

frontiers of japanese philosophy 4

Also in this series . . .

Japanese Philosophy Abroad, ed. by James W. Heisig (Nanzan: 2004)

Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy, ed. by James W. Heisig (Nanzan: 2006)

Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 2: Neglected Themes and Hidden Variations, ed. by Victor Sōgen Hori and Melissa Anne-Marie Curley (Nanzan: 2008)

Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy 3: Origins and Possibilities, ed. by James W. Heisig and Uehara Mayuko (Nanzan: 2008)

frontiers of japanese philosophy 4

Facing the Twenty-First Century

edited by

Lam Wing-keung
and
Cheung Ching-yuen

NANZAN

Cover art by Claudio Bado

Copyright © 2009, Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture

Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture
18 Yamazato-chō, Shōwa-ku
466-8673 Nagoya
Japan

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture.

isbn 978-4-9904248-2-4

Printed in Japan

Contents

i Editors' Introduction

Why Japanese Philosophy Today?

- 7 An Alternative Notion of Practice in the Promise of Japanese Philosophy
– John C. Maraldo
- 22 A Phenomenoethics of Compassion: Modernity in the Non-Western World and its Potential in the Twenty-First Century
– Ōhashi Ryōsuke

Philosophizing the Tradition

- 37 The Restoration of Confucianism in China and Japan: A New Source of Morality and Religion
– Nakajima Takahiro
- 51 From Heideggerian Reduction to a Phenomenology of the “Name”: A Reinterpretation of Japanese Pure Land Thought
– Taguchi Shigeru
- 65 Experience and Identity: *Umaretsuki* in the Writings of Motoori Norinaga
– Kim Tae-ho
- 76 Between the Global and the Local: Applying the Logic of the One and the Many to a Global Age
– Gereon Kopf

90	Aging, Dying, and Bereavement in Contemporary Japan – Carl Becker
nishida kitarō and beyond	
119	Nishida Kitarō as Philosopher of Science – Noe Keiichi
127	The Potential of Nishida’s “Encompassing” Language – Jacynthe Tremblay
135	The Shift in Nishida’s Logic of Place – Huang Wen-hong
152	Japanese Aspects of Nishida’s <i>Basho</i> : Seeing the “Form without Form” – Uehara Mayuko
165	The Potential and Limits of Nishida Kitarō’s Philosophy – Cheung Ching-yuen
176	Kōyama Iwao’s <i>Philosophy of World History</i> : Discussions with Suzuki Shigetaka – Sugawara Jun
chinese and korean connections	
195	The Formation of Modern Ethics in China and Japan: The Contributions of Inoue Tetsujirō and Cai Yuan-pei – Chen Wei-fen
211	Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy – Michel Dalsier

251	Assimilation and Dissimilation in Japanese and Chinese Philosophy – Lam Wing-keung
264	Thinking and Perceiving: Nishida and Park as Embodied Subjects? – Huh Woo-sung
293	Contributors
299	Index of Personal Names

Editors' Introduction

This book was compiled from an International Conference entitled “Envisioning the Potential of Japanese and Chinese Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century,” which was held in Hong Kong from 13 to 15 December 2008. The event brought together experts from East and West for a fruitful and fascinating exchange.

Japanese philosophy has undoubtedly found an international platform over the last couple of decades. A growing number of translations of Japanese-language texts such as works by Japanese philosophers and scholarship on Japanese philosophy and the Kyoto School can now be found in English, German, French, Spanish, Italian, and other languages. At the same time, except for a handful of Chinese and Korean translations and monographs, very little work on Japanese philosophy has been done in the “East.” Recognizing the need to take constructive steps in this direction, we attempted to focus on the relationship between Japanese and Chinese philosophy, a subject on which further research remains to be done.

From Nishi Amane’s translation of “philosophy” into *tetsugaku* 哲学 to the establishment of philosophy as an academic discipline at the University of Tokyo in the nineteenth century, philosophy has developed strongly in Japan. Courses in Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and Indian philosophy have been offered at the university level for some time, but until the establishment of a department of the History of Japanese Philosophy at Kyoto University in 1995, courses in Japanese philosophy were hard to come by. The debate continues over the question of whether there is indeed anything that might be called “Japanese philosophy” and whether Nishida Kitarō was in fact the first Japanese philosopher. What is more, there is little doubt that the philosophical movements that have occurred in Japan over the last century and a half have had a tremendous impact on Japanese intellectual history. Meanwhile, China has also put considerable effort into receiving and

confronting Western philosophy. Comparable to the “Kyoto School,” contemporary Neo-Confucianism or New Confucianism (新儒家) may be considered a philosophical “school” representing an important turn in the philosophical development of China during the twentieth century.

Unlike Chinese philosophy, however, Japanese philosophy has not yet received wide recognition in academia East or West as a formal discipline. While there are courses in Japanese philosophy offered in various universities around the world, they are rarely given equal status with Western, Chinese, or Indian philosophy. As John Maraldo has pointed out, “A sign of the predominant use of the term *tetsugaku* in Japanese academia today is the division of university departments. In addition to ‘pure philosophy’ and the ‘history of Western philosophy,’ there may be academic programs in ‘Chinese philosophy’ and ‘Indian philosophy’ (not in ‘Japanese philosophy!’); but these latter programs in fact comprise the philological and historical study of classics and require no training in Western philosophy.”¹ Maraldo’s exclamation mark is indicative not only of his own disappointment but of a growing dissatisfaction among academics who take Japanese philosophy seriously.

The same holds true in Hong Kong, a city that lies on the edge of “East” and “West.” Western, Chinese, and Indian philosophies are taught in departments of philosophy, but at present very few courses are offered in Japanese philosophy. If the present collection of essays aims to take a small step in the direction of addressing this imbalance, it does so self-consciously in the spirit of a wider concern that seems to be marking our turn to the twenty-first century: the desire to promote plurality within our growing symbiosis as a human community.

The essays collected in the following pages, all contributed by specialists in Japanese philosophy, fall into four sections, dealing respectively with the rationale for Japanese philosophy today, the philosophizing of Japanese tradition, the philosophical thought of Nishida Kitarō and

1. John Maraldo, “Tradition, Textuality, and the Trans-lation of Philosophy,” *Japan in Tradition and Postmodern Perspectives*. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Steven Heine, eds. (New York: sun y Press, 1995), 230.

efforts to move beyond it, and connections with Chinese and Korean philosophies.

In the first section, essays by John Maraldo and Ōhashi Ryōsuke remind us of the promise and potential of Japanese philosophy conveyed in the twentieth-first century. Section two comprises of papers by Nakajima Takahiro, Taguchi Shigeru, Kim Tae-ho, Gereon Kopf, and Carl Becker, and together give us a glimpse into an intellectual history not widely known outside of Japan or associated with “philosophy.” In section three, the focus is on the tradition surrounding the thought of Nishida Kitarō and its critique, with essays contributed by Noe Kei-ichi, Jacynthe Tremblay, Huang Wen-hong, Uehara Mayuko, Cheung Ching-yuen, and Sugawara Jun. Whether or not Nishida is the “first” philosophical mind in Japanese history, there is no overlooking his contribution and the stimulus it has given contemporary philosophy both inside Japan and abroad. In the final section, essays by Chen Wei-fen, Michel Dalissier, Lam Wing-keung, and Huh Woo-sung unveil a very different but important area in the study of Japanese philosophy, namely, its connections with Chinese and Korean philosophies. No serious student of Japanese philosophy can afford to ignore its connections, root and branch, with the thought of China and Korea.

As James Heisig has suggested, all of this belongs to the wider task of redefining philosophy itself for the twenty-first century.² The attention that philosophy has attracted in Japan over the last one hundred and fifty years cannot simply be brushed aside. Today, it can be said, “Japanese philosophy belongs to the world,”³ and we who live in this *world* need to work together to raise awareness of the fact. As Dominik Perler has noted, “Japanese philosophy is not simply one more field of specialization for experts. It poses a challenge for all Western philosophers to critically reflect on their own tradition.”⁴ To fulfill this role a place for Japanese philosophy must be found in academia alongside other philosophies of the world—not simply to challenge the West, but also to engage

2. See James Heisig, ed. *Japanese Philosophy Abroad* (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2004).

3. James Heisig, “Foreword,” *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy* (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, 2006), xii.

4. Dominik Perler, “Preface,” *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy*, x.

in dialogue with the rich philosophical heritage of China, Korea, and other countries of the “East.”

There are many people to thank for making this book possible. The Japan Foundation lent its support through the Grant Program for Intellectual Exchange Conferences. The Centre for Religious and Spirituality Education at The Hong Kong Institute of Education, and the Department of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong were also generous in providing financial, physical, and human resources for the conference and its publication. We wish also to acknowledge the stimulus given by the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong. Special thanks go to Lai Siu-mai, Chan Tsam-wai, Lee Sin-sin, Lee Chun-wing, Hedy Chu and Isaac Lowe. Without their untiring efforts, none of this would have been possible. James Heisig and David White of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture assisted in the actual preparation of the material for publication in book form. Last, but certainly not least, we wish to extend our gratitude to the contributors themselves, who bear witness to the lively debate going on at the frontiers of Japanese philosophy and its promise for the future.

Lam Wing-keung
Cheung Ching-yuen
Hong Kong, 17 April 2009

Why Japanese Philosophy Today?

An Alternative Notion of Practice in the Promise of Japanese Philosophy

John C. Maraldo

My reflections concerning an alternative notion of practice, form part of what I call the promise of Japanese philosophy. By that phrase I wish to point us to the future, a future that must incorporate the past of a vast tradition of thought and activity. The promise of Japanese philosophy points to the contributions that this tradition has yet to make. And the promise relies on us, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, European and North American students of that multi-faceted tradition. It is we who face the challenge of demonstrating the relevance and the significance of philosophical traditions barely studied in the mainstream academic philosophy that dominates European and North American universities. I am particularly interested in contributions to contemporary discussions among Anglo-American and European philosophers who so far have not been much interested in Asian philosophical thought. I will not be speaking about just what defines this thought as Asian and as philosophical, but I do want to comment on my use of the term *Japanese philosophy* here—not once again to try to define it but rather to acknowledge its roots and sources. I will more often use the term *Sino-Japanese philosophy* to indicate the profound influence of Chinese thought on the Japanese islands, including the thought that came to Japan through the Korean

peninsula. I wish to stress here the Chinese and Korean roots of Japanese philosophy, as strong as the European influence on modern thought in Japan has been.¹

My intent is to investigate possible contributions in the form of alternatives. My ultimate aim is to clarify a number of classical oppositions in mainstream philosophical traditions and show how Sino-Japanese philosophy can offer valuable alternatives. I have in mind alternatives to traditional oppositions that define many problems of interest to mainstream philosophers in Europe and the Americas. These oppositions include:

theory and practice
 autonomy and dependence, or agency and passivity
 fact and value, or descriptive and normative
 experience and language
 individual and communal
 self and other
 self and world, or mind and world
 passive and active resistance as responses to violence or attack
 culture and nature
 mind and matter, or consciousness and brain.

Each of the alternatives deserves a chapter of its own, with another chapter explaining the way that they are intertwined. That is the larger project. But here I will have time to present only part of one of them. Later I will return to the question of how alternatives might work—how they can offer a different way of dealing with classical oppositions and what exactly their promise is.

to Ward an alternative to the opposition
 between theory and practice

The traditional tension between theory and practice is an area where Sino-Japanese philosophy provides a revealing alternative. Contemporary thought understands practice as divided from a goal that is

1. For further reflections on the notion of Japanese Philosophy, see Maraldo 2004.

the point of an activity or action, the real reason for doing something. Theory on the other hand is thought to be removed from reality and, if value-free, then unable to tell us how things should be. Philosophy in the West counts for the most part as a theoretical discipline. Indeed the mainstream tradition has long been determined by the Greek distinction between the theoretical or contemplative life, and the life of action concerned with practical matters of everyday living. Although the legacy of Socrates cared about how to live a good life as much as how to think rationally, the predominant tendency even in Socrates was first to think through and test the consistency of one's views, and only then to live accordingly. "Think first, then act," has been the pervading principle. *Know-how*, knowing how to do something, has taken second place to *knowing that* something is the case, because philosophy seeks truth and truth, according to the tradition, is instantiated in propositions, not in actions.

To be sure, today we see a lot of emphasis on the applications of philosophical discourse, especially in relatively new subfields such as applied ethics and practical philosophy.² Social and political philosophers increasingly see their job as the application, and not only the analysis, of principles and ideas. Yet there is a fundamental difference between the ideas of applied philosophy and notions that we find in several East-Asian philosophical traditions— notions of knowing by way of practice. Let me try to clarify this difference.

To apply some principle or technique means that we already have a clearly defined principle or theory at our disposal. We might apply the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number to a particular way of doing business, for example; or we might apply game theory to particular studies of the kind of choices people make. In these cases, the general theoretical idea comes first, which afterwards can be developed into a particular practice or way of doing something. Of course

2. A new MA program in "Practical Philosophy and Applied Ethics" at my former institution, the University of North Florida, "seeks to foster application of ethical and philosophical knowledge to concerns in social, political, economic, and cultural life. The primary objective is to offer practically oriented but philosophically grounded expertise in ethics and normative theory generally." <www.unf.edu/coas/philosophy/graduate.html>. Here again we see the focus on application.

the theoretical idea may be discovered by trial and error, or by some activity, but its validity is usually considered independent of its discovery and much more general than the particular process that revealed it. So the first thing we can say tells us what practice in the alternative mode is not: *Practicing does not mean applying previously learned knowledge, that is, a prior theory or principle; it is not a matter of application at all.* To define practice more positively we need to look at some examples.

Let us suppose that one wants to know how to act properly in a particular kind of situation. A contrast between Socrates' method and that of Confucius seems to illustrate two different ways to teach and learn. In Socrates' dialogue with Euthyphro the issue is how to act in a manner that exemplifies *hosion*. *Hosion* is often translated as *piety*, but I think it is very close to what Confucius meant by *li* (禮), which we may call *ritual propriety*. Socrates questions Euthyphro who thinks it is pious or righteous to prosecute his own father for causing the death of a servant. Socrates tests the consistency of the definitions of *hosion* that Euthyphro offer, and exposes the contradictions and ambiguities in his understanding. This dialogue typifies the Socratic *elenchus* or cross-examination in a step-by-step, logical progression. This method does not always lead to a definite conclusion, but is nevertheless considered valuable for the method it teaches.

The *Analects* of Confucius, on the other hand, contain little discursive, logical progression but much exemplification. Confucius uses language more as indication than as a tool of discursive reasoning. He teaches by pointing out examples of actions that one can emulate, not by leading one through a series of propositions to arrive at the right definition. Recall the story about a man who thinks it upright (直) to report his father to the authorities for having stolen a sheep. Confucius replies that in his part of the country one would act differently, for it is upright to cover up for one's father (*Analects* 13:18). The point I want to make has nothing to do with what sounds like ethical relativism ("in our part of the country as opposed to yours"), or with some ideal of filial piety overriding legal justification. Rather, I would like us to notice the relative lack of discourse in this exchange. Confucius does not discursively examine a set of attempted definitions of uprightness to test their validity; he merely points out an example of how one acts rightly. One is to learn

proper action by doing, not by testing the consistency of one's thinking and then applying it.

Does the episode in the *Analects* exemplify the alternative kind of practice whereas the Platonic dialogue does not? I think that we can find something of the alternative sense of practice in both texts, though only in part and with priorities that differ from it. The discursive reasoning that Socrates leads us through actually takes practice, repeated practice, especially for students new to this form of thinking. To be able to think in this way one must do more than read through the dialogue a single time; rather one must enact discursive reasoning in a number of different situations. *How to do that* is what Socrates is trying to teach us: how to think and subsequently how to act accordingly. Here the priority remains: right thinking first, then right action; but right thinking is also a matter of practice.

To understand Confucius, on the other hand, one must do more than look at a particular example of upright action in one episode recorded in the *Analects*. One must rather look at the context of many such episodes. Only by seeing what Confucius points out repeatedly can one begin to live the lesson he wants to teach, to become an example oneself. There the priority is: see (that is, understand) over and over again, and right action follows of itself. This "seeing" is akin to the original meaning of the Greek θεωρεῖν. A kind of theory is at work in Confucian examples too, though not I think a theory that is first articulated in language and then applied to actions. In summary, if Socratic thinking and Confucian seeing both involve practice, this practice arises not after a theory is articulated but rather in the course of a theorizing or seeing, during an exercise in reasoning or in exemplifying. The thinking and seeing themselves are forms of acting or doing.

This reflection offers a step towards a more positive description of the alternative notion of practice. We can note three things so far: *Practice is a matter of training that involves attention and repetition; it is a matter of getting good at something, of performing well; and it presents thinking and seeing as part of doing, of action.*

What about the normative dimension? What about the question of the value, the goodness or the evil, of what one is doing? After all, one might get good at abusing others or at murdering them. It seems one

can practice evil as well as good. To put it this way however implies that we have a prior standard of good and evil and then judge a particular practice as more or less good. By putting it this way, we fall back into the same old oppositions—between theory as principle and practice as application, and between normative and descriptive. I will have to defer an answer to this important question on this occasion; it will require a separate discussion. For now we can indicate how virtuous behavior entails practice.

Learning by doing is actually at work in Aristotle's notion of virtue or *aretē*. One learns what the virtue of courage is, for example, by practicing courage, by being courageous. When judged by the strictures of logical discourse this sort of reasoning appears circular. To know what courage is, one has to practice courage. But how does one tell whether it is courage that she is practicing? How could she tell the difference between a courageous action and a cowardly or a rash one? It seems that she must already know what courage is. This impasse is broken, however, when we see the issue from a different perspective. Courage, or any virtue for that matter, is not the sort of thing that can be grasped by a general definition that is subsequently applied. Whatever general ideas one has about courage, for example, must be tested by actions, by repeated actions that let one get the hang of the thing and perform it excellently, almost by second nature. For Aristotle, to be sure, there is a measure to tell one is practicing courage rather than cowardice or foolhardiness. But this measure, the "golden mean" between the extremes of excess and deficiency, is again something that must be learned or embodied in concrete situations. The golden mean is not first defined discursively and then applied to particular situations. Rather, one learns the virtue of courage as a particular disposition (*hexis*) by experiencing a range of actions and attitudes and finding the mean.³ I think that Aristotle's account of the virtues pro-

3. Contrary to my interpretation one might object that determining the golden mean for Aristotle requires more than learning through practicing different actions; it requires practical reason. Consider Richard Kraut's interpretation:

The intermediate point that the good person tries to find is "determined by *logos* (reason, account) and in the way that the person of practical reason would determine it" (1107a, 1-2). To say that such a person 'sees' what to do is simply a way of registering the point that the good person's reasoning does

vides an early Greek example of the kind of practice I am talking about, but perhaps I was able to understand it this way only from a perspective I happened to gain from Japanese philosophy.

Often this perspective can help us better understand a mainstream European text or author. Consider the interpretation of Aristotle that says a virtue is a habit that allows one to achieve his or her purpose, so that we need an account of what the human purpose is in order to define human virtues. Suppose we say, following Aristotle, that the purpose or goal (*telos*) of humans is to achieve *eudaimonia*, and that a moral virtue like courage will help us achieve this state. We then know more or less what is courageous and what is not by the measure of achieved *eudaimonia*. Yet we still must have an experiential basis for telling whether this *eudaimonia* is present—all the more so if *eudaimonia* means more than a fleeting feeling of happiness. Like the virtues (*aretē*) themselves, *eudaimonia* cannot be defined propositionally or discursively; it must be lived, and it is lived through practices.

This leads to a fourth characteristic of the alternative notion of practice: *practice defines an activity that is an end in itself, not a means to an end different in kind from the activity*. The notions of the practical and the theoretical stance are fairly complex in Plato and Aristotle,⁴ but in

succeed in discovering what is best in each situation. He is “as it were a standard and measure” in the sense that his views should be regarded as authoritative by other members of the community. A standard or measure is something that settles disputes; and because good people are so skilled at discovering the mean in difficult cases, their advice must be sought and heeded. (Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2008 Edition, Edward N. Zalta, ed., url: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/aristotle-ethics/>>)

Yet if determining the mean requires practical reason, we may note that the exercise of practical reason is also a practice, at which the good person excels and thus serves as a standard, a person remarkably similar to the Confucian exemplary person 君子. Aristotle appeals to *logos* not only as a prior standard to be applied but as a measure itself learned through practical reasoning: the mean is “determined by logos and in the way that the person of practical reason would determine it.”

4. Richard Parry details the complexity of the Greek notions of theory and practice in the context of the differences between *epistēmē* and *technē*. “The relation, then, between *epistēmē* and *technē* in ancient philosophy offers an interesting contrast with our own notions about theory (pure knowledge) and (experience-based) practice.”

general for Plato practice signifies an activity that results in something separate from the activity itself. Aristotle, on the other hand, clearly recognizes that there is a kind of practice, namely *praxis*, which unlike *poiesis* does not result in a product (*ergon*) separate from the activity, and virtue is the disposition to this kind of action. But Aristotle does demand that both *praxis* and *poiesis* be based on a theoretical account, a *logos*, that is separate from the doing or the making and that informs and guides them.

We can now say more precisely what I said before: the alternative notion of practice presents thinking and seeing as part of doing, of action, but the thinking or seeing is not a separable part as in Aristotle. There is no separate articulated account that is essential to inform or guide the activ-

Plato seems more clearly to identify the practical side with activities that produce things different from the activity itself. In several dialogues, Plato implies “there is a distinction between theoretical and practical *technai*.” Parry notes that in several dialogues

...the *ergon* of a craft [*technē*] is its goal, the goal is frequently identified with a result separate from the activity of the craft... Practical *technē* brings into existence products separate from the *technē* itself, while theoretical *technē* does not.

For Aristotle the issue is more complex. There is a theoretical side to *technē* in that it is based on *logos*: “Aristotle refers to *technē* or craft as itself also *epistēmē* or knowledge because it is a practice grounded in an ‘account’— something involving theoretical understanding.” Two distinctions are clearer: first, that between practical thinking (*praktikē dianoia*), where “we attain truth and falsity with respect to action,” and theoretical thinking (*theōrētikē dianoia*) that “attains truth and falsity”; and secondly, especially in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, between two kinds of activity: making something (*poiēton*) or an activity that is a means to an end, and action (*praktikon*) that is an end in itself. Parry writes:

Presumably Aristotle means to distinguish between activity, whose end is in itself, and making, whose end is a product separate from the activity of making. When someone plays the flute, e.g., typically there is no further product of playing; playing the flute is an end in itself.

Similarly, in the case of virtue, the activity itself is the end; there is no product separate from the virtuous activity. To these distinctions is added one closer to the classical division between theory and practice: In the *Posterior Analytics*,

Scientific [or theoretical] knowledge concerns itself with the world of necessary truths, which stands apart from the world of everyday contingencies, the province of craft [*technē*]. (“Episteme and Techne,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *ut supra*, url: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/episteme-techne/>>)

ity. One learns by doing and absorbs the learning, as it were, so that the guidance is internal to the activity. The guiding reason is found not in a separate linguistic account or *logos* but in the 道理 or 筋道 of the activity: the thread or pattern that one learns by taking the path. *Practice in the alternative meaning is theoretical in the sense that it is a seeing as well as a doing, which means that practice embodies both its knowledge or know-how and its goal.*⁵ Again, in the alternative view, thinking and seeing themselves approximate forms of practice. (The philosopher who for me has best articulated thinking as a practice is Martin Heidegger. His essay, *Was ist das—die Philosophie?*, proceeds to answer the question not with a definition or series of propositions but by leading the reader down a path, the path he describes as thinking.)

To be sure, some important questions are left unanswered here. What defines a path or distinguishes one activity from others? How is one to tell the right way from deviant ways? These are questions of criteria, and once again suggest the normative issue and the task of demonstrating an alternative to the opposition between normative and descriptive. Here I would only note that the alternative notion of practice requires an alteration in our notions of criteria and testing. The usual meaning of criterion is an outside, ideally objective measure of the rightness, wrongness, or appropriateness of something. The alternative sense of measure would need to be generated on the inside as it were, from out of the activity itself.

Some examples of the alternative notion of practice

Where do we find the alternative notion of practice in Japanese philosophers? Certainly it is evident in Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*, in fascicles such as the *Bendōwa* that speaks of practice as the manifestation of realization or enlightenment, and of practice as beginningless and realization

5. It would be premature to claim that such practice is self-corrective. Certainly it is not self-corrective in the sense that some machines with “self-guidance” systems are; they respond to a prior computer program.

as endless. Dōgen's sense of practice as manifestation explicitly subverts the difference between means and end, just as his examples implicitly undermine the classical Western difference between mind and body. On the one hand, because practice takes bodily form, engages the practitioner bodily and disengages discursive thought, it does not fall into the category of mental activity as opposed to physical behavior. On the other hand, because practice requires acute attention it does not fall onto the opposite side of body in the classical Cartesian distinction. Thus we can add to our list of features of the alternative notion: *practice engages the practitioner bodily as well as mentally, or better: it engages the practitioner as a whole*. Japanese philosophers like Nishitani Keiji and Yuasa Yasuo have expanded upon this aspect of practice. Regarding the necessity of the bodily aspect, however, we might raise a further question.

Earlier I remarked that the discursive reasoning and right thinking that Socrates would teach us approximate practice in the alternative sense; discursive reasoning takes practice and is meant to be enacted in a number of different situations. That enactment might be considered a purely mental exercise, however, so where is the bodily engagement there? Since Socrates wants us to act *upon* the reasoning, that is, to act *after* it is performed and *in accordance with* it, many people would regard the performance of reasoning as purely mental. Think and see first, then take action. This priority explains why I implied that the exercise of discursive reasoning approximates but does not quite embody the alternative sense of practice. This aspect of practice may also give us a hint as to why discursive reasoning seems lacking in texts like Dōgen's. Dōgen practiced thinking and composing essays as well as contemplating koans and “just sitting” or *shikantaza*. There may be a “logic” to his essays but they do not exemplify a step-by-step discursive argument. Might it be that his practice of writing and lecturing were exercises in embodied attention, whereas discursive reasoning is practiced and taught as a disengagement with the body?

Turning now to another place where the alternative notion is implied, we can mention Nishida Kitarō's philosophy. Recall Nishida's “action-oriented intuition” (行為的直観), and his *From the Acting to the Seeing* (働くものから見るものへ). Both expressions reverse the usual sequence of “think and understand first, then act.” Although the essays in *From the Acting*

to the Seeing are primarily about a theory of consciousness, the title suggests that seeing or understanding proceeds from acting. The essays that develop the notion of 行為の直観 propose a reciprocity between action and intuition, so that we could also speak of “intuition-oriented action” or simply of “action-intuition.” Nishida’s preferred term suggests that acting and seeing are not only connected but that seeing or understanding is performative and productive. (Thus the term might also be translated as “performative intuition.”) Seeing is not a passive taking-in of objects, and acting is not acting on things, or merely producing things outside oneself.

Consider the difference between Nishida’s artistic creativity as a model of action-oriented intuition, and Aristotle’s *poiesis*. As we have seen, Aristotle distinguishes making something (*poiēton*) from action (*praktikon*). The latter activity constitutes an end in itself, whereas the end of making “is a product separate from the activity of making.”⁶ Both virtuous acting and making things well are guided by the proper disposition (*hexis*), and both involve an account or *logos* of the acting or making, so that Aristotle, unlike Nishida, also emphasizes the rational side of these forms of acting: practical reasoning is based on the accounts *technē* and *aretē* can give. Nishida on the other hand emphasized the bodily, historical, and “intuitive” nature of the activity. Nishida does not distinguish sharply between *poiesis* and *praxis* in Aristotle’s sense, that is, between an activity that produces objects separate from the activity of making them, on the one hand, and an activity that is an end in itself. Nor does he distinguish sharply between the activity itself and an account of it, a *logos* that guides practical reasoning.

Both distinctions are undercut, or should we say grounded, in a more fundamental attunement, an action-oriented intuition. One model of this performative intuition is artistic creation, which is of course productive, but we would misunderstand it if we saw the produced work as an end separate from the activity itself. What is “produced,” to use that term, is the artist herself, as the embodiment of the activity, as well as the historical world as its inseparable context. The twentieth-century master of calligraphy, Morita Shiryū, influenced no doubt by Nishida,

6. Parry, Richard, *loc. cit.*, note 4 above.

spoke of the calligrapher and her brush as creating one another, making each being what it actively is in a virtually endless web of relationships called the world (Morita 1970, 124–5). Again, in contrast to Aristotle, the production or rather creation would be misunderstood if we saw it as an application of practical reasoning.

To be sure, there is also an epistemological side to Nishida's action-oriented intuition. The kind of knowing or *epistēmē* that is involved in this intuition is a coming to know by way of interacting with things. What comes to be known is not a world outside oneself. With echoes of Wang Yangming's "unity of knowledge and action" (知行合一), Nishida implies that knowledge entails action; it does not proceed merely from a mental activity of forming beliefs about the world and then mentally confirming or disconfirming them, which are basically theoretical activities. In Nishida there is indeed a theory side, the side of seeing called "intuition" 直観, but unlike the usual connotation of the word, this action-oriented intuition is not a grasp that takes in every relevant thing at once⁷; rather, it is a process and achievement of the embodied self. Using the modern meanings of the words, there is also an "objective" side, or better said, a contra-subjective side to action-oriented intuition: it requires a displacement of the self-centered self or self-conscious self that would act *upon* things rather than interact with them.

To use the calligrapher Morita's example, the person gives herself up in the interaction with the brush, ink, paper, and environment. The calligrapher comes to know a world partially of her own making, and comes to know herself as progressively made by that world. If there is a process of reasoning here it is a give and take, a back and forth, between self and other, rather than an application of an account of the goal. Nishida's action-oriented intuition exemplifies the alternative sense of practice in which neither the goal nor the accounting is a separate thing from the activity itself.

We would limit the field too much, however, if we were to look for the alternative notion of practice only in Buddhist writers or Japanese philosophers inspired by Buddhism. Confucian thinkers both in China

7. Cestari 1998, 194, referring to 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2nd edition, 1965–1966), 4: 566–6

and in Japan also exhibited this notion of practice, in at least some of its features. One example from Japan is the thought of Ogyū Sorai. John Tucker notes that

Sorai emphasized practice as a way to learn, one that was more effective than book learning and the study of texts. In effect, what he advocated was learning how to do something rather than learning how to understand. Or, more positively, he believed that understanding was physical, with the ability to practice something as evidence of one's understanding of it.

This seems to go beyond even Zhu Xi, who “affirmed the value of theoretical study through book learning, but ultimately thought that had to be expressed in the practical world.”⁸ An example from China is the thought of Wang Yangming, the founder of the other major school of Neo-Confucianism. It would be worthwhile to explore Wang Yang-ming's idea of “forming one body with the universe and all things,” as well as his idea of unifying knowledge and action, as sources for understanding practice in an alternative sense.

To sum up the alternative notion of practice, I will attempt a definition that rephrases the features I have mentioned. *By practice I mean action done over and over again, performed for its own sake but with a learning curve toward improvement, with the whole person, “body and soul,” engaged; that is, with attentive seeing or know-how built into the action.* I use the word “action” instead of “activity,” because action implies bodily activity. No doubt this long definition will need to be refined. For now I want to reiterate that I have found this sense of practice most pronounced and best articulated in Sino-Japanese philosophies, although by no means is it totally absent in traditional European philosophy. Indeed in classical Greek philosophy we can also find an alternative to the theory-practice opposition⁹ that shares some features of my alternative notion. Again,

8. Personal communication from John Tucker, 10 October 2008. See also John Tucker, “Japanese Confucian Philosophy,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), url: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/japanese-confucian/>>

9. Richard Parry presents the difference and the overlap between *epistēmē* and *technē* as an alternative to the modern difference between theory and practice:

however, the Greek alternative insists on a rational account separate from the practice and so differs from the internal feedback, if you will, of the Sino-Japanese alternative.

the function of alternatives

As you may have guessed, this alternative to the opposition between practice and theory overlaps in part with alternatives to the oppositions *mind versus body*, *normative versus descriptive*, and *agency versus passivity*. These connections will have to be explicated on a different occasion. I do, however, want to say something about the whole notion of alternative.

What are my alternatives supposed to do? What is their function, their power or promise, their limits or bounds? To give a very brief and insufficient answer, I have in mind a kind of alternative that is not necessarily a replacement or substitution, an *Ersatz* for an opposition. Nor do I seek another way to dissolve the opposition by reducing one side to the other—theory to practice, for example. Finally, the kind of alternative I propose does not forge the two sides of an opposition together into an overarching synthesis, or combine parts of each side to form a new notion. My aim is rather threefold: to expose unnoticed assumptions in traditional oppositions; to reveal the underlying basis of a tension, or the

Epistēmē is the Greek word most often translated as knowledge, while *technē* is translated as either craft or art. These translations, however, may inappropriately harbor some of our contemporary assumptions about the relation between theory (the domain of ‘knowledge’) and practice (the concern of ‘craft’ or ‘art’). Outside of modern science, there is sometimes skepticism about the relevance of theory to practice because it is thought that theory is conducted at so great a remove from reality, the province of practice, that it can lose touch with it. In fact, at the level of practice, concrete experience might be all we need. And within science, theory strives for a value-free view of reality. As a consequence, scientific theory cannot tell us how things should be—the realm of ‘art’ or ‘craft.’ So we must turn elsewhere for answers to the profound, but still practical, questions about how we should live our lives. However, some of the features of this contemporary distinction between theory and practice are not found in the relation between *epistēmē* and *technē*. (*loc. cit.*)

context that makes the distinction possible; and to accommodate rather than discard the reasons behind the opposition.

My hope is ultimately to transform the arena in which philosophy is practiced. In the case of practice, the potential of the alternative is to heal the divide between theory and practice and make philosophy, traditionally a very theoretical discipline, more relevant to everyday life in society. I fear that I have scarcely approached this ambitious aim in these pages, but I think of it as a goal that must be pursued within the practice of philosophizing together.

References

Cestari, Matteo

1998 “The Knowing Body: Nishida’s Philosophy of Active Intuition,” *The Eastern Buddhist* 31/2:179-208

Maraldo, John C.

2004 “Defining Philosophy in the Making,” in *Japanese Philosophy Abroad*, ed. James W. Heisig (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture), 220–45.

Morita Shiryū 森田子龍

1970 「抽象絵画」 [Calligraphy and abstract painting], in 『森田子龍第一作品集』 [A first collection of the works of Morita Shiryū] (Kyoto: Bokubi Press), 120–33.

A Phenomenoetics of Compassion

Modernity in the Non-Western World and its Potential in the Twenty-First Century

Ōhashi Ryōsuke

Philosophical potential exists in a unique form in Eastern Asia, where classical spiritual traditions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Islam have deep roots. In comparison with the economic and military spheres, it may be said that this potential has yet to be sufficiently developed. Such development would not merely effect changes in the humanities, like philosophy, but would constitute an “event” in the history of civilization. It would realign the forms of the expression of self-awareness that any civilization in the modern era should have.

The modernity that began in the West has encountered various difficulties, giving rise to critical reflections on Western philosophy since the twentieth century, or, if we take Kierkegaard and Nietzsche into consideration, since the latter half of the nineteenth century. The explosive progress in the modernity of the non-Western world in the twenty-first century seems to indicate a new phase in the paradigms of thought. In the past, the critiques of modernity belonged to the self-consciousness of the West. Up until at least the first half of the twentieth century, modernity was essentially an expansion of concentric circles centered on the Western world, which has continued to innovate and change on the basis

of its own classical traditions. But the twentieth century was also the century in which the modernization of the non-Western world began. For Japan, the beginning of modernization dates back to the last three decades of the nineteenth century. This overlapped with Westernization, so that the process represented at the same time an innovation of Japan's own classical traditions. To question tradition is to question the identity of one's own world.

In the twenty-first century a new situation may be expected. The Western essence of modernity will be brought into question, and with it, its self-evidence. According to current statistical estimates, the economy of the Republic of China will surpass that of the U.S. in 2020, and the economic production of India will be almost half of the latter. For reference purposes, Japan's economy is currently one-third that of the U.S. The data suggests that not only is the non-Western world going to surpass the Western world quantitatively, but also that the modern world is undergoing qualitative changes. In the U.S. and France, the descendents of slaves and poor immigrants have gradually changed the make-up of the population, the remarkable result of which has been a transfer in power within these countries and a shift in the electorate. This has also brought about a qualitative change in the national consciousness in both countries. A similar change could take place on a global scale, so that a new sense of history, one with a self-awareness of classical traditions, would take on new philosophical potential.

The process has only just begun, however, and at the moment we cannot easily predict what course it will take. Economic and political power alone do not produce philosophical reflection. A glance at the past shows that, in spite of their power, not all great empires have succeeded in producing an age of philosophy. Furthermore, classical traditions, which in former times belonged only to certain localities, have been partly freed from their geographical limitations through the process of globalization. Classical traditions can now be found globally, and so are also able to act in other cultural spheres. On the one hand, the traditions of Christianity have taken root in Eastern Asia; on the other, the influence of Buddhism can be widely seen in the U.S. and Europe. And in spite of the wall of nation states, the tradition of Judaic thought has permeated the intellectual life of Europe.

What is the second condition necessary to enable the philosophical potential in Japan and China to emerge? What could express “modernity” in the twenty-first century? The answer might lie in a world religion. Modernity has its historical origins in Christian Europe. The philosophy of history is inconceivable apart from Christian eschatology. The opposing tendencies of the enlightenment and secularization turn on the same Christian axis. Therefore, a second condition for the “Asianization” of modernity and the multidimensional variety it would bring to the twenty-first century—but quantitatively and qualitatively—is the classical religious tradition in Eastern Asia which shows a potential for shaping the world in the future.

A decisive factor here is the extent to which the classical traditions of Asia will be able to embrace modern technology in such a way as to give new meaning to those traditions themselves. This, in turn, would introduce a third condition, the development of the philosophical potential of the classical tradition. Looking back over the twentieth century, the modern age has been distanced from religion, even if religion as a political power has exerted an ever greater influence on the world stage. However, religions that keep their archaic rituals lag far behind in their understanding of the world in the modern age. The modern age can do without religion, and the religious world appears to be able to exist apart from the modern age. The distance between the two—if not the antagonism—must somehow be overcome. Technology does not need religion, but it needs a life-world in which to be appropriated and take shape. Every life-world has its own culture, which is essentially local: it “glocalizes” the globalism of technology which would otherwise end up homogenizing and standardizing everything. This “glocalizing” action may be compared to the natural environment that provides a landscape to our concrete network of roads.

The question is if, and how, the classical tradition of world religions can contribute philosophical potential to the “glocalization” of each and every life-world in the twenty-first century. Do classical traditions such as Buddhism or Laozi, caught up in the technological maelstrom of our times, have the potential to give new meaning and understanding to this technologically standardized world? Can they contribute in making the society of the future multi-dimensional and enriching it spiritually? Phil-

ological and academic research on classical texts is still fundamental and indispensable, but such research alone does not exhaust the philosophical potential. What is required is a grasp of the “cross-classical” layer that exists in all classical traditions, and this entails deconstructing classical traditions. Only in this way can we prepare the cultural and spiritual soil for receiving technology and revitalizing it. Looking at the East Asian classical traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Islam, and so on, the common aim of countries such as Japan and China in the twenty-first century must be to locate and develop their philosophical potential in spite of the differences in political systems.

Over vie W

In the following section I would like to present my own attempt at locating such philosophical potential. I should point out, given the enormity of the task, I am humbled by the small steps I have to offer. At the same time, the attempt is not mine alone. It reflects the classical traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and the pioneering philosophy of Nishida Kitarō whose roots lie in that Buddhist heritage. Though the pace may be slow, one can only move forward.

I refer to my proposal as a “phenomenoetics of compassion.” The word “compassion” is a key term in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which together with “wisdom” constitutes the concept of “wisdom and compassion”; these correspond to “emptiness and phenomenon.” The general tendency of the religious philosophy of Nishida and his disciples in the Kyoto School was to stress the aspect of wisdom or emptiness. This was largely speculative philosophy “from above.” However, there could be an attempt to philosophize “from below” through phenomenology. In this case the aspects of “compassion” and “phenomenon” should be stressed.

My basic idea of “compassion” is borrowed from Mahāyāna Buddhism, which is not to say that I have taken its full doctrinal context. My intention is rather to take over the same standpoint that Nishitani Keiji adapted in employing the notion of “emptiness.” Concerning his treatment of Buddhist ideas, he writes:

Removed from the frame of their traditional conceptual determina-

tions, therefore, they have been used rather freely and on occasion—although this is not pointed out in every case—introduced to suggest correlations with concepts of modern philosophy. From the viewpoint of traditional conceptual determination, this way of using terminology may seem somewhat careless and, at times, ambiguous. (Nishitani 1982)

In Buddhist terms, compassion is the “mind” of the Buddha and bodhisattvas who take pity on the suffering of sentient beings and seek to alleviate it. Removed from that particular context, the idea initially surfaces in questions having to do with the “other.” In terms of Buddhist experience, sentient beings and dharmas are both essentially empty. To turn one’s mind and heart to an “other” from this kind of bottomless ground is not *sympathy* extended from a position of superiority or for moral reasons. The other must also be empty in its essential nature. The *Kyōgyōshinshō* reiterates the point: “The bodhisattva, in observing sentient beings, sees that in the final analysis they are nowhere to be found” (Ueda 1987 iv, 17; 391). This kind of experience may be no more than a fleeting glance, something seen in a flash, but it leads us to ask if it might not be possible to develop a phenomenological theory of the other that traditional phenomenology is hard pressed to reach, given that it takes ego-consciousness as the all but self-evident starting point.

If the disclosure of the “other” is inextricably linked to our own “self,” we may expand on the meaning of disclosing the self. The “self” cannot be grasped through reflective knowledge. The self that is objectified in the act of reflection is a *known self* but not a *knowing self*; the self is pushed away in reflective knowing. This is not to say that by nature the self is simply unknowable. We may compare it to a headstream which first becomes manifest when it is flowing in a stream of water. So, too, the headstream of the self that is beyond the grasp of reflections should in fact make itself manifest as one with the existence of the self in an active intuition that breaks through reflective knowledge. As the saying goes, “even after reaching the headstream, the water keeps flowing.” The headstream that can be “reached” is not the real headstream, whose nature is to gush and flow.

So it is with the self that cannot be seen as an object or a substance but is always manifest within actual reality itself. It needs to be backed up by

an experience of the non-objectifiable self and a view of the other *qua* other. In this way the fundamental disclosure of self and other can be designated with the same term—compassion. Clearly this entails an inexhaustible plurality of forms of sensitivity and of manifestations of moods and feelings.

Here “other” does not refer to anything in the singular but to the innumerable that form a world through coexistence and co-activity. The world of the other is always and ever the actual world. The disclosure of the other is the disclosure of the world. This is the third meaning of compassion. In Buddhism this world is also empty. Emptiness is not some dogma imposed from above. It is more like a beam of light that has uprooted traditional notions of ontology, obliging us to rethink them. When ideas such as substance, infinitude, and creation are brought head to head with the experience of “emptiness,” they need to return to the fundamentals and to break through the limitations of traditional ontology.

In this way compassion surfaces as a disclosure of self, other, and the world. If we delve deeply into the kind of disclosure we have just described, we would in effect be engaged in a “phenomenology of compassion” concerning self, others, and the world.

However, here I will use the term “phenomenoetics” rather than “phenomenology.” This is a result of having given some thought to the fundamental character of phenomenology. As Husserl insisted, phenomenology must always remain *strenge Wissenschaft*, “strict science.” At the same time, it entertains a fundamental intuition that turns the tables on “science” to confront questions from life and the world—the foundations of all science—and to that extent supersedes science from within. The “seeing” or *noesis* involved in this kind of fundamental intuition is an act that precedes its objectification as “reason” or *logos*. What I refer to as “phenomenoetics” is thus already to be found in the inner recesses of phenomenology. Tanabe Hajime’s idea of metanoetics may come to mind here, but his was a *meta*-project, an attempt to go beyond *noesis*. My focus is rather on understanding the fundamental intuition of a *phenomenon* under the rubric of “intuition” or aesthesis in its deeper sense of the “seeing” of *noesis*.

Another reason for preferring the term “phenomenoetics” to develop this kind of *noesis* and correlate it to *logos* is that I have in mind the

theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism as a development of the sermons of the Buddha laid out in the sūtras. Buddhist theory was not developed along the lines of objective, cognitive science but was passed on as teachings that in turn became doctrine or dogmatics. One of the problems is that, from a philosophical point of view, Mahāyāna Buddhist theory became stuck in a closed system of dogmatics and did not develop into an open philosophy. Still, it was able to accommodate an intuition more fundamental than the theoretical approach that objectified things and made them into subject matter. It intuitively perceives phenomena or *forms*, just there, to be *empty*.

This intuition of emptiness is not knowledge or science but an awakening to existence as it is lived by the self. In this sense Mahāyāna Buddhist theory had the character of a phenomenoethics that precedes and grounds phenomenology. The ideal of what I am calling a “phenomenoethics of compassion” is meant to shed light on the awakening implied in Mahāyāna Buddhist theory.

Compassion as Common Sense

Our consideration of compassion begins with the idea of sensitivity as it is generally explained in the idea of “common sense.” Aristotle was the first to draw attention to this idea of sense in his notion of *koine aisthesis* as a general quality common to the five senses. If we liken the five senses to the five fingers, what Aristotle calls “common sense” would correspond to the palm of the hand. This is particularly striking in the Japanese word for “palm,” *tanagokoro*—literally, the “mind” or “heart” of the hand, which coincides with Aristotle’s suggestion that common sense contains the level of mind and intellect.

Distinct from Aristotle’s use of the term, the ancient Romans referred to the *sensus communis* as a sense that people held in common, much the same as we speak of “common sense” today. The reference to commonality here is to groupings such as race, people, or gender, to which Vico would later supply a historical orientation. In addition to the social level that the term implied, it was deepened to include the aspect of “taste.” Kant referred to this *Geschmacksurteil* as a *sensus communis aestheticus*, by which he meant to include both the subjective judgment of individual taste as

well as the “collective” sharing of aesthetic perception in a defined range of people.

Gadamer drew attention to the dimension of “community” in common sense and eventually came to develop the notion of a “fusion of horizons.” He did not take this as a direct development of the notion of common sense as such, which he continued to understand basically in its traditional sense. As he saw it, the scope of common sense clearly embraced the hermeneutics of artistic production. If common sense extended as far as the level of mind and intellect and thus included conscious judgment and aesthetic consciousness, “sensitivity” would not be restricted to the perceptual sensation (*sentio*) of things. It would also extend to the pain that touches one profoundly in the heart (*patior*). Despite its range of associations with things like suffering, zeal, and passionateness, the word “passion” is better suited as a term to express this kind of sensitivity. Similar to the way the notion of common sense is constructed, when passion is felt in “common,” compassion arises. The *com-* of *commonality* with an “other” is philosophically important. It is another name for the working of *compatior* in which one is receptive, along with an other, to the past, the present, and the future of the world.

