Nationalism, Globalism, and Cosmopolitanism

An Application of Kyoto School Philosophy

Gereon Kopf

In an earlier essay I argued that Mutai Risaku 務台理作 rejected every kind of nationalism and proposed something akin to multilateralism (Kopf 2009). Here I should like to continue that argument and develop from Mutai’s humanism a typology to describe different modes of existing in the globalized world.

The question at hand is how we can understand and categorize multiple responses to the challenges presented by the cultural and economic globalization that have resulted from rapidly expanding and intersecting markets and the almost instantaneous and seemingly unhindered flow of information. The first response to the dilemma seems to be the modernistic demand for a “one-world-scenario” based on an economic realism and on what Jean-François Lyotard has called “meta-narratives” (métarécits) (Lyotard 1984, xxiv). While such an ideology at best reflects the universalism envisioned by enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and belief in the inalienable nature of human rights, it seems impossible to eradicate well-founded doubts that universalism implies, if not supports, the exclusive right of a particular authority to articulate a universal morality and value system for the rest of the world. Iris Marion Young has argued that no universalism is able to secure
social justice, despite its support of human rights, since it denies difference and thus cannot do justice to the particularities and idiosyncrasies of individual communities. Thus a second response to the challenges of globalization grows out of what Young calls a “politic of difference” (Young 1990, 228) focused on “small narratives” (petit récits) (Lytard 1984, 60) and promoting rather a “politics of recognition” (Taylor 1994) if not “self-determination.”

The critique of universalistic globalism issues from two rather distinct camps. First, we have the nationalism that, as Paul Tillich has argued, responds to globalization by regressing to pre-modern ethnocentricism in order to establish “imagined communities” (Anderson 2006). This desire to avoid globalism by evoking national myths and upholding an imagined identity stands in stark contrast to the call for the self-determination of all types of community and ultimately of the individual as homo politicus. Ironically, Sri Aurobindo Ghose, who earned himself the title of “Indian nationalist” for his resistance, first, to the British empire and, then, to the League of Nations, has made the strongest case to date for an individualistic notion of self-determination. In his words:

> The principle of self-determination really means this: that within every living human creature, man, woman and child, and equally within every distinct human collectivity, growing or grown, half-developed or adult, there is a self, a being, which has the right to grow in its own way, to find itself, to make its life full and a satisfied instrument and image of its being. (Aurobindo 1992, 601)

Self-determination is thus not only a matter for ethnic communities and nations, but extends to all communities and subcultures regardless of their identity or defining and unifying features, and ultimately to each and every individual. While Sri Aurobindo certainly cannot be said to exhibit a latent individualism or explicitly to anticipate postmodern discourses of identity, his notion of self-determination amounts to much

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1. Tillich identifies both ethnocentrism and nationalism as expressions of the “courage-to-be-as-a-part”; however, he suggests that the former is characteristic of pre-modernity, while the latter reveals a defensive reaction to modernity and globalization not unlike the regression to an infantile state.
the same thing. Thus he provides the prototype for a third model of response to globalism, namely individualism.

The key difference between these two positions, ethnocentrism and individualism, lies in their respective conceptions of culture. Ethnocentrism reflects an inherent essentialism, whereas individualism—or, more appropriately in this case, localism—is based on postmodern discourses that underscore the complexity of identity formation and resist the reification of cultures into identifiable essences. These discourses not only criticize the mistaken identification of ethnocentrism and nationalism, but, more radically, go on to question the modern assumption that cultures constitute internally homogenous entities that can easily be distinguished from one another. These imagined essences have the twofold effect of creating a mythic connection between the members of the same community, and at the same time of establishing artificial empirical and cognitive boundaries—what Raghavan Iyer refers to as “glass curtains” (see Clarke 1993, 17)—between communities. In short, they serve identity construction in the face of cultural complexity and diversity. In this sense Gerd Baumann suggests that the key to culture lies in “the boundaries that separate ethnic groups” rather than in any “cultural stuff” (Baumann 1999, 84), and Ananda Abeyasakara maintains that essences of cultures and religions are constructed in discourses at “contingent conjunctures” (Abeyasakara 2002, 3).

