and Honda Masaaki: both reversibility and irreversibility**

Closely observing the debate between the “absolute reversibility” of Abe Masao and the “absolute irreversibility” of Takizawa, the Protestant Yagi Seiichi and the Catholic Honda Masaaki, both strongly influenced by Buddhist thought, proposed that the divine-human relationship entails both reversibility and irreversibility. Yagi, who had been dialoguing with Takizawa since 1967 on the nature of the divine-human relationship, was deeply impressed by the newcomer Honda’s characterization of this relationship as a “reversibility and-yet irreversibility,” and praised it as “a superb idea” (Yagi 1994, 14). In the 1990s, the philosopher Yutaka Tanaka, himself a student of Takizawa’s thought, also discerned a moment of “reversibility” within the “irreversibility” of the relationship between God and creatures. For Tanaka, creatures related to God’s “primordial” nature in the manner of “irreversibility” are irreversibly dependent on God’s creative and guiding activity for their initial possibilities and their discernment of maximal value. Conversely, God, by virtue of the divine “consequent” nature, is irreversibly dependent on creaturely actions and attitudes in the manner of “inverse response.”

Further, for Yagi and Honda, the mutual, reversible dependence between God and contingent phenomena extends even to human knowledge of God. Unlike Takizawa, who was convinced that known objects—and this is especially true of the absolute or God—are independent of the knowing subject, both Yagi and Honda were convinced that modern science strongly suggests the necessary dependence of all knowledge on the knower. In response to the view that human cognition in some sense produces its objects, Takizawa responded:

> In the sphere of religion as in the sciences (though not in the same sense), there are objects entirely independent of human consciousness. That is why science is possible. (Takizawa 1983, 151–2)
As for the view of Yagi and Honda that God depends on human beings in a manner analogous to the way in which human beings depend on God, Takizawa countered that, even if human beings can alter contingent features of God, human finitude, which implies the irreversible human dependence on God for existence, and human fallibility, which implies the irreversible human dependence on God for moral direction and soteriological transformation, both guarantee that human beings and God are on completely different ontological “dimensions” (TAKIZAWA 1983, 177). In other words, God’s necessary character remains unaltered by human influence, while both the necessary and contingent features of human existence depend on God.

Yagi Seiichi: The Front-Structure of Self and Ego

It was not until the late 1970s that Abe Masao finally responded directly to Takizawa’s thesis on divine-human irreversibility and his 1950 critique of Hisamatsu Zen. Yagi had been engaged in these questions since the late 1960s. Yagi’s first response, of many, to Takizawa’s critique of his theology came in 1967. He singled out three criticisms for comment: the lack of a unified structure, the failure to recognize a transcendent absolute, and the inadequacy of “pure intuition” as a basis for religious existence. Yagi accepted the first two, and as a result came to acknowledge what he called the “true self,” a transcendent absolute that unifies all the forms of human existence (FURUYA 1997, 100; YAGI 1994, 13). To this extent, it may be said that he affirmed the idea of irreversibility.

Yagi’s recognition of divine-human irreversibility is especially clear in his “type A” theology of salvation history, in which a cultural “community” affirms traditional laws and embraces an eschatological hope, and in which finite egos are accountable to a directing force that is not accountable to finite egos. At least a partial affirmation of the irreversibility thesis can also be seen in his acceptance of a divine-human dimension to the relation between a transcendent, infallible self and a finite, fallible ego. At time he refers to the structural bond between self and ego with the Christian formulas “Christ in me,” “God with us,” and “the Word made flesh,” but also by the Rinzai Zen phrase, “true human of no rank” (mui no shinjin 無位の真人) (YAGI 1994, 22, n. 3). Takizawa’s “primary
contact” is thus aligned with the self-ego relation, while the “secondary contact” is made to correspond to the ego fully connected to the self. Finally, he relates the primary and secondary contacts to the biblical expressions “Christ in me” and “I live in the flesh” from Paul’s epistle to the Galatians:

I have been crucified with Christ. Nevertheless, it is not I who live, but Christ in me. And the life I now live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God. (Gal 2: 20)