As it happens, the English word *compassion* is particularly suited to translate the Mahāyāna Buddhist meaning. It seems fitting here to think of the “deep level” of common sense as overlapping with the Buddhist idea of compassion. In my *Prolegomenon to a Phenomenoethics of Compassion*, I presented compassion as a field of disclosure at the three levels of self, other, and the world. Here I take the further step of understanding it as “historical sensitivity.” We often say that our “heart is struck with grief” at some tragic event of the past, just as we say that our “heart goes out” to the current state of the world or that our “heart is set on” making the future the way it should be. This “heart” is something that arises within us, but at the same time it is something touched off in us by the way things are in the world. It is a state of mind that is past, present, and future; in it the world of the past and the world of the future interact with the world of the present. The subject of this threefold mind is a “world mind” in which this threefold world opens up, and yet at the same time is “my mind” and “my heart.” This is why common sense,

at its deep level of compassion, possesses a level of meaning that we are referring to as “historical sensitivity.”

I should add that the single Chinese character I am interpreting here as compassion (悲) carries the connotation of sadness or sorrow. Taken in the sense it has worldly life and is separate from the context of Buddhist doctrine, it conveys sentiments that belong to proper, convivial behavior. It takes on the meaning of a magnanimous “living together.” Compassion and conviviality can be seen as two sides of the same thing in the sense that, paradoxically, it is in the big-hearted and uplifting things of life that the shadow of death falls thickest. The abyss of nothingness shows itself at the height of the *force de vivre*. Once we grasp this compassion at the depths of common sense, a way of presenting the “historical world” phenomenologically—one that relies on the guiding light of Buddhist experience and at the same time corresponds everywhere to the manifold spectacle of reality—can be expected to open up.

The Common Sense of Non-Commonality

“Sensitivity” undergirds the whole process of the development of mind. In Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*, the fields of sensitivity that open up along the way are obscured on the surface of description like veins of ore hidden from sight. Yet it is possible to mine them out through a deconstruction of the work. The deeper one digs, the more one comes to the depths of a common sense.

In the section on “Self-Consciousness” in *Phenomenology of Mind* that deals with the master-slave relationship, Hegel lays the groundwork for a new meaning of common sense in the classical fashion (although he himself never intended it as such). The master faces the slave from a standpoint of authority and absolute control, the decision to grant the slave life or death firmly in hand. The slave, under the fear and threat of death, submits his entire existence to the master. Everything the slave produces through his labor and his very person belongs to the master who accepts it without reserve. The relationship between the master and the slave is a polarized opposition, as are their respective feelings for one another. Hence there appears to be no room to speak of a community of common sense between the two. For example, the “things” that the slave produces are surely received with different sensibilities by master

and slave. The slave is excluded from the satisfaction that the master feels at enjoying the beauty of a pot. Even though it is his own handiwork, he is alienated from the aesthetic appreciation of it. All he can feel in the pot is his own alienation. The relationship between master and slave is itself shaped by both in collaboration. The “place” that brings master and slave together may be called, in Nicholas of Cusa’s phrase, a *coincidentia oppositorum*. This locus of relationship is not marked by homogeneity. Even in the case of ordinary relationships between people, though both are human, to the extent that each remains an “other,” the relationship entails difference and rupture.

Ordinarily, the community of shared perception implied in the term “common sense” contains a tacit assumption of homogeneity within the community. When the judgment of taste that a number of people embrace subjectively with regard to a phenomenon is effectively common, this is because the teleology of that judgment is shaped in concert among the individuals of a community that transcends the individual. We may call this an aesthetic common sense. However, no matter what the community, there will be mutual differences and ruptures obtained in virtue of the otherness. All may appear to be equal as they look at a pot and judge its beauty, but all sorts of individual differences remain. These differences are rooted in the way people perceive one another and also in their relationships to one another. A common sense rooted in these kinds of differences is not essentially one of homogeneity; it is bound to contain elements of otherness. When such otherness is minimal, a homogeneous common sense may be thought to arise. Even so, this is the exception, much the same as Euclidean geometry holds true where non-Euclidean geometry reaches its limits.

Master and slave are located on a relational field marked by a polar opposition. The feelings of the master who holds absolute control and of the slave who fears death can be seen as formative elements and the self-determination of a *basho* of the “self-identity of absolute contradiction.” In this way the feelings that each has for the other are not mere psychological emotions; they are the self-expression of a collective *place* and as such are universal feelings. Because this world is a world whose identity embraces contradictions, the feelings of master and slave represent the common sense of a non-commonality. On this basis, the two faces of

a common sense of non-commonality are shown in the sense of alienation for the slave who creates a splendid piece of pottery but cannot claim it as his own, and the sense of absolute satisfaction for the master who expropriates for himself both the slave and his pot. The dialectical master-slave logic that Hegel develops is enabled by the underpinning of such a common sense of non-commonality.

This way of interpreting common sense is a radical departure from the usual way of conceiving it, which understands “common” in the sense of “homogeneous.” The normal tendency would be to avoid as contradictory the idea of a common sense that contains an opposition of contradictions. But the tacit assumption hidden in this normal way of looking at things, once brought into question, no longer looks so self-evident, namely, that the individual subject is the bearer of common sense. A different perspective allows us to shift our focus to the community in which the individual subject belongs. The community is the true carrier of common sense. This is the core ingredient in the view of a “common sense of non-commonality.”

The next step is to show how the common sense of non-commonality brings out both the disclosure of the “other” and the disclosure of the “world” and “history.” The *Phenomenology of Mind* goes on to describe reason, spirit, religion, and absolute knowledge. Along with this, the common sense of non-commonality already embraces the unbounded interiority and mental spirit referred to as “perception” or “sensitivity,” and can be interchanged with “compassion.” This is expressly stated in the chapter on “Reason,” realized in the chapter on “Spirit,” and made immediate in the chapter on “Religion.” In the final chapter on “Absolute Knowledge,” compassion shows up as the feeling of the “absolute” that arises there.

Nishida’s philosophy of the “*basho* of absolute nothingness” or Nishitani’s philosophy of “emptiness” contain elements of the phenomenoetics of compassion. However, as was stated above, the “*basho* of absolute nothingness” and “emptiness” refer to a religious experience in a deep sense. They attest, on the one hand, to the genuine roots of philosophizing, but on the other hand they present us with a methodological difficulty. The phenomenoetics of compassion is an attempt to philosophize from above while receiving the light of the “*basho* of nothingness”

or “emptiness.” An understanding of the philosophy of these concepts implicitly requires the same experience. Starting from this point, the task is to understand anew, and to give new significance to technology, nature, human beings, language, culture, and so on.

References

Nishi tani Keiji

1982 *Religion and Nothingness*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ueda Yoshifumi (ed.)

1987 *The True Teaching, Practice and Realization of the Pure land Way: A Translation of Shinran's Kyōgyōshinshō* (Kyoto: Hongwanji International Center), vol. iii.

Philosophizing the Tradition

The Restoration of Confucianism in China and Japan

A New Source of Morality and Religion

Nakajima Takahiro

The restoration of Confucianism in contemporary China began with the economic reforms of the late 1970s. Aside from the authority of Mao Ze-dong, there was a need to fill the vacuum that existed in peoples' beliefs; although Confucianism had been oppressed throughout modern Chinese history, it was at this point that the restoration of Confucianism occurred. This Confucianism plays an important part in affording legitimacy to the current political power. If we look at the phrase "harmonized society" that has been used by the Chinese Communist Party since 2006, we can discern that "harmony" as a new Confucian value has become a slogan for political power.

How can this restored Confucianism be defined? It is a belief in Chinese cultural traditions and values, although it is difficult to say that it is a religion. The Chinese Communist Party has a principle of laicization or secularization to separate religion from the public sphere, and this is why there is a struggle with terminology. In place of *rujiao* (儒教, Confucianism), which is understood as a religion, *ruxue* (儒学, Confucian scholarship) is often used in scholarship to maintain universal values such as philosophy or education. What is needed for political legitimacy is not

rujiao, but the secular teaching of *ruxue* to affect people at their very core.

Nevertheless, the definition of Confucianism as a religion is still influential but complicated, as Confucianism is regarded both as religious and non-religious. According to Gan Chun-song, on a theoretical level, there are three important discussions (Gan 2008, 15–25).

First, Jiang Qing evokes the notion of a Confucian state. He claims that the most important issue is to reconstruct the legitimacy of Chinese politics, but to do so, Western democracy is not sufficient, and thus it is necessary to construct Chinese state policies based on Confucianism (Jiang 2003, 125–7). In his framework, Confucianism will occupy the position of the constitution (Jiang 2004). This may be called “Confucian fundamentalism.”

Second, Kang Xiao-guang discusses making Confucianism a state religion. He insists that we need “Confucianization” at every level: Confucianization of the Communist Party into a confucianist community; Confucianization of Marxism-Leninism into the “Way of Confucius and Mencius”; and Confucianization of society with confucianism as a state religion (Kang 2005, xl iv–l ii). Once such Confucianization is realized, it can be said that

in this age of globalization, to restore Confucianism is not only to construct a base for the sacred and cultural legitimacy of Chinese politics, but also to construct a base for a ‘cultural China’ that transcends nation states, and a revolution in the human world. This is the historical mission of the Chinese nation in the age of globalization. (Kang 2005, 141–2)

The two discussions above aim to reconstruct Confucianism as a religion and to institutionalize it in the political sphere. They regard Confucianism as a specifically Chinese cultural value which can only be reappropriated by China. In this regard, it seems reasonable for Gan to criticize them by claiming that

such a Confucian system might limit various possibilities of the practice and development of a Confucian spirit, and if Confucianism and China are closely united, it might also restrict Confucianism, although

there may be the possibility of transcending a limited national spirit. (Gan 2008).

In this way, Gan refers to the third discussion on Confucianism as a “civil religion.”

Confucianism as a “civil religion” in china

Chen Ming argues for a civil religion as if he tries to escape the difficulties caused by the above two views (that is, the ambiguity in defining religion and the violation of the principle of laicization to separate religion from the public sphere):

If someone states that Confucianism is a religion, that person will face many theoretical difficulties; if the same person states that Confucianism is a *civil* religion, it may be far less problematic. Therefore, if one doesn’t mind the concept of civil religion being closely related to the American social situation, and understands the concept of “civil” as public regardless of its modern background, it is not an overstatement to say that China is a state where civil religion is fully developed. (Chen 2007)

Here Chen is referring to “American civil religion,” the phrase used by Robert Bellah. According to Bellah, American civil religion and God are closely related to American history:

The God of civil religion is not only rather “unitarian,” he is also on the austere side, much more related to law, order, and right than to salvation and love. Even though he is somewhat deist in cast, he is by no means simply a watchmaker God. He is actively interested and involved in history, with a special concern for America. (Bellah 1970, 175)

American civil religion is restricted to American citizens whose range is historically determined. A logic of exclusion is always present among those who do not believe in this civil religion or those who are not regarded as citizens. That is behind Chen’s view of civil religion:

Civil religion in the United States of America is constructed on the

basis of what white, Christian culture narrates. Civil religion in China is a natural consolidation of the cultural traditions of the Han people in political life. (Chen 2007)

Chen regards civil religion in China as a form of the Chinese experience within the framework of a natural consolidation of the cultural traditions of the Han people in political life. Those who do not belong to this cultural tradition could be excluded from being followers of civil religion. Even if “harmony” is regarded as a core value in Confucianism, it is no less than a harmony of the Han people and for the Han people. Such logic of exclusion has always haunted the idea of civil religion. If we look back at Rousseau’s concept of civil religion we can find the original logic of exclusion:

There is, however, a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it is the duty of the sovereign to determine, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject. Without having the power to compel any one to believe them, the sovereign may banish from the state whoever does not believe them; it may banish him not for being impious, but as unsociable, as incapable of sincerely loving law and justice, and of sacrificing his life to his duty. But if any one, after publicly acknowledging these dogmas, behaves like an unbeliever in them, he should be punished with death; he has committed the greatest of crimes, he has lied before the laws. (Rousseau 1895, 227–8)

Rousseau describes how a person who does not believe in civil religion can be banished from the state because he or she is “incapable of sincerely loving law and justice, and of sacrificing at need his life to his duty.” From this description, we can deduce two characteristics of civil religion: it is intolerant of the unbeliever and it contains a logic of sacrifice at its core.

If we understand civil religion as Bellah and Rousseau understood it, will Confucianism as a Chinese civil religion become a modern doctrine for Han people and thus carry out the logic of sacrifice? There may be no decisive answer to this question right now, yet we can learn something

from the experience of prewar Japan, where there was another attempt to use Confucianism as a civil religion.

Religion, practice, and morality in prewar Japan

Before discussing civil religion in prewar Japan, we need to confirm the meaning of “religion” and “morality” in modern-day Japan. Once the search was made in non-Western countries for an authority not grounded in “religion” *per se*, there was an attempt to change cultural resources and to construct something religious in them. This is referred to as quasi-religion, meta-religion, or para-religion, and is not religion *per se* but ethics or morality. Instead of religion, “national ethics” or a “national morality” was constructed to legitimize authority. Isomae remarks concerning Japan’s reception of the Western concept of religion:

There were two translations of “religion” between the end of the Edo era and the beginning of Meiji. One was *shūshi* (宗旨) or *shūmon* (宗門), stressing the meaning of practice in religion; the other was *kyōhō* (教法), *seidō* (聖道), or *shūkyō* (宗教), stressing the meaning of belief. The former was more prevalent and popular than the latter because it was connected with the pre-modern Japanese religious system. The latter was limited to a circle of intellectuals who had knowledge of canons and tenets. *Shūkyō* was also not exceptional. Inoue Tetsujirō had pointed out that “the term *shūkyō* was seldom used before the Meiji Restoration.” However, *shūkyō* was finally adopted as the translation of the term “religion,” and so an inverse phenomenon arose whereby the minority term stressing beliefs such as *shūkyō* surpassed the dominant term stressing practices such as *shūshi* or *shūmon*. (Isomae 2003, 36)

Modern Japan’s reception of religion shifted from a doctrine of practice to that of belief in the 1880s. If we consider this background, Protestantism played an important role in the shift at that time, and “took a severe position of belief-centralism, with a rejection of ritualistic elements” (37). In this shift, even an established religion such as Buddhism had a tendency to oppress the practical and to stress belief.

In fact, Buddhist sects tried to escape from their ritual-centralized manner known as “funeral Buddhism.” They philosophized and dogmatized their system following Christianity, and thus began to praise the ethical characters of the founders of sects such as Shinran 親鸞 and Nichiren 日蓮. On the other hand, in 1872, *shugenshū* (修験宗), which relied on prayer rituals, was abolished. In other words, magic rituals aiming at mundane interests were excluded from Buddhism. (Isomae 2003, 40)

Soon after the exclusion of the practical, religion as a belief was once again challenged. In the late 1880s, when the separation of religion from the political sphere occurred in Japan, religion as a belief was reduced to the private realm. Isomae notes that

what had been discussed before as “teachings” were re-divided into two realms: a private realm called “religion” being consigned to the individual’s free discretion; and a public realm called “morality” being imposed as a national obligation. (48)

In this new distinction between religion as a private realm and morality (ethics) as a public realm, Shinto and Confucianism were grouped into the latter. The idea that Shinto was not a religion was a well-known definition in prewar Japan, which should be understood within this history of re-division. If we use the phrase “civil religion” here, Shinto was turned into State Shinto as a civil religion that was separate from religion with private beliefs.

Wat suji t et surō: conf uc ianism’s
t each in g as t he Way of hu man i ty

The above-mentioned situation was similar to Confucianism. Confucianism in prewar Japan, which was always amalgamated with State Shinto, was defined as a teaching of ethics or morality and not as a religion. Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) discerned the typical discourse defining Confucianism as a teaching of ethics.

Watsuji described Confucius as one of the “teachers of humankind” but distinct from other teachers such as Buddha, Socrates, and Jesus, in

that he never touched on the problem of death, nor did his biography include any story about his death (Watsuji 1962, 337–40). The result was that the core doctrine of Confucius did not consist of a “religious God” but of a “way of humanity”:

It was sufficient [for Confucius] to understand and realize the Way. The Way is a Way of humanity, not the words of a God or a way to enlightenment. No fear or anxiety afflicted him if he followed the ethical way of humanity, that is, if he realized humaneness and practiced loyalty and tolerance. That is why his doctrine had no need for mysteries of any shade, no demand to “believe by virtue of the absurd” (*credo quia absurdum*). The Way is completely a way of reason. The most remarkable characteristic of the doctrine of Confucius is his recognition that the Way of humanity is significant on an absolute level. (Watsuji 1933, 344)

For Watsuji, Confucianism was not a religion with a transcendent God, but a doctrine rooted in the everyday to carry out human ethics. This image of Confucianism was not an isolated one, but prevalent in prewar Japan.

Hattori Unokichi: philosophical religiosity in Confucian teaching

Before Watsuji, Hattori Unokichi (1867–1939), a specialist in Chinese philosophy, played a large role in constructing an image of Confucianism as the teaching of ethics. First, he distinguished Confucian teaching (孔子教) from Confucianism (儒教). For Hattori, Confucianism was originally a local ethic for the Chinese people, but after Confucius appeared, he changed it into a universal doctrine that spread throughout East Asian countries and reached as far as Western countries (Hattori 1938, 118). According to Hattori, the difference between Confucianism and Confucian teaching is the difference between religion and ethics:

Thought before Confucius had many religious elements. After Confucius established his teaching, it became more theoretical and ethical, its religious character diminished. (Hattori 1939, 32)

In this regard, Hattori criticized Watsuji's contemporary arguments for defining Confucianism as a religion. He took up two examples: Kang Youwei's *Confucian Teaching: Kongzi Jiao*, and Dr. H. Giles's definition of Confucianism. They mistook Confucianism for a religion because they dealt with Confucianism in comparison with Christianity (2–9).

Hattori's argument was not simple, however. He did not entirely reduce his Confucian teaching to ethics as Watsuji did. He tried to find a new type of religiosity at the core of Confucian teaching:

Primitive Confucianism was quite religious, but Confucius turned it into an ethical teaching—yet the Teaching of Confucius is neither limited to the realm of mundane human matters nor ignorant of what is beyond them, as Huang Kan 皇侃 had asserted. The fundamental belief of Confucius is religious. (90–1)

Here Hattori referred to old and new types of religiosity: primitive Confucianism and Confucian teaching. What is the difference between the two? We can say that new religiosity is a “philosophical religiosity”:

Ancient ceremonies were altogether religious, but Confucius explained the meaning of ceremony from a wholly ethical point of view. Ancient ceremonies existed to bring fortune or avoid misfortune by the power of the gods, but Confucius preached only that we repay the fundamental favors of our ancestors. Still, Confucius deeply believed in the will of Heaven, and believed it to be within him. In this respect he was religious. Confucian teaching is ultimately religious if we think of religion as the coincidence of the finite and the infinite or the relative and the absolute. The doctrines of many philosophers ultimately advocate such a coincidence and thus are religious. Confucian teaching, too, is religious in this sense, but this religiosity differs from the Confucian religiosity of old. (Hattori 1938, 163)

For Hattori, Confucian teaching in modern Confucianism should be ethical as well as religious. Hattori's attitude is quite different from Watsuji's. Hattori was dissatisfied with any separation between public morality and private religion. He tried to construct a new type of religion, a civil religion, which would transcend respective religions in the private realm and be amalgamated with morality and ethics in the public realm.

In this regard, it was useful for him to find philosophical religiosity at the extreme limits of Confucian teaching.

In fact, Hattori supported the construction of the Association Concordia (帰一協会) with Anesaki Masaharu, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Inoue Tetsujirō in June 1912. This association was imagined as a “unification of spiritual sectors” including religious groups such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Shinto. The participants were not satisfied with moralism as advocated in the “National Moralism” (国民道徳論) of that time, and they wanted to re-appropriate religious dimensions into morality and ethics. They imagined that Confucianism could unite religions, and for this reason, Confucianism should be not only ethical, but also religious. Hattori’s views on Confucianism were in complete accord with the policies of the time.

Inoue Tetsujirō (1856–1944): ethical religion

Inoue Tetsujirō was one of the founders of modern Japanese philosophy. As a professor of philosophy at the University of Tokyo, he set up the departments of (Western) Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Religious Studies, and so on. Hattori was one of his colleagues, as was Anesaki who was also his son-in-law.

Inoue advocated that Confucianism was both religious and ethical at the same time. This is because he aimed to construct a new type of religion, an “ethical religion” (徳教／倫理の宗教), which should be based on Confucianism:

We need to make morality the place where our ideals become actualized to make it our religion. We have no need for old religions, but the time has come to construct a morality as a successor. This morality would be much more reasonable than any religion of old. Devoid of superstition, it would be aligned with the sciences of today. That old religions cannot align with science is evidence of their obsolescence. That today’s morality is able to be aligned with the sciences and foster individual autonomy is proof of its value as a replacement for old religions. Morality seen in this way surpasses any religion both in value and progressiveness. (Inoue 2003, 302–3)

Inoue implicitly rejected Buddhism as an old religion, but accepted both Confucianism and Shinto. Confucianism in his view was a moral teaching that retained a religious core:

In sum, Confucianism is coincident with religion insofar as it reveres Heaven as a greatness beyond human beings. It is quite different from religion, however, insofar as it ignores rituals and the afterlife. (309)

To defend the religiosity of Confucianism, Inoue took the bold step of refuting the proposition that “Confucianism is an ethical religion, but not a religion” (337), and indeed took the same attitude toward Shinto. The proposition that “Shinto is not a religion” was an official opinion in prewar Japan. However, Inoue did not deny its religiosity:

If one goes to worship [at a shrine] in a moral sense, you reach a depth of reverence that may be called “faith.” One’s visit is morally fruitless if one does not reach this depth. We may regard it as morality, recognizing that such faith is necessary for morality. (364–5)

As mentioned above, Hattori, Anesaki, and Inoue were not satisfied with “national morality.” They felt that something religious should be added to morality. In other words, they needed an amalgam of morality and religion for the legitimacy of modern Japan. We may define this amalgam as a Japanese “civil religion.” Confucianism was restored in this way as a new source of both morality and religion.

The political meaning of “civil religion” in prewar Japan

The high point of this restoration of Confucianism in prewar Japan was a Conference on the Confucian Way held in 1935. Hattori and Inoue played important roles as representatives of the *Shibunkai* 斯文会 (the Association for Confucianism).

In Japan in 1935 there was criticism of Minobe Tatsukichi’s theory of the emperor as an organ of government, followed by two “Clarifications of the Japanese National Polity” expressing ultranationalism. In April of that year, Yushima Seidō (湯島聖堂, the Yushima Confucian temple),

which had been destroyed in the great Kanto earthquake, was restored. In commemoration of the restoration, an International Confucian Congress (later renamed the “Conference on the Confucian Way”) was organized.

Before the conference was to be held on 28 April, the Emperor of Manchuria, Pu Yi, visited Yushima Seidō on 13 April. The conference clearly had the political goal of internationally acknowledging Manchuria. Along with this, the political meaning of modern Confucianism as a civil religion promoted by Hattori and Inoue became clear.

Hattori, who was then a secretary of the Japan-Manchuria Cultural Society and a vice-secretary of *Shibunkai*, gave the closing remarks at the conference:

The fever for Eastern studies that was generated during the First World War spread worldwide along with the war. It is unnecessary to say that the essence of Eastern culture is Chinese culture, which has been blended with the characteristic national culture of our country where it was introduced. It also goes without saying that the foundation of Eastern culture is the Confucian Way. The Confucian Way was introduced to our country long ago, fused into the Way of the Gods, cultivating the Japanese spirit, glorifying the achievements of the saints, and contributing to three great deeds: the Taika reforms, the Kemmu restoration, and the Meiji restoration of the monarchy. There may be some who have different ideas about the Confucian Way, but taking into account this history of the Confucian Way in Japan, and with concern for the future of the world, I believe that this gathering of men of letters from many countries and their frank exchange of opinions will help overcome political and economic problems and benefit world peace. (Hattori 1938, 68)

The Confucian Way, an amalgam of Confucianism with Japanese Shinto, was not only useful for the legitimacy of modern Japan, but also important for world peace in the time of crisis after the First World War. As long as the Confucian Way was constructed by modern Japan, world peace could be realized under the initiative of Japan; it was the protraction of Japanese civil religion in East Asia. If we borrow Robert Bellah’s

phrase, “a world civil religion could be accepted as a fulfillment and not as a denial of Japanese ‘civil religion’” (Bel l ah 1970).

Compared to Hattori, Inoue’s political implications were much more explicit. Before the conference, a “Conference on Confucian Culture” was held on 20 April 1935 at which Inoue gave a talk entitled “Confucius’ Character and Beliefs.” In this talk, he mentioned that China had celebrated Confucius again on 27 August 1934 and made that day a national holiday. He also surmised that the King’s Way (王道) in Manchuria lay in the background, influencing the Nanjing government. However, as long as China was advocating the Three People’s Principles, the King’s Way of Confucius could never be realized. What, then, could be done? Inoue’s answer was to make Confucius’ descendants monarchs, similar to the Japanese Imperial family, and to establish the King’s Way in the same manner as the Japanese Imperial Way (皇道), which was organized on the basis of the amalgam of Confucianism and Shinto (Inoue 2003, 129, 132).

Nevertheless, as long as the Imperial Way remained superior to the King’s Way, and even if China abandoned the Three People’s Principles, China and Japan would not be in an equal relationship. Inoue’s protraction of a Japanese civil religion was inevitably asymmetric, a political machination aimed at putting Manchuria and China in an inferior position since they had only the King’s Way of Confucius.

Concl usion

We are now facing the new phenomenon of the restoration of Confucianism in contemporary China. Needless to say, it is not directly related to the restoration of Confucianism in prewar Japan. Nevertheless, this is not an isolated phenomenon and is deeply related to modernity in East Asia. In this regard, we can learn more from the Japanese experience of modernized or modernizing Confucianism, especially when discourse on civil religion in China appears today, as Japanese civil religion, being an amalgam of Confucianism and Shinto, could become a mirror of reflectio .

We have thus come to the right moment to rethink Confucianism in

a completely different light. It would be difficult to make Confucianism a religion in the modern Western sense, as Hattori and Inoue did, or to secularize it as a “morality.” We need to take a third way, but not in order to amalgamate morality and religion; it is necessary to avoid using Confucianism as a civil religion, the path that Hattori and Inoue took. On the contrary, a revitalized Confucianism would never be used for political aims. Instead, it would criticize the politicization of Confucianism, and recover its critical potential. We might rename this revitalized Confucianism “critical Confucianism.” With roots in the modern experiences of Confucianism in China and Japan, critical Confucianism would critique and open up a new space for discussion on morality and religion. It is therefore important to rethink prewar Japanese discourse on Confucianism and at the same time observe the current restoration of Confucianism in China.

References

Bel lah Robert, et al.

1970 *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row).

Chen Ming 陳明

2007 「儒教公民宗教説」 [The theory of Confucianism as a civil religion]. (www.pinghesy.com/data/2007/1016/article_1594.htm).

Fukushima Kashizo 福島甲子三 (ed.)

1938 『湯島聖堂復興記念 儒道大会誌』 [Commemoration of the restoration of the Yushima Seidō: A report on the Conference on the Confucian way] (Tokyo: Shibunkai).

Gan Chun-song 干春松

2008 「21世紀初中国大陆“儒学运动”的理论构想及其评价」 [The theoretical framework and an evaluation of the Confucian Movement (*ruxue yundong*) in Mainland China at the beginning of the twenty-first century]. University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy Workshop, March 2008.

Hattori Unokichi 服部宇之吉

1938 『新修東洋倫理綱要』 [An outline of Oriental ethics] (Tokyo: Dobun Shoin).

1939 『孔子教大義』 [The essence of Confucian teaching] (Tokyo: Fuzanbō).

Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎

2003 『井上哲次郎集』 [The Inoue Tetsujirō collection] (Tokyo: Kuresu), vol. 9.

Isomae Jun'ichi 磯前順一

2003 『近代日本の宗教言説とその系譜—宗教・国家・神道』 [Modern Japanese religious discourses and their genealogy: Religion, state, and Shinto] (Iwanami Shoten).

Jiang Qing 蒋庆

2003 『政治儒学』 [Political Confucianism] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian).

2004 「王道政治与共和政体——蒋庆先生读《共和三论》致王天成」 [The politics of the King's Way and republicanism: Professor Jiang Qing reads "Three essays on the Republic" and writes to Wang Tian-cheng]. (www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=1462).

Kang Xiao-guang 康晓光

2005 『仁政——中国政治发展的第三条道路』 [Politics based on benevolence: A third way for the development of Chinese politics] (Singapore: Bafang Wenhua).

Rousseau, Jean Jacques

1895 *The Social Contract; or, Principles of Political Right*. Translated with a historical and critical introduction and notes by Henry J. Tozer (London: George Allen & Unwin).

Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎

1962 『和辻哲郎全集』 [Complete works of Watsuji Tetsurō] (Iwanami Shoten), vol. 6.

From Henological Reduction to a Phenomenology of the “Name”

A Reinterpretation of Japanese Pure Land Thought

Taguchi Shigeru

Pure Land Thought, Jōdo Shisō (浄土思想), included in Buddhist scriptures since ancient times, was radically transformed by a Japanese priest named Hōnen-bō Genkū (法然房源空, 1133–1212), who was deeply inspired by a Chinese master, Shandao (善導; Jp. Zendō 613–681). This Chinese–Japanese transformation of Pure Land Buddhism has had considerable influence on Japanese religious history since the Medieval Period. It has also stimulated modern philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime to remold their philosophies. These thinkers did not abandon philosophy for the sake of religion, but intrinsically deepened their philosophies by contemplating the “logic” of salvation in Pure Land Thought.

Under the guidance of such modern interpretations, I propose in what follows to examine Hōnen’s central teachings to highlight the “logical” structure of his Pure Land Buddhism. Such an attempt will suggest that there are highly interesting convergences between Japanese religious thought and recent phenomenological arguments regarding “trace” and “the unapparent.”

First, I will interpret the characteristic simplicity of Hōnen’s teaching as a religious and philosophical radicalisation of his Buddhist thought, instead of a compromise on behalf of propagation among uneducated people. He claimed that *nenbutsu* (念仏), the recitation of *Namu Amida Butsu* (南無阿弥陀仏, total reliance upon or devotion to Amida Buddha) is the ultimate way of salvation. To put it in the extreme, this is the sole teaching of Hōnen. His concept of selection (選択) can be regarded as a consequent reduction to *nenbutsu*, which may be tentatively called henological reduction. The reason for this is that, from Hōnen’s perspective, the *nenbutsu* refers to the ultimate “One” to which everything can be reduced and from which all meaningfulness springs.

It may be said that the *nenbutsu*, in terms of its place in the overall structure, is comparable, though not equivalent, to that of the One (τὸ ἓν) in Plotinus’ philosophy. Such a comparison is too demanding to carry out here in any detail. Instead, I will use the term “henological” only to characterize the reduction to the *nenbutsu*, the ultimate One of religious life in Hōnen’s sense.

Although the *nenbutsu* can be characterized by its ultimate Oneness, it cannot be interpreted as the cosmological reason behind all forms of life. *Nenbutsu*, despite being the center of life and the world, decisively rejects hypostatization and a logic of objective identification. It admits no identical substantiality that can be objectified. Rather, it is something intrinsically fleeting or transient in the sense that it is nothing other than *reciting the name* of Amida Buddha. By reciting the name we neither come to possess the ultimate nor merge into the all-embracing absolute. What we have is only the name and never its possessor or the ultimate truth itself. In this respect, the name of Buddha in *nenbutsu* can be interpreted as a “trace” in a sense similar to that discussed by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida.

Thus, in my view, the core of Hōnen’s thought entails first, a radical form of henological reduction, and second, a phenomenology of the “name” as commitment to a “trace” of the transcendent. In this essay, I will discuss this interpretation by examining Hōnen’s and other relevant texts. On the basis of such an interpretation I will then evaluate the possible relevance of Hōnen’s thought to contemporary philosophical thinking.

Henological reduction: the radical simplicity of hōnen's thought

Simplicity as Purpose

As mentioned above, Hōnen's teachings are prominently characterized by extreme simplicity. He emphasizes that nothing other than the *nenbutsu* or the reciting of *Namu Amida Butsu* is required to attain salvation or birth in the Pure Land (往生). In his testamentary writing for his disciples entitled the *One Sheet Document* (一枚起請文), he states: "If I am withholding any deeper knowledge beyond the simple recitation of the *nenbutsu*, then may I lose sight of the compassion of Śākyamuni and Amida Buddha and slip through the embrace of Amida's Original Vow" (that is to say, be unable to attain salvation) (shhz 1955, 416). He authorizes this document with his handprint and declares, "The Jōdo school way of practice and settled mind is completely imparted here. I, Genkū, have no other teaching than this" (416; Wats 2005, 158).

Hōnen's era was a time of transition from the Heian era to the Kamakura, and was characterized by innumerable political conflicts and natural disasters. At this time, the Buddhist teaching of *mappō* (末法), a period of decline that appeared long after Śākyamuni's death, "became not just a theory but a reality" (Hattori 2000, 19). Many Buddhist monks propagated frightful ideas of hell, which drove people to despair. These people believed that they were unable to live up to the demands of Buddhist precepts and to attain enlightenment. Hōnen taught such ordinary people that death was nothing to be afraid of, and that it simply meant birth (rebirth) in the Pure Land, if one would but recite the *nenbutsu*. This interpretation of death would change one's entire image of life through a new image of death insofar as death represents the terminal point of life and makes it a totality. In other words, for Hōnen, life is surrounded by death, and to go into this surrounding sphere implies ultimate salvation merely by reciting the *nenbutsu*.

It is true that Hōnen's teachings were an inspiration mainly to uneducated laity such as farmers, those regarded as morally depraved such as prostitutes, and even samurai and fishermen whose professions entailed killing (something Buddhist teachings explicitly forbid). Although this fact should not be underestimated, neither should it be overlooked that

Hōnen did not expressly set out to propagate his teachings among lay people when he devised his Pure Land interpretations (see Kat suk i 1970, 187–95).¹ It represented his personal breakthrough to a truly universal mode of thought. It is the exceptional universality, intensity, and logical consistency of his thought itself that enabled it subsequently to spread among all levels of society—not only the lower classes and the rising samurai class, but also among certain members of the aristocracy. As Tamura Enchō has noted, Hōnen’s way of salvation, though not intended by him, implied that all people could discover the way to salvation (Tamura 1948, 130). Thus Hōnen’s personal pursuit of salvation, carried out in a logical consistency while being strongly influenced by the Chinese master Shandao, culminated in “selection,” which led exclusively to the recitative *nenbutsu*. The simplicity of his thought is not a means of proselytizing. Rather, it is derived from the inner logic of his religious thinking and experience. Simplicity is considered a higher path to the realm of religiosity.

“Sel ec tion” as hen ol ogic al r educ tion

The method for attaining such simplicity is that of “selection.” This can be interpreted as a thoroughgoing *reduction* whose structure is similar to that of the “phenomenological reduction.”

Before Hōnen posited his concept of selection, the *nenbutsu* was only one among various Buddhist practices. It was a general term for practices that included prostration, veneration, meditation (礼拝, 讚歎供養, 觀察), and so on. The recitation of the name of Amida was nothing more than a supplementary practice among others. Hōnen positioned himself against this prevailing view, selecting the recitative *nenbutsu* as the sole and ultimate principle of salvation. His was not a simple elimination of all other practices, but rather a radical conversion of attitude, similar to what Husserl calls *Einstellungsänderung*. We may characterize Hōnen’s *nenbutsu* as

1. This is in clear contrast to Nichiren, founder of the Nichiren-shū (日蓮宗). As Tamura Enchō has pointed out, the social conditions of Hōnen’s day were not of much interest to him. “It was not the state of affairs on Earth but the very human existence [or human nature] that agonized Hōnen” (Tamura 1948, 127).

a sort of reduction, because Husserl's idea of "phenomenological reduction" entails a selection of what is evident and reliable, whose essence consists of a drastic change in perspective (Taguchi 2006, ch. 2).

As his starting point, Hōnen takes an ordinary view, juxtaposing various Buddhist practices, as it were, in front of us. He then leads us through the way of the "selection" to another view wherein the recitative *nenbutsu* constitutes the absolute zero point. From this exclusive viewpoint, we are able to organize all practices of Buddhism and of everyday life in a new order with the *nenbutsu* as its zero point. In this new perspective everything is centered on the *nenbutsu*. As Katsuki points out, Hōnen did not objectively classify methods of Buddhist practices; "selection" implies a subjective and practical change through which everything in Buddhism is rediscovered from a new perspective (Katsuki 1970, 15).

In fact, Hōnen stated that "the scriptures of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism are all embraced in the Pure Land School" (shhz 261). Katō Shūichi also regarded Hōnen's selection as a "replacement of the objectivistic access to Buddhist scriptures by a subjectivist attitude," making the "internalization of faith" into a pivotal event in the history of Japanese Buddhism (Katō 1978, 99).

As a result of this "reduction," everything in Buddhism and everyday life is, as mentioned above, was centered on the *nenbutsu* as the ultimate One in relation to which all forms of meaningfulness are to be measured. Because of this centering on the One, the change in perspective worked out by Hōnen can tentatively be called a *henological reduction*.²

The oneness of the *NENBUTSU* and its meaningful meaningfulness

The question this leaves us with is, What is the meaning of that selection or reduction and the radical transformation of perspective? What is, in fact, gained through this? To our ordinary way of thinking,

2. This term also appears in Duméry 1964. Although there are certain convergences with Hōnen's thought, for Duméry, the One to which all is reduced is "God."

does not the recitation of the name of Amida Buddha seem insignificant and meaningless?

The reduction to the Oneness of the *nenbutsu* effects a kind of concentration. This does not mean that those who recite the *nenbutsu* are concentrating their attention on something objective (a real thing, an image, a vision, an idea, and so on). Rather, it is a *concentration without an identical object* that can occur in the recitation.³ Repeated recitation can cut off all forms of attention to an object with a distinct identity, and this in turn brings about a freedom of consciousness.⁴ Such liberation is highly important in Buddhism, which tend to view consciousness as obsessed with all kinds of objective identities that cover the truth of the reality we live through, and as a consequence engender the sufferings of human life. Hōnen indicates that if one can recite the *nenbutsu*, there is nothing else that is significant:

If you cannot recite ascetically, you can recite while married. If you cannot recite while married, then you can recite ascetically. If you cannot recite in one place, then you can recite while traveling. If you cannot recite while traveling, then you can recite at home.... If you cannot recite alone, then you can recite with others. If you cannot recite in a group, then you can recite while living alone... everything is done only to support the *nenbutsu*. (shhz 462–3;cf. 640–1).

Why is the *nenbutsu* able to break the human attachment to objective identities? In my view, the reason lies in a radical *meaninglessness* of the recited *nenbutsu*, which enables an interruption in the natural flow of everyday consciousness, which is fixed on meanings and objective identities. The *nenbutsu* as the absolute One cannot be explained by reference to other things or systems because it is, in Hōnen's view, the absolute zero point in relation to which everything can be measured and evaluated. The things and activities that structure our everyday lives draw their value and their meaning from that structure. In contrast, the *nenbutsu*, as the ultimate point of reference for all meaning, cannot be measured,

3. Nishida stresses the non-objectivism of Pure Land Buddhism (2004, 326–7).

4. Suzuki analyzes the break from attention to objective identities from a psychological point of view (1968, 315, 325–9).

and consequently has no meaning corresponding to its place in the value system of everyday life.⁵

From this viewpoint, one can say that the *nenbutsu* is “meaningless” *in the strict sense of the term*. Ordinary meaninglessness denotes the “less meaningful.” Words and phrases—even those described pejoratively as “meaningless”—are assigned their “meaning” on a scale of “more meaningful / more meaningless.” But the *nenbutsu*, after the radical transformation it brings about, becomes the absolute zero point of all scales and measures. One might as well say it transcends measurement altogether. Its meaninglessness is not a relative one often observed in everyday life, but an absolute one.

It may be said that for the one who is reciting it, the *nenbutsu* has become a primal fact that can only be accepted. This being so, the very practice of the recitation is an example of the kind of “fact that surpass all explanation” which we observe so frequently in different religions. Still, this does not make the *nenbutsu* something mysterious or just another example of the barbarous obscurantism of religion. It has its own logic and as such demonstrates a particular form of religious rationality.

Nishida Kitarō points out that “the reason of the unreasonable does not mean an irrationality, but, according to Shinran (親鸞), an understanding of the meaning of meaninglessness.”⁶ It is not that the *nenbutsu* is simply lacking in adequate explanation; it does not, properly speaking, allow of *any* explanations. Something that is immediately comprehensive and fully explicable in a meaningful context cannot be the final support of religious faith. This is so because its meaning directly attracts our consciousness and involves it in the “mundane” system of meanings in which we are normally caught up and from which religions seek to liberate human consciousness.

Thus, the seeming meaninglessness and absurdity of the *nenbutsu* is the reverse side of its religious superiority. It refuses to be integrated into a conventional system of meanings and has no place in it. This is

5. Its place as “zero point” in the structure of the Pure Land view of the world is only apparent, since it is measured in reference to all other items whose positions are originally given in reference to the One as the zero point. Its apparent position is produced as a secondary effect of a reflexive nature.

the consequence of that selection or of the reduction to the *nenbutsu* recitation as an incomparable religious center of the world. At the same time, in Pure Land Buddhism this center does not constitute a substantial “origin” that accounts ontologically for the production of all things. It is merely a recitation of Amida’s name, which takes place as a “voice” and instantly passes us by. As Machida Sōhō puts it, it can be called a “hierophany of voice.”⁷ It is to this non-substantiality that we turn our attention next.

Hōnen’s logic of recitation

The Nenbutsu as a Fleeting but Concrete Center

I have characterized Hōnen’s “selection” of the recitative *nenbutsu* as a *henological reduction* because of its centering on the One that effects a radical transformation of perspective. This One, however, is not God or an equivalent being that is the substantial, powerful source of all beings. On the contrary, it is only a reciting “voice” that is fragile and fleeting. At the same time, it is not, of itself, something abstract but a very concrete event that can be brought about at any time and by anyone. It is a perfectly banal event that is initiated by “me,” occurring on my tongue and then vanishing. But in the repeated recitation, the “I” as the initiator of this event is absorbed into the very event itself. The *nenbutsu* is now at the center, to which “I,” though the initiator, am subordinate.⁸ Thus, it may be said that from Hōnen’s point of view, the fleeting event of recitation becomes a reliable foundation for the religious life.

Regarding the specificity of the *nenbutsu*, its *corporeality* is a central

6. Nishida 2004, 353 According to Nishida, this “reason of the unreasonable” is “what makes reason the true One.” See also page 351.

7. Machida, 1997, 123–9. “Hierophany” is a term used by Mircea Eliade to refer to a manifestation of the sacred (1957).

8. A famous passage in Shandao’s 『法事讃』, which Hōnen quotes in his *Senchakushū*, indicates the “me” as an accusative 「人能く仏を念ずれば、仏また念じたまう」 (shhz 326). Aoki emphasizes this point in 『善導和尚』 (1940, 2). In this respect, Hase refers to the “me-voici” and the absolute passivity in Levinas (2003, 79–82).

point of discussion, but there is space here only for a brief indication. Without doubt, the recitation cannot be “purified” of its bodiliness. This is one of main reasons why the *nenbutsu* cannot be sublimated into an abstract thought, but always remains concrete.⁹

The Mediation of the “Name,” or Identifying Differentiation

Another key point to note here is that the *nenbutsu* is the recitation of the *name* of Amida Buddha, and the essential “insubstantiality” of the *nenbutsu* is also a consequence of the “name” it contains. A name cannot be independent; of necessity it points to something else. That is, it is in the nature of a name *not* to be an independent substance. A name is useless if a substance can directly appear as itself; it functions as a substitute for something substantial and acts as if it were identified with the latter. In the case of complete identification, a name loses its being as a “name,” so that we may say that the name inherently differentiates itself from the named for which it is substituted. The mediation of the name consists of *identifying differentiation* (or identifying discontinuity).

Based on this characterization of the “name,” the recitative *nenbutsu* can never be accorded a substantial, self-contained origin. It cannot be self-contained but, as Aoki Takamaro notes, functions as a *medium* through which the transcendent, namely Amida Buddha, may reach us (cf. Aoki 1943, 24). According to Pure Land Buddhism, Amida Buddha absolutely transcends this world and there is no other mediation but the “name” of Amida. “Amida” is derived from the Sanskrit words “Amitabha” and “Amitayus,” meaning “immeasurable light” and “immeasurable life” respectively. This name, which can be experienced and measured in the world, mediates us with the immeasurable with which it identifies itself in a discontinuity.

Nishida points out that the relation of “inverse correspondence” (逆対応) between the absolute and human beings is only possible through an expression of the name. It mediates between the transcendent and worldliness without reducing the former to the latter because of *identifying differentiation*, which Nishida refers to as a “continuity of discon-

9. See Suzuki, 1968, 331; Nishida Sōhō, 1997, 115–B; Tsuchiya, 1975, 143–5

tinuity or mediation in a contradictory self-identity” (Nishida 2004, 350).

Thus, the *name* of Buddha in Japanese Pure Land thought provided a notion of transcendence that could break the image of a closed world filled with evil without degrading the transcendent to the mundane in the process. The attempt to secure so completely self-contained an intuition of the transcendent would end up either in degrading identification of the “immeasurable” with the worldly or in forfeiting everything in the world in order to leap to another dimension believed to lie “beyond” this world. A proper *medium* would not awaken such expectations for a complete intuition. The recitation of the *name* fulfills the requirements for such mediation perfectly.

As Tanabe Hajime repeatedly emphasized in *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, Pure Land Buddhism has the crucial advantage of avoiding abstract indifference typified in mystical insight or raptured vision. It naturally realizes a concrete mediation without positing a fixed identity. He remarks that “the concept of metanoetics is characterized by its rejection of abstract non-differentiation and the concrete realization of transforming mediation” (Tanabe 1986, 156). This “transforming mediation” “always transforming and always mediating; it is always brought about in action [or practice 行], not in intuition” (191).

The Recitation of the Name as “Trace”

Let us now consider the possible relevance of Hōnen’s thinking to contemporary philosophical thought. Based on the preceding characterization of the *nenbutsu* as an intrinsic mediation that is free of fixation on objective identities, the recited name in Pure Land Buddhism may be associated with the concept of “trace” often discussed in contemporary philosophy, particularly in the writings of Levinas and Derrida.

Levinas argues that the transcendent “signifies as trace,” maintaining the transcendence of the transcendent (Levinas 1967, 198). Indeed, it may even be said that for Levinas transcendence *is* trace. (211). The transcendent never reveals itself as such, but this does not mean that it simply conceals itself behind things that appear, as if under the right conditions it could be revealed. In this sense, “trace” as transcendence

is “the presence of that which, strictly speaking, was never there, that which has always passed” (Levinas 1967, 201). These characterizations of “trace” seem well suited to the mediation of the “name” in Pure Land Buddhism. In this connection, we may also recall that Levinas emphasizes extraordinary characters of “sacred name” in his interpretation of the Talmud (1982). He notes that a “name” at the same time appears and retreats. This description also fits Amida’s name, and may lead us to illuminating comparisons of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism with the philosophy of Levinas.