Philosophically, this means that while ethnocentrism, and even more so nationalism, can be said to cling to imagined collectivities as a protection against the realities of a multicultural world, localism and individualism ground identity in the intersection of the boundaries between cultural and subcultural identities. Identity is no longer conceived of as an inherent essence but as a narrative and a choice. This third approach, therefore, responds to the overwhelming diversity of the cultures and identities provided by globalism with a quest for uniqueness and what Tillich dubs the “courage-to-be-as-oneself” (Tillich 2000, 113–16). The result of this, however, is cultural relativism and, in its extreme form, radical particularism. Although localism rejects the essentialism on which ethnocentrism is grounded, it shares with it the quest for an identifiable, albeit constructed, identity, which it pursues for its uniqueness rather than for its connections to the community.
Cosmopolitanism

The resistance against relegation to the cultural niches created by this intricate web of cultural and subcultural boundaries, coupled with the desire and willingness to transgress them, lays the foundation for a fourth response to globalism, namely cosmopolitanism. Historically, the “cosmopolitan,” as Anthony Kwame Appiah has shown, was conceived of as the antithesis to the “provincial,” and the concept subsequently functioned as a moralizing category for enlightened individuals at home in the urban centers and metropolises of the world. It marked the “citizen of the world” who was civilized and capable of fulfilling his (during the enlightenment period, it was indeed mainly “his”) duty as a rational citizen. In her Strangers to Ourselves, Julia Kristeva sketches an unabashedly Eurocentric trajectory of the history of the cosmopolitan, from St. Paul’s vision of a multi-ethnic Christianity\(^2\) to the “citizen of the world” or Weltbürger of the European enlightenment (Kristeva 1991, 164). Today one would probably have to include equivalent trajectories from other cultures as well as take into account the multifaceted nature of the today’s cosmopolitan with its multiplicity of cultures, religions, and subcultures.

Be that as it may, the question we have to ask ourselves now is, What are the qualities of such a Weltbürger? There is no doubt that cosmopolitanism commences, as Appiah observes, “with the simple idea that in the human community, as in national communities, we need to develop habits of coexistence, of ‘conversation’ in its older meaning, of living together, association” (Appiah 2006, xix). What Appiah suggests here is a fundamental change not only in the conceptual and legal framework but also in the existential modality in which people live in this world. At stake is the cultural identity of the cosmopolitan individual as such. Cosmopolitanism, thus, does not simply call for rules of coexistence along the lines of Taylor’s “politics of recognition”; it further requires of cosmopolitans the ability to move in a variety of cultures. In many ways,

\(^2\) Of course, Kristeva also mentions the idea of the nation that harbors members of a multiplicity of religions as it was envisioned by the French revolution and the American constitution.
The concept of cosmopolitanism, a term that is increasingly relevant in contemporary discussions about identity and global interactions, is foundational to understanding the nature of today's interconnected world. A cosmopolitan is not merely someone who speaks multiple languages, even though language proficiency is often a key attribute of cosmopolitanism. Instead, being cosmopolitan means being fluent in the cultural codes of various societies, allowing one to navigate and participate in diverse societies without losing sight of one's own cultural identity.

In the same way that language reflects one's cultural identity, cultural codes are performative, can be acquired, and, most important of all, are not mutually exclusive. A cosmopolitan is someone who belongs to and is fluent in the codes of multiple cultures. More to the point, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are as much a matter of “multiple belonging” as they are of legal frameworks.

So what does it take to be cosmopolitan? A cosmopolitan is a person who is at home in a variety of cultures. If we follow this line of thinking, we have to admit that a cosmopolitan in some sense exhibits universal and individual qualities and can be characterized as the doublet of a “separated self/shared self” (Young 1990, 228). Persons capable of reconciling identity and social connectedness in this way fulfill the ideal of psychological maturity suggested by the developmental psychology of Erik Erikson and his feminist critics such as Ruthellen Josselson and Nancy J. Chodorow. Josselson suggests that “to fully understand development during the identity-formation stage, therefore, we must look at both sides of the process: both the individuating, autonomous part and the connecting/relating self” (Josselson 1987, 21). In a similar vein, Chodorow argues that “We become a person, then, in internal relation with the social world. The social world, even at its worst, is not purely constraining..., nor could it ever completely eliminate the individual (Chodorow 1989, 149).

