Kōyama Iwao’s *Philosophy of World History*

Discussions with Suzuki Shigetaka

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The *Philosophy of World History* (『世界史の哲学』, 1942), was written by a representative philosopher of the Kyoto School, Kōyama Iwao (高山岩男 1905–1993). Hiromatsu Wataru has asserted that *Philosophy of World History* has been regarded as an ideological work justifying the Pacific War. According to Hiromatsu, the *Philosophy of World History* “can be said to be suitable when discussing... about how the overcoming of modernity should function as a rationalization of the Great Asian War ideology” (HIROMATSU 1989, 58).

Putting aside any objection to Hiromatsu’s opinion that Kōyama’s work justifies the war, it is still difficult to comprehend that he directly connects the *Philosophy of World History* with *Overcoming Modernity* (『近代の超克』). In a narrow sense this refers to a symposium, the proceedings of which were printed in *Bungakukai* vols. 9 and 10 in 1942. Furthermore, members of the Kyoto School who attended the conference were Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), Shimomura Toratarō (1902–1995), and Suzuki Shigetaka (1907–1969); Kōyama did not take part. The symposium in which Kōyama participated was *The World Historical Standpoint and Japan* (『世界史的立場と日本』) published in *Chūōkōron* during 1941–42, in which Nishitani, Suzuki, and Kōsaka Masaaki (1900–1969)
also participated. Consequently, Kōyama’s *Philosophy of World History* was not immediately connected with *Overcoming Modernity*.

Indeed, Hiromatsu might argue against any proposal that the *Overcoming Modernity* project not be limited to this narrow meaning and not include the actions of intellectuals both during 1941–42, and before or after the Pacific War. The two symposia, which opened almost simultaneously, portrayed considerably different tones of arguments. Although those in attendance at the symposium assessed and reported Japan’s world-historical mission more or less optimistically, far from agreeing that the Japanese would find the door to world history open, they seriously questioned whether they had really understood European modernity.1 Suzuki, who attended both conferences, felt strange about this pessimistic discussion at this symposium and withdrew after contributing his article related to *Overcoming Modernity*.

Suzuki’s adoption of different attitudes to the two symposia suggests the difficulty in connecting them to Kōyama’s *Philosophy of World History*. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Suzuki promptly reviewed an essay, “Ideas of World History,” that included work by Kōyama. The polemics between Kōyama and Suzuki began with Suzuki’s critique, as a specialist in Leopold von Ranke, of an essay Kōyama had published in *Shisō* (215–216) under the title “Changes in the Contemporary World and the Problem of World History.” The critique in the first volume of *Risō* for 1941 and was refuted by Kōyama in vol. 4 of that same year. After two responses, Suzuki compromised with Kōyama through eventual agreement on a common conclusion. Nevertheless, the point of this dispute, namely the plurality of historical worlds and the problem of special world history, can be said to be important issues from the standpoint of historical interest, which separates not only Kōyama from Suzuki but also the *Philosophy of World History* from *Overcoming Modernity*.2

This essay considers what Kōyama might have thought in his work and how his philosophy of history was changed during disputes with Suzuki and arguments in *The World Historical Standpoint and Japan* by specifi-
cally addressing two concepts: the plurality of historical worlds and special world history.

A plurality of historical worlds

Kōyama’s *Philosophy of World History* is an edited collection of seven essays printed by him during 1940–1942. It consists of “Ideas of World History,” “Geography of History and History of Geography,” “Race, People, Nation and the Historical World,” “Phases of Historical Time,” “The Structure of the Historical World,” “Chronology of World History and Modern World History,” “and Problems of Historicism and World History.” As “Ideas of World History” was the first to be published, it is regarded as important as it expresses what Kōyama first thought of the problems of the “philosophy of world history.”

In the essay, Kōyama identified the situation of the world before and after 1940 as “the tendency or fact that the non-European world will be independent of the European world” (Kōyama 1942a, 22). According to him, “non-European nations have been made almost immanent in the European world since the end of the nineteenth century/beginning of the twentieth century, but the nations following Japan gradually rid themselves of this immanence and can finally express their transcendence from the European world. This world, which has been considered to be a single world, in fact turns out be only one of the modern worlds; therefore, the modern inner order which the European world holds will collapse” (Kōyama 1942a, 22).