Derrida also employs the term “trace” in a sense of his own. For him, “trace” is not, as is commonly thought, something derived from an originally given presence. Rather, it is a “trace” that enables presence without being its substantial origin. This follows from a careful examination of presence. We can never *have* a presence completely at hand, because what we *have* is either already a trace of the presence we seek to take hold of, or it is a “supposed presence” that has replaced the one we were set on. The same applies to the replacement presence we thought we had grasped. In trying to capture presence, we in fact lose sight of it. This means that “presence” enjoys its presence only in its disappearance or retreat, that is, in its “trace.” For Derrida, “presence” is “the trace of the trace, the trace of the erasure of the trace” (Derrida, 1972, 76–7).

In this way, the trace is “older” than presence and being. The trace never appears, but this does not mean that it is absent or latent. In the sense that it does not conceal itself behind the present, it “exposes” itself, but in this very “exposure” it wipes out its own presentation. For Derrida, the trace “produces itself as its own erasure... and it belongs to the trace to erase itself, to elude that which might maintain it in presence. The trace is neither perceptible nor imperceptible” (76).

This characterization of “trace” seems in many respects to fit the *nenbutsu* as we have been approaching it. The recitative *nenbutsu* appears as something present, and insofar as it can be heard and experienced as such, it seems incomparable with Derrida’s “trace.” But can we ever really grasp the *nenbutsu*? Is not the case that what we are able to grasp as *nenbutsu* is only a “trace of a trace” of the *nenbutsu*?

It may be argued that what Hōnen called *nenbutsu* and practiced as such was something that can never be taken hold of for what it is.

Through the henological reduction as a radical transformation of perspective, the *nenbutsu* manifests itself as an empty center that defies all attempts to identify it objectively or conceptually. As Hōnen emphasizes, there is nothing deeper or hidden behind the *nenbutsu*. It lies completely patent and exposed, and yet it cannot be captured as an object of consciousness. Insofar as we are involved in the practice of the recitation, our objectifying and identifying consciousness is dissolved. This may be considered an alternative way of *deconstruction*, one in which the bodily practice is of central importance.¹⁰ The *nenbutsu* is a repeatedly reciting voice that cannot be seized in its actualization and whose functioning “dislocates” the systems of institutionalized experience. Seen in this way, Derrida’s words are almost a description of the *nenbutsu*: “Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffle itself in resonating....”¹¹

Concl usion

Hōnen’s *nenbutsu* is the result of a “selection” treated here as a “henological reduction,” not in the sense of merging into an indifferent unity. Rather, it enables a “mediation” between the worldly and the transcendent, liberating the one from its closure and opening it to the other. This follows from the uniqueness of the *nenbutsu* (and the recited “name”) which is never identifiable as a substance, but is always a “trace.” It has not been my intention to claim that Hōnen’s teaching of the *nenbutsu* can be applied as is to today’s world.¹² It does, however, seem to me that the measure of intensity originally attributed to Hōnen’s thought, as well as the analysis of its “logic” of salvation, can inspire

10. A similar interpretation of Buddhism in relation to Derrida’s deconstruction is suggested by Loy 1992.

11. Derrida 1972, 24. Later Derrida contemplated the problem of the “name” (see especially 1993), but space prohibits going into further detail here.

12. Unfortunately, the *nenbutsu* already has a rather banal meaning in modern Japan that has become such a part of ordinary usage. Therefore, it can hardly be expected to play the same role it did at the time of Hōnen.

contemporary philosophical reflection on the “mediation” of the “unapparent” and alternative attitudes to life.

References

Abbreviations

shhz 『昭和新修法然上人全集』 [Complete writings of Hōnen], ed. by Ishii Norimichi 石井教道 (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1955).

Other Sources

Aoki Takamaro 青木敬麿

1940 『善導和尚』 [Zendō] (Tokyo: Kōbundō).

1943 『念仏の形而上学』 [A metaphysic of the *nenbutsu*] (Tokyo: Kōbundō).

CoWard, H. and T. Foshay, eds.

1992 *Derrida and Negative Theology* (Albany: State University of New York Press).

Derrida, Jacques

1972 *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Minuit).

1993 *Sauf le noms* (Paris: Galilée).

Duméry, Henry

1964 *The Problem of God in Philosophy of Religion* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).

El iade, Mircea

1957 *Das Heilige und das Profane. Vom Wesen des Religiösen* (Hamburg: Rowohlt).

Hase Shōtō 長谷正當

2003 『欲望の哲学——浄土教世界の思索』 [A philosophy of desire: Speculations from the world of the Pure Land] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan).

Hattori, Sho-on

2000 *A Raft from the Other Shore: Hōnen and the Way of Pure Land Buddhism* (Tokyo: Jōdoshū Press).

Katō Shūichi 加藤周一

1978 『加藤周一著作集』 [Collected writings of Katō Shūichi] (Tokyo: Heibonsha), vol. 3.

Katsuki Jōkō 香月乗光

1970 「法然上人の浄土開宗の年時に関する諸説とその批判」 [Hōnen's interpretations of the dating of the Jōdo sect, and a critique]. In 『浄土宗開創期の

- 研究』[Researches on the origins of the Jōdo sect], 187–95. Ed. by Jōkō Katsuki. (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten).
- Levinas, Emmanuel
 1967 *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin).
 1982 *L' Au-delà du verset* (Paris: Minuit).
- Loy, David
 1992 “The Deconstruction of Buddhism,” in Co Ward and Foshay, 1992, 227–53.
- Machida Sōhō 町田宗鳳
 1997 『法然——世紀末の革命者』[Hōnen: An end-of-the-century revolutionary] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan).
- Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎
 2004 『西田幾多郎全集』[Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten), vol. 10.
- Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙
 1968 『鈴木大拙全集』[Complete works of Suzuki Daisetsu] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten), vol. 4.
- Taguchi, Shigeru 田口 茂
 2006 *Das Problem des “Ur-Ich” bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen “Nähe” des Selbst* (Dordrecht: Springer).
- Tamura Enchō 田村圓澄
 1948 『浄土思想の展開』[The development of Jōdo thought] (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō).
- Tanabe Hajime 田辺 元
 1986 *Philosophy as Metanoetics* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Tsuchiya Kōdō 土屋光道
 1975 「称名の根拠—宗教学的視点より」[The basis for the “recitation of the name”: A religious perspective] 『浄土宗学研究』8, 121–2.
- Watts, J. and Y. Tomatsu, eds.
 2005 *Traversing the Pure Land Path: A Lifetime of Encounters with Hōnen Shōnin* (Tokyo: Jōdoshū Press).

Experience and Identity

Umaretsuki in the Writings of Motoori Norinaga

Kim Tae-ho

Motoori Norinaga (本居宣長 1730–1801) was a leading scholar of *kokugaku* 國學 (National Learning) in Edo-period Japan. He is best remembered for his commentaries on Japanese classics, *Genji monogatari tama no ogushi* (源氏物語玉の小櫛) and *Kojiki den* (古事記傳), each of which contains a critique of *karagokoro* 漢意 (Chinese-mindedness). Norinaga's aim was construct for Japan a cultural identity independent of China by restoring a spirit contained in Japanese tradition.

In this essay, I shall focus on Norinaga's understanding view of human nature (*saga* 性) and Japanese identity. In particular, I will consider his response to *karagokoro* as reflected in his essay *Shun-an zuibitsu* (舜庵隨筆), which contains a comprehensive account of theories of human nature in China and Japan up to that time.

The notion of *UMARETSUKI*

We begin with the notion of *umaretsuki* (“possessed from birth”), a term Norinaga took from Itō Jinsai (伊藤仁齋 1627–1705). In *Shun-an zuibitsu*, Norinaga writes that “Jinsai's comment, that one possesses *xing* (性, Jp. *sei*) by birth, is very interesting.... *Xing* is a matter of birth, and there is no need to speak of it as good or evil” (§718).

According to Norinaga, *umaretsuki* is something we possess by birth, and therefore it cannot be defined as either good or evil. In other words, *umaretsuki* is the natural condition of human beings, and therefore it is prior to judgments of good or evil. So what is the meaning of Norinaga's definition? To answer this question, we should first examine the historical construction of *xing shan* (性善) theory. In Confucian thought, the theory of *xing shan* began with Mengzi (孟子):

Everyone has a heart (心) that is sensitive to others.

The reason why I say that human beings all have hearts that will not bear others is this: suppose that someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well. In such a situation, everyone would have a feeling of alarm (怵惕) and compassion (惻隱). However, this is not because one tries to receive some good from the child's parents, nor because one wants to achieve fame among neighbors and friends, nor because one dislikes the sound of the child's cries.

From the beginning, Mengzi's explanation is about the human heart. He captures the tendency of humans to be good through the expressions "alarm" and "compassion." Mengzi's understanding of human nature is based on experiential induction. Although he used the notion of "heart," he did not define it through a transcendental epistemology. It is Zhu Xi's annotation to Mengzi that uses the concept of *li* (理):

Mr. Xie (謝) said that when we see a child about to fall into a well, all of us have a feeling of alarm, and this occurs in our real hearts (真心). This kind of heart is not attained by thought, nor hit upon by practice. It is just the nature of *tian li* (天理).

Since this does not have to do with *xing* but with "heart," we need to see how Mengzi and Zhu Xi define *xing shan*. Mengzi argues:

As for their *qing* (情), they can become good. This is what I mean by calling their nature "good." As for becoming evil, this is not the fault of their potential (才). Human beings all have the heart of compassion.

According to Mengzi, the good of human nature is the *potential* of being good, which may or may not be realized. But Zhu Xi asserted that human nature is good:

Qing is the activity of *xing*. Originally, a human being's *qing* could be good and could not act in an evil way. Accordingly, we can know that *xing* is good. (Mengzi 2.a.6.)

As a result, we know that the transcendental definition of human nature is not in Mengzi but in Zhu Xi. Although he also speaks of the same tension in human nature, Mengzi's definition does not have a transcendental logical basis. Therefore, we can say that Norinaga's definition of *umaretsuki* has two meanings. The first is the objection to the epistemology of Confucian thought, especially to that of Zhu Xi. The second, which is connected to the first, is the insistence on experiential rationalism, similar to Mengzi's explanation of the human heart.

In fact, Norinaga objects to Zhu Xi's commentary on *xing* and *qing*. According to Zhu Xi's theory, *xing* is wholly a good thing that we have by birth and it is related to *li* (理). *Li* is a cosmological law, and so man has the potential to become an ideal human being, a so-called *shengren* (聖人). But in order to become *shengren*, we have to restrain our desire of *qing*. Zhu Xi recommended replacing *qing* by returning to *xing*.

Zhu Xi's notion of *xing* is the potential of mankind, yet it also has the power to bind the greed of mankind. In any case, Norinaga's criticism of Zhu Xi's theory objects to the distinction between good (性) and evil (情). As a result, human nature has a strong sense of freedom. Thus *umaretsuki* may be seen as an experiential criticism of Zhu Xi's theory, and as such it denies various views of human nature, for example the view that humans are good or evil.

An important point to note here is that Norinaga does not deny the notion of *xing* itself. He only denies the logic according to which human nature is good. Does this mean that *umaretsuki* and *xing* have something in common? And if they do, could this open the possibility for a new East Asian thought?

Japanese identity of sympathy

Norinaga's *kokugaku*, which emphasized the freedom of human nature, was deeply related to traditional Japanese thought on nature (*shizen* 自然). This point of view was also shared by all the Japanese *kogaku*

(古學) scholars, especially Yamaga Sokō (山鹿素行 1622–1685), Itō Jinsai (伊藤仁斎 1627–1705), and Ogyū Sorai (荻生徂徠 1666–1728). Their common view forms one feature of modern Japanese thought, and so we can say that this is a classical form of Japanese identity.

Maruyama Masao (丸山眞男 1914–1996) has pointed out that *shizen* and *sakui* (作爲 [artifice]) are features of both Japanese *kogaku* and *kokugaku*. He captured Zhu Xi's viewpoint of nature as consisting of three points: first, it was regarded as a first step in human thought; second, Maruyama contrasted Zhu Xi's concept of *li* and Sorai's concept of *sakui* as transcendental substance versus human action; and thirdly, he contrasted the theories of Zhu Xi and Sorai as a difference between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* thinking (Maruyama 1952, 200–1; 217; 232–3).

Kurozumi Makoto (黒住 眞) criticizes Maruyama's theory of Japanese modernization, arguing that it leaves a gap in relation to the idea of “experiential rationalism”:

One, Maruyama's plan regarded Zhu Xi in the negative. He argued that Zhu Xi's theory is completely unrelated to the process of modernization.

Two, it is clear that Maruyama's reading of Zhu Xi was related to Japanese nationalism. His aim was to make Japan modern by becoming post-Asian.

Three, Maruyama planned to deny and overcome the old-fashioned system of Confucian thought in East Asia. This has the same roots of Norinaga's aim of building a Japanese identity by criticizing Chinese Confucian thought. (Kurozumi 2003, 167–8)

I agree with Kurozumi that we cannot accept Maruyama's work as it is. However, it is true there are some aspects of *sakui* and experiential rationalism in Japanese thought. Kurozumi also wrote:

[Japanese Confucian thought in the Edo period was] considered very important, not as transcendental deduction but as individual and inductive judgement. It opened the way for positivism and experiential rationalism. (173)

To summarize this point, Norinaga's *umaretsuki* belongs to a current of Japanese *kogaku* and experiential rationalism that is related to a

Japanese way of thinking or feeling (思い). Finally, it refined the notion of *awaremi* (哀れみ), meaning compassion. Earlier, I asked about the connection between *umaretsuki* and *xing* as a possibility for East Asian thought. To answer this question, it will be helpful to look at the notions of empathy and sympathy. First, we should consider the definition of both notions. Robert L. Katz writes:

It is true that in both sympathy and empathy we permit our feelings for others to become involved. The purpose of the two activities are different, however. In empathy we focus our attention on the feelings and the situation of the other person.... When we sympathize, we are preoccupied with the assumed essential bond between our own feelings and the feelings of others. We are not concerned so much with the objective reality and character of the other person's situation as with an analogy between him and ourselves. The analogy preempts our attention. The understanding of the other person is not our objective. (Katz 1963, 8)

According to Katz, the most important distinction is the essential bond between oneself and others. This bond is an expression of the coexistence between the subjective and the objective. Katz warns us of the difficulties involved in empathy:

This distinction is important. Unless it is sharply made, it will be difficult to appreciate empathy as a professional tool in the arts and sciences. Practitioners of empathy are committed to objective knowledge of other personalities. (Katz 1963, 8)

Martin L. Hoffman explains empathy from the viewpoint of moral development. He insists that empathy could be a principle of morality, but he also points out the risk of losing its connection to compassion in East Asian thought (Hoffman 2000). Where this is the case, the Japanese will need to reform their notion of empathy in the future.

We now need to examine the essential bond of *awaremi*. Naturally, this means questioning the logical leap of that experiential deduction. In other words, Norinaga's *kokugaku* was a kind of metaphysics. How could he have resorted to a metaphysical basis? To answer this question, it will be helpful to consider the aorist verb tense in the Japanese language.

The aorist in Japanese

As noted above, *umaretsuki* is based on experiential rationalism, but it is also related to transcendental metaphysics. This is natural enough, given that birth is a precondition of *umaretsuki*. Norinaga's criticism of Zhu Xi's theory pointed out the aspects of transcendental metaphysics, only to insist then on a transcendental metaphysical basis as a precondition of *umaretsuki*. How could he explain this logical leap in his experiential rationalism? Here I refer to the first chapter, "Kaimyo," of the *Kojiki den*:

When the sky and earth were opened, the name of God in Takama-no-hara was Ame-no-minakanushi. Next was Takami-musubi-no-kami. Next, Kami-musubi-no-kami. All three Gods are all *hitori-gami* and *make* the body *hidden*. (mnz 9: 121)

The very important point is "*make* the body *hidden*," (Jp. ミミヲカクシタマヒキ [*ki*]). Jumping to the conclusion, *ki* is a particle that indicates an aorist past tense. Fujii Sadakazu writes:

Likewise, *ki* was a particle for stating what has been seen. Therefore, it indicates a very high degree of certainty, like that of a witness... *Ki* is a particle used to report something that has been seen. (Fujii 1987, 288–90)

As we have seen, *umaretsuki* was based not only on experiential rationalism but also on transcendental metaphysics. Norinaga's *kokugaku* justified his transcendental metaphysics as an experiential fact by using the aorist tense, and his logical and identical leap was also clarified by the aorist tense. Yet it can be criticized based on his own transcendental metaphysics.

In fact, the possibility of *umaretsuki* provided a basis for Japanese nationalism in the Meiji period. For example, Uesugi Shinkichi (上杉愼吉 1878–1929) followed Norinaga's book *The Spirit of Rectification* (『直毘靈』) in a 1916 essay. In it he proposes that the idea of *umaretsuki* in the aorist tense has more power to bind desire than does the concept of *li* in Zhu Xi's theory. At the very least we can say that its binding force is as strong as the binding force of *li*.

If Norinaga's *kokugaku* thought was to be a method for accepting and digesting Chinese culture, it required a logical device that would correspond to Chinese thinking and enable us to understand it. It seems to me that today, too, we need to investigate the meaning of such a device and its problems. In other words, Norinaga's project suggests a possible way for East Asian philosophy to maintain its independence and at the same time coexist with other philosophies. It is not a question of favoring one over the other, but of a kind of independence through coexistence.

As mentioned above, however, Norinaga's *kokugaku* thought was often used as a basis for Japanese nationalism, the main point of contact being the idea of *awaremi*. Since *awaremi*, like *umaretsuki*, is grounded in the experiential world, we should examine the compassion of *awaremi*, a compassion of empathy or sympathy. In other words, does the compassion of *awaremi* have an essential bond or not?

In Inoue Tetsujirō (井上哲次郎 1856–1944), we also find connections to the experiential world, as evidenced in his concept of *kokutai* (国体):

The fundamental character of Japan came into existence naturally. It is not man-made, like many countries in Europe, especially those that have a republican system. (Inoue 1926, 2–4)

Almost all mythologies were originally produced by the imagination; even if Japanese mythology is not factual, it bears a close resemblance to ancient times, and so is considered to bear a relationship to the historical truth. (Inoue 1892, 24)

The important point to grasp here is the way national mythology is being understood. For Inoue, the logical basis of Japanese mythology lies in establishing close resemblances. This is a form of understanding based on experiential compassion, just as *awaremi* is. From this viewpoint, we are unable to see any essential bond in sympathy. It is a compassion lacking the potential to support the coexistence of the subjective and the objective.

In fact, Inoue does not hesitate to insist on the right of the nation to control the lives of its people (Inoue 1892). Does this reduce the potential of Norinaga's *kokugaku* thought, and in particular, of his notion of *umaretsuki*?

Sympathy in East Asian thought

In reflecting on Norinaga's *kokugaku* thought in line with experiential rationalism, we need to question the experiential basis for defining "Japan" and "Japanese identity," and then to consider how experiential identity can be connected to independent coexistence. Accordingly, in what follows we shall discuss: (1) Norinaga's metaphysical criticism, (2) the importance of the aorist tense in Norinaga's annotations; and (3) a suggestion for an empiricist view of identity coexisting independently.

Umaretsuki is based on Japanese experiential rationalism. Feeling is the most experiential function of human nature. On the other hand, the same traits of transcendental metaphysics show up in *umaretsuki*. In this regard, it is like *xing* and the experiential function in *qing* in Zhu Xi's theory. In short, Zhu Xi and Norinaga share a common understanding and function regarding human nature.

What kind of potential may we anticipate here for East Asian thought? Zhu Xi and Norinaga's were similar in some respects, for example, in the strong forces they see binding human nature. The difference between them has to do with *li* and nation, though even here the same function of compassion in human nature is present: *ce yin* (惻隱) or *awaremi*.

I would like to suggest that we consider this common idea of sympathy as a potential for a new East Asian philosophy. Both *ce yin* and *awaremi* are related to transcendental metaphysics, but they are also experiential functions. Both are one's own feelings and at the same time are related to other people or objects. This function of feeling comes from one's own experience, but it also means that one can reflect on oneself, overcome oneself, and be open to others.

Deleuze defined the subjective as a "meditation and transcendence." He also explained the subjective as a "movement" of "overcoming and reflecting upon oneself" (Deleuze 1953,90). Sympathy is also an important concept in Deleuze's *Empiricism and Subject*, where he stresses the need to "expand on it" (27, 30). In the concepts of *ce yin* and *awaremi*, there is also a movement of "overcoming oneself and reflecting upon oneself." I believe that if we are able to clear up the problem of metaphysical binding in the concepts of *li* and nation, we could then turn to

the idea of sympathy in East Asian thought and use it to consider independent coexistence.

However, as mentioned above, we cannot define the concepts of *ce yin* and *awaremi* as sympathy. So how can we find an experiential possibility in them? Above all, how can we distinguish empathy and sympathy in the two? Finally, can we not change the emphasized concept of compassion into sympathy? What is required to do so?

Jullien points out Mengzi's theory of "heart" as a fundamental experience and compares it with Kant. He writes:

In a word, what is described in Mengzi is not a principle of morality, but an assurance of the existence of the request for morality within myself.... Responsibility as a fundamental bond with others exists before every experience. (Julien 1995, 53–3)

In the case of the child and the well, Kant would view the feelings in one's heart as irrational. Jullien, in contrast, tries to re-read the experience of compassion as a fundamental experience. Jullien's immanence of morality and the idea of responsibility based on a fundamental relationship with others is what we have referred to as sympathy. We see the essential bond here in his notions of immanence and responsibility.

As stated above, *ce yin* and *awaremi* both belong to experiential compassion. We also saw a loss of the essential bond of sympathy. This is not because of the distinction between the two concepts, but because of Zhu Xi and Norinaga's logic of transcendental metaphysics. Accordingly, if, as a first step, we can eliminate deductive basis from experiential rationalism, we would be able to transform the empathy of compassion into sympathy. In the end, the potential of sympathy in East Asian thought is not yet a possibility but a task to be realized in the future through compassion towards the past.

Concl usion

As we have seen, Norinaga's *umaretsuki* criticized the metaphysical logic of Zhu Xi's theory through experiential rationalism. But his logic of *umaretsuki* was also based on transcendental metaphysics.

We saw that his experiential rationalism is based on his use of the aorist tense, and that his concept of *umaretsuki* is related to the idea of sympathy or *awaremi*. This is the same feeling of *ce yin* that we find in Chinese Confucian thought.

Thus the theories of *xing* and *umaretsuki* are based on a common understanding of human nature. The only difference is between *li* and the aorist tense, between thinking about all of humanity and thinking about Japan, and between empathy and sympathy. I believe that the function of feeling in East Asian thought means to be related both to oneself and to others. Even if this does not suffice to define it as “sympathy,” I believe the idea has the potential to aid us in rethinking an experiential identity for East Asia in the twenty-first century.

References

Abbreviation

mnz 1968–2003『本居宣長全集』[Collected works of Motoori Norinaga] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1968–2003).

Other Sources

Del euze , Gilles

1953 *Empirisme et subjectivité* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France).

Fujii Sadakazu 藤井貞和

1987『物語文学成立史——フルコト・カタリ・モノガタリ』[A history of the emergence of narrative literature: Ancient matter, speech, stories] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai).

Hof fman, Martin L.

2000 *Empathy and Moral Development Implications for Caring and Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎

1892「宗教と教育との關係につき井上哲二郎氏の談話」[Comments of Inoue Tetsujirō on the relationship between religion and education],『教育時論』272: 24–6.

1926『我が國體と國民道德』[Our national polity and civil morality] (Kobe: Junkōdō Shoten).

Julien, François

1995 *Fonder la morale: Dialogue de Mencius avec un philosophe des Lumières*
(Paris : B. Grasset).

Katz, Robert L.

1963 *Empathy: Its Nature and Uses* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe).

Kurozumi Makoto 黒住 真

2003 『近世日本社会と儒教』 [Modern Japanese society and Confucianism]
(Tokyo: Perikansha).

Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男

1952 『日本政治思想史研究』 [A History of Japanese Political Thought]
(Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai).

Uesugi Shinkichi 上杉愼吉

1916 『國體憲法及憲政』 [National constitution and constitutional government]
(Tokyo: Yuhikaku).

Between the Global and the Local

Applying the Logic of the One and the Many to a Global Age

Gereon Kopf

This essay is part of a larger project in which I explore the contributions that Kyoto school philosophers can make to the construction of a political philosophy for the postmodern and even the post-postmodern age in a globalized world. In particular, I am interested in how Mutai Risaku's vision of a "universal world" (世界の世界) and its "total human being" (全体的人間) can provide a theory of cosmopolitan existence that neither succumbs to communalism nor disintegrates in globalistic universalism.

This may sound ironic, since the two leading philosophers and main representatives of the Kyoto school, Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime, have both been accused of nationalist and, by implication, militarist tendencies. However, I believe that the nationalist overtones and subtexts in some of their writings are caused by conceptual inconsistencies and belie the true potential of their philosophies. One of their main disciples, Mutai Risaku, uses concepts central to Nishida and Tanabe's philosophies, and these are "one-and-yet-the-many" (一即多) and the "specific" (種) respectively, to envision a world consisting of a plurality of self-determining political entities. In fact, I believe that Mutai's strong anti-nationalist rhetoric indicates that his conceptual structure can function

as a paradigm that at the same time eschews a faceless universalism and ethnocentric communalism. I will focus here on Mutai's terminology, and in the conclusion will illuminate how his adaptation of the logic of the specific can help in envisioning a global citizen.

Nishida's notion of the nation

Nishida, who was born in 1870 in Kanazawa prefecture, attained national notoriety with his book *Inquiry into the Good* (1911). From then on he taught at the prestigious Imperial University of Kyoto, and came to political philosophy only later in life. After his retirement in 1929, he started to shift the focus of his writings from basic epistemological questions and the attempt to develop a first philosophy to more general reflections about human interaction and history.

These thoughts came to fruition when Nishida was invited to give a talk to a group of generals from the Japanese army in 1938, which was published as *The Problem of Japanese Culture* (日本文化の問題; nkz 14: 387–418). Other examples of Nishida's attempts at a practical application of his political philosophy can be found in his 1940 version of *The Problem of Japanese Culture* (nkz 12: 274–384), and his *The Principles of the New World Order* (世界新秩序の原理) (426–34). In these essays, which are rather ambiguous to say the least, he suggested that Japan and, specifically, the Japanese emperor, constituted the center of the world. As early as 1934 Nishida had already pronounced a less provocative version of the sentiment that Japan constitutes the highest culture in *The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* (哲学の根本問題). This was not unlike Hegel's claim for the superiority of Prussia. Nishida's argument for these obviously nationalistic positions is that Japan exhibits the most developed dialectical structure of “absolute contradictory self-identity” (絶対矛盾的自己同一) and thus expresses the “dialectical universal” (弁証法的一般者), the oneness of the world, that is, the “one” (一), and the “absolute” (絶対). Nishida notes, in a similar vein, that as one of the many, the emperor embodies the oneness of the world.

Nishida introduced his concept of the “one-and-yet-the-many” and the “many-and-yet-the-one” in his essay *Acting Intuition* (行為的直観)

in 1938, and brought it to fruition in his *Collection of Philosophical Essays Vol.4* (哲学論文集第四) in 1944. He believed that only the conceptual pair of the “one-and-yet-the-many” and the “many-and-yet-the-one” could sufficiently describe the relationship between the “historical world” (歴史の世界), which he conceived of as the “absolute,” and the multiplicity of the “acting individuals” that make up this world.¹

In *The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy*, Nishida probes the feasibility of the Aristotelian “subject that cannot become a predicate,” the Platonic “form,” paraphrased by Nishida as the “predicate that cannot become a subject,” and the quasi-Hegelian “dialectical universal.” He concludes that the former two concepts are not only exclusive but also ignore the multiplicity of the world insofar as they mainly highlight the relationship between one particular and one universal. While the latter concept sufficiently articulates the dialectical relationship of what could be called the fourfold principles of determination—the self-determination of the universal, the determination of the universal by the individual, the self-determination of the individual, and the determination of the universal by the individual—it nevertheless implies a primacy of the universal over the particular and of the particularity of the “acting individual” over the multiplicity thereof. It is only the conception of the historical world as the “one-and-yet-the-many” and the “many-and-yet-the-one” that sufficiently resolves the philosophical dilemma of essentialism.

Nishida sees this concept most poignantly expressed in the alternative between Spinoza’s monism and Leibniz’s monadology, and believes it describes the structure of the “acting individual” most appropriately. This “acting individual” is located at the intersection of the vertical axis connecting the universal and the particulars as well as in a net, not unlike Indra’s net, of connections among infinite particulars on the horizontal dimension. In other words, as Kasulis has suggested, it constitutes a “holographic entrapoint” (2002) to the “historical world” (歴史の世界).

1. While Nishida does not actually use the term “acting individual,” he often uses the term “acting self” (行為の自己) in his *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy*, and observes more than once that “individuals determine each other in their expressions and activities” (nkz 7: 59).

Using this framework, Nishida suggests that Japan in general and the emperor in particular constitute an “acting individual” which perfectly “expresses” (表現) the historical world as well as the individuality of all other nations and people respectively. In addition, Nishida continues, Japan constitutes a “self-identity of the absolute contradictories of East and West” and a “dialectical culture” that sublates the opposition of the archaic *Gemeinschaft* and the metropolitan *Gesellschaft*. Nishida uses the term “culture of nothingness” (無の文化), but defines “nothingness” (actually “true non-being” 真の無) as “being-*qua*-non-being” (有即無), that is, as that which dialectically sublates “being” and “non-being.” For this reason I use the term “dialectical culture.” This form of culture, Nishida contends, is most clearly manifested in the Japan of the early Shōwa period:

Within the Japanese spirit, which moves towards the truth of things at the bottom of the subject by transcending the subject, the spirit of Eastern culture is always and everywhere brought to life. At the same time, it is always something that is directly united with the spirit of Western culture, which emerges from its environment. (nkz 12: 360)

Subsequently, for Nishida, Japan occupies a central place in history. The former argument that Japan constitutes an “acting individual” is, for the most part, consistent with his basic philosophical insight; the problem with this line of argument, however, is that Nishida’s dialectic of the one and the many equally applies to all other nations or peoples without privileging any of them, including Japan and its emperor. He argued for the superiority of Japan on the grounds that it constitutes a “self-identity of the absolute contradictories of East and West.” This rhetoric could be (and has been) used in an appropriately altered form by a host of other political entities (such as in India and Hong Kong); it also absolutizes the rather spurious dichotomy between East and West and essentializes the notion of nation states and national or geographical entities. Most of all, however, his arguments in support of nationalist beliefs belie the subversive potential of his non-dualist philosophy, which, if taken seriously, subverts rather than reifies conceptual tokens such as the nation state and the orientalist bifurcation of the world.

Tanabe's concept of nation

The case of Nishida's successor at Kyoto University, Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), seems, ironically enough, strikingly similar. Tanabe first attained a reputation for his extraordinary work in the field of the philosophy of science and for his commentaries on Kant. His first original work, *The Logic of the Specifi* (種の論理), not only established his reputation as a creative thinker but also delineated his position from that of his mentor. While not necessarily representative of his later work, his “logic of the specifi ” constitutes his major contribution to the philosophy of the Kyoto School and forms the philosophical basis for what can be called the nationalist tendencies in his work.

Tanabe felt that Nishida's philosophy of history was too abstract and not really grounded in history itself. The reasons for this shortcoming was, in Tanabe's eyes, Nishida's obsession with concepts such as the universal and the particular, which strictly speaking constitute elusive, limit functions, and are not rooted in concrete objects and events. Moreover, Tanabe argued, the rhetoric of the one and the many implies a false alternative between an absolutism, whereby the individual is subsumed under and within the absolute, and an “irrational ideology” (非合理主義) in the case of a “unity” (統一) or “identity” (同一) of the one and the many. Therefore, Tanabe suggested shifting the focus of philosophy from the empty concepts that signify abstract and elusive extremes to one that mediates them concretely in history.

As the basic concept of his philosophy of “absolute mediation” (絶対媒介)—a notion derived from Hegelian dialectics—Tanabe identifies the “specifi ” (種). He argues that any philosophy of history requires a mediation of the “totality” (全体) and the “individual” (個体), as well as the encounter among individuals such as the “I” (我) and the “thou” (汝). The third term that enables this kind of “mediation” and decentralizes each of the extremes as well as de-essentializes history is “society” (社会). Tanabe's conceptual adjustment of Nishida's philosophy results in a shift away from Nishida's obsession with dichotomies and binaries, even the dichotomy of the one and the many, and breathes life into the abstract “many” by adding the anonymous and egalitarian “he” (彼, but unfortunately not a “she”) to the “I” and “thou”; society is thus not

restricted to interpersonal encounters, and history is not restricted to the conflict between two nations. It is the “specifi ” that mediates the “general” (普遍) and the “individual” (个体) as the “particular” (特殊). History is not constituted by abstracts such as empty universals or infinitely small particulars, but by specific cultures, traditions, and religions. The “logic” that describes the social dimension of history must be a “logic of the specifi .”

At this point a brief explanation of my translation of *shu* is in order. James Heisig suggests rendering this term, which is usually translated as “species,” as the “specific.” The traditional word choice certainly has validity since not only does the general use of *shu* suggest “species,” Tanabe himself contrasts it with the term *rui* (類), “genus.” Nevertheless, I follow Heisig’s lead here since Tanabe and Mutai both explicitly identify *shu* as the “particular” expression of the totality and contrast it with the terms “individual” and “general.”

This short exploration already illustrates that Tanabe designed his “logic of the specifi ” to cure Nishida’s philosophy of its absolutism and its lack of foundation in the concrete historical world. He replaced the term “absolute” (絶対), which constituted the central feature of most of Nishida’s later philosophy, with the term “specific” and illustrated the “specifi ” by what he perceived to be the historical and social reality of the “national entity” (国家). The “specific” was designed to be the corrective feature of limit function such as “totality” and “individual,” thereby preventing the equally unacceptable political ideologies of absolutism and anarchy. However, as a by-product, he ended up absolutizing the specific and, by default, the notion of the “national entity.” Tanabe’s philosophy of “absolute mediation” therefore resulted, at least temporarily, in nationalism and not in the “metanoetics” (懺悔道) of “absolute criticism” (絶対批判) as it did in his later work.

His later notion of the “absolute critique” manages not only to criticize the absolutism of foundational concepts, it also functions as a self-corrective, or some would say “deconstructive” principle, not unlike Derrida’s *différance* or the Mahāyāna concept of “emptiness” (*śūnyatā*) that escape any attempt of reification and absolutization, thus subverting any form of hegemonic thinking. This is where the irony of Tanabe’s philosophy of “absolute mediation” lies: as successful as he was in iden-

tifying the flaws in Nishida's system and pointing out the necessity of a mediating principle to prevent Nishida's dialectics of the one and the many from robbing history of its concreteness and its vitality, he succumbed to a similar mistake by reifying and privileging (if not absolutizing) the "specific ." Not only that, his identification of the "specific " with the "national entity" of Japan committed the fallacy of essentialism and ignored the plurality of specific .

What is nationalism?

Before I proceed to discuss Mutai's approach, I would like to reiterate what lies at the basis of the two forms of nationalism discussed. Nishida identifies the Japanese state as the one that transcends all citizens of Japan as well as one of the many nations that surpasses them as *primus inter pares*. The reason for this is that Japan constitutes, in Nishida's opinion, the only particular that fully expresses the absolute. Tanabe reifies the nation state as the "specific " and privileges this "specific " over the oneness of the world, the multiplicity of individuals, and over other nation states. A comparison between Tanabe and Nishida's nationalism discloses a feature of nationalism that should not surprise: nationalism implies the reification of an abstract concept, an "imagined community" to borrow Benedict Anderson's term, as well as the absolutization of one specific *primus inter pares*.

What is ironic about the nationalisms of Nishida and Tanabe is not the structural features they use themselves, but the fact that they justified these nationalisms with a philosophy that was, on the contrary, subversive, egalitarian, and anti-essentialist. If the historical world is conceived of as "one-and-yet-the-many," it is not only impossible to privilege one nation above the others but also to assign primacy to a community of nations over the individual nations themselves. It does not escape a certain irony that despite its use in the history of China and Korea, as well as by Nishida, the principle of the "one-and-yet-the-many" is, philosophically speaking, thoroughly egalitarian. Similarly, if the nation as the "specific" mediates the one and the many, not only does the "specific" reflect and express the multiplicity of individuals as well as the oneness

of the historical world, but there must be a multiplicity of specifics, lest it morph into a “one” itself, reifying and absolutizing that “one.” This is ironic because to avoid such an absolutization of the “one,” Tanabe articulated the “logic of the specific” in the first place. In other words, the notion of the specific is designed to subvert the hegemony of either the one or the many and, subsequently, to reject absolutism as well as anarchy as the ideal political systems. So what is needed is a re-conceptualization of these ideas to explore their application to political philosophy and their critical potential in subverting nationalism. It was Mutai Risaku who realized the true potential of Nishida’s “one-and-yet-the-many” and Tanabe’s “specifi ” and proceeded to ground his humanism in these very concepts.

Mut ai’s hum anism

Mutai Risaku (1890–1974), one of Nishida’s closest students, is frequently associated with the so-called “left wing” of the Kyoto school. He made a name for himself as a philosopher when he developed his own brand of humanism, which he called “global humanism,” or more literally, “humanism for humanity” (人類ヒューマニズム), after the end of World War ii. He contrasts this form of humanism with the aristocratic humanism of the Renaissance as well as the metropolitan humanism of the bourgeoisie and identifies it as socialist humanism. Mutai suggests that theories of humanism usually project Eurocentric trajectories of intellectual development that overlook forms of humanism that developed in different parts of the world. He cites as examples “the aristocratic humanism of ancient Japan as expressed in the *Manyōshū*, the martial humanism of the Kamakura period as expressed in war records, and the humanism characteristic of merchants and townspeople during the Tokugawa period” (mrz 6: 221). Of course, one could add, among others, the Confucian classics such as the *Analects*, the *Mengzi*, and the *Xunzi*, as well as early Buddhist writings. The implication here, though Mutai never spells it out himself, is that to really serve humanity, humanism has to acknowledge sources from more than one intellectual tradition.

Mutai grounds his humanism in the insight that human beings have simultaneous yet conflicting desires for freedom and peace. He roots this philosophy in the experience of World War II, especially in the resistance of the White Rose to the Third Reich. While Mutai avoids commenting on Japanese militarism throughout the first half of the twentieth century—for example, he talks about the destruction brought by the detonation of the two nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki but forgets to mention the Nanjing massacre or the fate of the comfort women—his attempt to ground his humanism in the experience of a movement that resisted a nationalist dictatorship signals a significant shift away from any association with the nationalist ideology or the military that Nishida and Tanabe may or may not have had. Mutai explicitly takes the side of a group of students who not only disassociated themselves from the nationalist ideology of a fascist dictatorship but actively opposed it. This disillusionment with universalist theories and his commitment to reassign importance and power to the individual is indicative of, and reflected in Mutai's humanism.

To be able to serve the needs of the contemporary period, Mutai argues, humanism has to recognize the central paradox at the core of human existence, which has traditionally been overlooked. He arrives at this paradox by taking as his starting point a postulate that seems innocuous enough to apply to any form of humanism: the goal of humanism is to “affirm the life, value, and creativity of humans in their totality” (mrz 6: 189). In other words, central to any conception of humanism is the demand for happiness (幸福), which is threatened by war, natural disasters, poverty, sickness, and alienation. To alleviate war, Mutai suggests it is necessary to assume the standpoint of “all of humanity” (全人類). At the same time, it is pivotal to guarantee the self-determination of all nations, the violation of which is, to Mutai, the “basic evil of war” (mrz 9: 216). Mutai explains “to abolish wars, the number one priority must be to embrace as a rule that it is indispensable to protect world peace and the independence of nations” (217).

Mutai does not stop at international or global politics, but also moves individuals into the framework of a “global humanism.” He believes that to solve the “evils of nationalism” and social evils such as poverty it is essential to recognize the need for freedom and happiness as well as the

rights and responsibilities of all individuals. Finally, to prevent the suffering that is brought about by natural disasters, human beings have to acknowledge that humanity and nature coexist in a “mutual relationship” and have to live accordingly. In short, Mutai observes that in order to alleviate suffering and to provide happiness to all of humanity, a global humanism must embrace the demands of nature, all individual nations, and all individuals alike. This means that he balances the demand of national self-determination with the rights of individuals, and suggests that peace involves not only every member of the human community but extends to all of nature as well. To develop such a philosophy is, of course, a tall order. But Mutai believes that the conceptual foundation of such a humanism is provided by the philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe.

To develop a humanism that fulfills all the above-mentioned criteria, Mutai established three basic terms: the totality of life, the individual, and a notion of culture that mediates the former two and thus evokes the dialectical philosophy of the main Kyoto school philosophers. Like Nishida, Mutai believes that any political philosophy has to start with the limit functions of the “one” and the “many”; in Mutai’s terminology, these are the “individual” (個体) and the “world” (世界); from Tanabe, he borrows the concepts of the “specific,” which he identifies as “society” (社会), and that of “mediation.” With these building blocks provided by his teachers, Mutai develops a sophisticated philosophical model of history.

History, Mutai maintains, evolves through a tension between the oneness of the cosmos and the individual defined as “acting subject” (行為の主体). He calls this cosmic oneness, which he conceives of in spatial and temporal terms, the “world.” However, since this “world” includes everything, it takes on the form of “nothingness,” in Hisamatsu Shin’ichi’s sense of “not a single thing.” At the same time, the individual is infinitely small and disappears, as Jean-Paul Sartre has noted, in the infinitely small rupture between two moments on the time line. Thus, Mutai concludes that while the “individual” and the “world” constitute the basic framework of the “historical world,” they are not concrete and thus need to be mediated by a third term, the “specific.” Like Tanabe, in Mutai’s philosophy, the “specific,” that is, the “particular” (特殊) expres-

sion of the world, and the individual functions as the social and cultural structure that mediates between the world and the individual. The principle of “mediation” is necessary to prevent the notions of “world” and “individual” from being reified and reduced to abstract and static entities. In other words, the concept of “mediation” functions as the principle of dynamicity and transformation. However, and this marks a crucial difference between Mutai and Tanabe, Mutai’s “specifi ” is neither singular nor central; on the contrary, Mutai introduces the notion of what could be called a triangular mediation that does not privilege any of the three terms, but rather presumes an egalitarian relationship among them. Politically, this means that Mutai equally eschews any form of totalitarianism—be it absolutism, nationalism, or anarchy—and implies a radical multilateralism not only among equals, such as individuals or societies, but also among the three terms insofar as he refuses to privilege any one of them.

To stratify Mutai’s multilateralism, I would like to briefly examine Mutai’s conceptions of the “world,” “society,” and “individual.” The key term here is “world.” The “world,” Mutai explains, “constitutes the totality but is not complete” (mrz 4: 92). This point is of absolute importance to Mutai’s system. Mutai postulates a unified system, the “world,” which contains a spatio-temporal reality and comprises the “actual world” (現実の世界). At the same time, he asserts the openness of this system, that is, not only the possibility of but the very necessity for change. The absolute is never completed; rather its completion is, to appropriate a term coined by Jacques Derrida, “infinitely deferred.”

It is for this reason that Nishida’s most accomplished critic, Takahashi Satomi, claimed that there is no totality but at the end of history. While this is correct, logically speaking Mutai’s conception is not only more courageous but, above all, constitutes the only way to conceive of a constantly transforming universe that does not disintegrate but displays some cohesiveness and unity. To articulate the paradox that the absolute is not absolute since it is in constant flux, Mutai uses Nishida’s terminology of “absolute nothingness” (絶対無) to refer to the “world.” This means that the “world” is devoid of essences, it is dynamic, and it forms the actual world in that it “transcends itself inside itself” (115). It is formed and,

to use one of Nishida's favorite terms, "determined" (限定された) by the "acting individual."

When it works as an "acting individual," the individual not only negates the standpoint of expression in that it transcends the universal world of expression, but also constitutes the point in which the world expresses itself in its depth. (72)

What Mutai states here using the language of the Kyoto School is that the subjective activity of the individual—"individual" not being defined as a person over time but rather as a creative moment—radically ruptures and, at the same time, creatively transforms, the "world." Given these descriptions, I think it is best to understand the "world" as a "principle of unity" insofar as it implies that the multiplicity of individuals all inhabit the same world, while "individual" designates an infinite amount of subjectivities that create and transform the world we live in.

As a place where the world and the individual oppose each other as opposites, Mutai identifies a "society in the form of the specific" (種社会) (mrz 4: 68). As such it discloses as its structure an "identity of contradictories" (矛盾の同一). It constitutes a concrete and particular expression of the world which is simultaneously universal and abstract. It is only in the specific that we can encounter the world. Admittedly, the term "specific" is not only indistinct. Even Mutai himself is rather hesitant to give concrete examples other than "society" and "culture." His more concrete description of the "specific" characterizes it as "the formative activity of cultural types" (95).

Here I would venture my own illustration of this central concept. In the same way in which I described Mutai's world as a principle of unity, and his "individual" as a concept denoting subjective agency and experience, I believe his "specific" is best described as concrete expression and material culture. It subsumes, among others, what we call personhood, ethnicity, religion, subculture, and nation. It constitutes the product of human activity. In other words, the individual transforms the world by producing concrete realities.

To articulate the paradoxical predicament that the specific simultaneously particularizes the world and generalizes the individual, Mutai refers to the structure of the specific as that which is "particular-and-yet-

general” (特殊即普遍). However, while the specific is always created by a multiplicity of individuals, it can at best constitute a world but not the “world,” that is, a relative generality but not the totality of the cosmos. And this is where, according to Mutai, the fallacy of nationalism lies: it commits the fallacy of absolutizing one particular. Not only does the “specific” constitute but a relative generality or collective, as there are an infinity of “individual” subjectivities, which, being formed by the world, transform the world, there must be an equally infinite number of specifics, which express the world. Such a conception renders nationalism, of course, indefensible.

Conclusion

So how does Mutai’s appropriation of Nishida and Tanabe’s philosophy render the notion of the global citizen? This is a complex question, not least of all because Mutai was writing some twenty years before the term “globalism” would gain currency. However, I think it is rather obvious how Mutai’s philosophy can make a contribution to this discourse. First, his concept of “world” provides a moment of unity and openness at the same time, thus barring any possibility that someone might postulate the essence of the world or at least its truth. This is important since throughout history such essentializations of the world have been used to justify hegemonic discourses.

Second, his notion of the individual as creative subjectivity decentralizes his conception of the “universal world” and, at the same time, emphasizes personal responsibility. Like the rejection of a world essence, his repeated emphasis that the “one world” possesses an infinite amount of centers bodes well for movements of multiculturalism and multilateralism. Yet, his focus on the responsibility the individual has towards the total whole, including its open-endedness, is a strong indication that Mutai values social justice. This sentiment is supported by his defense of liberation movements against oppressive regimes.

Finally, Mutai’s conception of the specific, which for him, contrary to Tanabe, is exemplified in “traditions” and “societies” but not in “nations,” not only thwarts any attempt of nationalism or any other

form of chauvinism, but also allows for theories of multiple belonging and cosmopolitanism and global citizenship as have been suggested, for example, by Anthony Appiah, Gerd Baumann, Iris Marion Young, and Julia Kristeva. I think it is these features that make Mutai's humanism a strong candidate for any theory of the global citizen.