A cosmopolitan displays individuality and autonomy in the construction of personal identity, but at the same time rejects isolation to live in a social world, a world of cosmopolitans. This description of the world of cosmopolitans echoes Derrida’s definition of the “democracy to come” as “[letting] singular beings (anyone) ‘live together’” (cited in Park 2009, 7). In this sense, cosmopolitanism marks not only a turn from globalization to glocalization (Park 2009, 3), but, more radically, a turn toward a

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4. The term “multiple belonging” (Cornille 2002) has already been used in religious studies to describe the phenomenon of one person claiming a plurality of religious identities.
modality that encompasses the ambiguity of autonomy and relatedness, individuality and universality.

What distinguishes the cosmopolitan approach from the models of globalism and individualism is that the latter see identity as an *internal* relation and difference as an *external* one. Communal identity is projected *into* a specific group or person, and the modality of difference is located in the space *between* communities and individuals. Ultimately, this model relies on a Leibnizian sense of identity, one based on the logical tautology “A=A,” and consequently requires that identities, be they communal or personal, behave like windowless monads: monolithic within and devoid of relationship to the external world. But this is not how our world works. In her *Strangers to Ourselves*, Kristeva shows convincingly how, throughout Europe’s trajectory towards a cosmopolitan society, religious traditions have been home to members of a plurality of nationalities and ethnicities, while nations have included religious diversity. In short, Leibniz’s way of thinking seems far too abstract to conceptualize existence in a world where religious, sexual, and subcultural identities transgress the boundaries of ethnic and national identities, and vice versa.

While the Leibnizian model of identity works well to protect the legal integrity of personal and national entities, it fails to recognize commonalities across boundaries and differences between communities and persons, since it cannot conceive of what Chodorow calls our “internal relation with the social world,” let alone of internal difference. This internal difference—that is, the recognition that our communities are not unified but diverse, and that we as individuals share similarities with persons on the other side of the artificially constructed boundaries of national, religious, and personal identities—is experienced as what Sigmund Freud calls the “uncanny” (*das Unheimliche*), and Kristeva, “our own foreignness” (*Kristeva* 1991, 169). Cosmopolitanism, then, envisions a “paradoxical community,” which, in Kristeva’s words, “is made up


6. Kasulis uses the legal contract as one of the prototypes of the integrity paradigm (2002, 60).
of foreigners who are reconciled with themselves to the extent that they recognize themselves as foreigners” (195). In the end, cosmopolitanism requires nothing short of a paradigm shift that discards the Leibnizian model of identity in favor of one that locates foreignness, social relationship, and, ultimately, universality inside the self. Such a model, I would like to suggest, is to be found in the philosophy of the Kyoto school.

**Nishida’s model**

The central figure of the Kyoto school, Nishida Kitarō, developed a fundamental paradigm but never worked out a theory of cosmopolitanism or dealt with the phenomenon of globalization in any direct manner. As I have argued elsewhere, on occasion he even slips into ethnocentric rhetoric (Kopf 2009). Nevertheless, the fact is, Nishida dedicated much of his later work and his general philosophy of history to the idea of a “worldly world” (*sekaiteki sekai* 世界的世界) (*NKZ* 12: 431). While the idea does not address any of the political themes mentioned above, it is based on the dialectic of the universal and the individual. Moreover, Nishida stratifies his conception of the “worldly world” in such a way as to avoid the perils of a monism leading to globalism, or of a pluralism entailing individualism. In the end, his aim is to replace the Leibnizian notion of identity with a paradoxical identity embracing elements of difference and plurality. He calls this new philosophical paradigm the “self-identity of contradictories” (*mujunteki jiko dōitsu* 矛盾的自己同一).

Admittedly, Nishida’s terminology is abstruse and misleading, but his intent is to express the very kind of “internal difference” and “paradoxical community” I have mentioned above. Nishida explains himself in these terms:

Descartes and Spinoza, however, thought in terms of a single totality. Spinoza went so far as to deny the individual in order to arrive at a timeless world. Coming to Leibniz, we see that being is imagined as a multitude of individuals. He introduced the notion of expressive action to account for the relationship between the one and the many. From there we have to proceed to the contradictory identity of that which expresses and that which is expressed…. This self-identity is
located neither in the many of the individuals nor in the oneness of the totality. There is neither pluralism nor monism. (NKZ 10: 488–501)

And one might add, neither is there localism or globalism.