His critique was that ordinary thinking takes a monistic view of the world (世界一元論), whereas our goal is to “change the world.” According to Hegel, for instance, “indeed, that the Eastern and the Mediterranean world belong to Greece and Rome are assumed, but are regarded as the means to prepare for the emergence of a German world” (Kōyama 1942a, 25). The materialistic history of Marx “may take into account such geophysical peculiarities as Asian productive styles, but cannot be rid of the simple world-monism by the opposition between classes that are particular to modern society, directly extending to world history and
If we examine Kōyama’s following comments, in which thought should be replaced by “mundane monism,” they are nothing but the plurality of historical worlds, including special world history. First, Kōyama notes that European historians prescribe “the prehistory of world history” to the Eastern world. Specifically, these historians assert that exceptional civilizations in regions near the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile Rivers preceded the ancient Greco-Roman world, which greatly influenced ancient European civilization. Against these former interpretations, he objected that “there is a peculiar and complete world history consisting of the ancient, medieval, and even modern period in the Eastern world,” and criticized this world history for structurally being “no different from the European one” (Kōyama 1942a, 29).

Furthermore, Kōyama asserted that the notions of “Eastern” or “Western” themselves arise from a fundamentally European concept and that “various Asian areas have been completely pushed away from the notion of ‘Eastern’ since they became known to European people.” Therefore, he inferred that “Eastern does not refer to a historical world, but only to a geophysical concept.” Asian areas in which Western people bond into the Eastern in fact have many worlds as constituent parts. Even if they are to be divided into Eastern, Central, and Western Asia, various worlds stand side by side, as it is said that “they are similar but independent in the Chinese and Indian world, and significantly Japan has been a single world since ancient times” (Kōyama 1942a, 30). Consequently, Kōyama concluded that “we must accept many world histories and historical worlds among human beings. We need the foundation of a plurality of historical worlds, for the present, to consider a true world history” (Kōyama 1942a, 32). Stressing the plurality of historical worlds, he distinguished special world history from general world history:

The histories of peoples are always world histories. No world history exists but the history of people. Furthermore, one world connected with another realizes a third. The first and second worlds will dissolve or be made into another when the third comes into existence. This is the process of world history. Consequently, we must distinguish two kinds of world history. One is world history constituted of connecting
people with one another, which we call special world history. Another
type signifies that composed of so-called “special worlds” and is
known as general world history. These two kinds of world histories are
incorporated within the same structure, and are not separated from
another but are closely connected (Kōyama 1942a, 67).

Kōyama reverted to conventional views of history by distinguishing
two world histories, but harbored the criticism that most students of
Western history in particular “cannot escape from unconscious or dog-
matic ideas identifying special world history directly with general his-
tory.” He emphasized the disclosure of true world history through the
defeat of dogmatic tendencies.

It is difficult to avoid [dogmatic] opinions in European ideas of his-
tory. We also find in our historical societies the disposition to expand
the Japanese world continuously to the European world. It seems to me
that we do not sufficiently take into account the complicated relations of
Japan to the Asian continent, although we have not experienced tension
on the international scene for many years (Kōyama 1942a, 80).

It becomes clear from examining “Ideas of World History” that
Kōyama’s Philosophy of World History, which has been regarded as an
aggressive work, distinguishes a special world history from a general his-
tory so as not to confuse one with the other. It can even be asserted that
he is a pioneering cultural relativist as he criticizes ethnocentrism and
uses expressions that stop generalizing domestic culture. His argument is
based on The Science of Cultural Types (『文化類型学』, 1939), in which he
wrote that “there are ethnic differences in cultures because we can dis-
cern Eastern and Western, or Japanese, Chinese, Greek, and Roman cul-
tures” (Kōyama 1942b, 21). I will use this work again to discuss Suzuki’s
criticisms of Kōyama.