The self-ego relation is set within a more general metaphysic of what Yagi calls “front-structure” (furonto kōzō フロント構造), in which each term in a relationship is integral to the being of the other, just as a wall can be shared by two adjacent rooms (AKIZUKI and YAGI 1990, 77, n. 4) or one pole presupposes its opposite (FUUYA 1997, 120). In his words, self and ego share the same “front”: the ego is the front of the self, and the self the front of the ego. As the New Testament teaches, the mere ego separated from the true self hates enemies and loves only friends, but the ego connected to the true self, which transcends the finite and fallible standpoint of the mere ego, is able to love even its enemies (Matt 5: 43–4). To the extent that the ego can be distinguished from the true self, Yagi recognizes an irreversible dependence of the ego on the true self for moral direction and soteriological transformation (YAGI 1987, 11). Thus the “front-gift” of the self becomes the “front-appropriation” of the ego through their shared “front-structure,” just as the life of the mother becomes the life of the child through the shared umbilical cord (AKIZUKI and YAGI 1990, 79).

Despite the surface resemblance between Takizawa’s divine-human irreversibility and Yagi’s “front-structure” account of self and ego, Yagi rejected Takizawa’s affirmation of the independence of the absolute from individual human egos. Whereas Takizawa insisted that the unconditional, universal, and eternal “primary contact” is real and active whether or not individual human beings have realized its transformative power, Yagi insisted that the “front-structure” of “Christ in me” only emerges with the realization of individual salvation or enlightenment. Indeed, front-structure metaphysics requires that one side in the relationship be integral to the being of another, so that the “primary contact” of the self,
Christ, or Buddha only exists if the finite and fallible ego also exists. The “secondary contact” that brings about the soteriological transformation of the ego is merely the concrete, human side of the ego-transcending “primary contact” that constitutes the experience of awakening. By thus equating the primary and secondary contacts in the sense that the former “is activated” or “comes into reality” only when an individual ego “becomes aware of” or “realizes” the self-ego relation in the latter, Yagi both sought to affirm the orthodox Christian doctrine that the Logos only fully emerged in the Jewish tradition with the ministry of Jesus, and at the same time to affirm the Zen attribution of ultimacy to the experience of individual enlightenment (Yagi 1987, 10–1). This accounts for his stress on the essential immanence of the true self and his criticism of Takizawa for maintaining “the absolute otherness of God,” a position that Yagi considered “closer to Platonism than to Jesus” (Yagi 1986, 102). Yagi further argued that the coemergence of the primary and secondary contacts in the form of a front-structure relationship between self and ego only occurs with an individual’s actual experience of soteriological transformation, while the irreversible dependence of the ego on the self can only be seen in their distinction.

Thus, on the one hand, irreversibility can be seen in “type A” theology, where a community of egos is bound legally, ritualistically, and eschatologically in a cultural unity by a basic force that they themselves are incapable of influencing; on the other, the human existence constituting “type B” and “type C” theologies exhibits a complete freedom and integration whereby self and ego are virtually indistinguishable and thereby manifest a fully mutual dependence of reversibility. Whereas the absolute in “type A” theology is characterized by “transcendence-objectivity-standardization” (choetsusei/taihōsei/kihansei), the absolute in “type B” and “type C” theologies is characterized as a “circularity” (enshinsei) in which self and ego are indistinguishably joined, interpenetrating each other mutually with no clear beginning and no clear end. In type B (or “divine being”) theology, egos can break free from the surface cultural forms of type A theology by realizing the natural and formless divine-human front-structure that is continually at work but never fully expressible by the laws of type A. In type C theology, where genuine love is realized, the absolute is revealed as an invisible
“field of integration” (tōgō no ba 統合の場) or “field of power” (chikara no ba 力の場) “that changes human beings into poles and integrates them into a ‘community of saints’”—a complex integration of language-transcending and nonconceptual concrete parts and wholes best likened to a piece of music. Yagi sees type C theology as the ultimate meaning of the Buddhist doctrine of codependent arising, a thesis of radical mutual dependence and relational reversibility (Yagi 1982, 134).

With the exception of Honda Masaaki, many involved in the reversibility vs. irreversibility debate were not able to take seriously Yagi’s idea that finite human beings are irreversibly dependent on the absolute, and yet that the very relationship between the absolute and human beings is produced by the soteriological transformation of human beings themselves. Yagi’s thesis that the irreversible dependence of the ego on the self emerges only when the ego experiences enlightenment, generated a lively dialogue between Yagi and Akizuki, who, as we have seen, by and large adopted Takizawa’s position (Yagi 1994, 14). For Takizawa, when human beings are soteriologically transformed, they become “phenomenologically identical” with the absolute without disrupting the ontologically difference of “an undeniable prior-posterior, leader-follower distinction that separates what is reflected from what reflects” (Takizawa 1974, 103–4). It is this irreversible order that Yagi fails to see.