In his works on the philosophy of history, specifically in *The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* (NKZ 7) written in 1933 and *The Problem of Japanese Culture* (NKZ 12: 275–384) written in 1940, Nishida develops his notion of the “worldly world” as a paradigm that successfully avoids the Scylla of monism and the Charybdis of pluralism. In both works he attempts to develop a paradigm that balances the principles of unity and individuality, of oneness and diversity, in a completely symmetrical fashion without privileging one over the other and without assuming either an essence or a center.

Before continuing my discussion of Nishida’s philosophy, however, a few words of caution are in order. First, despite his attempt to develop a symmetric paradigm, the terminology in *The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* is heavily tilted in favor of the principles of unity and identity, privileging the notion of the “dialectical universal” (*benshōhōteki ippansha* 弁証法的一般者). Second, in both works Nishida’s succumbs to the temptation of applying his philosophy to the historical realities of the 1930s in Japan, ending up in each case up with an ethnocentric, if not hegemonic, discourse that exalts Japan’s role in history. As I have tried to show elsewhere, however, these excursions into ethnocentrism are remarkably at odds with his otherwise egalitarian philosophy of culture and history.7

Finally, Nishida’s terminology changes frequently throughout his career, including the time period in which he composed the two works referred to above. His language in *The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* is still influenced by Aristotle and Plato and echoes the discussions on epistemology he himself had published in the 1920s, while the language of *The Problem of Japanese Culture* reflects the non-dualism of his mature philosophy and his increasing interest in a philosophy of history.

In later works, beginning with a 1938 essay entitled “Acting Intuition,” Nishida introduces the dialectics of the “many” (*ta* 多) and the “one”

7. I have argued elsewhere that there is a discrepancy between Nishida’s overall egalitarian philosophical model and the hierarchy evident in both works by virtue of his concrete application of the model to historical realities (*Kopf 2001*).
(ichi 一) to outline the structure of the historical world (rekishiteki sekai 历史的世界). In brief, Nishida refers to the “historical world” alternatively as that which is “one-and-yet-many” (isokuta 一即多) and as the “self-identity of the absolute contradictories of the many and the one” (ichi to ta no mujun teki jiko dōitsu 一と多の絶対矛盾的自己同一). The former expression clearly originates in the tradition of Huayan Buddhism, 8 but Nishida develops it slowly and carefully over the course of sixteen years in response to what he perceived to be the dualistic framework of European philosophy.

Nishida employs combinations of the two terms “one” and “many” for the first time in 1916, observing that “the many requires the one, the one the many” (NKZ I: 343). In the following year he translated Hermann Cohen’s Einheit and Vielheit in Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness as ichi (one 一) and ta (many 多) (NKZ 2). Later he was to introduce various phrases describing the relationship between the principles of oneness and multiplicity as “the one of the many” (ta no ichi 多の一) (NKZ 2: 101), “one is many” (ichi wa sunawachi ta 一は即ち多) (NKZ 2: 106), “the one gives birth to the many, the many produces the one” (NKZ 4: 137), “the unity of the one and the many” (NKZ 4: 138), and “the one-and-yet-the-many, the many-and-yet-the-one” (ichi soku ta, ta soku ichi 一即多、多即一) (NKZ 7: 41). All these playful combinations of the terms “many” and “one” anticipate his later terminology and are clearly each designed to subvert the dualistic paradigm in a particular context. Nevertheless, it is his phrase “one-and-yet-many”—particularly if it is understood as the “self-identity of absolute contradictories”—that replaces the Leibnizian monad with a paradigm aimed at reconciling the principles of unity and multiplicity, universality and individuality.