It is true that the Korean peninsula under Japanese colonial rule was
not prescribed for an “independent” world by Kōyama, but when we see
that his arguments inspired some Korean intellectuals to maintain the
East Asian Community (東亜協同体) (See Yonetani 2006, 145–52), we
can estimate to some degree the “Ideas of World History,” the opening
essay of his Philosophy of World History.
IS WORLD HISTORY PLURAL?

As noted, Kōyama insisted in “Ideas of World History “ that contemporary world history must be understood plurally; he concluded from his standpoint that the European view of history includes world history only as an extension of itself. This statement directly criticizes the Eurocentrism that is adopted not only in Europe but also by Japanese specialists of the history of the Western world. Suzuki refuted arguments of Western history from a philosophical perspective. In “Contemporary Change and the Problem of World History,” Suzuki asserted that,

While the “modern world” shows structural systems of the world composed by a European order because of the expansion of Europe and its political, economic, and cultural dominance, the “contemporary world” refers to the world-historical world that Kōyama designates, in which non-Europeans insist on their original principles. It is the contemporary turn in world history where they will establish new principles to construct world history. (Suzuki 1941, 205–6)

On the whole, he accepted the image of world history identified by Kōyama. However, Suzuki also criticized him: “I think by all means that usual European world history is... not world history in a true sense” (207 ). His objection was aimed at Kōyama’s assertion of plurality and special world history. Whereas Kōyama stated that Eurocentric world history falls into “a simple mundane monism,” Suzuki asserted that “I cannot easily escape from the view of monism of world history however simple this may be” (208). However, this statement by Suzuki did not mean that he would stay at simple monism. He insisted that “the plurality mediated by monism” that Kōyama asserted “is always considered and stressed by both Ranke and other specialists of world history” (209). According to Suzuki, “Ideas of World History” was not Kōyama’s original concept.

What, then, did Suzuki think about special world history? Although Kōyama thinks that “it is a surprising world historical event in the modern period,” Suzuki stated that there are many world histories side by side on earth “which soon converge into a single one,” taking his earlier work into account, that Kōyama’s idea was not world-historical and
“much inclined to the science of cultural types” (212). Suzuki described the reason for his judgment: “World history should not by nature be found in some special history but in general history, out of which some isolated peoples stand.” Indeed, according to him, from the view of the science of cultural types, all people “have a dominant culture and historical continuity,” but when it comes to world history, these particular histories must be treated separately. Therefore, he objected to grasping world history from the standpoint of this science because “one of the histories is world-historical and the others are not” (213–14). Following those arguments, Suzuki critically commented on Kōyama’s *Ideas of World History*:

I cannot yet agree with the idea of constituting a plurality of world histories as merely a *string* of particular histories. World history should always be *general*; moreover, since the modern age, this generality has originated from the European world. I consider Europeans to have lost their role in the epoch-making changes of contemporary society. (215–6).

These statements of Suzuki’s appear to mean that world history should be considered as focused on Europe to the very end. Indeed Suzuki and Kōyama agreed in accepting the 1940s as “the contemporary period” with “epoch-making changes,” but since we infer that Suzuki considered this phenomenon as one of “losing the European character,” he insisted that matters related to world history should be oriented from a European perspective.

**European modernity and world history**

We now understand that Suzuki’s critique of *Ideas of World History* severely denied not only the plurality of historical worlds and special world history but also the science of cultural types proposed by Kōyama. Suzuki seems to elect only the standpoint related to Western history as his standpoint regarding world history. How did Kōyama respond to Suzuki’s critiques?