References

Abbreviations

- mrz 『務台理作著作集』 [Collected writings of Mutai Risaku]. 9 vols. (Tokyo: Kobushi Shobō, 2000–2002).
- nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Collected works of Nishida Kitarō]. 20 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988).
- thz 『田辺元全集』 [Collected works of Tanabe Hajime]. 15 vols. (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1963–1964).

Other Sources

Heisig, James

- 2001 *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Kasulis, Thomas P.

- 2002 *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Differences* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Aging, Dying, and Bereavement in Contemporary Japan

Carl Becker

For people studying aging and bereavement, Japan occasions unique interest. Throughout the centuries, Japan was justifiably famous for its strong attitudes towards aging and dying. In contrast to the “cult of youth” popular in the West, Japan traditionally revered its elders. Ceremonies of Tea, Flowers, Meditation, Calligraphy, Aikidō, and many similar arts were precisely the kind of “Paths” in which the cultured sensibilities of maturity could find expression; people became potentially more, rather than less, valuable through age. Moreover, ideas of reciprocal obligation and interdependence dictated that elders be cared for, not because they might again contribute to society, but because they had already contributed to those now in a position to repay that obligation. Living in three-generational families, honoring their ancestors at family altars, Japanese ostensibly epitomized a culture conscious of its continuity with the past and its indebtedness to its forefathers.

In terms of dying, too, the suicides of countless samurai warriors, kamikaze pilots, and twentieth-century literati surprised the Western world with the reminder that classical civilizations lauded honor over life. While Japanese retain liberal attitudes on abortion, they do not acknowledge organ transplantation from brain-dead infants. Such apparent perplexi-

ties are in fact quite consistent within the Japanese worldview, but its fundamental disparity from the Anglo-European view confronts it with the throes of radical change.

Social change and the greying of japan

The Confucian notion that elders are universally to be cared for and respected (Holmes 1987) is rapidly growing outdated. To provide more future caregivers for its top-heavy elderly population, Japan's Ministry of Health has tried to stimulate the birth rate. Obviously what is needed is not merely more children, but more children who want to care for their elders—and such children are not in evidence. Since Japan, along with Holland, Bangladesh, and Java (Indonesia), has one of the densest populations on earth and can no longer feed itself without massive imports of food and energy, a higher birthrate is no solution to anything.

Japanese presently enjoy the longest life-spans in the world, averaging 79 for men and 86 for women, and longer for those who neither smoke nor otherwise suicide before that age (Japan National Institute 2005). As of 2006, about 20% of the Japanese population are over 65; by 2015, 25% will be over 65 (and in mandatory retirement; see Ezrati 1997). One generation from now, by 2040, over 33% of Japanese will be over 65, making Japan one of the most top-heavy populations in the world. In fact, most Japanese who survive into their 70's are likely to live well into their 90's, because the averages are weighted by a number of earlier-dying groups (Robine and Saito 2003).

The long life-span of Japanese poses severe economic challenges for the country. Japan prides itself on universal health care and pension plans that assure that no one goes without medical care. However, most medical expenses are incurred in the last years of life, so the more top-heavy the population pyramid, the larger the medical expenses for the population. Moreover, the Japanese mandatory retirement age, fixed over half a century ago when the average male life-span was about 66, still hovers between 60 and 62. Public pensions are generally provided from age 65. 50 years ago, the average pensioner collected social security for three

years before dying; today, the average pensioner collects for 15, and his widow for 25! The pension burden could be partially relieved by allowing people to work as long as they have the desire and ability, so that they are making contributions to the national tax and insurance base instead of withdrawing from it. Yet this alone will not make up for the ever-increasing costs of end-of-life care for ever-increasing numbers of seniors, including tens of thousands of centenarians unable to care for themselves.

Interestingly, elder Japanese do not aspire to the active, self-determined lifestyle that Americans idealize. In an extensive survey of “successful aging,” Mat subayashi (2006) found the Japanese prioritized simply “living a long time in fair health” as a top ideal, as opposed to American elders’ prioritizing of “staying involved, influencing others, making my own choices, meeting my own needs, and coping with my own problems.” This supports the author’s personal findings in both cultures that people with lower personal achievement ideals age more gracefully than those whose high ideals become frustrated by their gradual loss of influence, mobility, or mental agility.

Japanese living in three-generation households clearly have longer average life-spans than those living in newer “nuclear” families (Lester 1993), but the very phenomenon of three-generation households is fading from the scene. Young people are not content to work on farms in the countryside, and the price of land within commuting distance of metropolitan employers frustrates their acquisition of housing adequate for three generations under one roof. Thus the urbanization and “nuclearization” of Japanese families also takes its toll on the aging population.

The families that do feel social pressure and personal responsibility to care for their elders nonetheless face problems of burnout, of inadequate training, and of an environment lacking the barrier-free improvements required for comfortable and competent care of the increasingly handicapped (Harri s 1993). There are far too few nursing home facilities to care for all of Japan’s elderly, and the elderly may decline to apply to them in any case, out of shame for not having adequately “filia” children. Moreover, low levels of nursing home care lead to rapid deterioration in communication skills as well as to physical disabilities, even in patients exhibiting no other signs of senility (Nagatomo 1988). Many

Japanese elders prefer hospitalization as more “honorable” than applying for community welfare services (Noda 1991). All too often, hospitalization which begins for a cold, a sprained ankle, or an arthritic hand is prolonged until the patient dies of pneumonia years later (Ueda 1990).

Japanese face wide-ranging problems in adjusting to their own aging. While healthy elders optimistically respond to questionnaires that they can take care of themselves (Wolf 1985), this attitude changes rapidly when health declines. The fact that pneumonia is still the leading cause of death in elderly rural populations demonstrates that many lack basic care when faced with sickness. When an elderly rural person becomes unable to raise her own food, she may face real crisis if she has no one to purvey it. The depopulated rural areas show far greater rates of bedridden elderly, depression, and consequent decline in mental and physical health (Ueda 1990).

Urban port populations, and those near to power plants and refineries face severe rates of lung cancer (MinoWa 1981), as do the mostly male chain smokers in the population. Chronic alcoholism also contributes to an early mortality, both through disease and traffic accidents (Imai-zumi 1986). The government has been reluctant to publicize the harms of tobacco and alcohol because of the strong lobbies of those industries and the high surcharges that the government collects on both. Yet the cost to the country demonstrably outweighs the tax returns which these industries produce (Nakamura 1993).

For a range of social and psychoneuro-immunological reasons, single persons in Japan tend to die 15 to 20 years younger than married persons (Hu 1993)! On the one hand, the above-mentioned exceptions make it all the more amazing that the average life-span remains so long. On the other hand, an increasing number of elders dread the prospect of living thirty years beyond the typical retirement age of 60. This is made graphically clear by the voluminous research on Japanese suicide.

Japanese suicide

Perhaps because Japan is renowned as a society that does not condemn suicide for religious reasons, cross-cultural research on suicide

almost invariably tries to include Japan. An inordinate number of studies are available on the subject of suicide in Japan, although many lack linguistic competence or cultural sensitivity. While not the primary focus of this paper, these studies illuminate some Japanese attitudes towards death, so it is useful to grant them an overview here. In traditional Japanese society, suicide was permitted to samurai to escape shame and defeat, and to commoners as a chance to be reborn in a healthier world than this one of sickness and poverty. In the past decade, and without the benefit of handguns (strictly illegal in Japan), Japanese suicides have led the world, averaging over 30,000 reported every year since the year 2000 (compared to America's 29,000 out of a population 2.5 times as large as Japan's).

Japanese suicide patterns today must be divided into three broad age groups: students and young adults, the middle-aged, and the elderly. Traditionally there were two peak age groups: students who either failed university entrance exams or failed somehow in college, and elderly widows. My own Kyoto University is infamous for having one of the leading suicide rates in the country. This has bred a spate of studies indicating that from youth, Japanese students tend to think of suicide as a "right" and as normal and acceptable behavior (Takahashi 1991). Youth are less concerned than their seniors with the effects of their suicides on others; their suicides tend to be more intensely personal and "performance-oriented." It has repeatedly been observed that media publicity of one suicide tends to give rise to a wave of subsequent suicides in the pre-adult age group (Ishii 1991).

In the past decade, a national reduction of university entrance requirements and a proliferation of universities have made college entrance examinations less competitive; at the same time, the restructuring of the Japanese economy has put thousands of middle-aged Japanese men out of work. Middle-aged Japanese men suicide more than women today, their suicides being almost entirely provoked by unemployment (Snyder 1990), bankruptcy, or financial crises (Araki 1986, 1987). As in Western countries, poor social support is another major predictor of middle-aged male suicide (Berger 1993). Significantly, suicide among mature males was extremely low during the war years (Yamamoto 1984) and rose drastically after the war, showing that a loss of sense of "purpose"

was a major factor in reducing the will to live (Kitahara 1984). Some Japanese scholars have gone so far as to call suicide an “institutionalized adjustment mechanism” to the limitation of economic and social resources (Iga 1981). In middle age, Japanese females showed high suicide rates until the 1960s, the result of the conflict of their desires for success with their resourcelessness and vulnerability (Iga 1975). As the economic status of women has improved, those with access to economic independence suicide less than the norm (Iga 1978). Ironically, the increase of females in the work force has also led to the suicides of overworked women, and of men who have lost their sense of superiority (Lester 1992).

In contrast to Western countries, Japan shows lower female suicide rates after divorce than in marriage, indicating that some Japanese females are more likely to suffer silently until suiciding than to seek divorce (Lester 1992, 1995). By contrast, males are more likely to suicide after divorce, whether from shame, loss of face, or the inability to care for themselves (Motohashi 1991, 1992). Dual suicides of single parents and their children remain a striking feature, again with economic hardship the main predicting factor (Sakuta 1995). Regardless of sex or age group, living in depopulating rural regions, losing social support, insufficient income, and a sudden decline in physical condition are the main indicators of suicide in Japan (Araki 1986). Sadly, these indicators are all expected to rise rapidly in the foreseeable future, leading to major increases in elderly suicides in the future (Ohara 1994).

Among the elderly, physical disease and incapacitation are major causes of suicide (Tatui 1991). This is particularly evident among rural families whose children move away to the cities (Fuse 1980, Lester 1993). Feelings of “alienation,” or of being unable to keep up with rapidly changing times, also lead Japanese elderly to suicide (Travis 1990). On the surface, male suicides slightly outnumber female even in the elderly age bracket. However, a sharp increase in “unintentional drownings” is reported among Japanese females over the age of 55, reaching an incredible 15 times the comparison rates by age 75, indicating that a great number of elderly female suicides are reported as “unintentional drownings,” presumably for the family members to save face (Rockett 1993). While the national average in Japan is about 24 suicides per 10,000 people per

year, in the over-85-year-old population, the ratio is double, or 47–48 per 10,000—and that is of reported suicides alone (Takahashi 1998).

On all levels, suicide is deliberately under-reported. Universities report their students' suicides as sickness or accidents to protect their own reputations and those of the students' advisors, who might otherwise be pressured to resign. Corporations report their workers' suicides as accidents, lest they be sued for overworking their employees, and widows generally ask their doctors and police investigators to do the same, since their insurance benefits are greatly decreased if their husbands die from suicide rather than by accident. The unintentional drowning data for elderly widows also underscore that while individual suicides are not *morally* condemned, their families nonetheless feel great grief at the loss, and social shame for not having been able to save their relatives from this last desperate step.

There is some debate about the rural-urban prevalence of suicide in Japan. In most advanced countries where metropolitan life is hectic and impersonal, suicides are higher in urban than rural areas. However, Japan has particularly high suicide rates in its northern rural prefectures, afflicted with Seasonal Affective Disorder and heavy alcoholism (like Scandinavia), and relatively lower suicide rates in some of its youthful cities. Some have argued that rural residence is “the major factor in age-adjusted male suicide mortality” (Otsu et al. 2004). Others have held that high elderly rural suicide rates are due not only to loneliness or isolation, but also to interfamilial conflict—especially the inability of elders to understand their juniors, and their desire not to impose on them (Traphagan 2004).

If families are somehow more important to the Japanese than to their Western counterparts, then the loss occasioned by the death in such families may be expected to be a more serious blow to the bereaved than where independence is touted as a virtue from youth, and families frequently are scattered across continents. Indeed, studies show that Japanese mortality is directly related to social support, the quality of human relations, and the presence of children (Sugisawa 1994, Cornel 1992). But the Japanese have adapted their own Morita-style of meditative therapy to assist them in facing their own mortality (Ishiyama 1990). While wives often panic and fall into mental instability immediately following

their husband's deaths, their family activities are instrumental in helping them recuperate and take a more forward-looking view, and after a few years, not a small percentage go on to take an active part in counseling and consoling other recently bereaved wives (Henmi 1995).

Japan's changing attitudes towards suicide can be seen in a number of situations. When Emperor Meiji passed away in 1912, the suicide of his leading military figure, General Nogi, was seen as a natural and honorable expression of loyalty. When Japan was defeated in 1945, however, the generals were divided between those who suicided immediately, those who suicided only to avoid trial by the Allied Tribunal in Tokyo, and those who did not suicide at all. In 1988, when the Shōwa Emperor Hirohito passed away, the suicide of a few old army veterans was seen more as an anachronism than as an expression of patriotism. And when the Aum Shinrikyō plans for a coup d'état were uncovered, the young people responsible all fled the scene and pleaded ignorance, despite the public outcry that they should suicide. So shame, apology, and loyalty are becoming less common reasons for suicide. While suicide remains a "morally acceptable" escape from poverty, social alienation, or incapacitation on the one hand, it is coming to be seen less as a protestation of "honor" or "consistency" than a simple "opting out," from which society and family should have saved the victim. The flourishing of volunteer-staffed "suicide hotlines" in Japan's major cities indicates that social sanction for suicide is declining. Not surprisingly, the hotlines have been least successful in rural areas, and most successful in the Tokyo area, where human relations are most anonymous and autonomous. The above overview of suicide patterns indicates that Japanese views of death are also changing: an orientation once death-affirming, if not otherworldly, is moving towards a more this-worldly and death-avoiding worldview.

Yet suicide is still considered a dignified way to die. In 2004, a childless octogenarian couple in Fukui Prefecture, not far from my residence, willed all their property and funds to their community and set all their affairs in order. The wife was plagued with severe senile dementia, and the husband was losing his physical abilities to care for her as he had for many years. They were known to be very devoted to each other, and were reluctant to be split up into separate eldercare institutions. The

husband loaded the local crematorium with wood, soaked it with fuel, and then persuaded his wife to join him there. Presumably he killed her first before suiciding himself, but not before he had lit their own funeral pyre. The townspeople found the crematory chamber locked from the inside, and the ashes of the old couple inextricably mingled when the chamber was finally opened. The national press criticized the town for not detecting their intentions in advance and for failing to provide adequate social services. But praise, admiration, and the expressed desire to emulate their chosen way of passing were not limited to local elders; it echoed in unsigned editorials and even academic gatherings across Japan. As in American debates about assisted suicide in cases of medical futility, who are we to say that the couple should have been forced to live on in the enforced institutional separation that the welfare state would have provided?

Ideal environments for death and dying

The social centrality of interdependence and group decision-making has ramifications for the termination of care and definition of death. In the West, it has become common to leave decisions regarding the termination of care and organ donation to the individual, who may express through a living will when she wants life-support system care terminated, when she would not like to be resuscitated, and what organs she will donate for transplantation. By contrast, in Japan, living wills are rarely respected by doctors, because the patient's family overrules them. Even when patients volunteer their organs for transplantation, it is common for the surrounding family members to oppose the transplant, thinking that it may shorten the patient's life or disfigure their corpse. Given this background, the question of brain death becomes even more complex.

In Japan, when does a person become no longer a person? Traditionally, even after a person's heart stopped beating, a number of important ceremonies were performed. Her name was called from the rooftop or from the garden well. Her favorite foods were prepared and placed by her side. Sutras were chanted and fragrant incense burned. Her body was

bathed and clothed. Families which had the time and money to do so set the body aside for several days, for a period of *mogari*. In fact, during this period of being called, fed, bathed, clothed, and rested, some people considered to be dead actually revived. The question here is: when is the person no longer a person, but a thing? The Japanese answer is: the person remains a person until finally cremated or buried, and the ashes or bones officially installed in the family altar or crypt. As long as a person has a visible body which looks like a person, one remains a person.

For being a person in Japan does not require making individual decisions or actively influencing events; being a person means being a nexus in a series of human interrelationships. When relatives gather in the hospital, even if the patient is unconscious, she remains a member of their group. Particularly at the wake and funeral, she is the center and focus of a network which connects all the people who attend. They continue to make decisions for her benefit, and if her voice could be heard, she would continue to accede to their decisions. If a person is a discrete, atomic consciousness, then when that consciousness leaves the body, the person no longer exists. But if a person is a node in a larger organic network, then as long as the network values the relationship, the person does not lose her personhood; she does not become a non-person, nor merely a thing. For the same reason, there has been great resistance in Japan to organ transplantation. In the Japanese worldview, cessation of breathing does not make the person into a thing, to be cut up. A Japanese remains a person even when comatose, brain-dead, or medically “deceased.”

This is not the place to debate the rationality of these beliefs, nor is rationality the prime concern in understanding cultural practices anyway. The important thing we need to note is that viewing persons as parts of greater wholes leads to different policy implications in their health care and treatment.

Japanese place a premium on dying in a natural environment. A qod (quality of death) survey conducted at Kyoto University demonstrated that Japanese are far more concerned with dying at home or surrounded by relatives, and with seeing the sky, the trees, or the horizon from their deathbeds, and with dying in a “natural” setting, preferably on tatami mats, than are their Western counterparts (Becker 1997). Sadly, this is becoming less and less possible as more and more Japanese die in sterile

hospital settings. The stark contrast between the Japanese ideal of dying at home surrounded by family, and the Japanese reality of dying in sterile hospital rooms surrounded by tubes, machines, monitors, and nameless masked faces, disturbs many Japanese who would like to place a higher value on the time and style of this transition (Becker 1997).

In the typical hospital situation in Japan, the patient consults a doctor because he or she is ill, ailing, or in some way in need of the doctor's care. This situation immediately constructs a vertical relationship in which the patient is the inferior—weaker, less educated, in need of another's expertise—and the doctor is the superior—stronger, better educated, presumably expert in the area in question. By the rules of Japanese hierarchy, the patient is expected to follow the doctor's orders without question. It is typical for doctors to simply write prescriptions and tell the patient what color pills to take how often, without any clear explanation of the pathogenesis or nature of the complaint, much less an analysis of the potential side-effects or complications of the drugs. This tendency is intensified by the fact that the average length of consultation is some 80-90 seconds per patient, hardly conducive to developing a deeply interactive level of interpersonal communication between each doctor and each patient. Even more than doctors in the West, Japanese doctors lack the training and interpersonal skills to deal with the fears of their patients and patients' families fears of death. The vast majority of doctors do not inform their patients that they have terminal diseases or cancer—even in national cancer centers (Uchitomi 1994). Physicians themselves want to avoid or repress discussions of death, fearing both death itself and any consequent "unprofessional" emotionalism among their clientele (Takahashi 1990).

While some 80% of patients want more information about their condition and prospects, and wish to leave the hospital in time to spend their final hours in their homes, doctors are only correct in guessing their patients' wishes in about 50% of these cases (Kai 1993). So it is not surprising to find that the majority of Japanese patients are dissatisfied with the amount and quality of time which their doctors spend with them, and with their doctors' communications skills (Kurata 1994). Nurses, who often get much closer to the patients, are viewed as "subservient housewives" by many doctors. This view deprives the doctors of the

valuable opportunity to learn about their patients' through the nurses' eyes (Takeuchi 1989). Many Japanese doctors and scholars continue to confuse "informed consent" with "pressured persuasion from those who know best" (Nagayama 1994). Both doctors and families can commit mentally "incompetent" patients to hospital or psychiatric wards without the patients' consent (Asai 1983).

Doctors who are not personally skilled at counseling may nonetheless recognize the value of liaison counseling for both patients and families in theory, but they rarely refer them to liaison or psychiatric counselors either (Glick 1991 and 1994). This is partly because such liaisons are not well reimbursed by the present national health insurance system, and partly because the public does not understand the value of psychiatric counseling (Kurosu 1993). Not only are referrals to counselors or liaisons scarce to begin with, but many patients referred to counselors by their doctors resist the very counseling from which they might most stand to benefit (Takeuchi 1989).

In traditional towns and villages until the early years of this century, a death was not merely a family event but a community affair (as were weddings, births, coming-of-age celebrations, and other rites of passage). Neighbors and friends gathered to give solace and assist the grieving family, conduct the funeral, and dig the grave. Since funerals occasioned community solidarity, they were convivial, almost celebratory occasions, everyone so busy preparing for heavy drinking and eating that mourning was almost overshadowed by community obligations. In fact, one important definition of one's neighborhood was that of 同族 or the group of families who would share in the responsibility of funeral proceedings (Mikami 1980); similarly, the definition of one's "extended family" was largely defined by those five or six families who would participate in conducting a traditional funeral (Nakagawa 1984).

In the twentieth century, as village society began to break down, funerals first changed from village festivals to the province of the extended family who would gather for the occasion. In the postwar years of "lifetime employment" and total devotion to corporate growth, the deceased's employer or corporation gradually replaced the blood family, supplying everything from the reception tables to the master of ceremonies. In recent years, modern nuclear families turn to hired funeral

homes 90% of the time (Ikeda 1986). This transition further distanced the bereaved, not only from the communities who might help them through the transition, but also from the physical act of caring for the dead. Traditionally, the family would wash the corpse while preparing the deceased's favorite foods. Today, most Japanese die in hospitals, so nurses wipe the corpses with alcohol before shipping them to the funeral home (rather than the original residence) for the wake and funeral service. Typical apartments are too small to house the altar and sitting room required by traditional wakes. Moreover the wake itself has been shortened from a 3–4 day period to a single evening in most cases, forgiving those unable to attend.

The transition from burial to cremation is another parallel consequence of the rising cost of land as well as the lack of hands to dig graves. Until the early twentieth century, burial was standard practice, except for the extremes of the priesthood, on the one hand, and the irredeemably defile , on the other. Cremation was promoted in part to stop the spread of plagues, and in part to facilitate transporting the “remains” of soldiers from foreign wars back to their families. Today, cremation is so prevalent (99.9%) that many Japanese imagine burial to be illegal. However, burial remains the norm not only for Okinawans and remote villagers but also for the imperial family. A groundswell of interest in “natural burial,” allowing a “return to mother earth,” is held in check mainly by the prohibitive cost of gravesite land.

An anthropologically as well as psychologically interesting practice is that of bone-washing, now practiced only in Okinawa. The corpse is laid to rest in a large family crypt for a year or two, then removed, and the remaining flesh carefully stripped from the bones, which are washed and replaced in an urn or box. This marks a dramatic ending to the period of mourning, impressing upon the bone-washers that the deceased is very much in the other world to stay. A family feast is held outside the tomb, and the closest kin are then welcomed back from the realm of the “polluted” mourners to the realm of the living. In some such Okinawan tombs, there are three shelves for the bones of the dead. The most recently washed are placed in boxes on the lowest shelf; the previous generation on the middle shelf; those of two or three generations past on the upper shelf; and the bones of those not personally remembered by

the living are thrown in a heap behind the three-level altar. (For more on Okinawan religion and bereavement, see Kondō 1992.)

Such practices are unique to the southern tip of Japan, but throughout the country, the meaning of “in perpetuity” is simply “as long as someone is remembered by the living.” Most cemeteries sell family gravesite packages with memorial services and gravesite maintenance guaranteed “in perpetuity.” The small print makes clear that graves are maintained as long as family visit periodically, but that the ashes may be removed and the grave resold if a number of years pass with no visitation or servicing of the grave.

While not all Japanese are actively practicing Buddhists, the vast majority of funeral services are performed according to traditional Buddhist rites. Buddhist priests are summoned to chant sutras for the elevation of the soul during the wake; the guests all offer incense (sometimes flowers) on the altar in front of the portrait of the deceased. Coins are placed in the casket for the passage over the Styx-like *River Sanzu*, along with other items precious to the departed, and the family takes turns pounding in the casket nails with a rock.

The closest of kin serves as “chief mourner.” He is in charge of addressing the assembled guests, of carrying the portrait of the deceased to the crematorium (in the car behind the hearse), of pushing the button that starts the combustion of the corpse, and finally of picking from the ashes a few bones to be revered in an urn on the family altar for a time before internment. Traditionally, this was the role of the first son, but increasingly wives and sisters are replacing sons as first mourners, particularly in high profile, mobile urban families (Tsubouchi 1980). Similarly, the attendants at funerals are shifting from patrilineal kindred to personal friends and colleagues (Mikami 1980).

Most important for the bereaved is the custom of family visits to the familial or custodial temple at fixed intervals after the death: one week, seven weeks, one, two three, seven, ten year, and periodic intervals thereafter, as well as holding special services at the first summer “Obon” festival. These weekly and annual services not only involve chanting of sutras commemorating and praying for the well-being of the departed, but provide an opportunity for grief-work counseling by the temple priest. The family can discuss their fears, concerns, and questions about the

afterlife, sharing their sense of loss and seeking solace from the priests who intermediate between this world and the next. While there is considerable controversy over the cost of the mandatory “offerings” to the presiding priests, this practice of repeated gathering in the name of the departed is salutary and restorative for the psyches of the survivors (cf. Savishinsk y 1974). In wakes and funerals I have attended, long speeches on the character and foibles of the deceased by all the attendants helped to bring a sense of completeness and closure to the attendants’ image of the deceased.

Religious belief and death anxiety

The influence of Buddhism has traditionally been one of reducing the fear of death, whether because there was a better world to go to in the hereafter (Pure Land Buddhism), or because it was important to live fearlessly in the moment (Zen).

The Meiji Restoration of 1866 used State Shinto as a tool to overturn the Buddhist religious hegemony upon which the Tokugawa Shogunate had depended for local administrative purposes. With this turn from Buddhism to State Shinto, much of the ancestor-reverence taught by Buddhism was lost. Subsequently, MacArthur’s Allied Occupation repudiated and abolished State Shinto, which had promised that souls dying for the emperor would be exalted at national shrines. So postwar Japanese went completely devoid of religious and death-related education, indeed shunning the very topic of death as polluted if not shameful. This is in some ways analogous to processes traced in the West by Aries, but intensified by desires to avoid looking back at the wartime propaganda, both by elders who do not want their beliefs falsified, and by youth who feel their grandparents simply were brainwashed into colossal mistakes.

Today, some 75-80% of Japanese claim to be Buddhists, and another 75-80% to be Shinto, but neither of these affiliation are exclusive doctrinal commitments; they are rather indicative of a mind-set shared by almost all Japanese regardless of professed religion. The Shinto worldview is optimistic and this-worldly. Death is dirty and defiling, and involves a ghostly continuation of the consciousness in or near the locale

where the person died. The ideas that a person can physically feel what happens to their corpse and will be concerned with the upkeep of their gravesite, that dead spirits can bless or curse and communicate with the living, and come back from the nether world once a year to visit the living, are originally ideas derived from a Shinto tradition of animism and spirit-worship. These ideas also militate against autopsy and organ donation. Since the passing of Japan's Brain Death and Organ Donation Law, only three to four brain-dead organ donors have been found each *year*. (Many donations are surrounded by further scandals regarding transparency, priorities, and selection of recipients.)

None of this should be taken to mean that the Japanese do not feel anxiety towards death and dying; quite to the contrary, their efforts to avoid discussing and confronting the issue belie and intensify the very fears which prompt the aversion. The long Japanese traditions of honoring elders and death rituals, and permissiveness towards suicide, would seem to imply that Japanese experience less "death anxiety" than their Western counterparts. McMor die and Kumar suggested as much in their work in the early eighties (1984).

However, more recent empirical studies (cf. Schumaker 1991) have found that Japanese scored higher than comparable Australians on Templer's Death Anxiety Scale. Counter-intuitively, Japanese men show as high death anxiety as women, unlike males in most countries (McMor die and Kumar 1984). The inconsistencies of hypotheses and conclusions about Japanese death anxiety led Misao Fujita to research Japanese and American death anxiety along a number of axes, using such instruments as Hoelter's Multidimensional Fear of Death Scale (1979). Fujita (1995) and I collected data comparing 264 American and 169 Japanese college students' death anxiety using Hoelter's methods. Independent T-tests on each of eight subscales found a statistically significant greater fear of dying among Japanese subjects, viz: Fear of the Dying Process, Fear of the Dead, Fear of the Unknown, Fear of Conscious Death, and Fear for the Body after Death. Further scales demonstrated that the Japanese students had lower rates of acceptance of brain-death criteria and more reluctance to admit organ transplantation, which a Pearson correlation coefficient proved was connected to their higher death anxiety. Fujita speculates that the higher anxieties of the Japanese towards death "may

indicate their less frequent use of defense mechanisms against their fear of death.” The fact that Japanese males again scored as high as females in death anxiety supports earlier research findings (Schumaker 1991), and might be explicable on the basis that Japanese males respond emotionally (as women do) rather than cognitively (as Western males do) to the fears of death and dying.

Several observations arise concerning the Japanese reluctance to accept brain-death criteria and organ transplantation. Japanese respondents showed significantly higher anxieties on questions relating to “fear of conscious death,” such as “I am afraid of being buried alive,” and “I hope more than one doctor examines me before I am pronounced dead.” Similarly, Japanese showed significantly higher anxiety concerning “fear for the body,” involving such items as “I dread the thought of being embalmed,” and “the thought of my body decaying scares me.” Japanese subjects were more likely than their American counterparts to consider the body sacred even after death. Interestingly, fear of cremation is no longer any higher among Japanese than Americans, perhaps because cremation has become standard practice in Japan for nearly a century, and fire is considered “purifying” rather than “putrefying.” There is no time nor space here to introduce and discuss all of Fujita’s analyses, but our study leads to a number of important conclusions. Japanese are more rather than less anxious about death than their Western contemporaries; this anxiety is as high for men as for women; and this anxiety is also connected to their reluctance to donate organs for transplantation.

In this connection I might proffer a memorable if anecdotal case I encountered in Japan. An old gentleman wished to offer his corneas to an eye bank, and after some discussion, his family assented. His corneas were duly removed before his corpse was cremated, but a few days thereafter, his eyeless ghost was seen by several of the bereaved in their sitting room! As long as Japanese people experience, or even believe, such phenomena, mere legalization of organ banks and transplantation will by no means be sufficient to overcome the sociocultural barriers to such procedures and their psychological aftereffects (cf. Lock 1989). While most Japanese do not attend regular religious services, death is surrounded by deeply-felt beliefs, rituals, and experiences. The vast majority of Japanese taboos relate to death. For example, one may not wear a kimono

with right lapel over left, or leave chopsticks sticking in rice, for these are reserved for funereal occasions. References to death are scrupulously avoided; skyscrapers have no forty-second floor, for it is a homonym of the words “to die,” and envelopes for presenting offerings to the dead may not be purchased in advance, as if they might unfortuitously occasion a premature death.

The major festival of each summer is the “Obon” ceremony, in which the spirits of the dead (especially of the most recent generation) are welcomed back with food, dancing, and merriment. Memorial services are held, and then they are again sent “back” to the other world with bonfires, torch parades, or the floating of candles out to sea. Even those Japanese who deride the notion of life after death in other seasons seem unusually wary of offending spirits in this season. Shaman-like ladies called *yuta*, *miko*, or *itako* enter trance possession to allow the spirits of the dead to speak through them, occasionally with uncanny likeness to the dialect and memories of the departed. Midsummer tv and popular magazines are filled with stories of ghosts and contact with the dead. Even in American settings, Japanese-Americans exhibit a consciousness of contact with the deceased (Kalish 1973).

A survey of over 4,000 highly educated doctors and nurses found that a near majority of hospital staff feel that they have experienced some sort of contact with dead spirits or haunting (Kōri 1994). I, too, have noticed a consistent difference in attitude between religious and non-religious patients. Those patients who have not been able to vocalize or come to terms with their conceptions of the afterlife are consistently glummer, grimmer, and gloomier than those who speak with conviction about looking forward to meeting the Buddha Amida, their relatives, or other saints in the world to come. (This is consistent with the findings of Father Deeken working in Christian hospitals in Japan; see Deeken 1992). Since the ninth century, Japanese Buddhists have recorded near-death experiences in richly detailed accounts in which the dying person returns to life to recount a visit to another world of flowers, light, and encountering godlike bodhisattvas or previously departed relatives. Such records continued to be kept in the countryside until Buddhism was officially denounced by the Meiji Restoration in 1866. Recent research has revealed that despite their reluctance to discuss it publicly, Japanese

continue to experience a wide range of near-death phenomena (Kōri, 1994).

In a paradigmatic case of a junior high school student hit by a car after alighting from his school bus, the lad not only saw naturalistic images of flowers and rivers, but a Buddhist guardian assigning the dead to enter gates of light and darkness according to their karma, and met his great-grandfather who had died before he was born. As in the West, such accounts tend to breed more relief than incredulity. Perhaps the day is coming when Japanese can again discuss their fears of death and hopes for the next world without seeming politically incorrect or summoning images of Emperor-reverence (Becker 1992).

Superficially, Japanese treatment of the elderly, of suicides, of hospitalization, and even of funerals, have undergone sweeping change in the half century since the war. While fashions may influence the phrasing and professions of faith, the underlying fears and hopes of Japanese patients for a “natural” death and a happy hereafter remain fundamentally unchanged. The evolution of Japanese practices and beliefs concerning death and bereavement will continue to pose challenges to medical ethicists and anthropologists as well as psychologists. For those of us living and dying in Japan, however, the gaps between Japanese ideals (of caring for elders until their natural transitions) and realities (of dying in artificial hospital situations) pose ongoing problems, not only to the social security and health insurance systems, but to the psychological care of terminal patients and bereaved families (cf. Fukui 1994). Japanese are on the whole less willing than their Western counterparts to air their feelings in public, much less to consult with psychiatric professionals. Rather than creating a new class of professional counselors, then, the revitalization of preexisting mechanisms within families and Buddhist priesthood promises the possibilities of better grief work counseling in the future.

References

- Araki, S. and K. Murata
 1986 “Factors Affecting Suicide in Young, Middle-Aged, and Elderly Men,”
Journal of Biosocial Science 18/1:103–8

- 1987 "Suicide in Japan: Socioeconomic Effects on its Secular and Seasonal Trends," *Suicide and Life Threatening Behavior* 17/1:64–71.
- Aries, P.
 - 1974 *Western Attitudes Towards Death*, trans. by P. M. Ranum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
- Asai, K.
 - 1983 "Responses of Japanese Families to Mental Disorder," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 29/4: 257–68.
- Becker, C.
 - 1992 *At the Border of Death: A Japanese Near-Death Experience* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbun).
 - 1994 "Commentary on *Brain Death and Organ Transplantation* by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney," *Current Anthropology* 35:343–5
 - 1997 "Living, Dying, and Afterlife in Japanese Culture," in *Living and Dying in Buddhist Cultures*, ed. by David Chappell and Karma Lekshe Tsomo (Honolulu: sh ap s, University of Hawaii), 159–97.
 - 2003 "Good Clinical Practice? Can East Asia Accommodate Western Standards?" in *Varieties of Ethical Reflectio* , ed. by Michael Barnhart (Lanham: Lexington).
- Berger, D.
 - 1993 "Suicide Evaluation in Medical Patients: A Pilot Study," *General Hospital Psychiatry* 15/2:75–81.
- Chu, H. F. K., Y. Takahashi, and G. H. Suh
 - 2003 "Elderly Suicide Prevention in East Asia," *Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry* 18: 973–6
- Corneil, L. L.
 - 1992 "Intergenerational Relationships, Social Support, and Mortality," *Social Forces* 71/1:53–62.
- Deeken, A.
 - 1992 『日本のホスピスと終末期医療』 [Japan's hospices and terminal care] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha).
 - 2001 『生と死の教育』 [Life and death education] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten).
- Ezra, Milton.
 - 1997 "Japan's Aging Economics," *Foreign Affair*, on-line journal.
- Fujino, Yoshihisa, et al.
 - 2005 "Prospective Cohort Study of Stress, Life Satisfaction, Self-Rated Health, Insomnia, and Suicide Death in Japan," *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior* 35/2:227–37

Fuji t a, M.

- 1995 "Death Anxiety, Brain Death, and Organ Transplantation: Cross-Cultural Study Using American and Japanese Subjects," MS Thesis, University of Idaho.

Fukui , S.

- 1994 "Care for Bereaved Families," *Acta Paediatrica Japonica* 36/3: 304–6.

Fuse , T.

- 1980 "Some Characteristics of Suicide in Japan," *Psychiatric Journal of the University of Ottawa/ Revue de Psychiatrie de l'Universite d'Ottawa* 5/2: 89–94.

Glic k, I. D. et al.

- 1991 "Effectiveness in Psychiatric Care: ii. Outcome for the Family after Hospital Treatment for Major Affective Disorder, *Annals of Clinical Psychiatry* 3/3: 187–98.
- 1994 "Effectiveness in Psychiatric Care: iii . Psychoeducation and Outcome for Patients with Major Affective Disorder and their Families," *British Journal of Psychiatry* 164: 104–6.

Har r is, P. B. and S. O. Long

- 1993 "Daughter-in-Law's Burden: An Exploratory Study of Caregiving in Japan," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology* 8/2: 97–118.

Henmi, T.

- 1995 "The Mourning Process Following Sudden Death Due to Overwork Stress (*karōshi*), *Japanese Journal of Family Psychology* 9/1: 13–2.

Hoel t er , J. W.

- 1979 "Multidimensional Treatment of Fear of Death," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 47: 996–9.

Hol mes, L. D.

- 1987 "Cultural Values and Cultural Change: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Aging and Age Status," *Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology* 2/2 (Apr): 195–200.

Hu, Y. and N. Gol dman

- 1993 "Excess mortality among the unmarried: a case study of Japan." *Social Science and Medicine* 36/4: 53–46.

Iga, M.

- 1975 "The Vulnerability of Young Japanese Women and Suicide," *Suicide* 5/4: 207–22.
- 1978 "Suicide in Japan," *Social Science and Medicine* 12/6a: 507–16.
- 1981 "Suicide of Japanese Youth," *Suicide and Life Threatening Behavior* 11/1: 17–30.

Ikeda, M.

1986 『葬儀業・斎場経営実務資料集』 [The business of funerals: Materials on the economics of funeral operations] (Tokyo: Sōgō Yunikomu).

Imaizumi, Y.

1986 "Alcoholism and Mortality Rate in Japan," *Alcohol and Alcoholism* 21/2:159–62.

Ishii, K.

1991 "Measuring Mutual Causation: Effects of Suicide News on Suicides in Japan," *Social Science Research* 20/2: 188–95.

Ishiyama, F.

1990 "Meaningful Life Therapy: Use of Morita Therapy Principles in Treating Patients with Cancer and Intractable Diseases," *International Bulletin of Morita Therapy* 3/2:77–84.

Japan National Institute of Population and Social Security Research
2002 *Latest Demographic Statistics* (Tokyo: nipssr).

2005 <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/zuhyou/b>

Kai, I. et al.

1993 "Communication between Patients and Physicians about Terminal Care: A Survey in Japan," *Social Science and Medicine* 36/9: 1151–9.

Kalish, R. A. and D. K. Reynolds

1973 "Phenomenological Reality and Post-Death Contact," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 12/2: 209–21.

Kitahara, M.

1984 "Japanese Responses to the Defeat in World War II," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry* 30/3: 178–7.

Kondō Noriyuki 近藤功行

1992 「終末期ケアと伝統的宗教儀礼の関わり——琉球列島における調査研究」 [Traditional religious ritual and terminal care: A survey in the Ryūkyū Archipelago], 『日本公衆衛生雑誌』 39/10: 799–808.

Kōri Nobushige 郡 暢茂

1994 『医療現場の「ふしぎ体験」——看護婦と医師が明かす』 [Unusual hospital experiences: Nurses and doctors confess] (Nagano: Ginga Shuppan).

Kurata, J. H. et al.

1994 "A Comparative Study of Patient Satisfaction with Health Care in Japan and the United States," *Social Science and Medicine* 39/8: 1069–76.

Kurosa Wā, H. et al.

1993 "The Practice of Consultation Liaison Psychiatry in Japan, *General Hospital Psychiatry* 15/3:160–5.

Lester, D. et al.

1992 "Impact of the Economy on Suicide and Homicide Rates in Japan and the United States," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry* 38/4: 314-17.

1993 "Household Structure and Suicide in Elderly Japanese Women," *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 77/3, Part 2: 1282.

1995 "Are Females' Suicides in Japan Fatalistic?" *Psychological Reports* 76/3: 986.

Lester, D. and K. Abe

1993 "Regional Variation of Divorce Rates in Japan and the United States," *Journal of Divorce and Remarriage* 21/1-2: 227-30.

Lock, M.

1989 "Reaching Consensus about Death: Heart Transplants and Cultural Identity in Japan," *Society/Société* 13/1(Feb): 15-26.

Long, S. O. and B. D. Long

1982 "Curable Cancers and Fatal Ulcers: Attitudes toward Cancer in Japan," *Social Science and Medicine* 16/24: 2101-8

Matsumayashi, Kozo, et al.

2006 "Older Adults' Views of 'Successful Aging': Comparison of Older Japanese and Americans," *Journal of the American Geriatrics Society* 54/1: 184-6.

McMordie, W. R. and A. Kumar

1984 "Cross-Cultural Research on the Templer-McMordie Death Anxiety Scale," *Psychological Reports* 54: 959-63.

Mikami, K. and T. Yamamoto

1980 「山村の葬儀と親族」 [Relatives invited to funeral ceremonies in a village], 『ソシオロジー』 24/3 (March): 57-5.

Minowa, M. et al.

1981 "Geographical Distribution of Lung Cancer Mortality and Environmental Factors in Japan," *Social Science and Medicine* 15/1(Feb): 225-31.

Motohashi, Y.

1991 "Effects of Socioeconomic Factors on Secular Trends in Suicide in Japan," *Journal of Biosocial Science* 23/2: 221-7.

Motohashi, Y. and D. Lester

1992 "Effect of Using Age-Adjusted Suicide Rates on the Results of Time Series Analyses of the Suicide Rate," *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 75/1: 310.

Nagatomo, I. et al.

- 1988 "One Year Follow-Up Study of Older Persons in a Nursing Home," *Kyushu Neuro-Psychiatry* 34/3-4: 253-8

Nagayama, K. et al.

- 1994 『精神疾患の癌患者のインフォームドコンセント』 [Informed consent from psychotic patients with cancer regarding surgical operation], 『精神医学』 36/6: 625-32.

Nakagawa, Y.

- 1984 「シンレイの構造と機能——東浅井郡びわ町大浜における実態分析」』 [The structure and the function of extended families: A case study of Ōhama, Biwa-chō], 『ソシオロジー』 28/3(Feb): 41-70

Nakamura, K. et al.

- 1993 "The Social Cost of Alcohol Abuse in Japan," *Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 54/5 (Sept): 618-25.

Noda, F. et al.

- 1991 "Preference for Hospital Based Outpatient Treatment among Japanese Patients in Vancouver," *Hospital and Community Psychiatry* 42/6: 634-6.

Ohara, K. et al.

- 1994 "The Middle-Aged Generation is at High Risk for Suicide in Japan: A Comparison between the 1950s and the 1980s," *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica* 90/1: 14-15.

Otsu, A., et al.

- 2004 "Effects of Urbanization, Economic Development, and Migration of Workers on Suicide Mortality in Japan," *Social Science and Medicine* 58: 1137-46.

Robine, Jean-Marie, Yasuhiko Saito, and Carol Jagger

- 2003 "The Emergence of Extremely Old People: The Case of Japan, *Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on Organisms with Slow Aging Experimental Gerontology* 38/7: 735-9

Rockett, I. R. H. and G. S. Smit h

- 1993 "Covert Suicide among Elderly Japanese Females: Questioning Unintentional Drownings," *Social Science and Medicine* 36/11 (June): 1467-72.

Sakuta, T.

- 1995 "A Study of Murder Followed by Suicide," *Medicine and Law* 14/1-2: 141-53.

- Savishinsky, J. S. and H. Wimberley
1974 "The Living and the Dead: A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Jewish Memorial Observances," *Jewish Social Studies* 36/34: 281-300.
- Schumaker, J. F., W. G. Warren, and G. Grotzh-Marnat
1991 "Death Anxiety in Japan and Australia," *Journal of Social Psychology* 131: 511-18.
- Snyder, M. L.
1990 "Japanese Male Suicide before and after Retirement," *Psychology: A Journal of Human Behavior* 27/2: 47.
- Sugisawa, H. et al.
1994 "Social Networks, Social Support, and Mortality among Older People in Japan," *Journal of Gerontology* 49/1: s3-s13.
- Tachibana Takashi
1994 『臨死体験』 [Research on near-death experiences] (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū).
- Takahashi, Y.
1989 "The Demise of the Last Emperor: Its Influence on Japanese Society from a Thanatological Viewpoint," *Crisis* 10/2: 169-78.
1990 "Informing a Patient of Malignant Illness: Commentary from a Cross Cultural Viewpoint," *Death Studies* 14/1: 83-91.
1991 "Attitudes toward Suicide in Japanese and American Medical Students," *Suicide and Life Threatening Behavior* 21/4: 345-59.
- Takahashi, Y. et al.
1998 "Suicide in Japan: Present State and Future Directions for Prevention," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 35/2: 271-89.
- Takeuchi, D. T.
1989 "Ethnic differences in the marital status and psychological distress relationship." *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 24/6: 288-94.
- Tatei, K. and K. Tatei
1991 "Suicide in the Elderly: A Report from Japan," Special Issue: Suicide in the elderly, *Crisis* 12/2: 40-3.
- Traphagan, J. W.
2004 "Interpretations of Elder Suicide, Stress, and Dependency among Rural Japanese," *Ethnology* 43/4: 325-9.
- Traphagan, J. W. and J. Knight, eds.
2003 *Demographic Change and the Family in Japan's Aging Society* (Albany: SUNY Press).

Travis, R.

- 1990 "Suicide in Cross-Cultural Perspective," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 31/3-4(Sept-Dec): 237-48.

Tsubouchi, R.

- 1980 「喪主にみる《家》観念の変遷」 [Changes in the sense of family among chief mourners], 『ソシオロジー』 24/2 (Jan): 93-102.

Uchitomi, Y. et al.

- 1994 "Psychiatric Liaison Issues in Cancer Care in Japan," *Journal of Pain and Symptom Management* 9/5:319-24.

Ueda, K. et al.

- 1990 "Causes of Death in the Elderly and their Changing Pattern in Hisayama, a Japanese Community: Results from a Long-Term and Autopsy Based Study," *Journal of the American Geriatrics Society* 38/12: 1332-8.

Utoguchi, K., S. Nishisaka, et al.

- 1997 "Association between Self-Reported Stressful Feeling by social Mortality in a Japanese Community," *Journal of Epidemiology* 7: 9-16.

Watanabe, N. et al.

- 1995 "Suicide in Later Life in Japan: Urban and Rural Differences," *International Psychogeriatrics* 7/2: 253-61.

West, Mark.

- 2005 *Law in Everyday Japan: Sex, Sumo, Suicide, and Statutes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Wolf, R. et al.

- 1985 "A Model for the Integration of Community-Based Health and Social Services," *Home Health Care Services Quarterly* 86/ 6: 4.

Yamamoto, T.