To understand the paradigm shift envisioned by Nishida, it is important not to mistake the term “contradictories” (mujun 矛盾) as point-

8. It is somewhat puzzling that Nishida does not acknowledge that the phrase “one-and-yet-many” originated in the Huayan Buddhist tradition since he otherwise freely attributes the notion of “the unhindered penetration among phenomena” (jijimuge 事事無碍) to Huayan Buddhism. Just as puzzling, as I have argued elsewhere (KOPF 2005), is that commentators on Nishida’s use of Buddhism such as Nakayama Nobuji 中山延二, Takemura Makio 竹村牧男, Suetsuna Joichi 末綱恕一, Ōhashi, Ryōsuke 大橋良介, and Steve Odin ignore this terminological coincidence.
ing to the kind of logical contradiction implied, for example, in D. T. Suzuki’s interpretation of the *Diamond Sutra*. I believe that Nishida’s “self-identity of absolute contradictories” does not reject the logic of non-contradiction and Leibniz’s tautology; nor does it suggest that “A = not-A.” The object of his critique is rather the reification of the logical tautology as a “windowless monad.” What Nishida does reject is a metaphysical essentialism that claims a multiplicity of independent and self-sufficient essences. Such an essentialism he found to run counter to the facts and hence to be ultimately untenable. It seems to me that Nishida is not arguing that contraries are identical in any logical sense, but only that abstract concepts that imply a multiplicity of independent realities have to be subverted or deconstructed. The key to his philosophy lies in what he calls the “mutual determination” (sōgo gentei 相互限定) of the principles of identity and difference. In plain English, this means that difference applies not only to “external relations” but also to internal ones. The seeming contradictories of universal and particular, intimacy and integrity, community and self, are not “mutually exclusive” but “mutually inclusive.”

Nishida takes his clue for this notion of “mutual inclusion” (Park 2006, 11) and “internal difference” from the Huayan terminology of the “unhindered penetration of phenomena and the noumenon” (C. shishiwuai, J. jirimuge 事理無碍) and the “unhindered penetration among phenomena” (C. shishiwuai, J. jijimuge 事事無碍), even as he attributes the former of these two principles to Tiantai philosophy. What makes these terms difficult to understand is, of course, that they are removed from their native cultural and literary context in Tang Buddhist discussions of “buddha-nature” and its relationship to individual sentient beings. But if “unhindered penetration” is understood as a rejection of essences in

9. Suzuki suggests that “when we say A is A we mean that A is not A, therefore it is A” (SDZ 5: 380).

10. In his entry in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John Maraldo describes the philosophical project of Nishida as the “systematic deconstruction of logical relations” (Maraldo 1998, 13r).

11. I have argued this case more conclusively in Kopf 2004.

12. Compare Jin Park’s contrast between the paradigms of “mutual inclusion” and “mutual exclusion” (2006).
the sense of Leibniz’s “windowless monads,” and as the recognition that identities are neither timeless nor exclusive, the possibility of applying these terms to cosmopolitanism becomes more evident. In addition, the image of Indra’s net, which the Huayan tradition usually uses to illustrate the principle of the “unhindered penetration,” all but echoes the post-modern sense of identity as having no center and being located at the intersection of various cultural boundaries.

Huayan philosophy, and Nishida as well, add to this conception of identity a second dimension: the “unhindered penetration of phenomenon and noumenon.” This leads to the vision of a “paradoxical community,” the identity of whose members comprise the duality of a “separated self/shared self.” In this sense, Nishida (and the variety of the Mahāyāna Buddhist texts he evokes in his later work) embrace in one way or another the “mutual inclusion” of multiplicity and oneness.

In order to stratify this paradigm of “one-and-yet-many,” Nishida introduces the term “expression” (byōgen 表現) to address the structure of the “historical world,” linking this idea of “expression” to “Tiantai and Huayan” thought (NKZ 10: 438). He explains:

The particular expresses all other particulars ... the particular expresses, to some degree, the world.... The world forms itself through expression.... Our cognition... expresses the world.” (NKZ 10: 370)

In short, Nishida’s description of “expression” reveals four different modalities: (1) “the self-determination of the one”¹³ (ichi no jikogentei 一の自己限定); (2) “the mutual determination of the one and the individual” (ichi to kojin no sōgo gentei 一と個人の相互限定); (3) “the self-determination of the individual” (kojin no jikogentei 個人の自己限定); and (4) “the mutual determination among individuals” (kojin to kojin no sōgo gentei 個人と個人の相互限定). It is striking that once Nishida rejects the idea that individuals and communities constitute separate and autonomous essences, the interrelatedness of individuals, and of individual and