In “Various Ideas of World History—a Response to Mr. Shigetaka
Suzuki’s Comments,” Kōyama responded to the criticisms with a revision of his assertions. First, Kōyama stated his impression that “there are considerable differences of opinion between Mr. Suzuki and I when relating the plurality of special world history to the monism of general history,” and found that “while he relates mere history to world history, I assume a special world history in particular, and conceive of world history by relating mere history to a special and general history” (Kōyama 1941, 48). Kōyama insisted that Suzuki’s assertion that “one of the histories is world-historical and the others are not” means that “the reason for establishing a special world history named by me, as well as a single system of general history, cannot yet be grounds for denying special world history” (48–9). He explained in the essay “Race, People, Nation and the Historical World,” which Suzuki did not address, that special world history is linked with world history proper. This article, described later, insists that the reason for the formation of races and nations with which The Science of Cultural Types dealt was nothing but special world history. To Suzuki, who was going to deny the method of the science of cultural types by criticizing special world history, Kōyama stated that his assertions could be consistent with Suzuki’s.

However, it can be inferred that Suzuki would accept theoretical reasons for a special world history but could not accept a European world history as special history. In response to this problem, Kōyama frankly stated the European history that he had outlined. Suzuki prescribed stages of world history presumed by Kōyama for (1) those of special (European, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese) world histories and (2) general or world-historical world history, and his stages for the Mediterranean (ancient), and European (medieval) worlds, the expansion of the European world, and the world-historical-world (Suzuki, 1941, 218–19); on the other hand, Kōyama apologized that the third stage provided by Suzuki meant “a preparatory period or beginning of general world history” and asserted that the first and second corresponded to different special world histories. Kōyama insisted on the authenticity of his hypothesis by saying that “we must accept for the present a rupture between special and general world history” (Kōyama 1942a, 57).

Suzuki later recalled in his book that “hearing his [Kōyama’s] explanation, I realized there is little difference between him and me, and that I
even agree with him on several points” (SUZUKI 1941, 220). He seemed

to have been satisfied that Kōyama admitted that European modernity
should not be regarded as special world history but the beginning of
general history. However, initially in “Ideas of World History,” follow-
ing The Science of Cultural Types, Kōyama maintained that world history
should not be measured using Europe as the standard. From his view we
can deduce that the expansion of Europe that was characterized by the
“realization of international trade among European nations, and mod-
erm European capitalism that accompanied the imperialistic colonization
of non-European areas” furthered the erosion of special world histories
such as non-European histories. We can therefore judge that Kōyama
included the period of European expansion in general history, on the
condition that this period is regarded as the beginning, because he did
not stress his conception of cultural relativism during discussions with
Suzuki. As Kōyama debated with Suzuki, he was gradually inclined to
move away from pluralistic views of the world that we would categorize
today as Eurocentrism.

**The Monism of moralische energie**

Here I will consider how Kōyama changed his opinion by con-
trasting his remarks in the previously described symposium The World
Historical Position and Japan with his arguments laid out in “Ideas of
World History.” As described above, Kōyama and Suzuki attended this
symposium. At first Kōyama was opposed to Suzuki’s opinion of the
notion of the dominance of Europe:

S: European culture has universal validity; it has supported the domi-

3. In a “Chronology of World History and Modern World History,” written after
this debate and included in Kōyama’s Philosophy of World History, is the following
expression “European modern history has significance not only of particular world
histories but also of the prehistory of general world histories” (Kōyama 1942a, 390).

4. Kōyama 1941, 56. His view of the period of European expansion here appears
in the “Chronology” mentioned in the previous note. HIROMATSU limits his treat-
ment to essays written after the discussion with Suzuki (1989, 67–79) and takes no
account of the relation between the earlier Philosophy of World History and Science of
Cultural Types conceived under a kind of cultural relativism.
nuance of Europe and produced a European world order. Even if worlds outside Europe become conspicuous, they must be supported by this validity. Otherwise, their entrance is spurious.

K: I admit that Europe is culturally dominant. In addition to this, consider how the capitalist basis of the expansion of European culture gave rise to this situation. In fact, the consciousness of European dominance is rooted in economics, technology, or politics rather than cultural rule.

S: No, I think we should take note of cultural dominance (Kōyama 1943, 21–2).

After being defeated by Suzuki’s argument, Kōyama spoke on whether modernity exists in Japan.