- 1984 「自己本意的自殺に関する命題の検討——戦争と自殺との関係から」 [Themes of premeditated suicides: The relation of war to suicide] 『社会学評論』 35/113777-88.
- 1992 "Contemporary Social Problems in Japan: A Study of the Suicide and Depopulation Problems," *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 1: 19-33.

Nishida Kitarō and Beyond

Nishida Kitarō as Philosopher of Science

Noe Keiichi

Nishida Kitarō is known as the first original philosopher in modern Japan. He was born in 1870, just after the Meiji Restoration. In those days, Japanese intellectuals eagerly imported Western scientific knowledge and technology from European countries. Nishida lived during this time of Westernization and industrialization. As a young intellectual in the Meiji era, he had once considered being a mathematician. He recalled in a speech in 1928:

At Fourth High it came time for me to select the professional course I would enter in the future. This was a choice young students agonized over, and I too was at a loss what to do. Especially as it was a matter of either entering into mathematics or into philosophy, it was an extremely difficult choice for me. The advice of one teacher whom I respected was to opt for mathematics. Philosophy was not just a matter of rational ability, he said; it required poetic imagination as well, and he told me frankly that he was not sure whether I had that sort of ability or not. (Nishida 1995, 246)

The teacher Nishida mentioned is probably Hokuji Tokiyuki (北条時敬), who eventually became the second president of Tōhoku University. Nishida finally decided to study philosophy instead of mathematics, but

his passionate concern for mathematics and science continued throughout his life.

It may seem odd to speak of Nishida as a philosopher of science, since his philosophy is famous for its close connections with the Kyoto School and Zen Buddhism, and his highest accomplishment is widely thought to be the philosophy of religion. Moreover, Nishida's philosophy is characterized by metaphysics, dialectics, phenomenology, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of Zen Buddhism. It is seldom categorized as a philosophy of science; the two appear to be two isolated issues. Nevertheless, if one carefully studies Nishida, in particular the seven volumes of *Philosophical Essays* published at a later stage in his life, it is clear that he endeavoured to tackle various questions fundamental to mathematics, logic, and natural science. Nishida's achievement in the philosophy of science surely comprises an important part of his philosophy.

The philosophical activities of Nishida developed at crucial time points. Here I would like to divide Nishida's philosophy into three developmental stages. A first period of "early" philosophy begins in 1911 with the publication of his maiden work, *An Inquiry into the Good*. The keystone of his philosophy at the time was "pure experience," which then developed into his notion of "self-consciousness." A second stage constitutes his "middle" philosophy. In 1926 he published an essay entitled "Place," in which he discussed the problem and significance of the logical place, giving us what would come to be known as "Nishida philosophy." Nishida's final stage of "late" philosophy began in 1935 with the first volume of his *Philosophical Essays*. Here the key concept was "acting intuition," which may be related to the problem of mathematical intuition. It was during this later philosophical stage that Nishida paid attention to the philosophy of science.

Nishida and science

Nishida was born in 1870 and passed away in 1945. The period from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century represented a "crisis of science." During the first half of the twentieth century Nishida wrote numerous articles and books on the philosophy of

science, at a time when radical changes were taking place in the theories of mathematics and physics. This scientific change” or “paradigm shift” introduced many new concepts in the methodological foundations of science. Nishida could hardly have been indifferent to all of this. Indeed, his philosophy of science may be seen as a unique response to the crisis of science at the time.

For example, in the nineteenth century non-Euclidean geometries were proposed by Nikolai Lobachevsky and János Bolyai, followed by the controversy between Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert over imaginary geometry. In 1902, Bertrand Russell discovered the paradox of set theory, stimulating a serious debate over the foundation of mathematics. We may distinguish three positions here: logicism (Russel), formalism (Hilbert), and intuitionism (Luitzen Brouwer). In 1905 and 1915 Albert Einstein presented his theory of relativity, raising questions regarding the philosophical foundations of space and time. In the 1920s, quantum mechanics was developed by Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, and Louis de Broglie. In 1927, Bohr and Einstein debated the concepts of reality and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. All these controversies and new concepts were of interest to Nishida, who mentions the names of Bohr, Einstein, and Heisenberg in his works.

Nishida’s own philosophy of science was developed in later works such as *Logic and Life* (1936), “The Empirical Sciences” (1939), and “The Objectivity of Knowledge” (1943). He wrote prolifically in the year before his death, publishing four articles on “The World of Physics,” “Logic and Mathematics,” “Space,” and “Life.” In his final year, he published an article entitled “The Philosophical Grounding of Mathematics.”

Nishida’s early views of science

I would like to give a brief account of Nishida’s early views of science. Nishida began his career as a philosopher in the 1890s. The main concerns of his first book, *An Inquiry into the Good*, are ethics and reality. His interest in human experience, an important issue throughout the

book as well as throughout his whole life, is in evidence. Contrary to what one might expect, Nishida mentions science, scientists, mathematics, and physics several times, although most of his comments on science are rather critical or sceptical. He writes, for example:

A scientist's way of explanation is slanted toward just one aspect of knowledge, whereas in a complete explanation of reality we must satisfy intellectual demands as well as the demands of feeling and the will. (Nishida 1911, 50)

Nishida sought to explain the concept of pure experience or direct experience, a technical term borrowed from William James' radical empiricism. Through it he sought the unity of consciousness prior to the distinction between subject and object, or between the knowing self and its object. In his view, such a state of consciousness is the starting point of philosophical consideration. All scientific knowledge must be based on this experience, and the physical world proposed by scientists is merely one aspect of this world of pure experience. When Nishida comes to the point, he makes an interesting remark:

In the independent, self-sufficient true reality prior to the separation of subject and object, our knowledge, feeling, and volition are one. Contrary to popular belief, true reality is not the subject matter of dispassionate knowledge; it is established through our feeling and willing. It is not simply an existence but something with meaning. If we were to remove our feelings and the will from this world of actuality, it would no longer be a concrete fact—it would become an abstract concept. The world described by physicists, like a line without width and a plane without thickness, is not something that actually exists. In this respect, it is the artist, not the scholar, who arrives at the true nature of reality. (Nishida 1911, 49)

Nishida argues that artists understand the world better than scientists, in that our intellectual understanding of the world presupposes an understanding of everyday concerns. He draws attention to the importance of the everyday in Japanese culture, particularly in Zen Buddhism. There we see a way of understanding the world without secular concepts, as is the case, for example, of one's state of mind during the tea

ceremony. At the same time, Nishida recognized the problem of naive realism in science, whereby the physical world as described by physics has been unreflectively identified with a single world reality. It was Nishida's goal to recover the forgotten primordial mode of pure experience and at the same time to locate the ground of scientific activity.

Interestingly, Nishida's early philosophy of science tackles a very similar problem in the phenomenology of the life-world. Nishida does not himself employ the terms "phenomenology" or "life-world," but his notion of pure experience is similar to Husserl's concept of the life-world, which form the basis of his phenomenology. According to Husserl, the life-world refers to the one and only world actually given to consciousness. In this life-world, our action is actually intuited and experienced. It is within this experiential world that our whole life takes place. From this standpoint, Husserl severely criticized mathematical physics for its neglect and concealment of the life-world. Both Nishida and Husserl called for a rejection of empirical knowledge based on scientific hypotheses, wishing instead to return to immediate experience. In particular, they both wanted to begin their philosophies from conscious phenomena as a true foundation without hypotheses. In this sense, Nishida's early thought shared the methodology of phenomenology in that it aimed to return to the evidence of direct experience without presuppositions. In fact, Nishida had already drawn attention to this problem some twenty-five years before Husserl took it up in his *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

The turn in Nishida's thought

In October 1936, Nishida penned a new preface to the new edition of *The Inquiry into the Good*. In it he summed up the change that had taken place in his thinking over the years:

That which I called in the present book the world of direct or pure experience I have now come to think of as the world of historical reality. The world of acting intuition—the world of *poiesis*—is none other than the world of pure experience. (Nishida 1911, xxxiii)

It is clear here that Nishida has adopted the notion of “acting intuition” to replace that of “pure experience.” In fact, he no longer uses the term “pure experience” in his later works. The reason is that the state where the subject and the object have not yet been separated is a kind of chaos; the set of direct experience is unstructured or unarticulated. It is in his later stages that Nishida came to recognize how pure experience fails to provide a background for the historical and social world. He turned to study the structure of the world in terms of our bodily actions, or acting intuition. The life-world as a base of science was thus transformed into the world of historical reality. This change in Nishida’s philosophy may be called a transition to a logic of historical formation.

Acting Intuition and the Historical Body

As mentioned, the key concept of Nishida’s later philosophy was acting intuition, a cognition acquired through bodily action on objects. “Conceiving something and grasping it through acting intuition,” he wrote, “means seeing it through making it, comprehending it through *poiesis*” (nkz 9: 194). *Poiesis* here implies both technological and artistic activities, suggesting a continuity between of science and art. For Nishida, both science and art belong to praxis in the life-world.

Another key concept of Nishida’s later philosophy is the “historical body,” which is closely connected to that of acting intuition. In an essay of the same title he remarks that “the historical body is a body endowed with language and tools, that is to say, a social life” (nkz 14: 290). Language and tools are human cultural products transmitted historically from generation to generation. In other words, the whole of human experience and praxis is settled and crystallized in the historical body.

Scientific experiments are good examples of acting intuition performed by the historical body. In “Logic and Life” he suggests that “knowledge must be based on acting intuition of a rational body. The so-called scientific experiments are none other than the acting intuition of a body fitted out with tools” (nkz 8: 326). Though Nishida emphasized the importance of experiments in scientific research, he did not commit himself to a logical positivist view of verification. On the contrary, he saw experiment and theory as not only inseparable but inter-

woven. This point appears in statements such as, “Even if we know facts through external perception by experiments, experiments must presuppose theories,” and “perception without theory is blind” (nkz 8: 396). As is well-known, in 1959 N. R. Hanson characterized this view as the “theory-ladenness of observation.” Thus Nishida’s insight deserves to be reevaluated in the light of the contemporary philosophy of science.

“Anti-Realism” in Nishida’s Philosophy of Science

We may refer to Nishida’s philosophy of science in his later philosophy as an “anti-realism” in the sense that his philosophy of science does not presuppose an ideal, scientific world independent of scientists’ activities. To put it another way, the natural world is not furnished with an unchanging and everlasting structure, but is malleable to the various sciences that examine its many aspects. It also means that the structure of reality itself is involved in the process of historical formation by bodily acts.

In mathematics Nishida’s position was similar to Brouwer’s intuitionism, which contrasts with logicism and formalism. In the philosophy of physics, he was attracted to Bridgman’s operationalism. He understood operations in physics as acting intuition or *poiesis* through bodily activity. In addition, he held the concept of “measurement” in quantum mechanics in high esteem, viewing it as a true return to the intuition of the bodily self. In the philosophy of biology, he was influenced by J. S. Haldane’s organism, an alternative to the approaches of mechanism and vitalism. It is interesting to note here that the positions with which Nishida identified were not mainstream but belonged to what were considered heterodoxy in the controversy over the foundations of science at the time. This is the why Nishida’s philosophy of science is still challenging and stimulating for us today.

A provisional conclusion

In Nishida’s later philosophy of science, two themes stand out as incomplete projects. First is his attempt to ground the sciences phenomenologically by returning to the life-world through acting intuition

in the historical body. Second is his aim to establish a fully anti-realist philosophy of science. Nishida himself referred to this position as “radical positivism without substance.” In this connection, he cites the words of de Broglie: “As de Broglie has said, prior to analysis by prism, there are seven colors in the colorless ray. But they exist, in the sense that if we make an experiment, they appear” (nkz 8: 438–39). From this passage, we see his view of the reality of the world as potential actualized by experimental operation, namely as acting intuition. This is the point of departure of Nishida’s philosophy of science and his fundamental view of reality. From this standpoint, he attempted to form a philosophy of science with new possibilities. Unfortunately, he passed away before the project was completed, and this remains as one of the new challenges that face us in the twenty-first century.

References

Abbreviation

nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965–1966).

Other Sources

Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎

1911 *An Inquiry into the Good*. Trans. Abe Masao and Christopher Ives. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

1995 “The Retirement Speech of a Certain Professor,” *The Eastern Buddhist*, 28/2: 245–7.

The Potential of Nishida's “Encompassing” Language

Jacynthe Tremblay

The main terms of Nishida's “encompassing” language are place (*basho* 場所), “the *basho* in which it is ‘located’” (於てある場所), field (野), plane (面), to subsume (包摂する), to include (含む), and to encompass (内包する, 包む, 包含する, 包括する). They are found in *From the Acting to the Seeing* (1927), and *The Self-Aware System of Universals* (1930), as well as in Nishida's main essays about temporality, especially “The Self-Determination of the Eternal Now” (1931). In each case, I shall verify within the specific contexts what the most encompassing stage is, and what, exactly, is located in it. By proceeding in this way, it will be possible to figure out the complete encompassing structure of Nishida's logic of *basho* and temporality, as well as the potential that is concealed within them. This potential includes a concept of the present that emphasizes the connection to history, an insistence on the fundamental and ethical self, and the emergence of a significant theory of alterity.

The central concept of Nishida's philosophy from 1926 onwards is that of *basho*. It led Nishida to create a philosophical system, namely the “logic of *basho*,” within which all parts of reality fit together harmoniously. This logic allowed him to exceed the usual metaphysical oppositions, or at the very least, to put them in a framework offering a broader

perspective. With the concept of *basho*, other important terms of Nishida's philosophy acquire meaning and connect together.

In what follows I will discuss Nishida's "encompassing" language in his "logic of *basho*" and in temporality. The structure of the "logic of *basho*" is "encompassing." Nishida's notion of temporality possesses the character of "encompassing," just like the logic of *basho*.

BASHO and encompassing

The fundamental statement of the logic of *basho* is as follows: "Everything that is, is 'located' in something." The statement is rather complex but can be broken up into three parts:

everything that is すべて有るものは
is "located" in に於てある
something 何か

The term "is 'located' in" is the central point of this statement and constitutes the basis of an important distinction in Nishida, namely the difference between the *basho* and its content. The first part is "the place in which." This means that the *basho* is considered to be that which "encompasses." In other words, the *basho* is the place in which content is located: it accedes to a different status, according to the content that is located in it. Widening itself more and more, the *basho* transposes itself from consciousness as the *basho* of the subject/object relationship, to the affective self as the *basho* of the artistic world, and to the intelligible self as the *basho* of the realm of morality and religion. Ever widening, it is the historical world as *basho*. All these *basho* are located in an ultimate *basho*, which is not a being, but absolute nothingness (絶対無). This is the most encompassing and the largest *basho*, and it cannot be located in an even more encompassing *basho*. With this concept of *basho*, it is possible to break through the sphere of what Nishida called the "psychological self" to encompass all aspects of a human being (emotional, intellectual, intelligible, artistic, moral, and religious). This concept can also encompass a human being as "located" in society and in the historical world in relation with "thou" and with the multiplicity of beings.

The second part of the distinction which results from the emphasis Nishida put on “being in” (に於てある) is as follows: each *basho*, no matter where it is “located,” has a content of its own. Nishida calls this content “that which is” (有るもの), or “what is ‘located in’” (於てあるもの). In other words, it is always “located” in something, namely, in a *basho*. For example, the individual (個物) is “located” in the *basho* of being; the conscious self (意識的自己) is “located” in the *basho* of relative nothingness; and the intelligible self (叡智的自己) is “located” in the *basho* of absolute nothingness. In these cases too, the emphasis lies on “being in,” which is precisely the center, or axis, of Nishida’s fundamental statement that “everything that is, is ‘located’ in something.” Thus, Nishida separates the *basho* and the content that is “located” in it. That point is the focal node that leads to a better understanding of the logic of *basho* and of its extremely complicated parts.

Thus, each *basho* is determined in relation to its contents. Furthermore, each content becomes a self-determination of the *basho* in which it is “located.” Each determination splits into noematic determination and noetic determination, and therefore each *basho* encompasses double content. Things become increasingly complicated as each *basho*, including the content, are encompassed in a more encompassing *basho*. Each of these *basho* becomes new content in comparison to the more encompassing *basho*, while their own contents gain, in the broader *basho*, a new status. This continues on until one reaches the *basho* of absolute nothingness, which cannot be included in or determined by a wider *basho*. All the previous *basho*—which on their own level were considered as ultimate *basho*—become, in comparison to the *basho* of absolute nothingness, a series of *basho* more or less wide and encompassing in their own content.

In this sense, Nishida considers the *basho* as an encompassing transcendence (包越者) where everything is located (see nkz 4: 157). If one looks at Nishida’s philosophical vocabulary, the concept of encompassing was the medium that led, in 1926, to the concept of *basho*. During the period marked by the development of the logic of *basho*, the notion of encompassing appeared whenever Nishida dealt, for example, with the passage from the abstract universal (抽象的一般者; the first level of the universal of judgment) to the concrete universal (具体的一般者; the second level

of the universal of judgment). In the context of the abstract universal, Nishida used the terms "subsume" (包摂する) and "subsumption" (包摂). When analyzing the concrete universal, however, he completely changed his vocabulary and jointly employed the terms "contain" (含む), "encompass" (包む), "encompassing plane" (包容面), and "encompassing transcendence" (包越者). From Nishida's terminology it is immediately seen clear whether he is dealing with formal logic or discussing the workings of his logic of *basho*.

Encompassing and temporality

To summarize my ideas so far, the logic of *basho* is encompassing; Nishida uses this terminology to clarify the relations of reciprocal determination between the increasingly encompassing *basho* and their respective content. Nishida located himself in the framework of the same logic of encompassing when he tried to clarify the problem of time, the center of gravity being precisely the notion of *basho*. In fact, Nishida's conception of temporality remains unintelligible if it is not seen directly within the framework of the logic of *basho*. Both operate in the same way even though their subject matters are different. One of the major assertions of Nishida about time is strictly identical to his fundamental statement concerning the logic of *basho* discussed above. It reads: "Everything that is, is located in time," or, elsewhere, "Everything that is real is located in time." From this starting point, for methodological reasons it is possible to go in two opposite directions, although Nishida himself always deals with the two directions simultaneously.

The first direction presents time as an encompassing *basho* or as the form of its content, namely reality. In general this is intended to show the relationship between "the place in which," that is to say the *basho* itself, and "that which is 'located in,'" that is to say, the content of the *basho*. Itself a content of time, reality in turn acquires the status of a *basho* compared with its multiple content.

This first direction consists in proceeding from time as the ultra-encompassing *basho* (compared to its own content and at its own level), to reality as a less encompassing *basho*. But a second approach is possible.

It consists in proceeding from the time conceived as *basho*, to a series of more and more encompassing *basho*. Therefore, what is the *basho* that includes time, and whose time is the self-determination? It is the present. Nishida states, “One has to admit, as Augustine did, that time is located in the present” (nkz 6: 183).

Nishida’s topic of present-as-*basho* (場所の現在) is of extreme importance. It helps to take a crucial step in elucidating Nishida’s temporality since it now appears as the place (所), the space of time (時の空間) (nkz 9: 149, 152), or a temporal space (時間的空間) (150) in which the past is already past, but not entirely, and in which the future has not yet happened, although it already appears.

Nishida signifies here that his concept of *basho* has an effect on what is located in it. The opposition of two contradictory terms—the past and the future—is always located in a *basho*, in this case the present. Locating contradictory terms in a *basho* permits Nishida to leave the framework of the simple opposition and to situate these contradictions into the place of their emergence. Thus, it is possible to finally escape from strict logical duality and to introduce into it the constant movement of the emergence and disappearance of contradictions.

The above-mentioned allows us to clearly see that the present is the *basho* of time, that is to say the place wherein linear time (formed by the past, the present, and the future) emerges. From time—as *basho* of “that which is”—Nishida proceeds to an even more encompassing topic, the present—as *basho* of time. But where is the deepening of the more and more encompassing elements of Nishida’s logic of *basho* headed? In other words, where is the present itself located? What *basho* is more encompassing than the present and that which contains it?

The real present, the present as *basho*, “does not move on a line outside the self but enters deeply in the self” (nkz 4: 31). This means that while the present is a *basho* itself, it is deeply included in the self or in the spirit (see nkz 4: 31, 42–3; nkz 6: 185, 195). As Nishida states, “The self does not exist in time, it is time that exists in the self” (nkz 6: 187 and 277; nkz 12: 79). This is the new *basho* that is sought. In this sense, the self can be understood as the *hypokeimenon* of time (see nkz 12: 40). As seen before, time is the *basho* of everything. However, with its ultra-encompassing character—ultimately, it coincides with the instant—allowing it

to be the *basho* of time, the self obviously has a special status: here too, the key to understanding is the concept of *basho*.

To sum up, Nishida leads to a characterization of the self as it is marked by temporality, helping to enlarge the self in order to see where it has always been located. In other words, this place is in the historical world where the self determines itself in a spatio-temporal manner. In the historical world as *basho*, and ultimately in the *basho* of absolute nothingness, a human being enters into relationships with others and with things in the precise moment of the present instant; in doing so, he/she becomes self-aware. The reason is that neither the past self (which is no longer), nor the future self (which is only anticipated and, therefore, is not yet) can exist here and now. Therefore they cannot truly enter into a relationship.

From this close link between the present and the self, Nishida goes a step further, broadening his view of the self as the *basho* of time to the eternal now (永遠の今). In other words, the present as *basho*, which encompasses the past, the present, and the future, is itself encompassed in "eternity" or "eternal now," and in turn becomes the self-determination of the latter; the notions of self, self-awareness, individuality, and history appear in a new perspective on this new encompassing level.

In the logic of *basho*, absolute nothingness is the most encompassing universal, which cannot be determined by anything more encompassing, but whose everything is self-determination. In the same way, the eternal now is understood as the ultimate encompassing stage of temporality. The latter, as we have seen, is a series of concentric circles that works like the logic of *basho*. In reality, the eternal now is itself located in the *basho* of absolute nothingness, with which it ultimately coincides.

Here again, Nishida's emphasis lies on the encompassing aspect of the *basho*, but in a way that is intrinsically linked to the notion of self-determination. This means, as it did in the case of the logic of *basho*, that temporality involves a series of more and more encompassing *basho* which correspond to a series of increasingly larger content. These *basho* and their contents are interconnected through the relationships of determination (限定), self-determination (自己限定), and mutual determination (相互限定). It is precisely because these relations are established through these determinations that Nishida manages to target the most encom-

passing level of temporality, namely that of the eternal now and of absolute nothingness.

The concept of self-determination has the connotation of being fundamentally relational. Indeed, it does not involve only a single self-determining element: in this case time, the eternal now, or absolute nothingness are all involved. Those elements have meaning only in relation to what is born of their self-determination or, more precisely, to what is born *as* their self-determination. Another point to note is that the concept of self-determination implies a self-modification, that is, both the determining and the determined are modified in some way by the moment of determination. In this way there appears a dynamic tension between self-determination and mutual determination.

This mutual determination occurs through the self-negation of both things and their *basho*. It is important to add here that in Nishida, any mention of a *basho* whatsoever (present, absolute nothingness, self, environment, and so on) requires an act of self-negation of what is located in that *basho* and what is encompassed by it. The negation is primarily a “negating movement” that spares nothing, including nothingness itself. That is why the concepts of negation (否定), self-negation (自己否定), and absolute negation (絶対否定), which themselves are inseparable from the notion of absolute nothingness, are used by Nishida to mark the absolute contradiction inherent in the self-identity of each of the terms in their respective relationships. By deconstructing self-identity, the concept of self-negation simultaneously brings about an affirmation of what has been submitted to the act of self-negation. What exists in the way of self-negation always determines itself (nkz 6: 265).

Insofar as the movement of self-negation marks everything that is located in the *basho* of absolute nothingness, on the one hand it allows us to understand the complex relationships established forever between the various levels of reality (in this case between the different elements of Nishida’s temporality), and on the other hand, it allows us to rethink historical reality, human beings, thinking, and so on, in order to situate them in a broader horizon that leads to a questioning of traditional interpretations and fixed concepts. Based on the concept of self-determination as discussed above, it is easier to understand that the present itself functions as the self-determination of the eternal now:

What I think by self-determination of the eternal now means only that the present determines itself. The time which passes and eternity come into contact with each other in the present. Or rather, there is no eternity separated from the present that determines itself. The true meaning of eternity is where the present self-determines. (nkz 6: 138)

In this essay I have tried to show the potential that Nishida's logic of *basho* and his encompassing language has when applied to the question of temporality. Absolute nothingness, whose everything is self-determination, is not located beyond the historical world and temporality. Understood primarily as encompassing, absolute nothingness is like an infinite circle whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference nowhere. This aspect of the unlimited circle has been extended by Nishida to the topics of the present, the self, and the eternal now. By using the concepts of *basho* and circle, Nishida emphasized an opening of temporality that allows us to overcome linear conceptions of time.

Reference

- nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978–1980), 19 vols.

The Shift in Nishida's Logic of Place

Huang Wen-hong

Logic can be seen as a way of thinking. In his essay “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview,” Nishida Kitarō uses a “logic of place” to express his way of thinking. The notion is no doubt central to his philosophy. Although the word “place” appears often in the development of his thought, its meaning and focus changes to some extent along the way. Only once, in 1926, does he use the term to entitle an essay. There he indicates that the term signals a shift away from a view of the world from the standpoint of the self to a view of the world from the standpoint of the world itself. My primary concern in this essay is to clarify this turn in his logic and to consider what it entails.

To understand the logic of place, we need to place it in the context of the main concern of Nishida's philosophy. In his 1911 book *An Inquiry into the Good*, he wrote: “Before we discuss the problem of how to act and how to settle down in this world, to clarify true reality we must first clarify the truth of our lives and the cosmos” (nkz 1: 39). Nishida connects this problem with an analysis of pure experience. The attempt to explain reality in terms of pure experience is consistent in his thinking. Pure experience is not a break from ordinary experience; rather, it must be understood from these ordinary experiences as our “direct experiences before language is involved” (Fuji t a 2007, 54). As we have seen in *An*

Inquiry into the Good, Nishida regards pure experience as a pure activity and maintains “being-*qua*-activity.” This is the starting point of his philosophy, prior to the subject-object dichotomy. The idea that the world is constituted from an opposition between subjects and objects places one outside the world in order to see the world. This is not the world that we live in. In Nishida’s words, it is an intellectual construct, not our immediate experiences themselves. *An Inquiry into the Good* begins with this rejection of dualism in order to return to primordial experience and from there explain all phenomena. Moving neither toward the world itself nor toward the world that exists behind experience, Nishida’s philosophy includes an inquiry into the origins of our experiences and their structure. In this sense, it may be called a kind of “radical empiricism” (Huang 2007). Pure experience, as primordial, is a consciousness prior to the subject-object dichotomy; it is the pure, present consciousness. This consciousness is the origin of all realities but is itself without meaning, an immediate direct experience that cannot be grasped in object-oriented language.

By associating conscious experience with pure experience Nishida not only relates it to the original indivisibility of subject and object, he also describes it as spontaneous and self-developing. Distinct states of consciousness belong to a reflexive stage of pure experience. Unified and non-unified consciousness is only a problem of degree: that is, the reflexive states of consciousness are also regarded as pure experience and basically take the same form. Takahashi Satomi has pointed out this inconsistency in pure experience by presenting it in slightly different form (Ishigami 2001, 37ff.). If we follow Nishida, however, we find that the unified and non-unified states of pure experience are not two different experiences but two internal moments of one and the same total experience. In other words, strictly speaking, we do not have a developmental progression from one pure experience to another, but a single experience that is spontaneous and self-developing (Nishida 1952). Thus, the inconsistency of pure experience is only apparent and in fact merely demonstrates the structure of pure experience itself. Unified and non-unified experiences are two particular aspects of a single, total experience, to whose internal structure they belong. Pure experience is particular and universal; Nishida labels this the “concrete universal” or “dynamic universal.” By

“concrete universal” he refers to the contradictory unity of the particular and the universal in which pure experience is comprehended in the concrete. If we emphasize the concrete universal, then the unifying side (intuition) and the separating side (reflection) that are included in pure experience will clearly come out.

Nishida employs “self-consciousness” in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* to combine intuition and reflection. This may be seen as a response to the criticism posed by Takahashi. Self-consciousness means to “reflect oneself within oneself.” Intuition and reflection are two inevitable moments of a self-developing unity, namely the unified side and the separated side of pure experience. Though pure experience is the experience that unifies subject and object, the separation of subject and object is at some point inevitable within pure experience. Nishida has indicated that the emergence of reflection is not accidental, but an “inevitable quality” of consciousness (nkz 2: 13). All reality is regarded as the inherent development of a concrete universal.

In *Intuition and Reflection* Nishida regards meaning and values as the development of the self-consciousness. In self-consciousness, self-reflection is at the same time self-creation. In order to grasp the internal structure of self-consciousness, Nishida introduces Fichte’s *Tathandlung* by giving it a new meaning. “Being and Ought should be two sides of a single *Tathandlung*. Self-consciousness is the expression of their concrete truth” (nkz 2: 83). Nishida’s expressed goal in the work is to combine value and being, meaning and fact into a common system (3). Because of the freedom and dynamic of the will, ultimate reality is interpreted as a kind of will in *An Inquiry into the Good*. Will, as the basic form of pure experience, is not an object-oriented will that presupposes the separation of subject and object, but an original free will that is connected with the concept of creativity. In *Intuition and Reflection* Nishida further interprets this as a kind of creative “absolute free will,” or *creatio ex nihilo*. “True direct reality is the creative will; because of his creation it is absolutely free” (nkz 2: 223). Creative will is pure creativity, the creative nothingness. Its self-development is also a return to the origins. This constitutes Nishida’s “system of self-consciousness.”

In *Intuition and Reflectio*, then, Nishida’s task is to explain everything according to this system of self-consciousness (Fujita 2000,

43–57) But when he ponders this strategy, he admits that we have finally to acknowledge that “there must be absolute free will behind the system of self-consciousness” (nkz 2: 220). The absolute free will does not simply transcend reflectio ; it is also the source of our reflectio . Because it transcends reflectio , Nishida claims that it is similar to the *Ungrund* of Jacob Böhme. This seems to entail a kind of mysticism. Nishida seems to be unable to grasp the meaning of absolute free will: on the one hand, he affirms ultimate reality as a creative nothingness, an infinite creative activity; on the other, he acknowledges that it has a kind of mystical character that transcends our traditional way of thinking, that ultimate reality is mystified in traditional logic.

As indicated above, the general nature of Nishida's early philosophy is basically introspective. He probes deep into consciousness to discover the absolute free will or creative nothingness that transcends subjective consciousness. The aim of his introspective philosophizing is to clarify the “real self,” “the concrete universal,” or “the consciousness of consciousness.” On the one hand, such a way of thinking must avoid the criticism of subjectivism; on the other, it inevitably comes up against the question of how to understand “the real self” or “the concrete universal.” The origin of consciousness is the concrete universal as ultimate reality, transcending all conscious activities; strictly speaking, it is the real subject of the system of self-consciousness.

In the development of Nishida's philosophy, the idea of being-*qua*-activity is not abandoned, but he does not stop at this kind of meta-physical statement, nor can mysticism satisfy him. Instead, he tries to understand the logical structure of the creative nothingness. In other words, a logic of pure experience is essential to meet the challenge posed by mysticism. Nishida believed that in his logic of place he had replaced Ficht's voluntarism with a kind of intuitionism (nkz 3:255). The transformation from voluntarism to intuitionism is not a change of standpoint, but rather shows Nishida's response to the epistemological question of ultimate reality. This process is shown in *From Acting to Seeing* (Fujita 2000, 43–57) in which Nishida puts forward a logic of place that was later developed into a systematic philosophy of place. In this sense, his attempts to preserve the irrational in a rational logic may be said to be

the focal point of his logic of place. The logic of place is primarily a kind of epistemology.

With this preliminary understanding of the general progression from Nishida's early philosophy to his proposal of a logic of place, we can see him struggling for a logic to grasp reality. His logic of place is not only a logic of self-consciousness but also a logic of the historical world. But how is such an expansion into the historical world possible? Here I will focus on the discussion of his 1926 essay "Place" and attempt to clarify the basic ideas of his logic. Although this essay can only be considered a preliminary stage in his logic, it contains the seeds of further development, especially with regard to the question of rationalizing the irrational, a point at which it can prove fruitful for Neo-Confucian epistemology (Huang 2008).

In the following pages I shall first clarify some basic conceptions of Nishida's logic of place, in particular the path he follows to the place of absolute nothingness. I will then highlight some of the key aspects of his philosophy. We know that the logic of place is a logic of reality. In the construction of this logic, the concrete universal plays an important role. I will then clarify the need for a shift from a predicative logic to a logic of location. The emphasis on the mediating perspective of place is a key to his later philosophy. It is my view that the need for this shift lies in the identity of self-contradiction that is inherent in the concrete universal. In order to break away from subjectivism, as we shall see, Nishida has to begin from a totality that includes both self and environment.

Nishida's idea of place

In "Place," Nishida notes that "Being must exist somewhere; otherwise there is no difference between being and nothingness" (nkz 3: 415). In my opinion this is the cardinal feature of place. There are two senses of the meaning of existence implied in this sentence. First, "being" means being located in a place; this is the meaning of being as being. The meaning of being is bound up with *being "located in" a place*. As the place changes, so does the meaning of existence. "Being" only has meaning with reference to its place. Second, the earlier place of spe-

cific “being” is located in a more inclusive place. “Absolute nothingness” is the most inclusive and final place that is able to include everything without itself being included in any more encompassing place. Place is therefore nothingness in respect to that which is located within. Ultimate reality must therefore be the final place. The problem that remains is to show absolute nothingness to be a true nothingness and not a relative nothingness that positions non-being in relation to being.

Nishida begins with a reflection on the Neo-Kantian epistemology. He observes that in considering the meaning of knowledge, epistemology usually assumes a dichotomy between subject and object, whereas in the case of Neo-Kantianism the dichotomy is between form and content. In this view, knowledge is a constitution of form and matter wrought on an objective given (nkz 3:426). In other words, the object of experience is constituted by the knowing subject. From the perspective of pure experience, this kind of explanation is not original enough. An epistemology of pure experience is committed to abandoning subject-object dualism to return to an earlier stage from which the distinction is generated. In order for subject and object to keep their independence, to relate to each other, and to form a system, there must be a prior nothingness to ground the system and allow this to happen (nkz 3:415). In other words, before there is being, there must be a nothingness that brings “being” into existence. Here, Nishida borrows from Plato’s *Timaeus* to speak of “place” (nkz 3:415). This place includes a subject and object, allowing them to come to be and allowing a relationship to be established between them. “Place,” as the ultimate reality, must therefore include the principle of self-differentiation, and in this sense it may be called the concrete universal. As indicated above, the logic of place attempts to establish an epistemology of ultimate reality in a logical way. This leads Nishida to a thorough review of Aristotelian and Kantian logic.

Nishida accepts the general view that knowledge first takes the form of judgment. Logically, judgment is the inclusion of a subject in a predicate. Logic reflects an inclusive relationship between subject and predicate from which understanding arises. In judgment, however, a logical subject is set up in opposition to a predicate; a logical predicate is universal. Ontologically, a judgment means the inclusion of the particular in the universal. Therefore, as Nishida argues, judgment is an inclusion

whereby the universal includes the particular, or the particular exists in the universal; it is not a linking of two independent things. The inclusive relation between subject and predicate reflects the relation of place and being, which is “located in” the place. The logic of place has at the same time a logical and an ontological meaning. In other words, judgment as judgment means to include the subject through a predicate; particular as particular means to exist in the universal.

Along with Aristotle, Nishida accepts primary substance or the individual (*tode ti*) as that which can be a subject but can never be a predicate. This is the ultimate reality or being in the most fundamental sense. Although the individual transcends all concepts, as a being it must exist in a place. Such a place cannot be an abstract universal, which is merely conceptual and does not contain a principle of differentiation. Rather, the individual is considered to be that which transcends rationality. It is irrational, but in the sense of transcending the subjective logic, not in the sense of transcending our understanding. Therefore, along with Aristotle, Nishida thinks that the individual cannot be grasped by way of a concept, but only through “intuition.” In other words, it belongs to the level of transcendental subject. Our direct, intuitive acquaintance with the individual does not come by way of a concept, and yet it is a kind of knowledge. From the viewpoint of the universal, understanding means “inclusion”; from the viewpoint of the particular, it means “being ‘located in.’” Nishida has thus expanded the meaning of knowledge through “inclusion.”

At this point we can see that what concerns Nishida is not formal judgment, but judgment that truly includes the individual. Formal judgment extracts the differences and lacks ontological character. Its predicate is an abstract universal, and to exist in an abstract universal can only produce abstract understanding. On the contrary, Nishida’s inclusive judgment means being “located in” a particular universal. When we think of the particular, it is already in relation to some universal. To exist means to be located in a place.

Here, we can see that Nishida agrees with Aristotle in seeing ultimate reality as transcending the logical subject, that is, as a unity of infinite predicates. In his essay “Acting” of 1924, Nishida discusses the relationship between pure experience and judgment. He demonstrates that judg-

ment comes from the rationalization of the content of pure experience. In other words, judgment is that pure experience or concrete universal that has its own predicate in self-determination. Thus the real subject of judgment is not the logical subject, but pure experience. Pure experience determines itself in itself and establishes judgment (nkz 3:397).

For Nishida, Aristotelian logic cannot grasp reality, which belongs to the level of the transcendental subject. The logic that Aristotle offers determines reality as a kind of “being.” His logic is a logic established along with “being” or “determinate being” (限定せられた有). Ultimate reality thus becomes a kind of object. Accordingly, Aristotle establishes an objective logic that determines reality as an identity of objectivity. This is not to say that objective logic is altogether mistaken, but only that it simply expresses one side of reality, namely the side of being. While objective logic expresses the “being side” of ultimate reality, it also intuitively its own deficiency.

Thus, ultimate reality cannot be found in Aristotle's form and matter and *entelecheia*. These are determinate beings that are acquired through Aristotelian objective logic. Nishida's pure experience, which he also calls “pure quality,” is prior to any categorical thought, and as a kind of pure activity, is unable to be fixed as an object. The establishment of objective judgment is to seek a fixed entity in the world of pure activity or in the transitory world. The world of pure experience is not the world of fixed entities, but a world of pure sensation, and as such is far more abundant than the world of judgment. Reality must be universal, and here again Nishida breaks with Aristotle to claim that in order to grasp reality, we must begin not from the direction of a logical subject but from the direction of the predicate. Thus, in contrast to Aristotle's claims that ultimate reality is something that “can be a subject but never a predicate,” Nishida proposes that ultimate reality is the place that “can be a predicate but never a subject.” This is a kind of predicative logic in which “place” functions as a kind of universal. In order to clarify his logic, Nishida undertakes a thorough review of Kant's transcendental logic.

According to Nishida, Kant's transcendental logic is a logic that regards consciousness as a predicate. Natural phenomena are constituted through the exertion of pure concepts or categories onto the given material; for Nishida, this includes natural phenomena within conscious activity. Con-

conscious activity is grounded on “consciousness in general” (*Bewußtsein überhaupt*), “apperception,” or “transcendental ego.” Therefore consciousness in general is grounded in the natural world; in Kant’s theoretical philosophy it is the ultimate reality. Conscious activity encompasses natural phenomena and the natural world exists in the “field of consciousness.” Since for Nishida activity belongs to a predicate, Kant’s transcendental logic is regarded as a logic that follows the direction of the predicate. The kind of process proposed by Neo-Kantianism can only account for the structure of objective experience; it cannot account for the meaning of the constituting “I.” In other words, consciousness in general cannot be included in any activity. It is this inadequacy in Kantian thought that allows Nishida to maintain that Kantian consciousness in general is only a pure reflecting mirror, that is, “it totally emptied itself in order to mirror all things” (全然己を空うして、すべてのものを映す, nkz 3: 419). A “pure reflecting mirror” (単に映す鏡) can only reflect something outside itself; it is unable to reflect itself in itself (432–3). It cannot see itself in itself, and this means that consciousness in general cannot be ultimate reality.

In his essay “Place,” Nishida’s discussion of consciousness concentrates on judging consciousness and willing consciousness. He accepts Fichte’s viewpoint regarding the volitional self as the foundation of the cognitive self, so that on the field of consciousness the ultimate reality is free will. Free will “creates being out of nothing” and is the ground of our knowledge (nkz 3: 438). In the world of pure will, being attains validity. This is the standpoint to which Kant’s critical philosophy arrives. But according to Nishida the volitional self is still a kind of being, and is not consciousness in the truest sense. Consciousness in general is only the gateway to true nothingness. Nishida argues that when we transcend consciousness and enter the place of absolute nothingness, even free will is eliminated, all meaning of self-existence disappears, and a “pure state of intuition” comes about (446–7). In other words, the purest state of intuition occurs in a place where even free will eliminates itself. This does not mean that there is no free will, but that the will must negate itself in order to become true free will (Ōhashi 1995, 80).

The true self is more profound than the volitional self. It is the self that is discovered through transcending objectification in all its forms. In the

ultimate depths of the self lies the place of absolute nothingness, which is essentially religious in character. According to Nishida, “knowing” and “willing” are modifications of the place of nothingness (446). Knowing and willing are thus also ultimately religious in character. To reach the depth of the self does not mean that one must cut oneself off from the level of judging and willing, but only view them from a more primordial perspective. From the perspective of absolute nothingness, reality lies beyond all objectification and without any fixed nature. To employ the metaphor of a mirror, absolute nothingness will be a “reflecting without a reflecto,” an “acting without an actor” (nkz 3: 451). The structure of absolute nothingness differs from that of knowing and willing. Real consciousness is one that has transcended concepts altogether; real consciousness only becomes visible when all concepts have broken down (nkz 3: 424). Real consciousness belongs to the “level of the transcendental predicate” and it can be said to be the “universal of universals,” and hence not a universal in the ordinary sense.

The transition from relative nothingness to absolute nothingness needs to transcend all kinds of universals. Seen from this perspective, Kant’s predicative logic may be regarded as a negation of Aristotle’s subjective logic. If we regard the Aristotelian position as a position of “determinate being,” is the Kantian position then a position of “relative nothingness”? Although relative nothingness includes or encompasses the position of the determinate being, it is still not absolute nothingness. Similar to Aristotelian logic, Kantian logic grasps only one side of ultimate reality.

The logic of determinate being and relative nothingness cannot grasp ultimate reality; they belong to a logic of being. Nevertheless, in “Place,” Nishida still thinks that in order to grasp reality, we need to follow the direction of the predicate, that is to say, we need to go deeper into consciousness and inquire into the “consciousness of consciousness.” As we transcend relative nothingness, we enter into a position of absolute nothingness. While being located in absolute nothingness, everything exists as it is and becomes the “image” of absolute nothingness (nkz 3: 445). The concrete universal is a mirror that reflects itself in itself; it is not a predicate, but transcends all predicates and belongs to the level of a transcendental predicate. This is the universal in the truest sense. Unlike Kantian consciousness, which can only reflect other things, the mirror of

absolute nothingness is a mirror that reflects itself in itself. It does not have any content nor any meaning of being, but produces in itself the meaning of being. It does not distort the thing, but lets the thing be established as it is. "Reflecting" means not to distort, but to let a thing be established as it is." Absolute nothingness is the viewer and the real subject of judgment. When absolute nothingness becomes the subject of judgment, "being" comes to be viewed as a modification of it and loses its self-nature. It intuitively "the world of pure activity," the world "without *noumena*" (nkz 3:429–30).

Seen from the logical relation of judgment, the basic meaning of place is originally a predicate. It is a universal and should not be interpreted merely as a concrete universal. The subject as encompassed in a predicate means that the subject is reflected in it. In penetrating deeper into the consciousness, Nishida finds that real place belongs to the level of the transcendental predicate. It is the place where the individual is located. Consciousness develops and determines itself within itself. Seen from this perspective, judgment is not the combination of a logical subject and object, but is rather the self-determination of the concrete universal. The concrete universal is the real subject of judgment. When the concrete universal is treated as the subject of judgment, it functions as a self-determiner and not as something being determined. Therefore, Nishida thinks that the concrete universal is the real meaning of Aristotle's philosophy of what "can be a subject but never a predicate." And so "We can say that the concrete universal is the true reality" (436).

From the discussion above, we know that in Nishida's early years the concepts of pure experience and absolute free will lacked adequate epistemological foundations and led him into a kind of mysticism. His logic of place, which attempts to rationalize the irrational, is thus primarily an epistemology that attempts to grasp the ground of experience. Nishida's way of thinking moves logically from predicate to transcendental predicate, and ontologically from consciousness to "consciousness of consciousness." Though this line of thinking can be treated as a kind of "internalism," it has a meaning all its own. During this period Nishida emphasized the priority of the world of interiority. In a 1926 essay on "Questions Remaining Concerning Consciousness," Nishida claimed that contemporary epistemology did not really touch on the problem

of the consciousness of consciousness, which he took to be the place of absolute nothingness (nkz 7: 222). In “Answering Dr. Sōda” (1927), he states his intention to discuss knowing in the direction of self-consciousness, which is different from the tack followed by Neo-Kantianism (nkz 3:482). In “Place” he begins from the judging consciousness, goes on to self-consciousness, and finally arrives at the pure self-intuition of absolute nothingness. This, we may say, was his way of deepening in a subjective direction.

Nishida expanded our understanding of knowledge by penetrating deeper into the self-consciousness. Knowledge is not something constructed by an acting subject. This way of thinking is based on a form-matter dualism. For Nishida the knowledge has to do originally with “reflecting itself in itself” or “self-consciousness,” and it is this form of knowing that he holds to be primary (nkz 3:420). In this way, he transforms the epistemology of Neo-Kantianism into a kind of epistemology of self-consciousness, supplying Kant’s consciousness with a more general view of self-consciousness. While a knowing consciousness points to the object, it also points necessarily to itself; it is self-consciousness. In other words, knowledge itself includes the knowledge of the knower. In Nishida’s view, self-consciousness is more basic. What interests him is not so much the relationship between subject and object, but the consciousness that does the judging. Consciousness encompasses a logical subject and predicate. From judging consciousness to willing consciousness and finally to absolute nothingness, Nishida considers absolute nothingness to be the real subject of knowledge. When absolute nothingness becomes the subject, knowledge becomes the “self-determination” of absolute nothingness: it is the self-intuiting of the concrete universal or self-predicating of the true self. Consciousness develops, determines itself within itself, and acquires a meaning of being; it is the real subject of the judgment, the real self. The real self is the “identity in predicate” (nkz 3:469).

Nishida’s logic of place seeks to grasp the structure of *Ereignis* or the occurrence of reality, unlike Western philosophy, which attempts to grasp the world in the form of judgment. His philosophy of self-consciousness includes its own philosophy of identity. The concrete universal as a real subject includes in itself a principle of self-differentiation. As a real subject

it is the particular of particulars, and encompasses within itself an infinity of predicates. It offers its own content and intuit itself within itself, and is self-differentiating and self-intuiting; absolute nothingness expresses its own content within itself. In expressing itself, general concepts must be employed, since general concepts are the self-objectification of absolute nothingness. “The self-determination or self-objectification of place is the so-called universal” (nkz 3:427). Knowing is, in its most complete form, the self-determination of absolute nothingness.