¹³. In The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy where Nishida introduces the four-fold modality of expression, he uses the terminology of “universal” (ippansha 一般者) and “particular” (kobutsu 個物) or “individual” (kojin 個人). To facilitate the application of this paradigm to the issue of cosmopolitanism, I will use the terms “one” (ichi 一) and “individual” instead.
community, comes to the fore while hierarchies and inequalities recede from view. Ueda Shizuteru illustrates this fourfold modality of “expression” by imagining someone thinking about the place where they live:

There is no escaping the fact that England and I cannot be separated. England is the country in which I reside, and I reflect England by living there…. Insofar as I reflect England, England is reflecting itself from within…. By internalizing the fact that I reflect England, I am also reflecting myself. (Ueda 1991, 309)

One might add that “insofar as I reflect England, which is reflected by the individuals living there, I reflect my fellow citizens.” In this way Ueda not only manages to concretize Nishida’s principle of “expression” but also to direct Nishida’s rather abstract discussion of the “historical world” to the specific issue of cosmopolitanism.

Mutai’s humanism

If Nishida stratified the paradigm of “mutual inclusion” in a way no one had done before, it was his disciple Mutai Risaku who would develop go on to Nishida’s terminology into a political philosophy that can provide a paradigm for cosmopolitanism. He did so, as I have tried to show, by combining Nishida’s philosophy of the “one-and-yet-the-many” with Tanabe Hajime’s notion of the “specific” (shu 種). In particular, Mutai enhanced the philosophy of his teacher in three significant ways. First, he introduced Tanabe’s notion of the “specific” as a principle of mediation into Nishida’s dialectic of the “many” and the “one.” Nishida himself had already intuited that reliance on a dual terminology could result in a dualism or, at least, in an unbalanced philosophi-

14. After Tanabe had introduced this term, Nishida used it for a while only to discard it again later. In 1941, he wrote that “in the historical and social life, the nation state forms a single world in the relationship to the absolute. We are born in the historically specific. We act in the historically specific. The specific is the paradigm of our activities. As the self-identity of the contradictories of the many and the one, the specific constitutes the society that lives in the form of the poesis-qua-praxis forms itself.” (NKZ 10: 172–3)
cal system prone to a certain measure of latent essentialism. It was for this reason that he experimented with Tanabe’s notion of the “specific” and articulated the concept of “expression” and phrases that combined opposites by means of the sinograph *soku*—for example, “one-and-yet-many” (*ichī soku ta* 一即多)—in lieu of appealing to a third term. Yet Nishida never felt comfortable with the terminological triad and preferred conceptual pairs when it came to political philosophy. Second, Mutai replaced the abstract principles of “oneness,” “manyness,” and the “specific” with precise terms inviting application to concrete questions of political philosophy. Finally, Mutai developed a philosophical system that neither privileged nor essentialized any of the three basic terms.

Like Tanabe before him, Mutai, introduced the term the “specific” to remedy what he considers the major flaws in Nishida’s system. Most of all, he believed that Nishida’s notions of individuality and universality constituted limit functions that could never be reached. To Mutai, the “one” embraces a spatio-temporal totality that cannot be completed before the end of time; the “individual,” on the other hand, constitutes an infinitely small, fleeting moment of experience. It is for this reason that Mutai suggests that the abyss between the infinitely small and ephemeral individual (*kotai* 個体) and the all-encompassing but never completed totality (*zentai* 全体) has to be “mediated” (*baikai* 媒介) by specific identities such as personal identity, culture, and religion. As a prototype of this third term, Mutai speaks of “society” (*shakai* 社会), though it should be noted that his descriptions of the “specific” apply to cultures, religions, and nations as well. These specific identities “express,” in Nishida’s sense of the word, the “individual” by particularizing the “world,” and the “totality” by generalizing the “individual.”

Mutai argues that the “specific,” which “mediates” between the “totality” and the individual,” constitutes a person’s concrete identity as constructed in the “historical world.” At the same time, Mutai cautions his readers that the concreteness of specific identities tempts theorists to mistake this constructed identity for the essence of what people and communities really are. In fact, there is a multiplicity of specifics; “specifics” are particulars (*tokushū* 特殊) and therefore subject to change. Identity discourses often fall into the trap of creating quasi-entities by reifying a
particular “specific.” The absolutization of what is “particular” or “specific,” he observes, leads to fascism (see Kopf 2009).