In the end, Yagi was to lament having been “criticized from both sides” so that “Takizawa and Abe, otherwise opponents, could be happily united in the judgment that ‘Yagi is missing the point!’” Little wonder that he characterized the discussion as “an unhappy dialogue” (Yagi 1987, 12–3).

**Honda Masaaki: Reversibility and-yet Irreversibility**

The Catholic theologian Honda Masaaki became a Christian by reading Augustine’s *Confessions* after struggling through the nihilism of Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s “merciless condemnation of the history of Christianity” was to return to haunt him during his study under the Dominicans in Europe. Feeling alienated as a Japanese, traditional Catholicism appeared to him as “a mere object of logical construction,” confining him in a world that was in conflict with his subconscious, existential,
and even physical being—leading to what Honda called a “logical-shock syndrome.”

It was only after an encounter with an elderly Japanese farmer with “Buddhist sensitivities,” followed by ten years of study with the Buddhist philosopher, Nakayama Nobuji, that Honda finally felt he had discovered a concrete logic capable of representing and fulfilling both his native Japanese and his general human needs. Inspired by Nakayama’s relational thesis of “contradictory-correlation” (むじんてきそうく mūjunteki sōoku 矛盾的相即), Honda proposed his own relational thesis of the “logic” or “theology” of soku, based on the East-Asian logical connective soku 即, variously translated as “and-yet,” “sive,” “qua,” or “in.” Honda’s relational thesis was further inspired by Nishida’s idea of “absolute contradictory self-identity” and Cusanus’s coincidentia oppositorum. This sort of “continuity of discontinuity” underlay Honda’s theology of soku to form an organic connection between life and logic, practice and theory, contingent and absolute, and human and divine. It restored the connection that had been severed by his “logical shock” without compromising the uniqueness and interrelatedness of the elements onvolved (HONDA 1990, 20–33; 1998, 59ff).

Honda entered the reversibility-irreversibility debate with his theology of soku in hand, concluding that the divine-human relationship is best understood as a “reversibility-soku-irreversibility.” That is, the divine-human relationship is reversible insofar as human beings can cultivate a relationship of love with God, influence God through prayer, and sadden or please God through obedience or disobedience. At the same time, he seems to grant the priority to irreversibility by recognizing the irreversible dependence of human beings on God, as “the ground on which reversibility is based” and “the condition in which reversibility is revealed” (YAGI 1982, 133).

The priority of irreversibility is further bolstered by Honda’s attempt to see it at the core of Buddhist doctrine: on the one hand, codependent arising is the “eternal and omnipresent realm of cosmic law” that necessarily directs the destinies of finite beings but which cannot inversely be altered by finite beings; on the other hand, the Buddha guides the ignorant to enlightenment, but the ignorant do not inversely guide the Buddha to enlightenment (HONDA 1990, 74).
Although the principle participants in the reversibility vs. irreversibility debate did not strictly belong to the Kyoto School, it attracted the attention of those who were. Nishitani Keiji touched on the debate peripherally by seeing emptiness as beyond Akizuki’s trans-individual. He also collaborated with Yagi in arguing for the validity of “immediate-experience” that Takizawa had criticized for its limited scope and tendency to escapism. Meantime, Ueda Shizuteru has observed the debate with deep interest. The fact that Akizuki, a Zen master, had embraced the irreversible dependence of contingent phenomena on the absolute made a strong impression on him, but in the end he opted for a “suspension of judgment on the matter” (Akizuki 1996, 390). At the same time, Ueda wrote to Honda of how taken he was with the idea of a divine-human “reversibility and-yet irreversibility” (Honda 1990, 81).

Ueda’s interpretation of the ten Zen Oxherding Pictures (Jūgyūzu 十牛図) has stressed the depth of everyday life in a way that seems to suggest both reversible and irreversible aspects. His account of the process of cultivation in the first seven pictures implies both a relatively irreversible temporal structure as well as an irreversible dependence of prior stages on latter stages for soteriological guidance. The final three pictures, which deal with nothingness, nature, and society, show an “oscillation back and forth” in which “the direction is reversible, meaning that one can move freely among” these last three stages (Stambaugh 1999, 129). In this sense, the last three seem to demonstrate a reversible, mutual dependence. Thus the cultivation process of the first seven pictures is irreversibly dependent on the guidance of the last three, but not vice versa.