K: I always think there are two modernities in Japan. This is a new hypothesis, and so I want you to criticize it. “Two modernities” refers to the eras before and after the Meiji Restoration. Modernity in Japan started at almost the same time as in Europe. Japan as well as Europe expanded abroad, and these two expansions were rooted in the development of individual consciousness and commerce. So, if the Tokugawa Shogunate had not closed Japan to the rest of the world, then modern Japan would have developed in some other way, as we know. However, the modern spirit in the Edo period had a considerably different character from that of modern Europe because of national isolation. I think that the modern spirit with feudal tones has been formed in this way. In this sense, the Edo period achieved a reasonable adjustment to modernity. The Japan that emerged after the Meiji Restoration, however, combined this style after European ways (26–8).

In The Science of Cultural Types, Kōyama suggested a kind of modernity in the Tokugawa period; he then took Suzuki’s standpoint into consideration by interpreting the innovative characteristics of modern Japan as another legacy of the Meiji era.5 After approving of Kōyama’s assertion

5. Recently a number of Japanese historians have begun to express doubt over this dominance in Eastern Asia. For instance, Takahashi (2001) views Southeast Asia island peoples from the standpoint of the world of oceans, noting the networks established among people unattached to particular countries or regions. From this perspective, it may be said that Kōyama’s medieval Japan was constructed from the standpoint of modern nation states.
that two modernities exist, Suzuki asserted that this fact demonstrates the dominance of Japan in the East:

S: I agree on the whole with Mr. Kōyama in the existence of two modernities in Japan.... There is also an ancient period in the East, which is magnificent. But, however magnificent, this is not modernity. Indeed the East was as magnificent as the West or more advanced than Europe, but did not yet have such a thing as modernity. On the other hand, Japan has a modernity that will awaken a new period in the East. This fact is world-historical.6

The “East” that is presumed here apparently refers to China because prior to Suzuki’s remarks, Kōsaka Masaaki criticized Chinese logic as having “only correspondence or distribution, and it is short of development or deduction” (Kōyama 1941, 32).

Kōyama’s proposal described above referred to a Japanese character based on his view of the science of cultural types irrespective of Chinese culture. However, Suzuki regarded this proposal as evidence of the dominance of Japan over the East or over China. Consequently, arguments in the symposium tended to regard not China but Japan as modern without distinguishing two modernities in Japan.

Kōyama emphasized the dominance of Germany over France using Ranke’s moralische Energie, in which Suzuki had specialized. Two of Kōyama’s remarks are particularly noteworthy:

K: When we say that France was defeated, what was the fundamental cause of this defeat? I think that it was a lack of moralische Energie, namely the vital energy of morality. Culture was separated from politics because of the occurrence of gaps or opposition between them. In addition to this, they lost the vital energy of morality. I think that this is the basic cause of the defeat of France.... It is still the vital energy of morality that always moves world history. I expect that this force will be a political principle. I hope that Japanese youth will increasingly possess moralische Energie, a healthy moral sense, and vital, fresh energy (Kōyama 1943, 101–2).

6. Kōyama 1943, 33–4. Strictly speaking, Suzuki was reiterating Kōsaka’s position here, though we should note that he combined it with Kōyama’s.
K: I think that the victory of Germany means a win based on the moralische Energie of the German people.... It is often said that world history is the judgment of the world, but this sentence does not signify that the God outside of world history judges it. It seems to me that nations should criticize and judge themselves. The ruin of nations is not rooted from such outer causes as aggression. An outer battle is only one occasion. In fact, national ruin is based on the exhaustion of the moralische Energie of a nation. If this energy of a nation is exhausted, an enemy nation will defeat it. Therefore, the causes that destroy nations are not outside, but inside; economic or cultural ruin is based on the same cause. The ultimate cause of national ruin springs from the loss of a healthy and new moral sense, the moralische Energie of a nation. We should not look for an outer cause (Kōyama 1943, 104–5).

In the preceding discussion with Suzuki, Kōyama analyzed economic and political factors to consider the move from a special world history to a general one, but here found the cause of the change of world history only in moralische Energie instead of these factors. Kōyama's view appears to head in a simpler direction than the former because he determined cultural dominance between nations from the standpoint of which nation's moralische Energie is stronger or weaker.