The discussion of the “specific” brings us to the heart of Mutai’s political philosophy, namely the threefold structure of the “historical world” (MRZ 4:73). To Mutai, the oneness of spatio-temporal “totality” is embodied in the “historical world.” He explains that “while the world is total and absolute [and one might add, inclusive], it is neither perfect nor complete” (4: 115). He chooses the term “historical world” to describe this totality in order to stress that “totality” does not indicate a reality separate from our historical reality but is something expressed there. What makes Mutai’s “world” transcendent is that it constitutes an open system whose completion is, to use a Derridean term, infinitely deferred. Philosophically, the “specific” functions as a principle of unity that prevents the world from breaking up into a multiplicity of parallel and unrelated universes. This unifying tendency of the “world” is set in opposition to the subjective activity of the “individual.” As noted above, the term “individual” does not imply a person-over-time but rather a moment of embodied self-awareness. The subjective activity of the “individual” ruptures and decentralizes the oneness of the “world” to introduce the element of multiplicity.

By the same token, the creativity of the “individual” transforms an otherwise stagnant and intransient world. In Mutai’s words, “the working of the active subject advances the universally expressive world in the form of the individual” (MRZ 4: 72). This does not mean that the “individual” is opposed to the “world. Indeed, Mutai observes that “while world and individual are opposed to each other, they are unified” (4: 85) Rather, as Nishida had already suggested, the individual is the world’s own “self-negation” (jikohitei 自己否定) and “expression.” This “expression”—which presupposes the opposition between “world” and “individual,” unity and multiplicity, changelessness and change—is made possible by the “specific society” (shuteki shakai 種的社会) that mediates between “world” and individual” and comprises “the basis of the mutual determination of the contradictories” (4: 85). The “specific” constitutes a “particular totality” (tokushuteki zentai 特殊的全体) (4: 84) as a “particular orientation” (tokushuteki hōkō 特殊的方向) (4: 83) of the “historical world”. Mutai alludes to this aspect of the mediating function of the
“specific” when he refers to the “specific society” or culture as “particular-yet-general” (tokushu soku fuhen 特殊即普遍) (4: 91).

Despite the terminological affinity of “totality” and “general” (fuhen 普遍)—the Japanese translation of the German word “das Allgemeine”—and despite the fact that he refers to the “specific” as a “small world” (shōsekai 小世界) (4: 59), Mutai is relentless in stressing that the “particular” and “specific” differ fundamentally from the “totality” of the “historical world”: while there exists a “multiplicity” (tasei 多性) (4: 50, 87) of “specifics,” there is only one “world.” This does not mean that he conceived of the “specific” and the “world” as absolutely irreconcilable and mutually exclusive contradictories. For him, the opposition between the absoluteness of the “world” and the relative nature of “society” is mediated by the subjectivity of the “active individual” (kōiteki kotai 行為的個体). The mediating element between the subjectivity of individual activities and the objectivity of our identities and “expressions,” meantime, is none other than the “world,” which, as a “totality,” includes and thus unites all existing phenomena.

As our analysis of Mutai’s terminology shows, his system discloses de facto three modalities of “mediation.” The “specific” mediates between universal and individual, the “individual” between relative and absolute, and the “world” between subjectivity and objectivity. It is important to note that in Mutai’s system none of these three modalities of “mediation” is given place of privilege over the others. This is one of the ways in which his notion of the “specific” differs significantly from Tanabe’s, who, at least in his The Logic of the Specific, privileged the “specific” as the principle of mediation and assigned it a special position vis-à-vis the “individual” and the “world.”15 Tanabe’s emphasis on the “specific” resulted in nationalist rhetoric. Mutai’s system, however, resists any axiological hierarchy and, subsequently, any kind of hegemonic discourse. Practically, this means not only that Mutai treats his three terms of “world,” “individual,” and “society” as equals, but further, that his system cannot be used to justify placing any “individual” over others,