Comparing this to Western logic, which concentrates on the object, Nishida's is a logic that deepens subjectivity. His intention is not to reduce *noema* to *noesis*, but to show that the entire distinction between subject and object is based on a misunderstanding of experience. Though his philosophy of self-consciousness might not be solipsistic, he nevertheless needs to clarify the relationship between subjective experience and objective reality. Nishida's solution is to insist that logic and reality display a common structure. The logic of place is not only the logic of pure experience, self-consciousness, and absolute nothingness; it is also the logic of creation through self-determination. It is the “creativity of the universe” (nkz 2: 228). In his work *Logic and Life* (1937), Nishida describes his logic of place as “a forming activity” (一種の形成作用; nkz 8: 9). In other words, Nishida tries to unify self-consciousness and the historical world. By unifying the subjective consciousness and objective reality in a common logical foundation, he attempts to apply his logic to the understanding of historical phenomena.

The claim that self-consciousness is active or even historically formative is particularly evident in Nishida's later philosophy. But how can a philosophy of self-consciousness, which is basically self-directed, become an ontology of the historical world? If we consider a standpoint of subjectivism to be one that views the world from the vantage point of the self, then in order to overcome this position of subjectivism we need a more inclusive perspective that encompasses self and non-self. Or, as Nishida says, we need to see the world from the world. By his own admission, it is not until his essay on “The World as Dialectical Universal” that Nishida really overcomes this difficult (nkz 6: 159). In other words, the logic of place required a “turn” away from its basically inwardly-oriented way of thinking.

We know that Aristotelian “substance” plays an important role in Nishida’s transition from self-consciousness to the logic of place (Fuji t a 2000). Nishida transforms substance to relate it to the transcendental level of the predicate. This introverted way of thinking finally comes to concentrate on the problem of the true self. The self is not only already known, but can only see itself within itself. The self is nothingness but encompasses infinite beings and produces within itself the antithesis of subject and object. From our analysis, we have seen that Nishida agrees that knowledge is always knowledge of the universal, and that the universal in the truest sense is the concrete universal. The concrete universal is the true subject of judgment; it is the particular of the particulars, and belongs to the level of the transcendental subject. On the level of the transcendental predicate, it is the universal of universals. Alternatively, we might say that the concrete universal is neither a particular nor a universal but the identity of the particular and the universal. Such an identity is not a simple identity, but a contradictory unity. The concrete universal that can be a subject but never a predicate is “the final irrationality” (nkz 3: 443). In other words, the self as the identity of the universal and particular is the final irrationality. “The rationalization of the irrational” is the basic aim of Nishida’s logic of place (Nit t a 2003, 258ff)

Although Nishida regards place as a nothingness that encompasses subject and object, his discussion of place remains an introverted approach to the subject-predicate relationship. By delving deeper into the depths of subjectivity, Nishida encounters the absolute nothingness that encompasses both subject and object. He puts forward a predicate that transcends the previous predicate, and finally reaches the level of transcendental predicate. Such a way of thinking is no doubt introverted, but does that make it a simple “internalism”? Here again, we need to pay strict attention to the problem of the concrete universal.

We know that the concrete universal, as ultimate reality, does not belong to judgment but is rather the source of judgment. The logical subject and predicate are contained within it and related to one another within it. On this matter Nishida noted in his 1927 essay “Knowing” that “the most perfect form of the concrete universal can be regarded as the syllogistic universal” (nkz 3:535) We know that a typical syllogism is constituted by major, minor, and middle terms. The middle term functions

as a mediator that does not manifest itself in the conclusion, but lets the major and minor terms be combined to constitute the conclusion. The opposition between the major and minor terms must be related through a medium that seems to have the function of place. Though it is not clear how far this analogy can be taken, an internal turn from predicate to medium in his logic of place seems clear (Tanaka 2000, 53–4). In his later philosophy, Nishida emphasizes the mediating function of place and introduces the concept of an intermediary or “dialectical world.” When the position of place passes from the predicate to the medium, at the same time it is labeled an internal “turn” in Nishida’s line of thinking. When such a “turn” occurs, the main line of his thinking should be reoriented. Nishida begins from a world that includes both humans and the environment, and probes the creative structure of the historical world. He does not begin from the antithesis of self and environment, but takes a position that includes both; his is actually a philosophy of totality. The logic of place means the “self-determination of the whole” (nkz 10: 168). According to Sueki, the problem of wholeness is one of the cardinal features of Nishida’s later thinking (Sueki 1987, 162).

I would argue that, whereas Nishida’s line of thinking is basically oriented inwardly, it is not a simple internalism that can be opposed to an externalism. He tried to expand the forms of self-consciousness in order to uncover true reality, but in doing so encountered the deeper problem of the concrete universal, which is not a simple identity but a contradictory identity. It is the contradictory identity that is implied in reality that causes an internal turn in Nishida’s logic of place. Near the end of “Place” Nishida writes:

It is regrettable that after numerous repetitions the above-mentioned still cannot fully express my thoughts, especially concerning the problem of intuition. Regarding “knowing,” my view is that, in lieu of the usual view that begins from an antithesis of knower and known, I would rather go more deeply and try to think from the inclusive relation of judgment. (nkz 3:477)

Starting from the position of self-consciousness to understand “intuition,” “encompass,” or “inclusion” is the focal point of Nishida’s transformation of Neo-Kantian epistemology. But this does not express the

fullness of what he was about. “Thought that is not fully expressed” needs ultimately to be acknowledged as a contradictory identity that is unavoidable in the philosophy of self-consciousness. According to traditional logic, this is an irrational existence. As Nishida expressed in the preface of *The Determination of the Self-Consciousness of Nothingness*, as long as the irrational can be brought into thought, then it must be shown *how* it can be thought (nkz 5: 3). The purpose of Nishida’s logic of place is an attempt to grasp such an irrational. The internal “turn” in logic of place is not a change of position, but a more radical or thoroughgoing development of his philosophy of self-consciousness. Such a “turn” enabled Nishida to expand his logic to the historical world.

References

Abbreviation

nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003–2008), 24 vols.

Other Sources

Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝

2000 『場所——根底からの思惟』 [Place: Thinking from the ground] (Kyoto: Shōwadō).

2007 『西田幾多郎——生きることと哲学』 [Nishida Kitarō: Living and philosophy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten).

Huang Wen-hong 黃文宏

2007 「西田幾多郎與熊十力」 [Nishida Kitarō and Xiong Shi-Li] 『清華學報』 37/2:403–30.

2008 「西田幾多郎の宗教的世界の論理——新儒家の宗教観との比較を兼ねて——」 [Nishida Kitarō’s logic of the religious world: A comparison with the religious view of contemporary Neo-Confucianism] 『日本哲學史研究』 5/9:24–53.

Ishigami Yutaka 石神 豊

2001 『西田幾多郎——自覚の哲学』 [Nishida Kitarō: A philosophy of self-awareness] (Tokyo: Hokuju Shuppansha).

Nitta Yoshihiro 新田義弘

2003 「西田哲學中的《哲學邏輯》——特論其後期思想中的《否定性》邏輯」 [The “logic of philosophy” in Nishida’s philosophy: Focusing on the logic of

“negation” in his later thought], trans. by Huang Wen-hong, 『掲諦』 5: 239–61.

Ōhashi Ryōsuke 大橋良介

1995 『西田哲学の世界——あるいは哲学の転回』 [The world of Nishida’s philosophy: On the turn in philosophy] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō).

Sueki Takehiro 末木剛博

1987 『西田幾多郎—その哲学体系』 [Nishida Kitarō: His philosophical system], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Shunjūsha).

Tanaka Kyūbun 田中久文

2000 『日本の「哲学」を読み解く——「無」の時代を生きぬくために』 [Reading Japanese “philosophy”: Surviving the age of “nothingness”] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō).

Japanese Aspects of Nishida's *Basho*

Seeing the "Form without Form"

Uehara Mayuko

Basho (場所) is a concept that characterizes Nishida Kitarō's thought in his middle period and logically completes the system of his subsequent philosophy. His 1926 essay "*Basho*" surveys the idea (which may be translated as "place" or "locus"), and establishes *basho* as his own original logic. It is the logic of *basho* that set the foundation of Nishida's philosophy as it opens up from a theory of knowledge to encompass the aspect of the "historical world."

Philosophy in Japan has inherited traditions from both the Western and the Eastern worlds since the modern Meiji period, to which the origins of the discipline called "philosophy" or *tetsugaku* (哲学) may be traced. The term *tetsugaku* to designate Japanese traditional thought did not exist prior to the Meiji period. Nishida was no exception. Both Western and Eastern sources are indispensable for a consideration of his philosophy, although references to Eastern thought constitute no more than a minor part of his philosophical discourse. When, on limited occasions, he refers to "Eastern thought," he mainly mentions ideas that can be found in Mahāyāna Buddhism. It appears that he did not devote himself to a philosophical analysis of Buddhist doctrine. His essential contact point with Buddhism was the practice of Zen meditation to which he devoted himself seriously for about ten years as a young man. Compared

with other denominations, Zen is characterized by a complete rupture between immediateness and explanation, thus rejecting the logic that is the basis of philosophy. Nishida experienced this contradiction in his own person, and in a sense it may be said that the ascetic practices contributed to the publication of *An Inquiry into the Good* (『善の研究』, 1911). This first philosophical essay of Nishida's introduced the idea of "pure experience" in the sense of knowing the "facts as they are" (nkz 1: 9) without differentiating between subject and object. However, he concealed the traces of Zen influence in his literature, as a letter addressed to his disciple, Nishitani Keiji, in 1943 attests (nkz 19: 225). Nishida was disappointed when people confused his philosophy with Zen; his ambition was to combine these two very different ways of thinking. He hoped to disprove the impossibility of reconciling Zen's immediate grasp of reality in the truest sense with a philosophy of self-reflection by way of objectification.

As the above background sketch shows, the concept of *basho* is an intersection of Eastern and Western thought, and the Zen approach to reality underlies the logic of *basho*. Nishida compares the characteristic features of Eastern culture, in particular Japanese culture, to "seeing the form without form" (形なきものの形を見る). His project of constructing a logic of *basho* is tied up with this, as makes clear states in the preface of *From Acting to Seeing* (『働くものから見るものへ』, 1927), where the logic of *basho* is first introduced.

What is the meaning of the contradictory expression "seeing the form without form?" How does Nishida integrate this Japanese concept into the logic of *basho*? I will examine these questions by focusing on its Japanese aspects.

The culture of emotion

I shall begin by considering the expression "seeing the form without form" from the cultural point of view by which Nishida presented it. I quote from the preface of *From Acting to Seeing*:

Obviously there is much to admire and much to learn from the dazzling developments in Western cultures where form belongs to being

and taking form is seen as good. But is there not something fundamental in the cultures of the East that have nurtured our ancestors for thousands of years, something beneath the surface that can see the form without form and hear the voice without voice? I would like to attempt to give a philosophical grounding to the desire that drives our minds continually to seek this out. (nkz 4:6)

The quotation shows Nishida's desire to build up a new philosophy through an appreciation of his own traditional culture. "Without form" here refers to "non-being" (*mu* 無), which in fact distinguishes the basis of the logical structure of *basho*. According to Nishida, non-being is the metaphysical point of view that grounds Eastern culture, unlike Western culture which merely acknowledges "something with form," "the formed," or "the determined" as "reality" (実在). Nishida develops this idea in *The Forms of Culture of the Classical Periods of East and West from a Metaphysical Perspective*¹ (『形而上学的立場から見た東西古代の文化形態』, 1934) (nkz 7).

From the viewpoint of culture Nishida distinguishes Eastern "non-being" from Western "being" (*u* 有). Examples of the former are seen in India and China, and those of the latter in the Greek, Christian, and Jewish worlds. Here I will focus on the essential points of Japanese culture that form the basis of Nishida's essay.

Nishida's cultural morphology has two types: an "immanent world" that is "based on the real world," and a "transcendent world" that is "based on the unreal world" (nkz 7: 442). In the real world, subject and object opposites are dialectically unified. It is not a question here of organic unification, but rather a standpoint of thinking from the real world that implies self-contradiction. Conversely, the unreal world rejects self-contradiction.

Japanese culture falls under the "immanent world" classification, as do Chinese and Greek cultures, while Christian and Buddhist cultures typify the "transcendent world" type. The religious world is considered transcendent, and Japanese culture is characterized in terms of both "non-being" and "reality."

1. For an English translation, see Dilworth 1988, 21–36.

Japanese culture is artistic and in this sense is comparable to Greek culture. Nishida takes note of its distinctive attributes, in particular the attribute of the Platonic Idea, of which he remarks “the shadow of the eternal is actuality (現実).” In other words, “the eternal” designating the “Idea” is perceptively invisible, while actuality is perceptively visible, but is like a “shadow” (nkz 7: 443)—an “imitation” or “negation”² of reality. The Idea, which is separated from the sensible, signifies the “intelligible object” (443). Nishida’s adoption of the expression “seeing the form without form” to explain Japanese traditional culture is suggestive of Plato’s Idea. At the same time, Japanese culture is not intellectual but emotional (情的, 441–3) in the sense that it does not seek the timeless and visible. Emotion cannot be talked about in terms of the objective but by the impersonal that denies a rational (理性的) standpoint (443–4).

It would seem that Nishida’s main concern here lies in contrasting the emotional tendency of Japanese culture to the intellectual concept of the Idea developed in ancient Greece, rather than attempting a comparison of traditional Japanese culture to the Chinese culture that had such a large role to play in its formation. Nishida shows great interest in this contrast between emotion and Idea and, as we shall see later, his own original “logic of *basho*” will be very much inspired by the Greek Idea.

Emotional culture and intellectual culture are both artistic and yet the two are fundamentally different. Their similarities and differences can be seen from a spatio-temporal perspective. One of the typical Greek forms of art were the dramas that took up the problems of life. In contrast, the Japanese created short poems like *tanka* and *haiku*, which support Nishida’s claim that emotion is conceived as “form without form, voice without voice.”

He asserts that a culture of “form without form... is, like time, a formless unity” (445; Dilworth 1988, 31) and like “music” (Nishida and Miki 2007, 12). Temporal unity is no doubt embodied admirably in music, as Nishida states, and it is founded on “momentalism” (刹那主義), the idea that time is always conceived from the present (nkz 7: 449–50; Dilworth, 33). Nishida notes the “productivity” in time and the “evolution” in life, because “time is not just a passing flow” (nkz 7,

2. These expressions are borrowed from Mat t é i 1996, 199 and 209.

445; Dil Wör t h, 31). We can therefore understand that temporal unity makes form appear. In other words, the appearance of form arises from the negation of time, that is to say, from its becoming spatial. Can the same be said of “the momentary fixation of streaming time” such as the moment when a *haiku* is produced?

Nishida analyzes the notion of emotion (感情)³ in a chapter of his 1920 work *Problems of Consciousness* (『意識の問題』, nkz 3: 51–77). Emotion is a psychological component that evolves internally. When the evolving consciousness is objectified, Nishida argues, it is known as a “phenomena of consciousness,” and the “surplus that is never objectified in any case is emotion” (59). He asserts the transcendence of emotion over all intellectual actions, whereas Kant limited the latter to the action of formal judgment (60–1). In Nishida’s philosophical structure, emotion is an *a priori* of *a priori* at the “standpoint of the highest order” rather than the intellectual action of consciousness (59–60). “The content of emotion cannot be sought in intellectual elements, but is expressed only by means of art” (67). Hence, emotion is considered a source of intellectual creation.

We may now return to the question of emotion in Japanese culture. To form is to express, since, as Nishida observes, “no art can exist aside from form” (nkz 7: 446; Dil Wör t h, 31). We can assume that to express is to grasp the flow of time in a flash. At the moment of grasping, form appears in the stream of time. It is in this way that art can be created. According to Nishida:

Greek arts saw the formless (無形) within form (有形)—while the distinctive quality not only of the Japanese arts but also of all Eastern arts grounded in the principle of non-beine—to lie in employing form to express what is formless. Eastern arts do not just symbolically represent other forms but reveal the formless. (nkz 7: 446; Dil Wör t h, 32)

As stated above, “seeing the formless within form” means, in the Greek sense of art, seeking a timeless and immutable reality in the determined form of the actual world. Nishida clearly opposes the artistic cultures

3. *Kanjō* (感情) is often used as a psychological term and *jō* (情) is in more general use.

of being and of non-being. “Seeing the form without form” consists of revealing the form of the formless or the invisible, or to express what has not yet appeared by means of form. The invisible that the Eastern culture of non-being implies is the non-speakable and the non-conceptualized, but is also the invisible in the sense of Greek art as *Idea*, that is to say, the speakable and the conceptualized.

Emotion in nor inaga's *TANKA*

We shall now turn to the expression of emotion in traditional Japanese art, taking as our example the *tanka*, a short poem composed of thirty-one syllables. In the essay that we are focusing on here, Nishida occasionally cites the last twelve syllables of Motoori Norinaga's (1730-1801) *tanka*:

朝日に匂う山桜かな

Cherry blossoms

glowing in the morning sun. (nkz 7: 450. Dil Wor t h 1988, 34)⁴

What Nishida seeks from the context in which this artistic form is cited is the “object of emotion”:

The object of emotion cannot be intellectually determined. It cannot be frozen spatially. That present is infinitely dynamic. (nkz 7: 450)

The passage explains what Norinaga's “cherry blossoms glowing in the morning sun” expresses. Moreover, in the emotion that rejects subject-object dualism, we can feel Norinaga's notion of *mono no aware* (もののあわれ, 444).⁵ As Nishida says, *mono no aware* designates the har-

4. The complete poem reads: 敷島の大和心を人間はば朝日に匂ふ山櫻花. The verses are inscribed on a 1790 portrait of Norinaga entitled “Motoori Norinaga: A Portrait of Self-Praise at Sixty-One”: 本居宣長六十一歳自画自賛像, which reads しき嶋のやまところを人とは朝日にほふ山さくら花 (If one asks about the heart of Shikishima-Yamato, I would reply that it is like cherry blossoms glowing in the morning sun).

5. *Mono no aware* is an aesthetic notion which appeared in the literature and the aesthetic life in the Heian period (794–1192), and Motoori Norinaga pointed out and systematized its literal theory. See 『和歌大辞典』 [Dictionary of *waka*] (Tokyo: Meiji Shoin 1986), 996.

mony between the internal *aware* forming the emotion, and the external *mono* or thing. How does this explain the contradiction between the frozen present, as explained above, and the dynamic present?

Nishida reads “eternity” into this instant that is determined and frozen: “the true instant has to be what borders eternity.” “Eternity” involves “infinite” (無限) as was seen in the citation “infinitely dynamic.” This is a central point both to Nishida’s system of philosophy and to his understanding of *tanka* art. What is infinitely dynamic is also considered to be the “self-determination of non-being” (無の自己限定) (nkz 7: 450) that functions as a philosophical device for the logic of *basho*. The non-being, in opposition to the being that comes to be realized into being, is a source of creation. This holds true not only for art but for all activities and phenomena in human life. The source of creation is not exhaustible but infinite, in other words *mugen* (the “mu” referring to “non-being”). When speaking of infinite, Nishida adopts the term “absolute nothingness” (絶対無), which he considered the best way of characterizing *basho*. The logic of *basho* takes on various levels of knowledge, from the dichotomy between subject and object, to the grasp of being, to the union of subject and object, to the grasp of non-being. In each case, the *basho* determines itself, without a subject determining an object or vice versa.

The idea of “eternity” has to be conceived in the light of what was stressed above, namely its capacity to resolve the problem of the self-determination of non-being. According to the logic of *basho*, time is not spatial and linear, “flowing from the eternal past to the eternal future” (nkz 6: 187); it is ultimately personal and conceived within the self:

Time has to start from the fact that the present determines itself by conforming with the self-determination of time. Where there is the self of each person, there is the time of each self. It is not the I that is within time, but time that is within the I. (187)

Time determines itself when the self is fundamentally temporal. “Various changes of the self are decided by itself” (nkz 14: 488). In Nishida, the self is not something substantial, but is considered non-being. Briefly put, time determines itself as non-being:

We come in contact with true time at the top of an instant as something that is truly non-being and self-determining. (190)

In the instant of the self-determination of time, the self makes its appearance; that is, the self is nothing other than the “fulfillment of time” (208). Time is the “absolute present” (絶対的現在), “into which the eternal past and the eternal future can be unified at every instant.” In this sense it is referred to as an “eternal now” (永遠の今, 188). As Nishida writes, “time passes eternally away as it comes eternally into existence” (203). Since the self appears at numerous moments, the present determines itself eternally and is “infinitely dynamic.” The self-determination of the dynamic present that is grounded in absolute nothingness takes place at the very instant of expression. The real existence of the expressing self seems to be conceived in this way.

Let us now turn to Norinaga’s poem (“cherry blossoms glowing in the morning sun”) to locate its concrete experience of emotion. A single bright scene of cherry blossoms is expressed in fourteen syllables, the artistic expression producing a highly visual effect. It is, as it were, a snapshot of an instant in time that reproduces the scene and preserves it eternally just as it is.

In a 1933 essay on “*Tanka*” (『短歌について』), Nishida writes that significant features of life appear in the course of our lives that can be grasped only in the form of a short poem (nkz 13 131). The quantitatively limited form such as we see in the *tanka* does not aim at a full description along with an analysis of actuality. The reality of “the cherry blossoms glowing in the morning sun,” without any expression of emotions, imply reproduces the scene itself. Fujita Masakatsu points out that *tanka* is like a kind of place (*ba* 場, Fujita 1998, 147): Norinaga would have been moved by the simple beauty of the cherry blossoms, by its colors bathed in the morning sun, and so forth. Without trying to guess at the meaning of his *tanka*, the reader is still able to feel a certain emotion, an emotion that springs up of its own accord and recreates a particular scene in the poet’s life. This “place” is what is given full expression in the *tanka*.

What is expressed in *tanka* shares a place with the poet’s life and reality. To put it another way, “the self sees itself within the thing” (nkz 6: 207) while grasping reality. Thus the sense of the “eternity of the present” or the “absolute present” or “eternal now” can be understood fittingly through the example of the *tanka*.

Kuki Shūzō expresses an opinion similar to Nishida’s. Kuki, who con-

structed his own theory of time in Japanese literature as a part of his philosophical system of contingency, attaches great importance to the “eternal now.” For Kuki, the present of the poem is eternal and infinitely deepening as it converges on the present. The emotion expressed in the poem cannot be repressed; it seems to burst forth from the present. It is because of this convergence on the present that the poem is necessarily short (ksz 4: 47–8).

In appreciating a *tanka* we are free to sense something of the past or the future emerging from the present that serves as its starting point. Nishida notes that memory and present emotions live together at the bottom of a consciousness of the present. He briefly invokes Bergson's idea of consciousness presented in *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (nkz 3:260). We cite here a part of the passage in question:

I breathe in the smell of a rose, and the memories confused with childhood return immediately to my memory. These memories were by no means roused by the perfume of the rose: I breathe them in with the smell itself.⁶

The structure of *BASHO*:
a logic of form without form

Nishida's concern was with constructing a logic that could assume a form without form. He sought to do so by reinterpreting Western logic and in the light of traditional Japanese culture. His criticism of Western philosophy rests on the fact that it takes only one position, subjective or objective, without considering any other alternative. He suggested an “enveloping logic” that would rise above the subject-object dualism, and to this end he turns to Greek philosophy where the dichotomy has not yet fully developed. In this sense, we can say that *basho* was formed as a new philosophical method that rejects the objectification of reality and indeed envelops the subjective view within the logic.

6. The French original reads: “Je respire l'odeur d'une rose, et aussitôt des souvenirs confus d'enfance me reviennent à la mémoire... ces souvenirs n'ont point été évoqués par le parfum de la rose: je les respire dans l'odeur même” (Bergson 1993, 21).

Briefly put, the structure of the logic of *basho* that was framed in 1926 may be put as follows: Plato's notion of *khora* (χώρα) led Nishida to the term *basho*. The *khora* is defined as a receptacle of the Idea or the "intelligible form" (Br isson 1992, 17) in which the sensible comes into being (Br isson 1998, 1421). In Nishida's interpretation, the *khora* is only the "matter" (nkz 12:16), while his *basho* is the "field of consciousness" (意識野) in which we reflect our thinking when we think (nkz 4: 210). Furthermore, *basho* is something in which the whole of consciousness, including intellect, emotion, and will (知情意) takes place (223–4).

The logical basis of *basho* lies in a reinterpretation of Aristotle's logic. His concept of substratum (ὑποκείμενον; 基体) hinted at the opening of a novel direction for Nishida, who quotes Aristotle:

Now the substratum is that of which the others are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. (nkz 4: 95)⁷

Nishida interprets this reality as "what becomes the subject of judgment but not the predicate," or as "what is infinitely determined" but has been turned into "what becomes infinitely predicate but is not a subject." The logical form in Aristotle's logic sees that "the subject is the predicate," in contrast to which Nishida proposes that "the subject is *within* the predicate" (主語が述語に於てある). Thus "the *basho* of 'being located'" (に於てある場所) (nkz 4: 218) is Nishida's attempt at a new perspective from which to solve the problem of the opposition between subject and object, or the individual and the universal. Furthermore, a perspective from which "the subject is within the predicate" introduces the immediacy of the relation between subject and object, or the individual and the universal. In other words, the universal that is immediately given determines itself. At the same time, the individual appears and knowledge is established. Different kinds of knowledge and judgment lie within the predicate or the universal. Therefore, it is "the *basho* of 'being located,'" namely the "enveloping" (包む) (216) attribute, that characterizes *basho*. Intellect, emotion, and will are all situated there.

The worlds of various objects of knowledge are classified according to the meaning of each stage within the *basho*. The stratification of *basho*

7. Nishida appears to refer to a translation in English, but does not indicate its source.

describes a diverse range of activities of consciousness and will, transcending consciousness from the most abstract stratum to the most concrete. This was argued in Nishida's next work, *The Self-Awakened System of Universals* (『一般者の自覚的体系』) in 1930. There the logic of *basho* is structured broadly into three stratifications: (1) the natural world, (2) the world of consciousness, and (3) the intelligible world. The natural world is the world of being (*u* 有) and conceptualization. The world of consciousness is that of non-being (*mu* 無) and self-awakening (*jikaku* 自覚). *Jikaku* is one of Nishida's key concepts and makes up the core of the theory of knowledge in the logic of *basho*. His basic formula is "the self reflects itself within itself" (自己が自己に於て自己を映す) (nkz 5: 4 15). "Reflect" is often replaced by "see" (見る), but both imply "intuition" (直観), the ultimate in self-reflection. As consciousness deepens, the self seeing itself completely within itself attains to "absolute nothingness" in which the self sees itself by transcending intellect and consciousness. This is the intelligible world that is situated at the deepest stage of absolute nothingness.

Although the inner world is no doubt far more complex and nuanced, my interest here in "form without form" or "emotion" relates directly to the intelligible and sensible worlds of *basho*. To begin with, the location of intellect, emotion, and will in *basho* are illuminated. The intellect functions within "the natural world" as well as within "the world of consciousness," and in addition forms part of "the intelligible world." Just where it functions depends on the object of activity; if it is relative to the intellect in the intelligible world, then it is considered to be intellect. Emotion, which is mainly taken account of in art, is observed only in the intelligible world (279). The will, which is treated in the domain of morality, is assigned to the intelligible world. It occupies the deepest stratum, transcending the activities of consciousness in *basho*. The will supports the activities of consciousness, whereas absolute nothingness supports the will (464–81).

To put it another way, Nishida stratifies the intelligible world into intellectual intuition, emotional intuition, and volitional intuition; perceptive intuition is also classified in this intelligible world. Intuition is brought about by a psychological concentration that rejects the distinction between subject and object. To take an example that Nishida highlights,

when an alpinist climbs a rocky cliff or a musician plays a piece after long hours of training, their mental state is one of intuition. Nishida does not distinguish qualitatively between the perception that everyone can experience in daily life and the intuition of the artist or religious person that results from particular discipline. The only difference is the depth of the experience (nkz 1: 11–12).

In light of the above explanation, it should be clear that for Nishida the idea of emotional intuition corresponds to the idea of “seeing the form without form.” The idea of *basho* offers an infinitely deep stratification in which the worlds of knowing appear in their different forms. Intellectual knowledge is conceptualized, while the self forgetting itself, as well as the object, become the activity of consciousness itself and intuitive knowledge. The true significance of the infinite quality of the *basho* lies in the “content of the emotional self,” because it is in the world of the objects of emotion and will that we encounter something that can never be attained by mere intellectual reflection (nkz 5: 279). In this sense, intellectual knowledge is finite.

The idea of the contradictory “form without form” could not be sustained without a foundation in an absolute nothingness that is perfectly intelligible. At the same time, this absolute nothingness conceals itself at its most basic level. Emotion is excellent at sniffing out forms within an infinitely formless source, and emotions do not deceive. As Nishida states, “The emotional self is a shadow of the intelligible self” (279). The intelligible self as absolute nothingness becomes real when it sings of “cherry blossoms glowing in the morning sun.” This is not so far from the description of Zen enlightenment as “the willows are green, the blossoms are red” (柳は緑に花は紅) (nkz 7: 450. Dilworth: 34).

References

Abbreviations

ksz 『九鬼周造全集』 [Complete works of Kuki Shūzō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), vol. 4.

nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978–1980), 19 vols.

Other Sources

- Bergson, Henri
 1993 *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (Paris: puf).
- Brisson, Luc
 1992 “Introduction,” *Timée/Critias* de Platon (Paris: GF-Flammarion).
 1998 “Khora,” *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle: Les notions philosophiques Dictionnaire I* (Paris: puf).
- Dilworth, David. A., et al., eds.
 1988 *Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents* (Westport: Greenwood Press).
- Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝
 1998 『現代思想としての西田幾多郎』 [Nishida Kitarō as a contemporary thinker] (Tokyo: Kōdansha).
- Mattei, Jean-François
 1996 “Le mythe de la chôra,” *Platon et le miroir du mythe* (Paris: puf).
- Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 and Miki Kiyoshi 三木 清
 2007 『師弟問答——西田哲学』 [A dialogue between mentor and student on Nishida's philosophy] (Tokyo: Shoshi Shinsui).

The Potential and Limits of Nishida Kitarō's Philosophy

Cheung Ching-yuen

In this essay, I shall discuss the potential and limits of the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), regarded as the most important figure in modern Japanese philosophy. Nishida began his philosophy with a notion of a concept called “pure experience.” In the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* it is suggested that “like [William] James, Nishida articulates ‘pure experience’ as an immediate awakening in the stream of consciousness emerging prior to subject-object dualism. Yet it is widely agreed that Nishida reformulates ‘pure experience’ in light of his own study of Zen Buddhism” (Audi 1999, 499). It is interesting to compare Nishida’s philosophy of pure experience to Zen Buddhism, especially his position on the primacy of direct experience. But Nishida’s philosophy of pure experience is not identical to Zen philosophy. From *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911), Nishida always tried to philosophize a variety of problems; Zen (or religion) is only one of the many aspects of Nishida’s philosophy.¹

So how are we to understand Nishida’s philosophical projects? Gener-

1. Nishida’s philosophy of Zen or religious philosophy deserves a re-examination, but this lies beyond the scope of the present essay.

ally speaking, I would suggest that Nishida's philosophy always attempts to take a "third position." Abe Masao gave us a hint:

On the basis of historical life innate in human existence, which is neither Eastern nor Western, he neither established a new Eastern philosophy nor reconstructed Western philosophy, but created a new world philosophy.²

In the case of pure experience, Nishida's purpose is to develop a new position to overcome intellectualism and voluntarism. He writes:

In the past, psychology was primarily intellectualist, although in recent times voluntarism has gradually come to the fore, with exponents like Wilhelm Wundt. From a newer perspective, consciousness is always constructive no matter how simple it may be. The contrasts in its content are necessary for its establishment—if there were truly a simple consciousness, it would immediately become unconscious. (1911, 48)

From the citation above, Nishida's philosophy of pure experience can be understood as a third position beyond intellectualism and voluntarism. On other occasions, Nishida tries to apply this third position to overcome different kinds of dichotomies. What are the potential and limits of Nishida's philosophical project?

Potential

Interestingly, Nishida draws an analogy between his philosophical project and mining and refining. He writes, "I have to refine in a modern way the ore of Eastern culture, including precious metals" (nkz 12: 160). But he also states, "I am just a miner. I have no time to refine the mined stones" (221). We may say that Nishida's philosophy is neither the mined stones nor metal as such, but the process of mining and refining. Different mined stones have different origins, but their full potential can only be realised after refinement. To achieve this task, it is necessary for us to reflect on our methods of refining. There are different ways

2. Abe Masao, "Buddhism in Japan," in Carr 1997, 787.

of reading Nishida, but I shall introduce a phenomenological reading of Nishida's philosophy. The reason for viewing Nishida's philosophy as a phenomenological philosophy is not to limit his philosophy to a "school" or "finished product," but to reveal the possibilities of Nishida's philosophical thought. Phenomenology is not a school, but an open way of doing philosophy. This is my understanding of phenomenology. Husserl's phenomenology is not, and should not, be understood as a Husserlian school. Rather, phenomenology is a way of going back to the most fundamental way of seeing.

Of course, phenomenology is not the only way of reading Nishida. Nishida's philosophy can be understood as metaphysics or as a philosophy of religion. I do not intend to belittle the research on Nishida's philosophy of religion, and phenomenology should not close the door on the philosophy of religion. It should not be closed as a philosophical system. To clarify my position, my phenomenological reading of Nishida is an attempt to interpret his philosophy as a third position, as Nishida suggests: "[i]t is necessary for a third position" (nkz 12: 262). What is meant by a third position? It is a position beyond two opposite positions (materialism and spiritualism, mechanism and vitalism, dualism and monism, and so on), or an alternative to two contradictory concepts (life and death, East and West, good and evil, and so on).

In a lecture note on the "Introduction to Philosophy" (1910)—composed before the publication of his first major philosophical work—Nishida lists three metaphysical positions: monism, pluralism, and dualism (nkz 15: 133). It may be oversimplifying to conclude a philosopher's philosophy with one single position, but at least it is fair to identify the basic philosophical positions along the development of his/her philosophical thought.

In Nishida's case, we can assert that his philosophical position at all stages is basically against dualism. Modern philosophy presupposes many dichotomies, such as mind and body, subject and object, form and material, particular and universal, *noema* and *noesis*, self and other, and so on. These can be traced back not to Descartes himself but to the Cartesianism that inevitably falls into the problem of solipsism. We can view Nishida's philosophy as opposed to all kinds of dichotomies, but is Nishida's own philosophical position one of monism or pluralism? This is

a difficult question to answer. On the position of monism, one may identify Nishida's early philosophical position as a monism, or more precisely, a "monism of pure experience." Nishida's notion of pure experience is phenomenological in a certain sense, especially in the opposition to philosophical dualism; but the metaphysical position of the "monism of pure experience" may cause theoretical difficulties in developing itself as a phenomenological philosophy. As for pluralism, we would note Nishida's interest in Leibniz's monadology. But in the end, his philosophical position is essentially different from that of Leibniz: Nishida's philosophical thought is not pluralistic. Even though Nishida's later philosophy suggests a social-historical approach to the problem of the other, the body, and life, Nishida has no intention of developing a pluralistic philosophy. Nishida's position is neither monist nor pluralist. Rather, it is a philosophy based on a logic of the one and the many.

Nishida's position on Japanese culture does not argue the case for cultural pluralism; rather, he tried to link Japan and the world. Nishida's theory of Japanese culture coincides with his theory of philosophy, which can be regarded as a Japanese philosophy that can overcome the philosophical problems of the West. It is neither an Easternized nor a Westernized philosophy, but a philosophy that can challenge the modern notion of the ahistorical Cartesian self, and return to a historical reality that can be understood in both ordinary language and in the life-world. In other words, it can be understood as a third position. Nishida calls his theory "radical objectivism":

I believe that the world of the contradictory self-identity of the one and the many is necessarily, on the one hand, a world which can be thought of throughout as mechanistic, and on the other hand, a world which can be thought of throughout as ideological. However, such views [that is, mechanistic or ideological views which try to explain actuality from a standpoint which negates actuality] are views which, in fact, we always hold outside the world of historical actuality. Absurd though it may seem, from the world of actuality, we conceive of a world which passes beyond actuality, and from the world in which we do exist, we entertain the thought of a world in which we do not exist. To speak in this way is not to think of the world subjectively. The so-called objective world which is conceived by simply negat-

ing man, is, in fact, always conceived in opposition to man, and so is rather itself something which does not get rid of subjectivism. The true objective world must be that which goes beyond ourselves, and which conversely embraces us. It must be a world which makes of ourselves its individuated plurality. In this sense I am a radical objectivist. (Nishida 1940, 361; translation modified)

Nishida's is a third position: to philosophize on the "logic" of identity in contradictions. As Heisig suggests, Nishida's notion of contradictories can be understood in what we might call contraries or correlatives (Heisig 2001, 66). Of course, Nishida is not speaking of "contraries" in classical logic, such as "all men are mortal" and "no man is mortal"; rather, he is dealing with contraries or correlatives such as "being" and "nothingness," "life" and "death," "I" and "you," "one" and "many," and so on.

Nishida's logic of absolute nothingness is usually explained as a logic of *soku*. For example, the *is* in "one is many" is not in the sense of an equation, but in the sense of *soku*. The underlying principle of *soku* is the so-called "logic of absolute nothingness": the one and the many are contradictory, but in the logic of absolute nothingness they are necessarily the same. In fact, this "logic" is not original with Nishida. It can be found in the Buddhist tradition of the *Keḡon* doctrine, where the one and the many are the same (see Blocker and Starling 2001, 43–44). Nishida's "logic" is, however, not appealing to all his critics. For example, Nishida's logic of "the one and the many" (一即多) is crucified as a "mess" (イッショクタ).³ This criticism is certainly not sympathetic, but instead of overlooking Nishida's logic of "the one and the many," phenomenology can be used as a tool to explore its potential.

Limitations

As a third position, Nishida's philosophy is quite consistent. It can be regarded as a Japanese philosophy that can even overcome the

3. The two notions have the same pronunciation: *issbokuta*. Nobuchi 1997, 50. According to Nobuchi, this critique is from Itō Kichinosuke (伊藤吉之助, 1885–1961).

philosophical problems of the West. It is a third position: neither an Easternized nor a Westernized philosophy, but a world philosophy genuinely global in its aims. But what are the limits of this philosophical project?

Here, I shall highlight some problems in Nishida's philosophy. His philosophy overemphasizes the logic of life, but not ethics and life. One may argue that Nishida's view of life and the environment can be regarded as a pioneer in earth ethics, which suggests the idea of "thinking like a mountain" (Kosa ka 2001, 186–7). Nishida may be seen a a pioneer of deep ecology, which does not see the environment as an object, but as something that one must "become." At the same time, it would seem that Nishida's philosophy of life fails to provide insight into the ethical problems of life. For example, can Nishida give us some insight on the ethical problem of abortion? He may argue that even an embryo has "active maintenance," which is a biological concept borrowed from J. S. Haldane (1860–1936). Indeed, Nishida admits that Haldane's position is closest to his own philosophical thought (nkz II: 289). Concerning the problem of life, one may ask: What is life? When is the beginning of life? When is the end of life? But there is another set of questions that also need to be asked: How can I live a better life? Should I accept that brain death is the end of life? Should I support organ transplantation? Is euthanasia morally justifiable? What does it mean to be an ethical person?

Nishida's third position may develop a philosophy of life, but a philosophy of life is miles away from ethical theory. Although Nishida studied the ethical theory of T. H. Green at the beginning of his career, he did not continue to develop an ethical theory. It is not my intention here to criticise Nishida for his failure to give us an ethics of life. Even if he failed to do so, his philosophy still provides us with insight into various philosophical problems. What I am trying to point out here is the limit of Nishida's phenomenological philosophy: it may provide us with some insight on what one can know, but it fails to provide us an ethics on what one ought to do.

Nishida has never developed an ethical theory as such, but he has reflected on what is good and what is evil. For example, he took as his life's motto: "A man should be a broken jade and be ashamed of a whole clay roof tile" (丈夫玉碎恥瓦全にあり, see Shimomura 1990, 33). This means that a man should die for his spirit rather than preserve his body.

This was originally an ancient Chinese saying that was later imported into Japanese culture.⁴ Needless to say, this motto shows a hierarchy of values. There are good and bad values in Japanese culture, but good and evil are ethical concepts that are independent of the hierarchy of values. To kill a person is absolutely evil, no matter what one's cultural values happen to be. Even though Nishida prefers some particular values over others, we still have to ask: What is good and what is evil in a universal sense? Nishida tries to justify the primacy of religion concerning the ground of good and evil:

The historical world realizes itself in the form of nations. Yet I do not say that the nation itself is the absolute. The nation is the fountainhead of morality, but not of religion. As the nation is a form of the absolute's own self-formation, our moral actions must reflect a national character; but the nation does not save our souls. The true nation has its ground in the religious. (Nishida 1945, 122)

It seems that Nishida tried to dissolve the distinction of the ethical good and evil and to search for a trans-ethical "absolute good." For example, in "The Logic of Place and a Religious Worldview" he suggests that God must have the face of Satan:

A God who merely opposes and struggles with evil is a relative God, even if he conquers evil; a God who is only a transcendent supreme God is a mere abstraction. An absolute God must harbor absolute negation within, and must be a God who descends into ultimate evil. The highest form must transform the lowest matter into itself; absolute *agape* must reach even to an absolutely evil person. (Nishida 1945, 74–5, translation modified)

Nishida did not see "logic" as *a priori* formal logic independent of the *a posteriori* world. Such a view becomes suspect if it leads to the

4. 玉碎 originally meant "breaking a piece of jade." It became a word referring to the suicides of Japanese soldiers and civilians in World War II, who were asked to choose an "honourable" death rather than surrender on the island of Iwo Jima.

5. It is necessary to distinguish bad (*schlecht*) from evil (*böse*). The former is related to the value judgments of a person or a society, while the latter is related to ethical issues with universality, disregarding the preference of any single party. For example,

view that logic alone can overcome good and evil.⁵ For example, Nishida mentions the famous story of Abraham and his son (nkz 10: 163). One may sacrifice his/her son or daughter to God, but we have to say that killing a person is universally an evil act, whether it is based on a "religious reason" or a "justified belief." At the same time, Nishida's philosophy failed to answer the ethical questions of why killing is evil, or how we can overcome evil in human nature.⁶

As a pioneer of Japanese philosophy, Nishida makes it clear that he is merely a novice in the search for wisdom. However, he is ambitious to solve the various philosophical problems of East and West. He writes:

Since the beginning of the Meiji period, Western cultures have been imported into Japan; by learning from them we in the East have made noteworthy progress. We still have much to learn, and it is incumbent on us to continue to develop by absorbing world cultures. Obviously, however, this does not mean that we should continue to absorb and digest Western cultures but rather that we must create a new global culture while being sustained by our Eastern heritage, which has nurtured us for thousands of years. (Nishida 1937, 271)

Japanese philosophers were not mere passive learners of Western philosophy, but they tried to compare the differences between the East and the West. Many among them not only studied philosophy as such, but they also sought to identify the shortcomings of Western culture. Nishida

we would say it is bad to be lazy, but we would not say laziness is an evil act. However, in the case of murder, we would not say it is bad, but it is in all cases an evil act. In other words, good and bad refer to values, which are essentially different from the ethical concepts of good and evil. It is not a matter of degree between bad and evil, since the two concepts are qualitatively different.

6. Prior to Nishida, the problem of evil was debated among Japanese Confucian scholars, many of whom disagreed with Chinese Confucianism that every person can become a sage since human nature is more evil than good, and that the only way to overcome evil is through strict laws and social controls. Japanese Confucianism tried to break the parallelism between Orthodox Confucianism and legalism. The doctrine of the Sorai School, one of the most important schools in Japanese Confucianism, had a rather legalistic manner. Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), the founder of the school, was a Confucian scholar who had the ability to read ancient Chinese classics, and was widely regarded as a Sinophile. However, he was also one of the first Japanese scholars to recognise the importance of legalism (Blöcker and Starling 2001, 102).

and others, who sensed “the rise of the East,” also sense a resonance in European philosophers who were speaking of “the decline of the West.” Consequently, Japanese philosophy became a conscious movement “to overcome the West.” This notion was a natural point of departure for many philosophers in Japan during the first half of the twentieth century. “To overcome the West” meant, on the one hand, to defy Western culture, and on the other, to uncover the uniqueness of Japanese culture.

According to Noe Keiichi, Nishida’s philosophy can be seen as a post-modern philosophy in that it takes a stance against the dualism of modern philosophy. However, Noe correctly notes that Nishida’s philosophy of life is inevitably socio-biological. Nishida did not confine his philosophy to biology, but he extended it to social concepts such as history, society, national polity (国体), race, and blood:

Nishida unconsciously confused the concept of blood in the biological dimension with that of blood in the social and cultural dimension, and identified the latter in the end with an ethnic definition of nationality. This is a trap into which thinkers who try to combine biology with sociology easily fall, as is seen in the case of social Darwinism and socio-biology. (Noe 2003,29)

In fact, Nishida made a controversial reference to the Nazis in his discussion of Japan as a “nation state” (nkz 12: 415), apparently seeking to justify the myth of Japan as a homogenous national polity, but what if Nishida had known of the Nazi policies of racial purification? In fact, many Japanese believed that the “Japanese way” was the future of mankind, and that Japan was justified in “liberating” other Asian nations. Japanese philosophers might have stopped Japan from entering the war, but unfortunately, the story of modern Japan turned tragic with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. This tragic sense of life is deeply rooted in Japan’s postwar philosophy.

Concludin g r emar ks

In this essay, I have discussed the potential and limits of Nishida’s philosophy. No doubt Nishida is an important figure in Japanese

philosophy. Yet research on Japanese philosophy should not be reduced to the historical study of philosophical doctrines and concepts. It needs to aim at developing a third position that avoids the pitfalls of cultural monism and relativistic pluralism. The most important task of Japanese philosophy is neither to attack nor to defend one or another “school” of Japanese philosophy, but critically to rethink the potential and limits of the thought of Japanese philosophers. In the end, philosophy is not a showroom for finished products, but an ongoing process of mining and refining .

References

Abbreviation

nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965–1966).

Other Sources

Audi, Robert, ed.

1999 *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press).

Blocker, H. G. and Stirling, C. L.

2001 *Japanese Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press).

Carr, Brian, with Indira Mahalingam

1997 *Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy* (London: Routledge).

Heisig, James W.

2001 *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Kosaka Kunitsugu 小坂国繼

2001 『西田幾多郎の思想』 [The thought of Nishida Kitarō] (2 Vols.) (Tokyo: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai).

Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎

1911 *An Inquiry into the Good*, trans. by Abe Masao and Christopher Ives. (New Haven: Yale University Press).

1937 “On the Scholarly Method: A Public Talk at Hibiya Park.” In Yusa 2002: 271–7.

1940 “The Problem of Japanese Culture,” partial trans. by Tsunoda Ryūsaku

in Wm. Theodore de Bary et al., *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1958), 2: 350–6.

1945 *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*, trans. by David Dilworth. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Nobechi Tōyō 野辺地東洋

1997 『西田哲学批判』 [Critique of Nishida's philosophy] (Tokyo: Daimeidō).

Noe Keiichi 野家啓一

2003 “Postmodernism and ‘Overcoming Modernity.’” In *Postmodernism in Asia: Its Conditions and Problems* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo), 19–41.