Ueda’s caution in affirming a robust irreversible dependence of contingent phenomena on the absolute in the manner of Takizawa and Akizuki is seen in the emphasis he places on Nishida’s this-worldly-oriented “everyday depth” (byōjōtei 平常底) as a corrective to Nishida’s idea of the “inverse response” (gyakutaiō 逆対応) of finite individuals to the infinite topos—a vertically oriented relationship which, without “everyday depth,” would run the risk of allowing an excessively transcendent reality with no connection to the concrete activity of this world (Akizuki 2006, 233).
Takizawa's response

In 1983, Takizawa published *Where are You? The Basis of Real Life and Religion* as a rejoinder to the combined responses of Abe, Akizuki, Yagi, and Honda that had appeared in book form. Takizawa's title alludes to a biblical text (Gen 3: 9) that highlights human weakness before God and thus reaffirms the ultimate dependence of contingent phenomena on God, even if moments of reversible dependence and human responsibility are manifest in the divine-human encounter. While Takizawa held to his firm rejection of Abe's “absolute reversibility” thesis, he provisionally affirmed Honda and Yagi's proposal of “reversibility and-yet irreversibility,” on condition that any perceived human ability to affect God is itself enabled by a divine power “on a completely different dimension” from human power (Takizawa 1983, 177). The following year Takizawa issued a similar response to the process theologian John B. Cobb (Cobb 1985, 274), who also had affirmed a reversible, mutual dependence of God and creatures.

Takizawa's death in 1984 prevented him from witnessing later developments in the debate, including (1) Abe's continued espousal of “absolute reversibility” in various English publications, (2) Akizuki and Yagi's six volumes on the subject (Yagi 1994, 14, n. 10) comparing and contrasting soteriological transformation in Buddhism and Christianity, (3) Nobuhara and Tanaka's development of Takizawa's idea in the context of process thought, and (4) the close association that developed between Takizawa's followers Nobuhara and Akizuki, who referred to themselves, respectively, as the “younger” and “older” “disciples” of Takizawa.

A synopsis of Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis

It was his disappointment with Nishida’s unity of opposites and the inspiration of Barth’s ideologically driven opposition to the Nazis that grounded Takizawa’s thesis that fallible contingent phenomena are existentially and morally dependent on the infallible absolute, but not vice versa. The simple unity of Nishida’s earlier concepts such as “pure experience” and “absolute will” and similar concepts adhered to by
Hisamatsu and Abe, seemed to Takizawa insufficient to discern right from wrong or to prompt soteriological transformation. Further, although mere difference, or even a unity of opposites, may provide a means for distinguishing opposing forces, such relationality seemed morally aloof. He therefore concluded that as it stands, a mere unity of opposites easily falls prey to an ethics of “might makes right” and does not provide the kind of solid ground for enlightenment or salvation that the idea of divine-creaturely “irreversibility” does.

His stress on the unidirectional character of this ultimate relationship between the absolute and contingent phenomena provoked criticisms from Yagi and Honda, as well as from process thinkers like Cobb and Nobuhara, all of whom insisted that the absolute must also be influenced in some way by contingent phenomena. Affirming a unilateral dependence of creatures on God seemed to raise serious problems concerning the insignificance of finite actualities, the impossibility of freewill, the inevitable attribution of evil to the divine, and a divinity without passion or meaningful interaction with creation.

Takizawa himself did not deny that contingent phenomena can influence the absolute, but he located such creaturely influence to the status of a “different dimension” so that the absolute can be influenced in various ways by contingent phenomena, but only in regard to its accidental qualities. Whereas contingent phenomena can be affected by the absolute in basic ways such as receiving their very existence and moral direction from God, God is not created by creatures nor do human beings guide the divine moral character. It is this sort of robust divine power, he argued, that allows for human freedom and intimate interaction with God, while at the same time inspiring faith in the possibility of guidance from an infallible moral standard and soteriological guide. This faith was the heart of Takizawa’s irreversibility thesis.

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