15. In his later years, Tanabe introduced the concepts of “absolute critique” (zettai hihan 絶對批判) to complement his earlier notion of “absolute mediation” (zettai bai-kai 絶對媒介), thus subverting the hegemony of the “specific.”
any “society” over others, and even any kind of specific,” whether it be national, religious, cultural, or subcultural identity, over any others. This is why I am persuaded that Mutai’s application of Nishida’s philosophy of the “self-identity of the absolute contradictories of the many and the one” to the realities of the postcolonial world\(^{16}\) lays the groundwork for a philosophical paradigm and conceptual model that can help us theorize and understand cosmopolitanism as an ideology that gives equal value to individual autonomy and to the particularity of each culture and subculture without discarding universal principles, all the while not losing sight of the fact that all of us live in one and the same world.

In addition to providing a philosophical paradigm, Mutai’s terminology provides a key to understanding each of the four responses to the challenge of globalism discussed at the outset. Thus, we can say that premodern ethnocentrism, along with what Tillich considered the contemporary regression of nationalists to this premodern state of affairs, lies in the absolutization and totalization of one particular “specific,” regardless of whether it is a question of cultural, religious, or national identity. Ethnocentrism denies the diversity among the members of its own community, ignores the plurality of equally valid communities, and fails to appreciate the multifaceted nature of identity itself. It uses cultural essentialism to erect “glass curtains” and cognitive boundaries between communities and, in the process, inadvertently limit the member of its own community insofar as it mistakenly identifies one community with the “totality” of the “world.” Universalism, on the other hand, privileges the principle of oneness and unity to the detriment of the plurality and diversity of cultures. From the other side, localism sacrifices the unity and oneness of the “world” in order to preserve the uniqueness and self-determination of each particular community and, ultimately, of every individual. The price localism pays for its adherence to a unique identity is an inability to understand other communities and philosophical positions and, ultimately, even oneself.

\(^{16}\) As I have shown (Kopf 2009), Mutai assumes as the starting point for his humanism the two sometimes conflicting demands of peace and justice. In order to demonstrate that the latter requires self-determination, Mutai explicitly refers to independence struggle of formerly colonized communities.
Cosmopolitanism introduces the paradigm of “mutual inclusion” to eliminate the artificial barriers between cultures and to indicate that communities and even selves are not homogenous. While this conception alerts us to the presence of something “uncanny” in the world as well as within ourselves, matters do not stop there. In acknowledging the “uncanny” and the “unthought” in our own persons, cosmopolitanism accepts the cognitive limitations of human beings. If the very “totality” of the world remains infinitely incomplete, how much more so our knowledge of the “world” and of ourselves. By conceding the fundamental limits of knowing, we are in a better position to understand philosophical positions other than our own and to participate in variant cultural codes and practices. In other words, from a cosmopolitan perspective, I need not relate to other positions and identities simply in terms of identity or difference, but am free to embrace a twofold modality of identity-and-yet-difference.

Consequently, the study of philosophical positions need not be a matter of mere agreement or disagreement, but can become a search for similarities and differences that leads finally to understanding a multiplicity of positions. Naturally, such an argument invites an objection: Does not the call to understand all positions carry with it the inherent danger that all philosophical positions be counted as true or morally acceptable? What about morally reprehensible positions? Though this is not the place to enter into a full discussion, a cosmopolitanism based on Mutai’s humanism not only discourages immoral positions and behavior, it aims at exposing them. This is a function of the fact that it is governed by the principle of the “many-and-yet-the-one”: insofar as every “individual” and every “particular specific” “expresses” the totality of the “world” fully but not exhaustively, inclusion becomes the overriding moral principle. This is why we are able to insist that the characteristics of a cosmopolitan are familiarity with a multiplicity of cultural codes and the ability to be a “citizen of the world” in a “paradoxical world” where

17. Foucault suggests that the inclusion of the “unthought” into the “I think” collapses the duality of inclusion and exclusion (FOUCAULT 1994, 324–8).

18. In his description of the “totality” of the “world,” Mutai always reminds the reader that the metaphysical reality of “totality” cannot be divorced from our cognition of it.
“foreigners… are reconciled with themselves to the extent that they recognize themselves as foreigners” and to the extent that their “expression” constitutes an act of “self-negation.”

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