Shimomura Toratarō 下村寅太郎

1990 「西田哲学と日本の思想」 [Nishida's philosophy and Japanese thought], in 『下村寅太郎著作集』 [The works of Shimomura Toratarō], vol. 12 (Tokyo: Misuzushobō).

Yusa Michiko 遊佐道子

2002 *Zen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Kōyama Iwao's *Philosophy of World History*

Discussions with Suzuki Shigetaka

Suga Wataru Jun

The *Philosophy of World History* (『世界史の哲学』, 1942), was written by a representative philosopher of the Kyoto School, Kōyama Iwao (高山岩男 1905–1993). Hiromatsu Wataru has asserted that *Philosophy of World History* has been regarded as an ideological work justifying the Pacific War. According to Hiromatsu, the *Philosophy of World History* “can be said to be suitable when discussing... about how the overcoming of modernity should function as a rationalization of the Great Asian War ideology” (Hiromatsu 1989, 58).

Putting aside any objection to Hiromatsu's opinion that Kōyama's work justifies the war, it is still difficult to comprehend that he directly connects the *Philosophy of World History* with *Overcoming Modernity* (『近代の超克』). In a narrow sense this refers to a symposium, the proceedings of which were printed in *Bungakukai* vols. 9 and 10 in 1942. Furthermore, members of the Kyoto School who attended the conference were Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990), Shimomura Toratarō (1902–1995), and Suzuki Shigetaka (1907–1969); Kōyama did not take part. The symposium in which Kōyama participated was *The World Historical Standpoint and Japan* (『世界史的立場と日本』) published in *Chūōkōron* during 1941–42, in which Nishitani, Suzuki, and Kōsaka Masaaki (1900–1969)

also participated. Consequently, Kōyama's *Philosophy of World History* was not immediately connected with *Overcoming Modernity*.

Indeed, Hiromatsu might argue against any proposal that the *Overcoming Modernity* project not be limited to this narrow meaning and not include the actions of intellectuals both during 1941–42, and before or after the Pacific War. The two symposia, which opened almost simultaneously, portrayed considerably different tones of arguments. Although those in attendance at the symposium assessed and reported Japan's world-historical mission more or less optimistically, far from agreeing that the Japanese would find the door to world history open, they seriously questioned whether they had really understood European modernity.¹ Suzuki, who attended both conferences, felt strange about this pessimistic discussion at this symposium and withdrew after contributing his article related to *Overcoming Modernity*.

Suzuki's adoption of different attitudes to the two symposia suggests the difficulty in connecting them to Kōyama's *Philosophy of World History*. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Suzuki promptly reviewed an essay, "Ideas of World History," that included work by Kōyama. The polemics between Kōyama and Suzuki began with Suzuki's critique, as a specialist in Leopold von Ranke, of an essay Kōyama had published in *Shisō* (215–216) under the title "Changes in the Contemporary World and the Problem of World History." The critique in the first volume of *Risō* for 1941 and was refuted by Kōyama in vol. 4 of that same year. After two responses, Suzuki compromised with Kōyama through eventual agreement on a common conclusion. Nevertheless, the point of this dispute, namely the plurality of historical worlds and the problem of special world history, can be said to be important issues from the standpoint of historical interest, which separates not only Kōyama from Suzuki but also the *Philosophy of World History* from *Overcoming Modernity*.²

This essay considers what Kōyama might have thought in his work and how his philosophy of history was changed during disputes with Suzuki and arguments in *The World Historical Standpoint and Japan* by specifi-

1. I have had occasion to argue this elsewhere. See SugaWār a 2007.

2. For proof of the importance Kōyama put on these discussions with Suzuki, see Kōyama 1942a, 11, 13.

cally addressing two concepts: the plurality of historical worlds and special world history.

A plurality of historical Worlds

Kōyama's *Philosophy of World History* is an edited collection of seven essays printed by him during 1940–1942. It consists of “Ideas of World History,” “Geography of History and History of Geography,” “Race, People, Nation and the Historical World,” “Phases of Historical Time,” “The Structure of the Historical World,” “Chronology of World History and Modern World History,” “and Problems of Historicism and World History.” As “Ideas of World History” was the first to be published, it is regarded as important as it expresses what Kōyama first thought of the problems of the “philosophy of world history.”

In the essay, Kōyama identified the situation of the world before and after 1940 as “the tendency or fact that the *non-European world* will be independent of the European world” (Kōyama 1942a, 22). According to him, “non-European nations have been made almost immanent in the European world since the end of the nineteenth century/beginning of the twentieth century, but the nations following Japan gradually rid themselves of this immanence and can finally express their transcendence from the European world. This world, which has been considered to be a single world, in fact turns out to be only one of the *modern worlds*; therefore, the modern inner order which the European world holds will collapse” (Kōyama 1942a, 22).

His critique was that ordinary thinking takes a monistic view of the world (世界一元論), whereas our goal is to “change the world.” According to Hegel, for instance, “indeed, that the Eastern and the Mediterranean world belong to Greece and Rome are assumed, but are regarded as the means to prepare for the emergence of a German world” (Kōyama 1942a, 25). The materialistic history of Marx “may take into account such geophysical peculiarities as Asian productive styles, but cannot be rid of the simple world-monism by the opposition between classes that are particular to modern society, directly extending to world history and

looking upon it as the class struggle that is everywhere under rule of the same economic law” (Kōyama 1942a, 25).

If we examine Kōyama’s following comments, in which thought should be replaced by “mundane monism,” they are nothing but the plurality of historical worlds, including special world history. First, Kōyama notes that European historians prescribe “the *pre*history of world history” to the Eastern world. Specifically, these historians assert that exceptional civilizations in regions near the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile Rivers preceded the ancient Greco-Roman world, which greatly influenced ancient European civilization. Against these former interpretations, he objected that “there is a peculiar and complete world history consisting of the ancient, medieval, and even modern period in the Eastern world,” and criticized this world history for structurally being “no different from the European one” (Kōyama 1942a, 29).

Furthermore, Kōyama asserted that the notions of “Eastern” or “Western” themselves arise from a fundamentally European concept and that “various Asian areas have been completely pushed away from the notion of ‘Eastern’ since they became known to European people.” Therefore, he inferred that “Eastern does not refer to a historical world, but only to a geophysical concept.” Asian areas in which Western people bond into the Eastern in fact have many worlds as constituent parts. Even if they are to be divided into Eastern, Central, and Western Asia, various worlds stand side by side, as it is said that “they are similar but independent in the Chinese and Indian world, and significantly Japan has been a single world since ancient times” (Kōyama 1942a, 30). Consequently, Kōyama concluded that “we must accept *many world histories* and *historical worlds* among human beings. We need the foundation of a plurality of historical worlds, for the present, to consider a true world history” (Kōyama 1942a, 32). Stressing the plurality of historical worlds, he distinguished special world history from general world history:

The histories of peoples are always world histories. No world history exists but the history of people. Furthermore, one world connected with another realizes a third. The first and second worlds will dissolve or be made into another when the third comes into existence. This is the process of world history. Consequently, we must distinguish two kinds of world history. One is world history constituted of connecting

people with one another, which we call *special world history*. Another type signifies that composed of so-called “special worlds” and is known as *general world history*. These two kinds of world histories are incorporated within the same structure, and are not separated from another but are closely connected (Kōyama 1942a, 67).

Kōyama reverted to conventional views of history by distinguishing two world histories, but harbored the criticism that most students of Western history in particular “cannot escape from unconscious or dogmatic ideas identifying special world history directly with general history.” He emphasized the disclosure of true world history through the defeat of dogmatic tendencies.

It is difficult to avoid [dogmatic] opinions in European ideas of history. We also find in our historical societies the disposition to expand the Japanese world continuously to the European world. It seems to me that we do not sufficiently take into account the complicated relations of Japan to the Asian continent, although we have not experienced tension on the international scene for many years (Kōyama 1942a, 80).

It becomes clear from examining “Ideas of World History” that Kōyama’s *Philosophy of World History*, which has been regarded as an aggressive work, distinguishes a special world history from a general history so as not to confuse one with the other. It can even be asserted that he is a pioneering cultural relativist as he criticizes ethnocentrism and uses expressions that stop generalizing domestic culture. His argument is based on *The Science of Cultural Types* (『文化類型学』, 1939), in which he wrote that “there are ethnic differences in cultures because we can discern Eastern and Western, or Japanese, Chinese, Greek, and Roman cultures” (Kōyama 1942b, 21). I will use this work again to discuss Suzuki’s criticisms of Kōyama.

It is true that the Korean peninsula under Japanese colonial rule was not prescribed for an “independent” world by Kōyama, but when we see that his arguments inspired some Korean intellectuals to maintain the East Asian Community (東亜協同体) (See Yonetani 2006, 145–52), we can estimate to some degree the “Ideas of World History,” the opening essay of his *Philosophy of World History*.

Is World history plural?

As noted, Kōyama insisted in “Ideas of World History” that contemporary world history must be understood plurally; he concluded from his standpoint that the European view of history includes world history only as an extension of itself. This statement directly criticizes the Eurocentrism that is adopted not only in Europe but also by Japanese specialists of the history of the Western world. Suzuki refuted arguments of Western history from a philosophical perspective. In “Contemporary Change and the Problem of World History,” Suzuki asserted that,

While the “modern world” shows structural systems of the world composed by a European order because of the expansion of Europe and its political, economic, and cultural dominance, the “contemporary world” refers to *the world-historical world* that Kōyama designates, in which non-Europeans insist on their original principles. It is the contemporary turn in world history where they will establish new principles to construct world history. (Suzuki 1941, 205–6)

On the whole, he accepted the image of world history identified by Kōyama. However, Suzuki also criticized him: “I think by all means that usual European world history is... not world history in a true sense” (207). His objection was aimed at Kōyama’s assertion of plurality and special world history. Whereas Kōyama stated that Eurocentric world history falls into “a simple mundane monism,” Suzuki asserted that “I cannot easily escape from the view of monism of world history however *simple* this may be” (208). However, this statement by Suzuki did not mean that he would stay at simple monism. He insisted that “the plurality mediated by monism” that Kōyama asserted “is always considered and stressed by both Ranke and other specialists of world history” (209). According to Suzuki, “Ideas of World History” was not Kōyama’s original concept.

What, then, did Suzuki think about special world history? Although Kōyama thinks that “it is a surprising world historical event in the modern period,” Suzuki stated that there are many world histories side by side on earth “which soon converge into a single one,” taking his earlier work into account, that Kōyama’s idea was not world-historical and

“much inclined to the science of cultural types” (212). Suzuki described the reason for his judgment: “World history should not by nature be found in some special history but in general history, out of which some isolated peoples stand.” Indeed, according to him, from the view of the science of cultural types, all people “have a dominant culture and historical continuity,” but when it comes to world history, these particular histories must be treated separately. Therefore, he objected to grasping world history from the standpoint of this science because “one of the histories is world-historical and the others are not” (213–4). Following those arguments, Suzuki critically commented on Kōyama’s *Ideas of World History*:

I cannot yet agree with the idea of constituting a plurality of world histories as merely a *string* of particular histories. World history should always be *general*; moreover, since the modern age, this generality has originated from the European world. I consider Europeans to have lost their role in the epoch-making changes of contemporary society. (215–6).

These statements of Suzuki’s appear to mean that world history should be considered as focused on Europe to the very end. Indeed Suzuki and Kōyama agreed in accepting the 1940s as “the contemporary period” with “epoch-making changes,” but since we infer that Suzuki considered this phenomenon as one of “losing the European character,” he insisted that matters related to world history should be oriented from a European perspective.

European modernity and World history

We now understand that Suzuki’s critique of *Ideas of World History* severely denied not only the plurality of historical worlds and special world history but also the science of cultural types proposed by Kōyama. Suzuki seems to elect only the standpoint related to Western history as his standpoint regarding world history. How did Kōyama respond to Suzuki’s critiques?

In “Various Ideas of World History—a Response to Mr. Shigetaka

Suzuki's Comments," Kōyama responded to the criticisms with a revision of his assertions. First, Kōyama stated his impression that "there are considerable differences of opinion between Mr. Suzuki and I when relating the plurality of special world history to the monism of general history," and found that "while he relates mere history to world history, I assume a special world history in particular, and conceive of world history by relating mere history to a special and general history" (Kōyama 1941, 48). Kōyama insisted that Suzuki's assertion that "one of the histories is world-historical and the others are not" means that "the reason for establishing a special world history named by me, as well as a single system of general history, cannot yet be grounds for *denying* special world history" (48–9). He explained in the essay "Race, People, Nation and the Historical World," which Suzuki did not address, that special world history is linked with world history proper. This article, described later, insists that the reason for the formation of races and nations with which *The Science of Cultural Types* dealt was nothing but special world history. To Suzuki, who was going to deny the method of the science of cultural types by criticizing special world history, Kōyama stated that his assertions could be consistent with Suzuki's.

However, it can be inferred that Suzuki would accept theoretical reasons for a special world history but could not accept a European world history as special history. In response to this problem, Kōyama frankly stated the European history that he had outlined. Suzuki prescribed stages of world history presumed by Kōyama for (1) those of special (European, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese) world histories and (2) general or world-historical world history, and his stages for the Mediterranean (ancient), and European (medieval) worlds, the expansion of the European world, and the world-historical-world (Suzuki, 1941, 218–19); on the other hand, Kōyama apologized that the third stage provided by Suzuki meant "a preparatory period or beginning of general world history" and asserted that the first and second corresponded to different special world histories. Kōyama insisted on the authenticity of his hypothesis by saying that "we must accept *for the present* a rupture between special and general world history" (Kōyama 1942a, 57).

Suzuki later recalled in his book that "hearing his [Kōyama's] explanation, I realized there is little difference between him and me, and that I

even agree with him on several points” (Suzuki 1941, 220). He seemed to have been satisfied that Kōyama admitted that European modernity should not be regarded as special world history but the beginning of general history.³ However, initially in “Ideas of World History,” following *The Science of Cultural Types*, Kōyama maintained that world history should not be measured using Europe as the standard. From his view we can deduce that the expansion of Europe that was characterized by the “realization of international trade among European nations, and modern European capitalism that accompanied the imperialistic colonization of non-European areas”⁴ furthered the erosion of special world histories such as non-European histories. We can therefore judge that Kōyama included the period of European expansion in general history, on the condition that this period is regarded as the beginning, because he did not stress his conception of cultural relativism during discussions with Suzuki. As Kōyama debated with Suzuki, he was gradually inclined to move away from pluralistic views of the world that we would categorize today as Eurocentrism.

The monism of *MORALISCHE ENERGIE*

Here I will consider how Kōyama changed his opinion by contrasting his remarks in the previously described symposium *The World Historical Position and Japan* with his arguments laid out in “Ideas of World History.” As described above, Kōyama and Suzuki attended this symposium. At first Kōyama was opposed to Suzuki’s opinion of the notion of the dominance of Europe:

S: European culture has universal validity; it has supported the domi-

3. In a “Chronology of World History and Modern World History,” written after this debate and included in Kōyama’s *Philosophy of World History*, is the following expression “European modern history has significance not only of *particular world histories* but also of the *prehistory of general world histories*” (Kōyama 1942a, 390).

4. Kōyama 1941, 56. His view of the period of European expansion here appears in the “Chronology” mentioned in the previous note. Hiromatsu limits his treatment to essays written after the discussion with Suzuki (1989, 67–79) and takes no account of the relation between the earlier *Philosophy of World History* and *Science of Cultural Types* conceived under a kind of cultural relativism.

nance of Europe and produced a European world order. Even if worlds outside Europe become conspicuous, they must be supported by this validity. Otherwise, their entrance is spurious.

K: I admit that Europe is culturally dominant. In addition to this, consider how the capitalist basis of the expansion of European culture gave rise to this situation. In fact, the consciousness of European dominance is rooted in economics, technology, or politics rather than cultural rule.

S: No, I think we should take note of cultural dominance (Kōyama 1943, 21–2).

After being defeated by Suzuki's argument, Kōyama spoke on whether modernity exists in Japan.

K: I always think there are two modernities in Japan. This is a new hypothesis, and so I want you to criticize it. "Two modernities" refers to the eras before and after the Meiji Restoration. Modernity in Japan started at almost the same time as in Europe. Japan as well as Europe expanded abroad, and these two expansions were rooted in the development of individual consciousness and commerce. So, if the Tokugawa Shogunate had not closed Japan to the rest of the world, then modern Japan would have developed in some other way, as we know. However, the modern spirit in the Edo period had a considerably different character from that of modern Europe because of national isolation. I think that the modern spirit with feudal tones has been formed in this way. In this sense, the Edo period achieved a reasonable adjustment to modernity. The Japan that emerged after the Meiji Restoration, however, combined this style after European ways (26–8).

In *The Science of Cultural Types*, Kōyama suggested a kind of modernity in the Tokugawa period; he then took Suzuki's standpoint into consideration by interpreting the innovative characteristics of modern Japan as another legacy of the Meiji era.⁵ After approving of Kōyama's assertion

5. Recently a number of Japanese historians have begun to express doubt over this dominance in Eastern Asia. For instance, Takahashi (2001) views Southeast Asia island peoples from the standpoint of the world of oceans, noting the networks established among people unattached to particular countries or regions. From this perspective, it may be said that Kōyama's medieval Japan was constructed from the standpoint of modern nation states.

that two modernities exist, Suzuki asserted that this fact demonstrates the dominance of Japan in the East:

S: I agree on the whole with Mr. Kōyama in the existence of two modernities in Japan.... There is also an ancient period in the East, which is magnificent. But, however magnificent, this is not modernity. Indeed the East was as magnificent as the West or more advanced than Europe, but did not yet have such a thing as modernity. On the other hand, Japan has a modernity that will awaken a new period in the East. This fact is world-historical.⁶

The “East” that is presumed here apparently refers to China because prior to Suzuki’s remarks, Kōsaka Masaaki criticized Chinese logic as having “only correspondence or distribution, and it is short of development or deduction” (Kōyama 1941, 32).

Kōyama’s proposal described above referred to a Japanese character based on his view of the science of cultural types irrespective of Chinese culture. However, Suzuki regarded this proposal as evidence of the dominance of Japan over the East or over China. Consequently, arguments in the symposium tended to regard not China but Japan as modern without distinguishing two modernities in Japan.

Kōyama emphasized the dominance of Germany over France using Ranke’s *moralische Energie*, in which Suzuki had specialized. Two of Kōyama’s remarks are particularly noteworthy:

K: When we say that France was defeated, what was the fundamental cause of this defeat? I think that it was a lack of *moralische Energie*, namely the vital energy of morality. Culture was separated from politics because of the occurrence of gaps or opposition between them. In addition to this, they lost the vital energy of morality. I think that this is the basic cause of the defeat of France.... It is still the vital energy of morality that always moves world history. I expect that this force will be a political principle. I hope that Japanese youth will increasingly possess *moralische Energie*, a healthy moral sense, and vital, fresh energy (Kōyama 1943, 101–2).

6. Kōyama 1943, 33–4. Strictly speaking, Suzuki was reiterating Kōsaka’s position here, though we should note that he combined it with Kōyama’s.

K: I think that the victory of Germany means a win based on the *moralische Energie* of the German people.... It is often said that world history is the judgment of the world, but this sentence does not signify that the God outside of world history judges it. It seems to me that nations should criticize and judge themselves. The ruin of nations is not rooted from such outer causes as aggression. An outer battle is only one occasion. In fact, national ruin is based on the exhaustion of the *moralische Energie* of a nation. If this energy of a nation is exhausted, an enemy nation will defeat it. Therefore, the causes that destroy nations are not outside, but inside; economic or cultural ruin is based on the same cause. The ultimate cause of national ruin springs from the loss of a healthy and new moral sense, the *moralische Energie* of a nation. We should not look for an outer cause (Kōyama 1943, 104–5).

In the preceding discussion with Suzuki, Kōyama analyzed economic and political factors to consider the move from a special world history to a general one, but here found the cause of the change of world history only in *moralische Energie* instead of these factors. Kōyama's view appears to head in a simpler direction than the former because he determined cultural dominance between nations from the standpoint of which nation's *moralische Energie* is stronger or weaker.

Furthermore, we should note the change in Kōyama's attitude to China. In *The Science of Cultural Types* he argued that Chinese culture was separate from Japanese culture without expressing which culture is dominant over the other. However, if we adopt a standpoint such as the monism of *moralische Energie*, we will make decisions only using the dominance of one nation over another—thought to be a Western trait—not only in the case of Germany and France, but also of Japan and China in the East.

We cannot help concluding from the following considerations that Kōyama fell into the role of an ideologue for the invasion of China. This was shown in *The World Historical Position and Japan* as he abandoned his view of the plurality of a historical world and special world history that had been proposed in “Ideas of World History” and “Various Ideas of World History,” submitting to the Eurocentric concept of world history emphasized by Suzuki.

Questions

In his remarks in *The World Historical Position and Japan*, Kōyama seems to have abandoned the plurality of historical worlds based on the distinction between special and general world history that he proposed. However, considering the *Philosophy of World History* in detail, we can attest that he did not relinquish his ideas of special world history completely.

In “Race, People, Nation, and the Historical World,” which was described as a reply to Suzuki and which was later included in *Philosophy of World History*, Kōyama thought much of “life as a bloody continuum” as the medium to transform special world history into general history. This life was regarded as a “natural entity” combining an “objective and outer moment,” namely geography, with a subjective and “inner one,” namely race. In this context, he used the term “responsive accord” (呼応的一致) which would bear salient importance in his later works:

In general, life consists of a subject's response to its environment, and is always shaped into a “specific” plurality according to the circumstances and peculiarities of the subjects that make it up, however different they might be in various regions. In this sense, the specific life of human peoples entails the bloodier effort of the subjects to respond continually to their specific climate and natural environment. (Kōyama 1942a, 159)

Kōyama referred to Ranke's *moralische Energie* by stressing the importance of a “historical entity” based on this “natural entity.” Taking account of this argument, he admired *moralische Energie* in *The World Historical Position and Japan* because his praise did not always mean flattery of Suzuki's opinions, but rather came from the development of his own thought.

But in the passages described above, “responsive accord” reminds us of Kōyama's relation to Nishida and Tanabe than discussion between Suzuki and himself. It is true that we cannot find words that show Kōyama's intimacy with Nishida, although we associate “specific life” (種的生命) with Tanabe's “logic of the specific (種の論理).” However, in the postwar period, Kōyama proposed in his later work *The Logic of Place*

and the Principle of Call-and-Response (『場所的論理と呼応の原理』) that he tried to compensate systematic defects of both Nishida's and Tanabe's philosophy for the principle of call-and-response. "Responsive accord" associated with "principle of response" must not be overlooked in his prewar work *Philosophy of World History*.

Nevertheless, we wonder why Kōyama did not express his idea of "responsive accord" in *The World Historical Position and Japan*, which would have meant the accomplishment of a monumental work in Japanese philosophy. He would not be regarded as a mere Suzuki sympathizer if he had developed his arguments using this idea. Presumably, he did not develop this because he had a foreboding that he was unable to completely explain a "philosophy of world history" with the aid of "responsive accord." Subsequently, we will examine "Problems of Historicism and World History" considering this key word included in *Philosophy of World History*.

Kōyama, acknowledging Suzuki's opinion that world history became European, asserted that "we should accept the standpoint regarding modern European world history as special history" (Kōyama 1942a, 362). He called this standpoint "trans-world-history" or "trans-world" (Kōyama 1942a, 363) and proposed a mysterious view of world history:

The absolute transcends the world, eternity transcends temporality: generally speaking, the consciousness of the relativity of histories lies in this transcendence. It is the transcendence that makes even general world history relative and forms historical periods. However, the absolute or eternity, transcending world or time, has revealed itself in the world-history of historical worlds as soon as it makes us conscious of relative and finite world and time. In contrast, no place exists in which the absolute or eternity reveals itself without revealing itself in world history. The absolute that is separated from relatives or opposed to them should not be the absolute in a true sense, but relative. The true absolute reveals itself in relatives and contains them in itself. *It is world history in which the absolute or eternity reveals itself.* (365)

Indeed we find no words corresponding to "responsive accord" in the passage above, but we should consider "Problems of Historicism and World History" relating to "Race, People, Nation, and the Historical

World” and *The Logic of Place and the Principle of Call-and-Response* because the descriptions in connection with “Themes and Resolution” included in Kōyama’s later work follow from these passages (See Hana z-aWā 1999, 122). By not taking up “responsive accord,” we seek to examine the meanings of the trans-world of world history proposed here.

We immediately notice that Kōyama equivocates the distinction between special and general world history, which he established previously by asserting a trans-world. He would destroy logical schemes moving from special to general history that he constructed if the view of world history “that makes even general world history relative” caused it to be regarded it as special history.

Furthermore, Kōyama insufficiently argued the role of culture stressed in *The Science of Cultural Types* and “Ideas of World History” within general world history. For instance, in “The Structure of the Historical World” included in *Philosophy of World History*, he assigned one chapter to treat cultural worlds. However, this insufficiently discussed relations of individual ethnic cultures to cultural worlds argued in two previous treatises because “cultural worlds” are regarded as being connected only with political or economic systems that spread globally during the period of European expansion.

Taking these arguments into account, we can bring into relief the problems Kōyama proposed in speaking of *moralische Energie* in *The World Historical Position and Japan*. In reply to Suzuki he indirectly acknowledged that China did not have such modernity as Japan, maintaining that Japan had more *moralische Energie* than China, similar to relations between Germany and France. However, according to him, the standard for deciding the strength of *moralische Energie* in these nations, especially in Japan and China, depended on which of them adapted to the current of an expanding Europe with which general world history “originated.” Therefore, should we assert that he overlooked factors indispensable to conceiving plural historical worlds, even though he previously considered which of these two nations stuck to their own specific culture?

Perhaps Kōyama would insist that it is the European political or economic world in particular that is connected with general world history. However, we cannot help concluding that Kōyama, maintaining the framework of plurally historical worlds expressed in “Ideas of World His-

tory,” has abstracted their cultural content because “trans-world” not only made special world history relative, but also political, economic, world, and general world history.

The aporia of *THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY*

Therefore, as Hiromatsu pointed out, Kōyama’s *Philosophy of World History* bore an aggressive ideology but initially conceived plurally historical worlds as standing against Eurocentrism. However, his concept lasted only until he wrote “Ideas of World History.” As he discussed with Suzuki, he was inclined to a Eurocentric view of world history, and he stressed the dominance of Japan over China in *The World Historical Position and Japan* instead of the plurality of historical worlds, which he never proposed in *The Science of Cultural Types*.

It is difficult for us to discard Eurocentrism when we consider the change in Kōyama’s thought. Indeed, among Asian nations Japan attempts to make Europe relative because what is meant as glorious for the West is miserable for the East. However, before long this Japanese plan cannot help but break down because we must develop our arguments in the framework of Europe making Asia wretched, even if we speak of Asian misery. Taking this situation into account, we seem to select no alternative to Takeuchi Yoshimi’s “resistance.”

Whoever receives productive ideas from Kōyama’s thought may insist that *Philosophy of World History* be regarded as a preparatory work of *The Logic of Place and the Principle of Call-and-Response*.¹ However, according to his idea, “responsive accord” was originally conceived not to compensate for the defects of Nishida’s and Tanabe’s philosophy, but for the purpose of being postulated as the basis of his original philosophy of history. During replies to Suzuki’s critiques, Kōyama realized the difficulties of the philosophy of plural histories and was forced to concede to Eurocentric ideas in many situations. Nevertheless, did he have to depend on a “trans-world” as a unifying principle that did not apply to the European framework?

Japanese philosophy has recently been viewed with greater interest in foreign countries than in Japan. Such foreign interest in it stimulates

domestic study. Even if we make new discoveries among the ideas of Japanese philosophers, we should simultaneously learn many lessons from the difficult struggle of Kōyama Iwao.

References

Hana za Wā Hidefumi 花澤秀文

1999 『高山岩男——京都学派哲学の基礎的研究』 [Kōyama Iwao: Foundational studies in the philosophy of the Kyoto school] (Kyoto: Jinbun Shoin).

Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松 渉

1989 『《近代の超克》論——昭和思想史への一視角』 [The debate on “overcoming modernity”: A view towards a history of Shōwa thought] (Tokyo: Kōdansha).

Kōyama Iwao 高山岩男

1941 「世界史の種々の理念——鈴木成高氏の批評に答う」 [Various ideas of world history: A response to Suzuki Shigetaka], in 『理想』 4: 45–59.

1942a 「世界史の哲学」 [A philosophy of world history], in 『高山岩男著作集』 [Writings of Kōyama Iwao] (Tokyo: Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2008), vol. 4.

1942b 「文化類型学研究」 [Philosophical studies of cultural types], in *Writings of Kōyama Iwao*, vol. 3.

1943 (Kōyama et al. 『世界史的立場と日本』 [The world-historical standpoint and Japan] (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha).

Sugawara Jun 菅原 潤

2007 「《近代の超克》再考(その1)」 [Rethinking “overcoming modernity,” Part 1], 『長崎大学総合科学紀要』 9/2: 33–40.

Suzuki Shigetaka 鈴木成高

1941 「現代の転換性と世界史の問題」 [Changes in the contemporary world and the problem of world history], in 『歴史的國家の理念』 (Tokyo: Kōbundō), 189–220.

Takahashi Kimiaki 高橋公明

2001 「海域世界の交流と境界人」 [Marginal men and overseas exchange], in 大石直正 Ōishi Naomasa et al., 『周縁から見た中世日本』 [Medieval Japan from the periphery] (Tokyo: Kōdansha), 265–335.

Yonetani Masafumi 米谷匡史

2006 『アジア/日本』 [Asia and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten).

Chinese and Korean Connections

The Formation of Modern Ethics in China and Japan

The Contributions of Inoue Tetsujirō
and Cai Yuan-pei

Chen Wei-fen

In the late nineteenth century, Japanese intellectuals used several Chinese characters to translate Western terms such as “ethics” and “morals” when they first encountered those conceptions. Not until 1881 did Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944) borrow the Chinese term *lunli* to translate “ethics” as *rinrigaku* 倫理學. Later the word “morals” was given the Japanese translation *dōtoku* 道德. Thus *rinri* and *dōtoku* were used to signify the subjects of “ethics” and “morality” based on the meaning of describing human relationships and high morality. The two terms thus began to have a clearer distinction. Inoue subsequently published *New Interpretations of Ethics* in 1883, advocating a “Japanese ethics” and theoretically exploring the “foundations of ethics.” Furthermore, he composed an academic discourse in Japan about “the problems of Japanese ethics” modeled on Western ethics.

In Chinese history, *lunli* and *daode* have never been interpreted separately. The terms *rinri*, *dōtoku*, and *rinrigaku* were passed from Japan to China during the late Qing Dynasty while the theory of Western ethics was introduced into China in the twentieth century. Cai Yuan-pei (1867–

1930) grasped the timing of this and consciously absorbed the methodology of Western ethics. In his *History of Chinese Ethics* (『中國倫理學史』, 1901), Cai followed the Japanese course and searched for corresponding Chinese translations of Western ethical terms. In addition, he edited the discourse of Chinese ethics in terms of the methods, principles, and history of ethics.

As educators, Inoue Tetsujirō and Cai Yuan-pei were both officially assigned by their respective governments to study German. During their time overseas, they took note of Western ethics, and after returning to their homelands, enthusiastically devoted themselves to integrating Western ethics into the University of Tokyo and Beijing University respectively. Meanwhile, they zealously translated and disseminated works on Western ethics. Inoue chose to consider Confucian morals as the basis of “national morality” while Cai emphasized the importance of morality in the system of education.

Based on Inoue and Cai’s interpretations, this essay will explore the “borrowing” and “regeneration” (Mor iok a 1991 and Liu 1999) of the meanings of moral relationships and conduct as derived from *rinri* and *dōtoku*, and will discuss the process of constructing ethics in contemporary China and Japan.

The appearance of “ethical issues”

In the “Chapter of Music” in the *Book of Rites*, there is a sentence stating that “All modulations of sound take their rise from the mind of man; music is the intercommunication of them in their relations and differences.” *Lunli* 倫理 here means the principles by which things communicate among themselves their relations and differences. In Jia Yi’s “Changes of Time” in the *New Book*, the sentence, “The Shang King violates the rituals and righteousness and abandons the principles of human relationships,” indicates the meaning of *lunli* as “all kinds of principles of relationship.” As for *daode*, it appears in the sentence, “They harmonize these principles with the *daode* and lay down the order of moral principles” (from the chapter entitled “Speaking of Divinatory Symbols” in *The Book of Changes*). In addition, we can find it in the phrase, “*daode* has

principles” (from the chapter entitled the “Universal One” of *Guanzi*). In Laozi’s *Daodejing*, *daode* is not only mentioned but is also interpreted word by word.

Thus *lunli* is the *li*, or principles, that exist in human relationships, but *daode* puts more emphasis on practicing the essential manners and sentiments of *dao*. Since both are associated with the way one behaves in relation to other people, they are not clearly separated in the Chinese language and as such are nearly synonymous.

Before the Tokugawa period, the two words were introduced into Japan from China through the circulation of classical books. *Lunli* rarely appears in Japanese records, while *daode* is much more common. A small number of other words similar in meaning to *daode* also appear: *lun* (倫, principle), *wulun* (五倫, five principles), and *renlun* (人倫, human principles). *Dao* and *de* sometimes appear separately. In his book *The Meanings of Words in the Analects and Mencius*, Itō Jinsai mentions *dao* and *de* in particular, regarding them as nearly equivalent in their meaning of the operation of human relationships.

“Ethics” originates from the Greek word *ethos*, while “moral” is derived from the Latin word, *mores*. Both refer to “habits” or “principles.” Aristotle took *ethike* to mean the study of *ethos*, for which Cicero coined the term *philosophia moralis*. The two words *ethos* and *mores* are the origins of the philosophy of ethics and morals in the Latin heritage, from which their English equivalents are derived.

In 1867, J. C. Hepburn first included the word “ethics” in his *Japanese-English and English-Japanese Dictionary*, with ethics being rendered as *dōtokugaku* (道德學) or *shūshingaku* (修身學). In his 1873 book on *Utilitarianism* (『生性發蘊』), Nishi Amane translated ethics as *rinri* (rituals), whereas Horii Tatsunosuke translated it as the “teaching of rituals, models, and methods” in his *Pocket Dictionary of English-Japanese Translation* (『英和對譯袖珍辭書』). Until 1872, Nakamura Masanao treated “ethics” as the behavior of morality when he translated J. Mill’s book *On Liberty*.

Up until 1881, Inoue Tetsujirō had recourse to Confucian terms and considered “ethics” as “writing rituals and music, intercommunicating ethics; but more than that, close to records of thinking, rectifying ethics, and being sincere in gratitude.” Later, “ethics” was rendered *rinrigaku* in his *Dictionary of Philosophy* (『哲學字彙』). Still later, he translated moral

philosophy as *dōgigaku* (道義學, the study of morality and righteousness). He especially focused on the conception of subject classification, and was concerned how to express Western terms in Eastern languages. Borrowing Tetsujirō's translations, Shibata Shōkichi published an English-Japanese dictionary the following year in which he listed *rinri* as "ethics" and *dōtoku* as "morals."

Linguists categorize *rinri* (倫理) and *dōtoku* (道德) as new Chinese characters (新漢語) or modern Chinese characters (近代漢語). Unlike "democracy" (民主), "science" (科學), and "economics" (經濟), the original meaning of the two words of the compound disappeared when being used to refer to a Western term, which then lent legitimacy to the new Chinese compound. In other words, it was not a matter of simply resurrecting old terms or giving birth to new ones, but of allowing the previous and current meanings to coexist in the same terms. Thus, when Western concepts are translated into modern Japanese, the concepts take on the superiority of a guest language. This in turn implies that the theory at work in the guest language is playing a leading role. The new meaning of *rinrigaku* explains the superiority of a newly organized discourse based on the rejection of old moral doctrines.

During the Meiji period, *rinrigaku* was translated as "ethics," with the result that what the younger generation of philosophers encountered at the time not a cluster of *rinrimondai* (ethical issues), but rather *rinrigaku mondai* (issues regarding the study of ethics). In other words, the question was how to integrate the problems that arose within *rinrigaku* into academic discourse or from the challenge of scholars who supported "Japanese moral theory."

Inoue Tetsujirō's *RINRI SHINSETSU*

Inoue Tetsujirō, who was taught by Nishi Amane (1829–1897), collected his teacher's and other scholars' translations of Western philosophical terms in his philosophical glossary, 『哲學字彙』. In addition, his study of modern poetic form, 『新體詩抄』, was based on the imitating the poetic rhymes of English poetry. Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), who was one of Tetsujirō's students, was interested in the question of the good

(善) and in the fusion of Western and Eastern cultures. In Tetsujirō's case, fusion affected only cultural forms. For Nishida, in contrast, it was the theoretical fusion that he aimed at in his talk of "pure experience" in *An Inquiry Into the Good*.

Nishi Amane is known as the "Japanese father of Western philosophy," Tetsujirō as the "founder of Western philosophy in Japan," and Nishida Kitarō as the "founder of the Kyoto School." We may therefore grant Tetsujirō a central place in the development of modern Japanese philosophy as having inherited the achievements of Nishi and stimulated those of Nishida. The uniqueness of Tetsujirō's philosophy lies in his combining important elements of Western philosophy with Eastern Confucianism and Buddhism. His approach is grounded in a comparative *rinrigaku*. Like other new disciplines that emerged in the Meiji Period, such as physics, political science, psychology, and financial management, *rinrigaku* was reclassified and reorganized in academic circles to become part of the history of modern Japan.

While teaching at the University of Tokyo, Tetsujirō offered courses on "the history of Eastern philosophy" and "logic" with a special focus on ethics and the issues facing the East. He was convinced that the philosophical essence in Eastern thinking had not yet been sufficiently distilled and disseminated. Western philosophy, he believed, would aid in bringing the requisite theoretical foundation to promote the philosophical values of the East. He appealed to "ethics" and "morality" to distinguish Eastern and Western values, but in his enthusiasm to find points of similarity, he failed to take the individuality of particular thinkers adequately into consideration:

Western ethics mainly emphasizes the exploration of knowledge, not moral cultivation. In other words, moral thinking is practiced through the pursuit of knowledge; both should be combined. There is no way to lay particular stress on one side. If the advantages of Western and Eastern philosophy can be integrated, an unprecedented morality is bound to result later on. (Inoue 1900, 578)

Tetsujirō also edited a dictionary of ethics 『日本倫理彙編』 and a compendium on *bushidō* 『武士道叢書』, once again in the attempt to find Eastern counterparts to Western ethical ideas: "Western ethics, Eastern

morals.” He was sent to study philosophy in Germany by mext from 1884 to 1890. He learned German, French, and Italian in his first four months, and later was admitted into the University of Heidelberg. During his year in Heidelberg, he took Kuno Fischer’s (1824–1907) philosophy courses, and audited lectures on zoology and physics. Subsequently, he transferred to the University of Leipzig to audit the lectures of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), and made friends with Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906), from whom he learned metaphysics and the philosophy of Hegel. After that, he taught at an Eastern language school in Berlin. He did not return to Tokyo until 1890, at which time he became a professor at the University of Tokyo.

Tetsujirō was the first Japanese professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Tokyo to publish a textbook on ethics, *A New Interpretation of Ethics* (『倫理新説』, 1883). In this short, sixty-three-page book, he argues that ethics has to do both with principles of practice and with norms of public education. It is worth pausing to look at the origins of this approach.

To philosophize, one needs to delve into the origins of ethics. This was in fact where Tetsujirō begins:

There is no need for us to discuss how to obtain happiness or what kind of behavior leads to trouble; rather we need to explore why humans pursue happiness as the ultimate objective. (Inoue 1883, 415)

Thus the structure of ethics that Tetsujirō offered had to do with the ultimate *good* of human beings. His task was to establish a discourse on the subject in Japan based on the way the questions were framed in European ethics.

Although his *New Interpretation of Ethics* was criticized by the commentators of the 『明治文化全集』 (*Complete Works of Meiji Culture*), the criticisms have been dismissed as “nothing more than traditional ideas and ethics with evolutionism, so lacking in logical integrity that they can only be dismissed as inferior opinions” (Mat su zaki 1992, 416). Although the criticisms are not altogether unreasonable, given the high-spirited, flamboyant rhetoric to which Tetsujirō was prone, we cannot dismiss the work lightly as it represents the first academic discussion of ethics in Japan. Tetsujirō tried to introduce the “question of ethics” in

order to structure the treatment of particular ethical issues. In other words, what modern ethics is concerned with is what the *good* is, and how to choose it. The former belongs to foundational moral philosophy and the latter is the object of applied ethics; the one gives ethics its substance, the other its function.

Tetsujirō insisted that we should consider the nature of *good* and *evil* (惡) before delving into substantial issues such as how to choose the *good*. Before creating a general framework for resolving ethical issues, we need to consider the meaning of good and evil through rational thinking and reflections on human experience. In the process, our aim should be to fortify our capacity for moral judgment and secure methodologies to verify basic moral principles.

Inoue Tetsujirō's junior schoolmate, Inoue Enryō (1858–1919), published his own *Theory of Ethics* (『倫理通論』) in 1886. In his later textbook, *An Outline of Ethics* (『倫理摘要』, 1891), he illuminates the aim of ethics:

Rinrigaku is equivalent to the English “ethics,” “moral philosophy,” or “moral science.” Subsequently, people translated it as *dōgigaku*, *dōtokugaku*, and *shūshingaku*. All of these translations are inappropriate. I advocate naming it *rinrigaku*. This discipline has to do with the criteria for judging good and evil, the principles for evaluating *dōtoku*, and the standards to govern behavior. The reason I translate it this way is the result of logical argumentation, not of free imagination or simple happenstance. (Inoue Enryō 1891, 2)

Enryō pointed out that *rinrigaku* was translated from “ethics.” *Dōtokugaku* and *shūshingaku* are both unable to cover the full meaning of *rinrigaku*. He criticized Confucius' and Menzi's ideas of human nature as being products of the imagination resulting from insufficient evidence to prove “how benevolence, righteousness, ritual, and courtesy are human principles.” Therefore, he worked out a structure for ethical questions, aiming to judge “the criteria of *good* and *evil* and the principles of *dōtoku*.”

Enryō began by compiling a glossary of terms, a study of the naming of schools of ethics, a chronological chart of ethical thinkers, and a brief history of ethics, and then set out to edit his results. Along the way he picked up contemporary and modern European theories, reorganizing

them into a catalogue of “148 ethical questions” to help students navigate their way around his ethical system. His chapters covered:

1. Introduction (how to define ethics)
2. Teleology (what the result is if people do not take happiness as the ultimate goal)
3. Norms (the difference between theory and reality)
4. Conscience
5. Will (what the ultimate goal is)
6. Behaviorism (whether there are things that take egoism to be a good)
7. Regulations
8. Conclusion

Enryō was persuaded that the issues of ethics and morality arising in real society could be brought into his study of ethics. With the aim of redefining ethics, he created a modern, integrated, academic discourse for ethics. Since his work was framed as a textbook of ethics, at the same time, it takes on the mission of education (teacher training).

“Good and bad, righteous and evil” were some of the main concerns of Western ethics in the mid-nineteenth century. For Japan, these ideas no longer had much appeal. Most scholars focused instead on utilitarianism, which aimed at increasing the happiness and goodness of human beings and diminishing the evil. This same focus can be found in Nishi Amane’s *Three Treasures of Human Life* (『人生三寶説』) and in the ethical theories of the two Inoues. The emphasis in Western ethics fell on standards of individual behavior. Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), who was exploring these questions at the same time as Tetsujirō and Enryō, was an English utilitarian moral philosopher. He believed, as Tetsujirō summarizes, that

Ethics is a study of the principles that govern right action or conduct. It is different from politics, because it is concerned with what is right for each individual, while politics is concerned with what is right for society. (Inoue 1874, 15)

Enryō agreed with this idea, observing that, “The police stress the criteria of how a country behaves, but ethics focuses on individuals. The

two are very different” (1886, 1-2). In a similar vein, Ōnishi Hajime (1864–1900) noted that, “Ethics is a study of the principles that govern correct action or conduct. It helps to criticize the behavior of each individual” (1903, 5).

Tetsujirō disagreed. As the Imperial Rescript on Education had proclaimed in 1890, “loyalty and filial piety” were the aim of ethics. Christians and Buddhists alike disapproved reducing ethics to guidelines for the country and national identity, and making “loyalty and filial piety” the highest virtues. The conservatives, in contrast, believed that each individual has the duty of “good citizenship” towards his or her country. In this regard, Tetsujirō pointed out in his *Outline of the Ethics of the People* (『國民道德概論』) what he saw as the greatest flaw of Western ethics: that it did not include “good citizenship” as duty. He criticized Western scholars who defined virtues as a praiseworthy quality exhibited in right conduct, while failing to take into consideration the importance of good citizenship and its practice (Inoue 1912, 11–B). In his view, “good citizenship” was the defining characteristic of a country. In Japan, this culminated in Shinto and the national polity (国体), in the pursuit of the martial arts, in loyalty and filial piety, and so on.

Fujii Kenjirō (1872–1931), a student of Tetsujirō’s, was appointed professor of ethics in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tokyo in 1901. He also believed that “good citizenship” should be part of *rinrigaku*:

Even though ethics is a product of Western philosophy, its structure and practicality have been weak and unrealistic. “Good citizens/morals” were founded a long time ago. They supplement the ideas of our nationality, and thus constitute practical wisdom and a standard for the Japanese. (Fujii 1920, 8)

Based on these practical beliefs, Tetsujirō published his *Moral Education* (『倫理與教育』) in 1908, and the following year Fujii Kenjirō edited *The Problem of the Examination for Educational Discipline* (『修身科教員試験問題』), both eager to fulfill their final educational mission as scholars of ethics at the University of Tokyo, and to prove the comprehensiveness and obligatory nature of “good citizenship.”

Cai Yuan-pei's history of Chinese ethics

In the beginning of the twentieth century in China, views of “ethics and morals” from the West were at first rationalized in terms of human relations, the principles that govern them, and “virtuous behavior.” How were they to respond to comparisons of Western “ethics” and “morals” with these traditional Eastern notions?

The earliest Chinese scholars exiled in Japan had already begun to study Japanese ethics. In 1897 Kang You-wei (1858–1927) published a catalogue entitled 『日本書目誌』 introducing Japanese books, content, and methods. Liang Qi-chao (1873–1929) then began writing newsletters in 1901 about Western philosophers, among them Spencer, Rousseau, Francis Bacon, Descartes, Kant, and Darwin. He believed that Japanese ethics covered the whole of the human sojourn of life (Liang 1900, 35). Although the Chinese believed that they were “a country of etiquette,” Kang believed that the significance of China’s ethics was narrow and unable to comfort the masses of people: “We must attentively mimic the ideas of the West to rescue society from its chaotic disorder and reorganize the history of Chinese ethical philosophy.” He quoted from the *Recent Mandates from the Japanese Ministry of Education* (『日本文部省近日之訓令』) to emphasize the ethical education in middle schools in the following six concepts:

Oneself: health, purpose of life, knowledge, emotion, thoughts, and so on.

One’s family: parents, siblings, children, relatives, ancestors, servants, and so on.

One’s society: properties, fame, honor, gratitude, generosity, and so on.

One’s country: constitution, patriotism, laws, civil rights, international relations, and so on.