Furthermore, we should note the change in Kōyama's attitude to China. In The Science of Cultural Types he argued that Chinese culture was separate from Japanese culture without expressing which culture is dominant over the other. However, if we adopt a standpoint such as the monism of moralische Energie, we will make decisions only using the dominance of one nation over another—thought to be a Western trait—not only in the case of Germany and France, but also of Japan and China in the East.

We cannot help concluding from the following considerations that Kōyama fell into the role of an ideologue for the invasion of China. This was shown in The World Historical Position and Japan as he abandoned his view of the plurality of a historical world and special world history that had been proposed in “Ideas of World History” and “Various Ideas of World History,” submitting to the Eurocentric concept of world history emphasized by Suzuki.
QUESTIONs

In his remarks in *The World Historical Position and Japan*, Kōyama seems to have abandoned the plurality of historical worlds based on the distinction between special and general world history that he proposed. However, considering the *Philosophy of World History* in detail, we can attest that he did not relinquish his ideas of special world history completely.

In “Race, People, Nation, and the Historical World,” which was described as a reply to Suzuki and which was later included in *Philosophy of World History*, Kōyama thought much of “life as a bloody continuum” as the medium to transform special world history into general history. This life was regarded as a “natural entity” combining an “objective and outer moment,” namely geography, with a subjective and “inner one,” namely race. In this context, he used the term “responsive accord” (呼応的一致) which would bear salient importance in his later works:

In general, life consists of a subject’s response to its environment, and is always shaped into a “specific” plurality according to the circumstances and peculiarities of the subjects that make it up, however different they might be in various regions. In this sense, the specific life of human peoples entails the bloodier effort of the subjects to respond continually to their specific climate and natural environment. (Kōyama 1942a, 159)

Kōyama referred to Ranke’s *moralische Energie* by stressing the importance of a “historical entity” based on this “natural entity.” Taking account of this argument, he admired *moralische Energie* in *The World Historical Position and Japan* because his praise did not always mean flat-tery of Suzuki’s opinions, but rather came from the development of his own thought.

But in the passages described above, “responsive accord” reminds us of Kōyama’s relation to Nishida and Tanabe than discussion between Suzuki and himself. It is true that we cannot find words that show Kōyama’s intimacy with Nishida, although we associate “specific life” (種的生命) with Tanabe’s “logic of the specific (種の論理).” However, in the postwar period, Kōyama proposed in his later work *The Logic of Place*
and the Principle of Call-and-Response (『場所的論理と呼応の原理』) that he tried to compensate systematic defects of both Nishida’s and Tanabe’s philosophy for the principle of call-and-response. “Responsive accord” associated with “principle of response” must not be overlooked in his prewar work *Philosophy of World History*.

Nevertheless, we wonder why Kōyama did not express his idea of “responsive accord” in *The World Historical Position and Japan*, which would have meant the accomplishment of a monumental work in Japanese philosophy. He would not be regarded as a mere Suzuki sympathizer if he had developed his arguments using this idea. Presumably, he did not develop this because he had a foreboding that he was unable to completely explain a “philosophy of world history” with the aid of “responsive accord.” Subsequently, we will examine “Problems of Historicism and World History” considering this key word included in *Philosophy of World History*.

Kōyama, acknowledging Suzuki’s opinion that world history became European, asserted that “we should accept the standpoint regarding modern European world history as special history” (Kōyama 1942a, 362). He called this standpoint “trans-world-history” or “trans-world” (Kōyama 1942a, 363) and proposed a mysterious view of world history:

The absolute transcends the world, eternity transcends temporality: generally speaking, the consciousness of the relativity of histories lies in this transcendence. It is the transcendence that makes even general world history relative and forms historical periods. However, the absolute or eternity, transcending world or time, has revealed itself in the world-history of historical worlds as soon as it makes us conscious of relative and finite world and time. In contrast, no place exists in which the absolute or eternity reveals itself without revealing itself in world history. The absolute that is separated from relatives or opposed to them should not be the absolute in a true sense, but relative. The true absolute reveals itself in relatives and contains them in itself. *It is world history in which the absolute or eternity reveals itself.* (365)

Indeed we find no words corresponding to “responsive accord” in the passage above, but we should consider “Problems of Historicism and World History” relating to “Race, People, Nation, and the Historical
World” and *The Logic of Place and the Principle of Call-and-Response* because the descriptions in connection with “Themes and Resolution” included in Kōyama’s later work follow from these passages (See Hanazawa 1999, 122). By not taking up “responsive accord,” we seek to examine the meanings of the trans-world of world history proposed here.

We immediately notice that Kōyama equivocates the distinction between special and general world history, which he established previously by asserting a trans-world. He would destroy logical schemes moving from special to general history that he constructed if the view of world history “that makes even general world history relative” caused it to be regarded it as special history.

Furthermore, Kōyama insufficiently argued the role of culture stressed in *The Science of Cultural Types* and “Ideas of World History” within general world history. For instance, in “The Structure of the Historical World” included in *Philosophy of World History*, he assigned one chapter to treat cultural worlds. However, this insufficiently discussed relations of individual ethnic cultures to cultural worlds argued in two previous treatises because “cultural worlds” are regarded as being connected only with political or economic systems that spread globally during the period of European expansion.

Taking these arguments into account, we can bring into relief the problems Kōyama proposed in speaking of *moralische Energie* in *The World Historical Position and Japan*. In reply to Suzuki he indirectly acknowledged that China did not have such modernity as Japan, maintaining that Japan had more *moralische Energie* than China, similar to relations between Germany and France. However, according to him, the standard for deciding the strength of *moralische Energie* in these nations, especially in Japan and China, depended on which of them adapted to the current of an expanding Europe with which general world history “originated.” Therefore, should we assert that he overlooked factors indispensable to conceiving plural historical worlds, even though he previously considered which of these two nations stuck to their own specific culture?

Perhaps Kōyama would insist that it is the European political or economic world in particular that is connected with general world history. However, we cannot help concluding that Kōyama, maintaining the framework of plurally historical worlds expressed in “Ideas of World His-
tory,” has abstracted their cultural content because “trans-world” not only made special world history relative, but also political, economic, world, and general world history.

THE APORIA OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY

Therefore, as Hiromatsu pointed out, Kōyama’s Philosophy of World History bore an aggressive ideology but initially conceived plurally historical worlds as standing against Eurocentrism. However, his concept lasted only until he wrote “Ideas of World History.” As he discussed with Suzuki, he was inclined to a Eurocentric view of world history, and he stressed the dominance of Japan over China in The World Historical Position and Japan instead of the plurality of historical worlds, which he never proposed in The Science of Cultural Types.

It is difficult for us to discard Eurocentrism when we consider the change in Kōyama’s thought. Indeed, among Asian nations Japan attempts to make Europe relative because what is meant as glorious for the West is miserable for the East. However, before long this Japanese plan cannot help but break down because we must develop our arguments in the framework of Europe making Asia wretched, even if we speak of Asian misery. Taking this situation into account, we seem to select no alternative to Takeuchi Yoshimi’s “resistance.”

Whoever receives productive ideas from Kōyama’s thought may insist that Philosophy of World History be regarded as a preparatory work of The Logic of Place and the Principle of Call-and-Response.” However, according to his idea, “responsive accord” was originally conceived not to compensate for the defects of Nishida’s and Tanabe’s philosophy, but for the purpose of being postulated as the basis of his original philosophy of history. During replies to Suzuki’s critiques, Kōyama realized the difficulties of the philosophy of plural histories and was forced to concede to Eurocentric ideas in many situations. Nevertheless, did he have to depend on a “trans-world” as a unifying principle that did not apply to the European framework?

Japanese philosophy has recently been viewed with greater interest in foreign countries than in Japan. Such foreign interest in it stimulates
domestic study. Even if we make new discoveries among the ideas of Japanese philosophers, we should simultaneously learn many lessons from the difficult struggle of Kōyama Iwao.

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