One’s humanity: justice, good faith, veracity, gratitude, generosity, courage.

Altruism: biotic and abiotic things, selfless concerns, and so on.

In 1905, Liu Shi-pei (1884–1919) published a *Textbook on Ethics* (『倫理教科書』), noting out that Chinese ethics is mainly concentrated in studies of the Song period, especially Zhu Xi (1130–1200), and that they placed

stress on practicality and self-discipline rather than altruism. In the first, introductory section, he argued that Chinese ethics is based on eight focal points, from which he derived an initial definition of ethics. He then turned to the question of the right mindfulness, the capacity for self-discipline, and finally, the management of family and country to secure peace in the world. The second section, focusing on family and society, included the Ming dynasty *Liuyu* (『六喻』), the *Shengyu guangxun* (『聖喻廣訓』) from the Qing dynasty, and quotes from Inoue Enryō's *Points of Ethics* (『倫理摘要』) to draw attention to Western philosophy's knowledge, emotion, and ideas of good and evil. From this, we can surmise that Liu Shi-pei had devoted considerable time to studying ethics as it was understood in both the West and in Japan.

Cai Yuan-pei by and large agreed with Liu Shi-pei. Both accepted the form of ethics from the West, though Cai Yuan-pei concentrated more on methods of research, adapting traditional culture to what he had understood of other countries from his reading of Japanese sources. During the time he spent in Germany to learn from the West, his appreciation of the importance of Chinese education and its focus on ethics deepened. This is reflected in his 1908 *Textbook for Middle-School Discipline* (『中學修身教科書』). He published a partial translation of Friedrich Paulsen's *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, which outlined the concepts, objects, and methods of ethics, with numerous digressions on the consequences of good and evil, on pessimism, evil wickedness, egotism, altruism, the relationship between morals and religions, freedom of the will, and so on. Through Cai Yuan-pei's translations, neo-Kantian ethics came to shape the foundations of modern Chinese ethics.

In 1910, Cai Yuan-pei published a *History of Chinese Ethics* (『中國倫理學史』), written in the light of *The History of Eastern Ethics* (『東洋倫理學史』) by Kimura Ōtarō 木村鷹太郎, and *An Outline of the History of Eastern Ethics* (『東洋倫理史要』) by Kubo Tenzui (1875–1937). Cai Yuan-pei's book is similar in content to Kubo's. He divides the work into three parts: Pre-Qin establishment, the heritage of the Han and Tang, and the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. In each part he lays out the characteristics, correlations, and development of each school of thought. In addition to introducing more than thirty significant philoso-

phers and their accomplishments, he analyzed their successes and failures in as fair and objective a manner as he could. For example, he writes:

Confucianism represented fully the root idealism of our nationality... yet its philosophy was not as deep as Daoism, its theory as detailed as legalism, or as focused on human equality as Moism. (Cai 1900, 15)

Cai argued that Mozi's belief in universal well-being would "last three hundred years"; that Xun Zi's belief was that human nature is inherently evil; that Lao Zhuang focused on the individual's freedom of will; but that Han Fei (韓非, 281–233 bce) had advocated monarchical authoritarianism, with only the sovereign having freedom of will. Although Han Fei's idea had its advantages, Cai found it ill-suited to ethics. At the end of his *History of Chinese Ethics*, Cai strongly recommended the views of Dai Zhen (1724–1777), Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), and Yu Lichu (1775–1840). He praised them for their progressive thinking and for representing the first voices of "freedom in the East." Finally, he concluded by listing the four flaws of Chinese traditional ethics:

1. A lack in the basis of science. Only Moists studied science in the pre-Qing dynasty. This died out soon after the Han Dynasty.
2. All studies of ethics were only focused on discussion, and only Xun Zi and Mozi concentrated on the practicalities. This also died out after the Han Dynasty.
3. The teaching of politics and religion were mixed.
4. The lack of comparison from other cultures was also a flaw. Although Buddhism was around, becoming a monk was not compatible with the soul of Chinese ethics.

Cai was impressed by the results gained from absorbing Western ethics at the end of the Qing Dynasty, and believed that "the development of Chinese ethics will move forward to a new phase."

In 1924, Cai edited and published another book, *Philosophy Made Simple* (『簡易哲學綱要』), in which he further identified and explained the sources of problems and methods in Chinese ethics. He indicated that "the value of ethics is equivalent to the purpose of human behavior," and that ethics should be therefore incorporated into personal morality, sociology, and historical philosophy (Cai 1900, 120). He also sought to

integrate Western judgment further into Chinese ethics. He proposed ideas such as “freedom, equality, and universal well-being” as principles for “good citizens.” Righteousness is for freedom, forgiveness for, equality, and altruism for universal well-being. He wanted to keep both politics and ethics together since ethical well-being defines the highest good as the greatest happiness attainable by an individual or a society. In this sense, Chinese ethics was clearly different from the Japanese ideals of loyalty and filial piety or “good citizenship,” even if such notions merit further consideration on their own.

The search for Japanese ethics

Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1902), one of the members of the Meiji 6 Society, lamented the loss of moral principles in the Meiji period. He felt that the ethics that had been introduced to Japan from Europe was unable to save Japan from moral degeneration. He was further convinced that “ethics” was so excessively abstract as to be incapable of satisfying the Japanese need for a concrete morality. For this reason, it was all but impossible for European ethics to become “national principles.” Instead, Nishimura advocated the development of “Japanized morals,” an eclectic combination of secular principles East and West. More specifically, he proposed adopting modern, Western logic and language to reconstruct Confucian human principles based on the questions facing the Japanese nation at that time. In 1888 Nonaka Jun published his *Fundamentals of Japanese Morality* (『日本道徳原論』), a work that appears to be a response to Nishimura’s proposal for a Japanized morality. He begins by describing various schools of ethics, the foundations of ethics, and applied ethics. In fact, the work is little more than a piece of propaganda for Confucian doctrines. Although “ethics” appears in the title of every chapter, it has more to do with *rinri* rather than with ethics. Nonaka states:

Rin, in its Japanese pronunciation, is read *tomogara* or *tsuide*. The dictionary defines this as meaning rank, order, or principle, that is, the ordering of individuals within a group and the rules for getting

along with others in all human societies. This is why it is called *rinri*. (Nona ka 1888, 2)

Obviously, the ethics he refers to is a Confucian ideal that is not interested in corresponding ideals in Western ethics. In the early years of the Shōwa era, when Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960) published his *Study of Ethics in Human Formation* (『為人之學の倫理學』) and *Ethics* (『倫理學』), he believed that:

Ethics must challenge “ethics so-called”... The term “ethics” was neither created by us nor was it produced merely for the sake of the individual subject. Like other terms, even before we begin to question it, “ethics” has an objective existence all its own. This should suggest that we need to unravel the myth of ethics. *Rinri* originates from China, and was passed on to Japan, where it radiates, full of life. What conceptions can we create through this idea? (Watsuji 1934, 6)

Watsuji drew on Dilthey’s historical hermeneutics to generate a “hermeneutical method.” Taking “ethics” as a vocabulary for life and “living human experience,” he related interpretations of ethics to daily life:

Human *ri* is the principle of human behavior. *Rin* refers to the order and conditions that human beings share. The meaning is expanded when the two terms are joined to form a compound, but the principles included in the original meaning of *rin* are emphasized in terms of *ri*. Therefore, *rinri* represents the basic principles of shared conditions. (1934, 7)

Watsuji viewed *rinri* and human beings as belonging to the secular world. Thus, as the study of human relationships, *rinrigaku* seeks to analyze the basic order that human beings share. Although his *rinrigaku* was constructed through the language and methods of modern Western philosophy, its content focused on “common human relationships.” In contrast to the modern European emphasis on the individual, Watsuji’s *rinrigaku* was clearly cut from another cloth.

As we have seen, the ethical discourse of Japan took its start from Inoue Tetsujirō’s translation of the term “ethics.” During the Shōwa period, certain professors of *rinrigaku* at the University of Tokyo held the nation (國家) to be the supreme structure of “human organization.” *Rinrigaku*

itself comprised a fuller theory of subjective morality, even when its focus was shifted to the national level. China initially took note of the study of *rinri* as a result of the Japanese translation. Cai Yuan-pei, as we saw, tried to establish freedom, equality, and love as the core of ethical morality. He saw moral praxis as including both moral education and the cultivation of the full personality, thus providing a framework for ethics in China. In addition, he considered the purpose of ethical education to be the preservation of traditional mores and the promotion of a healthy personality. We see his proximity to Hegel's ethics when we expand the aims of ethics to include the nation and the Great Self (*mahā-ātman*). In discussing war, for example, Cai's attitude is milder than Hegel's but still argues for its legitimacy. Here again, the emphasis on protecting the nation rather than on race came to take precedence in the ethical ideas of China and Japan in the early twentieth century.

References

- Cai Yuan-pei 蔡元培
 1901 『中國倫理學史』 [History of Chinese Ethics] (Shanghai: Shangwu).
 1900 『蔡元培全集』 [Complete works of Cai Yuan-pei] (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1989).
- Fujii Kenjirō 藤井健治郎
 1920 『倫理學方法』 [Method in ethics] (Tokyo: Hokubunkan).
- Inoue Enryō 井上圓了
 1874 『倫理通論』 [An introduction to ethics] (Tokyo: Fukyūsha).
 1891 『倫理摘要』 [Outline of ethics] (Tokyo: Tetsugaku Shoin).
- Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎
 1883 『倫理新說』 [New interpretations of ethics], published in 1883, then collected in 『明治文化全集』 (1992 vol. 23, 415).
 1900 『日本陽明學派之哲學』 [The philosophy of the Yangming school in Japan] (Tokyo: Fuzanbō).
 1912 『倫理通論』 [Survey of national morality] (Tokyo: Sanseidō).
- Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋
 1704 『語孟字義』 [The meaning of words in the *Analects* and Mencius], collected in *Nihon Rinri Ihen* 『日本倫理彙編』.

Liang Qi-chao 梁啟超

1900 『東籍月旦』, in Liang Qi-chao, ed., 『飲冰室全集』 [Collected works of Liang Qi-chao], (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1989).

Liu, Lydia H. 劉禾

1999 『語際書寫』 [Cross-linguistic writing] (Shanghai: Sanlian Shudian).

Matsumura Minoru 全先 実

1992 「倫理新説解題」 [Bibliographical notes on the *New Interpretation of Ethics*], in 『明治文化全集』 (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha) vol. 23.

Morioka Kenji 森岡健二

1991 『改訂近代語の成立』 [The emergence of modern Japanese, revised edition] (Tokyo: Meiji Shoin).

Noma Jun 野中 準

1888 『日本道德原論』 [Foundations of Japanese morality] (Tokyo: Chūōdō).

Ōnishi Hajime 大西 祝

1903 『倫理學』 [Ethics], in 『大西祝全集』 [Complete works of Ōnishi Hajime] (Tokyo: Keiseisya Shoten), vol. 2.

Sidgwick, Henry

1874 *The Methods of Ethics* (London: Macmillan).

Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎

1934 『為人之學的倫理學』 [The study of ethics in human formation] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten).

1937 『倫理學』 [Ethics] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten).

Nishida Kitarō and Chinese Philosophy

Michel Dal is sier

The Twenty-Second World Congress of Philosophy held in 2008 may be said to represent a kind of “internationalization” of philosophy taking place at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It demonstrates not only the recent growing interest abroad in Japanese philosophy and the improvement of philosophical relations within East Asia, but it also addresses the very possibility of “world culture” and “world philosophy” (Nishida 1933, 254; Heisig 2001, 7–11). It will not have escaped notice that, having already transcended the limits of Europe and the Near East in 2003 (Istanbul), the World Congress was taking place at the edge of East Asia, not in what we might call the philosophical “middle” of China nor the “abyss” of Japan, but in the “in-betweenness” of Korea.

It is precisely between these two empires of the “Middle” and the “Sun”

* The present essay is the first part of a two-part study. The conclusion will appear in the *Japan Review: Journal of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies*. The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Japanese Ministry of Science and Education (*Kakenhi* 20682002) and the International Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto. Thank are also due to Professor Inaga Shigemi 稲賀 繁実, my counterpart at the Center, to Lei Guo-shan 雷国山 for his help on Chinese classics, and to Inotani Kazuo 猪谷一雄, the curator of Nishida's archives in Unoke, Ishikawa prefecture.

that we would like to introduce the figure of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945). He is rightly considered as a philosopher mainly influenced by Western philosophy¹ and Buddhism (see Dalissier 2006a, 2009). If we consider, for example, the debate opposing Daoism to Buddhism reported by Huilin (慧林, fifth century), Nishida's views might also appear to have been influenced at least as much by Daoism:

Chinese saints do not lighten the dark way (the beyond); they never speak about transformations of future life. If they exalt the void of the heart, they do not realize the void of phenomena. Their penetration never reaches that of [the saints] of the West.... For Śākyamuni, things themselves are emptiness, emptiness and things meet. For Laozi, being (*you*) and non-being (*mu*) are two distinct realities.²

In general the Japanese philosopher's debt to Daoism and Confucianism, and beyond that to Chinese "philosophy,"³ remains relatively unexplored. As a non-specialist in this domain, I would like to try to shed some light on significant parallels, without ignoring their limitations, basing my remarks principally on the rich material provided by Anne Cheng in her *History of Chinese Thought*. Even so, the task is by no means an easy one since Nishida hardly quotes any Chinese thinkers the way he cites Western philosophers or even Zen masters.⁴

1. I will focus on Chinese Confucianism in this paper, but it is also possible to consider Japanese Confucianism in relation to Nishida's philosophy. See Dalissier 2009, 36, 79, 93, 286, 287, 322, 390, 403 and 538. The connections between Nishida's philosophy and Korean philosophy and culture have not been studied thus far. Suffice it to mention the two works on Korean thought listed in the References (c. 207/234, 308/201, 278/199).

2. *Baihe lun*, cited in Cheng 1997, 377. The word "realize" will be taken here in the twofold meaning pointed out by Nishitani Keiji (1982, 5).

3. We need to distinguish several meanings of the word *philosophy* in this essay. By "Western philosophy" we will refer especially to "continental" philosophy as rational and conceptual thought born in Greece. "Japanese philosophy" refers to the post-Meiji Westernized form of thought that began with Nishi Amane. "Chinese philosophy" refers to Chinese thought in general, both ancient and modern. Concerning the problem of using the word "philosophy" in the expression "Chinese philosophy," see the studies collected in ypc. For a parallel with the expression "Korean philosophy," see Lee 2004, 10.

4. In Nishida's first work, *An Inquiry into the Good*, the Chinese philosophers who

Inquiries into AN INQUIRY INTO THE GOOD

Unificatio

Elsewhere I have tried to show how “unificatio” (*tōitsu* 統一) is the key to the “feel” (骨) for Nishida’s philosophical intuition (Dal issier 2009, 565). He first proposed this idea of a philosophical “knack” in referring to Western philosophers, but its mention readily calls to mind

are quoted in the third part devoted to “the good” include Wang Yangming (王陽明 1472–1529), Xunzi (荀子 298–338), Confucius (孔子 551–479), and Zisi (子思 485–420). For other references, see c. no. 440–9/310. Sengzhao (僧肇/肇法師, 374–414) is quoted in Nishida 1973, 78. Maybe the most important essay concerning Nishida’s interpretation of Chinese philosophy is Nishida 1933, where the *Book of Rites*, the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the *Book of History*, the *Book of Songs*, the *Commentary of Zuo*, the *Analects*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, *Zhuangzi*, and *Daodejing*, as well as Confucius, Mencius, Zisi, Mozi, the legalist philosophers, Xunzi, and the Gong Yang scholars are quoted. In addition, Nanquan Puyuan (南泉普願 748–835), Baoji (盤山寶積), Linji (臨濟), Zhao Zhou (趙州 778–897), Pan Gui (盤珪 1622–1693), Bunan (至道無難 603–676), Huineng, and other Zen thinkers are quoted in the posthumous essay, “The Logic of Place and Religious Worldview” (nkz 11:424, 454–5, 430, 449).

I have studied Nishida’s personal collection of Chinese books, approximately 886 volumes preserved in Unoke, a number even greater than that of his Japanese books (561). On Nishida’s early training in classical Chinese and the Chinese classics, see Yusa 2002, 10, 15. In these books, we find annotations in at least two kinds of writing styles. A specialized graphological inquiry might be able to distinguish and identify them. In order to try to “identify” the marginalia, we need to see if the book has the words “borrowed from [my] grandfather... written by Kitarō” (祖父遺書幾多郎記) or “inherited from ancestors... written by Kitarō” (自祖父の代所傳幾多郎記). If such is the case, as in volumes i–iii of the work by Neo-Confucian thinker Minagawa Kien (1734–1807) 『助字詳解』 [Research on propositional particles], c. no. 281/200, then the signs in red ink (point, circle, underlining with or without the reproduction of the underlined part in the margin), the tiny pieces of colored paper attached to show an important word or passage (a usual technique for readers of the Chinese classics in China and Japan), and the annotations of transcription and commentary could be those of his grandfather (西田新登 Nishida Aranori, circa 1850), “a highly accomplished man of letters, especially conversant with the Chinese classics” (Yusa 2002, 5). If not, the annotations might be Nishida’s work. Obviously, if the date of the edition of a book is after 1850, it cannot belong to his grandfather or other ancestors. There are also some books that contain reading marks in a writing style that could be Nishida’s, to judge from my studies of his marginalia in other books. This is especially the case in his copy of *stic*, vol. i, c. no 78/188, in which we find the *Mean* is annotated throughout in lead pencil as well as with an ink pen or brush. See 2–6, and

the words of Confucius and Zhuangzi.⁵ If Western philosophers have conceived of unification as a pure and simple union, many have made an essential use of it (Plato, Lotze); others have at times been critical of it (Aristotle, Bergson); and still others, though more rarely, have sought its philosophical potential (Cohen, Heidegger). It is difficult on the one hand, to appreciate how Nishida could really have simply extracted his own conception of unification from a Buddhist framework, where the very idea of a unity of the “I” is conceived to be “illusory,” and where, at the same time, the “feeling of unity” seems to have been rejected.⁶ On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the idea of unification has a deep intellectual history in Chinese thought, where it is characterized by an “attraction for syncretism” (Granel 1934, 15).

What is unification? To begin with, it represents an organic unity of consciousness and reality, a conception that could be said to have issued from “Nishida’s medieval bent” (see Heisig 2004, 15). In his very first

in particular chapters 9 to 13, pages 32–7. There is a light lead pencil mark on page 8, at the level of the passage of the *Mean* which is quoted first in Nishida 1933: “The heavenly mandate is called human nature; that which rules human nature is called the Way; cultivating the Way is called the true teaching” (241). However, we find no mark on page 95, corresponding to the second citation (243). We find the same kind of annotations throughout the *Analects*, in particular chapters 1, 3, 9, and 20, pages 16–21, 28, 58, 160–1, 372–3, and 390. Apart from this, only a few other books are so richly annotated. Concerning Chinese thought and literature, except for those which will be quoted in the present study, consult the following references c., no. 201/195, 216/196, 241, 242, 245/197, 252/198, 281, 284, 288, 292/200, 299/201, 422/208. Concerning Japanese classics, see c., no. 316/201, 332, 337/203. Concerning Buddhism, especially Zen, see c., no. 354, 358, 368, 375/205, 380, 381, 389, 390/206, 411/207.

5. “A unique principle enables me to grasp everything,” *Analects*, cited in Granel 1934, 15. “Between strength and smoothness, the hand finds and the spirit answers. There is a trick I cannot explain by words” (*Zhuangzi* 13, quoted in Biller 2004, 21). We can find many materials concerning the *Zhuangzi* in Nishida’s library, see *Index*, vol. 9; c., no. 79, 243–5, 436, 437/188, 249, 208.

6. Cheng 1997, 351–2, 385–6. “We do not find behind all emotional and psychic states, thoughts, and actions any immutable federating or unifying principle that we could qualify as an I” (Fauriol 1998, 352–3). Thus, if Nishida rethinks the Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian theme of “forgetting the I,” in order to realize the “true self,” at the same time, beginning with his first book, he also meditates on a cosmological and psychological “ruling unity” or “master unity (統一).”

work, he highlights the “identity” (*dōitsu* 同一) of *ātman* and *brahman* in “Indian religion and philosophy,” though without giving any references.⁷ He argues further:

The more we discard the self and become objective or selfless, the greater and deeper our love becomes. We advance from love between parent and child or husband and wife to love between friends, and from there to love of humankind. Buddha’s love extended to birds, beasts, grasses, and trees. (Nishida 1911, 174)

Such a conception does not refer only to Buddhism. We find clear parallels in Zengzi (曾子 504–436 bce),⁸ and especially Hui Shi (惠施 380–305 bce): “Let your love extend to [embrace] the thousand beings; Heaven and Earth are *a single body*.”⁹ More generally, it refers to “the ancient tradition of *unity* of man and cosmos” in Chinese thought (Chen 1997, 450; emphasis added).

Viewed in terms of pure naturalism or brute technique, man and nature are neither unified nor polarized; men and God do not coincide in a temporal “alliance.” They do not represent “two separate reigns

7. Nishida 1911, 38, 80. Cf. Dalissier 2009, 125.

8. These are well known words, coming from the opening of *The Great Learning* (大學), quoted in Chen 1997, 73. Yet the paradigm is not so much religious as moral and political:

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered (治) their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere (誠) in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge (到知) lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete [unification makes sincerity]. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy.” (38–9)

A few reading marks made with a black lead pencil appear in his 1912 edition, *stic*, vol. 1, 10–14.

9. *Zhuangzi*, 33; Watson 1968, 375; emphasis added.

but a unique society” (Gr anet , 1934, 24). This dynamic unity is symbolically expressed in the Chinese language¹⁰ and ritually celebrated in “rhythms” of “time and space” and during festivals.¹¹ Mencius emphasizes this point.¹²

In addition, when “consciousness” joins the very place of such a unity, unification refers to an endless organic operation (*sōsa* 操作) in the making, a conception that the “logic of place” will justify and that a later theory of *poiesis* will apply (see Dal issier 2005, Parts iii–iv). Here again, even if Nishida appears to be indebted mainly to Western thought, a genealogy of his approach cannot exclude certain Chinese philosophical materials. Can we not see it at work in the sort of “evolutionism,” “cosmopolitanism,” and “universalism” that characterizes the period around the composition of his first work, and that we find in such thinkers as Yan Fu (嚴復 1853–1921), Liang Qichao (梁啟超 1873–1929), Tan Sitong (譚嗣同 1865–1898) and Kang You-wei (康有為 1858–1927)?¹³ Our minds are drawn to the unending, organic creation of the universe, as well as to other ideas coming from ancient and modern Chinese thought, which I will detail in the course of this essay.

Pure Experience and the Fall

These two meanings of “unificatio ” unite in “pure experience,” wherein we “become one” with reality, or “become objective” (nkz 12: 285, 302–3, 337–8, 375–9). But a core argument of the *Inquiry* is that we “fall” (墮落) at each moment from this encompassing “state.” Besides the explicit

10. “When a Chinese author speaks of ‘nature,’ he thinks of the written character 性, composed of the element 生, that refers to what is birthing or living, and of the radical element for the heart/spirit, which orients his reflection on nature, human nature in particular, in a vitalistic sense. According to the specificity of its writing, Chinese thought can imagine itself taking place within the real rather than being simply superposed on it” (Chen g 1997, 35).

11 Where human beings appear as “*united* by the desire to obey together an order for everyone” (Gr anet 1934, 24, 60, 97, 112; emphasis added).

12. Cheng 1997, 455. A copy can be found in Nishida’s library, st ic , vol. 2. The annotations are most probably Nishida’s.

13 Chen g 1997, 619–28, 637–8 It would be helpful to compare in this context Tan Sitong’s *Renxue* and Kang Youwei’s *Da tongshu* to Nishid a (1911).

reference to the Christian myth, there may be an implicit allusion to Mencius' statement: "the *Dao* of study and experience (學問) is nothing else but simply to quest [seek] for the original spirit lost from sight" (*Mencius* vi.a.11). Obviously, the *Inquiry* is structured along the lines of a "dialectical" fourth-stage Hegelian logical process¹⁴ associated with a Trinitarian Christian history of fall and salvation (see Dal issier 2009, 85–18). At the same time it refers to a primary Daoist source: the *Dao* as a lost origin, as is apparent in *the very image Nishida uses to illustrate pure experience*: a baby sucking at its mother's breast (Nishida 1911, 120; cf. Dal issier 2009, 38, 131), the image of a saint who knows how to draw directly from the *Dao* as from a spring (*Laozi* 20).¹⁵

A second source evoked by this threefold structure is an ethical account that appears in the writings of a Neo-Confucian author quoted in the *Inquiry*, Wang Yangming (王陽明 1472–1529):

In the beginning, the spirit of all men in the world differs in no way from the spirit of the saint.

But when egoism comes to interpose, and material desires come to obstruct, what was high becomes small and what was freely flowing becomes blocked through its own action. Everyone begins to have personal concerns, to the extent that some finally consider [even] father, son, and brother as enemies.

This is the great worry of the saint, urged to transmit and teach everywhere the sense of humanity, which brings together into one

14. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Addition §171 (Hegel 1975, 236; Marquet 2001, 193). Regarding the question of whether it is possible to apply this fourth-stage dialectic to the earlier account of the "logic of place" in 1926, see Dal issier 2008. On Nishida's later critique of Hegel, see nkz xii: 64–85 (French translation, Nishida 1931).

15 We can find considerable material on the *Laozi* in Nishida's library, including three editions that appeared after his grandfather's death: st ic, vol. 9; c., no. 79, 201/188, 195. Two other editions are much older: c., no. 239–40/197. Anne Cheng explains: "The loss of the origin can be actually felt in contact with small babies: while we know that we have ourselves been in this state, we have the feeling that everything has been deleted, hence the difficulty of restoring this original state" (Cheng 1997, 202). In *Zhuangzi* v, the notion of a "fall" into the inferior and "exhausting" intentional "scheme" (regime) of activity is opposed to the recovery of the "calm" corporeal scheme of necessary activity (see Billet 2004, 43–53, 63, 78, 87, 113).

body the Earth, the Sky [heaven] and the thousand beings (天地萬物一體). Acting in this way, we will dominate our egoism, get rid of what obstructs, and recover what we have in common: the original constitution of our spirit.¹⁶

This much can be said of the Daoist and Neo-Confucian heritage in Nishida's early "dialectics." In *Inquiry into the Good* he himself criticized, from a topological position, the general idea of an "obstruction" (蔽, 塞) of the flow of reality taking the form of an "I" (cf. Dal issier 2009, 526ff), but his critique of "egoism" is nonetheless oriented towards an affirmation of "personality" and "desires."

Forget Yourself

This paradox recalls the repudiation in Mahāyāna Buddhism of the Hīnayāna circle of an "I" trying to escape the "I" (Chen g 1997, 355). In the attempt to resolve this contradiction, Nishida grounds his "psychological" theory of "forgetting the self" topologically, that is, on an idea of the self as a "place" for the realization of the finite and ontological nature of the "I" (Dal issier 2009, 85–18).

Although a kind of forgetting of selfhood is found in certain Western philosophers (Eckhart, Bergson, Heidegger),¹⁷ it is central in Confucianism: "To subdue oneself and return to the rite, is the *ren*" (克己復禮爲仁, *Analects* xii. 1). Ritually, to forget oneself is to relate to the universe and to others. However, if "the thousand beings are in totality present in me" (Mencius), if "I, insignificant being" (Zhang Zai 張載 1020–1078), have to take place between sky and earth, between men as friends and brothers, there is a kind of necessity for the persistence of the I, at least as a practical agent, respecting and loving others.¹⁸ Thus, to forget one's "consciousness" is to attain perfection of action, according to the famous images of the *Zhuangzi*.¹⁹

16 *Chuanxi lu* ii. The book is in Nishida's library, c., no. 260/198, a work he refers to in his diary in 1898, c., no. 441, 449/310. See no. 1054/339.

17 See Dal issier 2009, 93. On the relations between Nishida and Eckhart, see Heisig 2004, 57–67.

18 *Mencius* vii. a.4; and 『正蒙』 [Right initiation], 17, in *Zhangzaiji* 62–3.

19 The good cook Ding and the swimmer at the falls of Lǔliang, *Zhuangzi* iii. 6.

“Forgetting the self,” we unite with the working of reality and “become objective.” In the Daoist and Buddhist metaphor of the “mirror,” which was so important for Nishida (cf. Dal issier 2006a, 99–142), such forgetfulness compels us to act as a “mirror that reflects without passion the things such as they are.”²⁰ In Shao Yong (邵雍 1012–1077), this conception takes a new expression in the idea of “reversed observation” (反觀):

Not to observe things from the point of view of the I, but from their thing-like point of view.... Because we can use the eyes of the world as our own eyes there is nothing that our eyes cannot observe.²¹

Shao is influenced by another Buddhist and Daoist conception, also mentioned by Nishida (1940, 357–8, 377), the “inverse reflect” (反照). Last but not least, in this connection Zhang Zai emphasizes a kind of “illumination of spirit,”²² which is most suggestive in relationship to Nishida’s optical theory of “self-awakening” (自覺).

See also: “an ego too cumbersome to enter into the fluidity of the *Dao*” (Chen g 1997, 136) and “In the spontaneity (*ziran* 自然) which consists in harmonizing with things, there is no place for the ‘I’” (*Zuangzi*, cited in Cheng 1997, 130; cf. also 208, 326). Again, in *Zhuangzi* xii we read: “The man who has forgotten the self (忘己) may be said to have entered Heaven.” This topic appears in the *Liezi* i.6, ii. 1 (all who refer to this work must keep in mind its composite and artificial nature, see Chen g, 114).

Nishida’s library contains three editions of the *Liezi*: st ic, vol. 9; c., no. 241–2/197. These last two editions, dated respectively 1660 and 1748 (henceforth referred to as a and b), are covered with reading marks, including punctuation, isolation of sentences, underlining (with a continuous stroke, simple or double, or with *bōten*), transcriptions, and translations from the Chinese, comments in Japanese with black and red ink, in particular around the references given above; chapters are distinguished with paper marks in a, and there are written papers with annotations in b. While these books are old, these marks may be Nishida’s because there is nothing to indicate an inheritance from his ancestors. Both books contain circles in red to indicate important terms and chapters (for instance a, chapters 2, 3, 6–8), as well as other signs that Nishida used frequently, as I have demonstrated (Dal issier 2005 and 2009).

20. Chen g 1997, 130. Tang Junyi explains: “Let our spirit empty itself. Then it becomes purely receptive and is ready to fully accept things, and all things become transparent to us. Thus illumination and forgetting of the self happens.” (1967, 272)

21. Shao Yong, vi.26b; cited in Chen g 1997, 439–40.

22. “It is by getting accustomed to the letting-go [abandonment] of one’s own self (脫去己) that light will come by itself” (*Zhangzaiji*, 285).

Sincerity

This dimension of enlightenment brings us closer to the ethical account of the *Inquiry into the Good*, where Nishida stresses the importance of being “serious” and “earnest” (真摯):

Goodness is actualization of personality. Viewed internally, this is the satisfaction of a solemn [*sincere*] demand—that is, the unification of consciousness—and its ultimate form is achieved in the mutual forgetting of self and other and the merging of subject and object.²³

This *integrity* with oneself and others is also described as the uppermost “sincerity,” “honesty,” and “loyalty” (至誠).²⁴ Sincerity does not refer to a psychological dimension of the “individual,” but to a “mutual forgetting of self and other, and to a merging of subject and object” whereby “pure experience” is realized through an ethical position.

Apart from the Christian meaning pointed out by Nishida, we may unearth other important roots to this way of thinking. For Confucius, what is needed to accomplish the rites is precisely a “sincerity” of intention.²⁵ What is more, the *ethical dimension* of sincerity present in Nishida’s account (“Goodness... is the satisfaction of a sincere demand”)

23 Nishida 1911, 163–4, 166–7; emphasis added. See also 37, 134, 144, 152, and Takeuchi 1996, 211.

24. “Christ said that only those who are like an innocent child can enter heaven. Sincerity is good not because of the results arising from it, but because it is good in itself.... To deceive another is to deceive oneself and to negate one’s own personality.... The internal necessity of personality—that is sincerity—is a demand based on the union of knowledge, feeling, and volition. It does not indicate simply following blind impulse in opposition to judgment made by the intellect and the demand of human feeling. It is only when we exhaust the intellect and feeling that the true demand of personality—sincerity—arises in us.... When the motive is good but the actual conduct is not necessarily good, people often say that individual sincerity and the supreme good of all humankind sometimes conflict. I believe, however, that those who say this lack a correct understanding of sincerity—what such people say is not true if we use “sincerity” in the sense of the truly deepest demands of the spirit as a whole. Our true demands are not artificially created by us; they are facts of nature.” (Nishida 1911, 133–4, 144)

25 *Analects* iii. 4. “In festive ceremonies, it is better to be sparing (儉) than extravagant. In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there be deep [sincere] sorrow (戚) than a minute attention to observances.”

might indicate the fact of choosing the good and thus “realize the celestial part in each human being,” as we find it expressed in the *Mean*.²⁶

In later Confucianism, we may refer directly to the core notion of “authenticity” (誠). The *experimental dimension* in Nishida’s account (“actualization of personality”) may be borrowed from the idea in Mencius that “authenticity” belongs to the “one who realizes fully his humanity, having realized his existence as engaged in a close interdependence and interaction with all the others” (Chen g 1997, 183). Such a “return to a fundamental nature” (復性) was described by Li Ao (李翱 772–836) and offered as a Confucian equivalent to Buddhist and Daoist enlightenment (Chen g 1997, 417). This may, in turn, be related directly to the tradition of the *Changes* and the idea of “what is without extreme,” “without top,” or “boundless” (無極) by Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤 1017–1073) (Chen g 1997, 443–4).

But here again the thinker closest to Nishida is Zhang Zai: “The union of human nature with the celestial *Dao* lies in authenticity. The *Dao* through which the sky endures infinitely is called authenticity” (*Zhang-zaiji*, 20–1; Chen g 1997, 457). This unifying authenticity is not likened to the unity of being as in Heideggerian *Eingentlichkeit*; it is described as “full,” that is, full of “void” (*xu* 虛). The void represents the vanishing place that enables an authentic union, a core intuition of the *Zhuangzi* (4; see Billet 2004, 96–99). Thus *Inquiry into the Good* is a search for the void, as for Zhang Zai “the highest point of the good is the void.”²⁷ These provide a sound basis for developing from Nishida’s arguments what I call a “neontology” of unification: *emptiness unifies*.²⁸

26. Chen g 1997, 182. A treatise repeatedly quoted by Nishida (1933), and perhaps annotated by him. Notice that a kind of *epistemic dimension* of “sincerity” (誠) of thoughts is present at the core articulation in the above quotation of the opening of *The Great Learning* (note 8 above).

27. 至善者虛. *Zhangziyulu* 324–6; Chen g 1997, 457.

28. Dal issier 2009, 319–566. We might interpret Nakagawa’s comments on Doi Takeo’s *Reverse and Surface* in this way (2005, 49–50). In Japanese culture, “reverse” (裏, 本音) is a kind of emptiness unifying things that opposes “facially” (面, 建前). Nakagawa gives the examples of administrative negotiations and the “double structure of Japanese consciousness.” We might also refer to the “retired emperor” or the respected old man who retains a strong influence (元老) in the Japanese political tradition. See Hérail 1986, 58, 77, 411, 421. In this sense, *ura* (裏) unifies where *omote*

Moreover, insofar as Nishidean “pure experience” represents realization of the “facts as such,” authenticity can be said to correspond to a sort of realization of the nature of the thing, as when we say: “This is it, no doubt”; or when we treat, for instance, the authenticity of a testimony and aver, “She is obviously telling the truth and cannot be lying.” One is authentic when one “participates in the creative process of the Sky ... everything is here, there is no reason to search elsewhere for a truth whatever it could be” (Chen g 1997, 184).

Nishida’s originality seems to lie in the meaning of the unification process. In authenticity, a unity is not only something realized or to be realized; it actually realizes itself. He was certainly influenced here by Wang Yangming, who is cited to this effect in the *Inquiry*.²⁹ Wang believed that our spirits can sympathize with other beings and the whole universe in virtue of a “corporeal unity” (一體) like that previously emphasized by Zhuangzi.³⁰ Recovering “Mencius’s ancient intuition: spirit is prior because it is unity” (Chen g 1997, 53), Nishida runs counter to Zhu Xi’s

(面) repulses. From a metaphysical point of view, it is just as if a groundless reality, hollowing out and emptying itself, was grounding all existing appearances. In Nishidean terms, the “place of absolute nothingness” unifies “things,” finding themselves “isolated” from within the “place of determinate being,” and unifies “forces,” “acts,” and “persons” finding themselves still opposing each other from within the “place of oppositional nothingness.” At this point, Nishida’s ideas might contrast with the ideal of “isolation” of the omniscient Daoist saint, for whom the void does not unify but makes language disappear and hinders familial and social relations, as stated in the *Liezi* iv.5, 8. This passage is underlined with comments in red ink in Nishida’s edition of the *Liezi*.

29. “As in Wang Yangming’s emphasis on identity of knowledge and action (知行同一), real knowledge [or knowledge of reality] must always be accompanied by the performance of the will” (Nishida 1911, 106, translation modified)

30. “The great man regards Heaven and Earth and the thousand beings as *a single body*. (The reference is to Hui Shi and Zhuangzi, as indicated above.) He regards the world as *one single family* and the country as *one single person*. As to those who make a *cleavage* between objects and *distinguish* between the self and others, they are small men.... Therefore when he sees a child about to fall in a well, he cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration. This shows that his [sense of] humanity (*ren*) *forms one body* with the child.... This means that even the mind [heart] of the small man necessarily has the humanity that forms one body with all [cannot escape all these feelings].” Wang Yangming, *Inquiry on the Great Learning* as cited in Chan 1963, 659–66.

(朱熹 1130–1200)³¹ “distinction” between “principle” (*ri*) and “energy” (*qi*), arguing for the “unity of knowledge and action.” Thus, to be “authentic in one’s intention” (誠意) means to obey this very nature of spirit: to unify (Chen g 1997, 534). Here we find a “resolution to be authentic” (立誠), defining spirit as a “will” to unify with oneself, the others, and the world, in contrast to a differentiating thinking, considered to be a deceiving operation.³²

Needless to say, these ideas are central in the *Inquiry*, the Hegelian dialectical structure of which begins from “pure experience,” only to break apart in its fallacious “aspect” of “thinking,” then to recover its true nature in the effective aspect of “will,” before finally returning to pure experience from within “intellectual intuition” (知的直觀). Nishida will always claim such a priority of the “will” over “thinking.” To know is to act, to act is to know, and this conception will certainly have a deep influence on his late theory of “intuition in action” (行為的直觀).

However, the Japanese philosopher seems to give a more general face to this intuition of unity than we find in Wang Yangming. For the latter, “The world looks like one single family, and the country one single person” (*Da xue wen*, 26, 968; Chan 1963, 659), an already existing unity, an identity we need to recover. But the former’s conception of unification³³ cannot be reduced either to Zhu Xi’s dual unity of “one in two, two in one” (一而二二而一), or to Wang’s “unity of knowledge and action” (知行合一) which realizes a “perfect and total fusion in a single, sole reality” (Cheng 1997, 540). In Nishidean words, unification is neither simply a “final unity” nor a “reciprocal” or “contradictory”

31 Nishida’s library contains several works of Zhu Xi in rather old editions, c., no. 215, 217, 256, 295/196, 198, 200, especially c., no. 216/196 (including reading marks and clues such as papers).

32 This is an idea also found in the *Laozi* 18 “From the emergence of intellect and discrimination the great deception was born.” Izut su translates: “Only when cleverness and sagacity make their appearance do wiles and intrigues arise” (2001, 58).

33 “Curiously, such a dichotomy of contemplative and passive [Aristotle] can be found in China in Zhu Xi’s philosophy (end of the eleventh century to the beginning of the twelfth century). But Wang Yangming (end of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the sixteenth century) had unified these two notions in a key concept of his philosophical doctrine according to which knowledge and praxis are simply one, just as Hegel had tried to reunify contemplation and action in his dialectics. Nishida,

unity (cf. Dal issier 2009 and 2005, 132). What is more, the Nishidean unity is “corporeal” to the extent that it is essentially *creative*, and is not merely given as “one single body,” “family,” or “person,” as seems to be the case in Wang. At the same time, it is true that Wang is only quoted in the third part of the book, referring to a “moral” level that comes “before” religion, and corresponds, for Nishida, to the essential middle that represents “Chinese culture.”³⁴ (I will develop this point further in the second part of this study.)

Summing up, we can recognize an important influence of Chinese thought on Nishida’s early philosophy, particularly as shown in *Inquiry into the Good*. The question we still need to ask is whether this influence carries on or recedes from his later thought. Is this not a question of a delay in the maturation of his own thought? Can we not say that references to Chinese thought will disappear as quickly as those to Buddhist thought do? Does Nishida’s first philosophical systematization as a “logic of place” have anything more to do with this prior continental heritage?

Chinese philosophy in the “logic of place”?

Before entering into these ontological and post-ontological considerations, we need to take into consideration the following warning:

Ancient Chinese thought is not interested in the absolute of being. It searches not for what grounds being—a metaphysical problem—but for what can explain how the extraordinary diversified multiplicity of the “thousand beings” operate in a sole movement, the movement of the universe—a cosmological problem. (Vander meers ch 1988, 28–9; cf. Kamenarovic 2005, 202–4)

To avoid what the Korean philosopher Lee Seung-hwan calls “out-of-context comparative philosophy” (Lee 2004, 18), we should not speak

who had practiced Hegelian philosophy as well as Wang Yangming’s teachings, created his system under the double influence of these philosophical traditions, the Chinese and the Western” (Nakagawa 2005, 61).

34. “Chinese culture has been a moral culture, seeing in the social organization of the Chinese people the development of an eternal human nature” (nkz 12: 357–8).

of “metaphysics” and “absolute ontology,” at least not where ancient and modern Chinese philosophy are concerned. We may, however, refer to a multiplicity of “beings” (有) and “things” (物) as simply “ontological,” and to the *Dao* as the “source of being.”³⁵

As we shall see later, from early on, thinkers in China were divided on this question, some of them—whatever their differences—granting a kind of “priority” to non-being over being.³⁶ Of course, the use of these terms borrowed from Western philosophy remains problematic (Zhen g 2005, 13–5). At the same time, recalling Nishida’s warning, should we deprive Chinese thought of the meanings it conveys?³⁷ He remarks in this regard:

By metaphysical standpoint, I mean how each culture considered the question of reality. It may be said, of course, that in China, and especially in Japan, the question of reality was not considered scientifically; metaphysics may even be said not to have been especially developed. But the fact that there was no [distinctive science of] metaphysics does not necessarily mean that there was no metaphysical thought. Inasmuch a specific culture has developed itself, it can be conceived in metaphysical terms. Where a culture is, there must be a vision of life (人生觀). At the roots of a vision of life must be included some kind of metaphysical thought, even though it is not consciously realized. (Nishida 1933, 237)

35 Chen g 1997, 289. As we will see below, Izut su (2001) translates 有 literally as “Being” and 物 as “Non-Being.”

36 Nishida will particularly emphasize this aspect for Laozi and Zhuangzi (1933, 242, 250). On Confucius and Zhuangzi, see Bil l et er 2004, 144. See also *Liezi* ii.14, ii.1; iv. 13–14. Wang Bi and others such as Mozi, Guo Xiang, Pei Wei, and Ruan Ji seem to come closer to an “ontological” vision.

37 If the “theoretical results of modern Chinese philosophers appear mostly in the domains of cultural philosophy and metaphysics... and ontology” (Zhen g 2005, 13), is it only the result of a historical contingency, or is it a reaction against Kant and Hegel? For Zheng himself it is because it “gives an ontological or realistic turn to concepts of traditional thought (135).” But in response, we might ask: Is it not also because modern *and* ancient Chinese philosophers deal in a certain way with at least the fundamental questions or problems of metaphysics and ontology? In other words, is not the “language” of ontology and metaphysics much more in question than its “objects” (13–5)?

Place and Logic

It is well known that Nishida's metaphysics of "place" (場所 *basho*) issued from a critique of notions such as χώρα (Plato), τόπος (Aristotle), and *Gebietskategorie* (Emil Lask). From the very start, however, the general methodological moorings of his "logic of place"—which may be interpreted to mean "understanding comes with localization" (Dalissier 2009, Appendix xv, 347ff)—recalls a Daoist idea present in the great synthesis of ancient thought orchestrated under the Han, the *Huainanzi* (Chen g 1997, 298). This is the "induction through categories" (推類) and analogy from within a network: "to explain and infer is to locate within the pattern" (Graham 1989, 320) of the "production-transformation (造化) of beings," as given in the model: "*Dao* → *qi* → clear/unclear → Sky/Earth → Yang/Yin → hot/cold → fire/water → sun/moon, and so on." Cheng consequently adds:

In such a network of correlations, no distance and critiques are possible: everything is foreseen, already given. It is the networking of the network itself that takes the place of an explanation, its adherence to real being is at no time tested. (1997, 299)

We may also recall that in *Inquiry* Nishida is quick to criticize empirical and logical "inference" (推論, 推理), and to define reality itself as a kind of self-unifying "inference" (推す) through analogy (Dalissier 2009, 105). On the other hand, if his philosophical topology may also be said to deal with the above-mentioned problem of "adherence" to the real, his topology does not in turn completely follow the kind of limited "ontological" explanation given in the 1911 book. In fact, what he called "the place of absolute nothingness" shows not only a structural and ordering "depth" entailing the "dissemination" (散乱) of beings into determinate places that might correspond to the scheme of induction, but also and above all, an endless opening to an increasing depth in the "retreat," allowing the very localization of the Western tradition and thus a more profound understanding of its philosophers and their concepts (see nkz 3:283 and Dalissier 2009, 503–73).

So much for some clues dealing with methodological and epistemic stakes. More directly to the point, the logic of place itself focuses on an

operation of “embodiment” (包む) as opposed to the logics of Aristotle and Spinoza.³⁸ In this regard, it is difficult not to acknowledge parallels with the Chinese logician of the Warring Kingdoms dynasty (third and fourth centuries bce), Gongsun Long (公孫龍 3rd century bce):

Contrary to Aristotelian logic, which conceives the definition of a particular thing from what this thing is not or from what it excludes, Chinese logic proposes a mode of identification by inclusion: a thing is a whole that include parts, parts being not identical to the whole. This conception can be found in Gongsun Long as well as in the Mozi canon.³⁹

For his part, Nishida distinguishes simple “inclusion” (含む) from the “embodiment” alluded to earlier, in order to think of “place” not merely as a “combination” of “parts” but also as a “unification” of “parts as images.” According to Cheng:

Gongsun Long starts from the presupposition that the Whole is not one of its parts; its logical formulation is given in the Mozi canon: “‘ox and horse’ is not ‘ox.’” (1997, 153)

In contrast, Nishida argues:

The whole is not the union of the parts, but instead the part can be conceived as a determination of the whole. (Nishida 1917, 163–4)

As his “first” paradigm in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Realization*, Nishida took Royce’s paradox of a person trying to draw a perfect map of England that will have to include himself drawn within the picture, inspired by Dedekind’s definition of infinity, according to which the whole becomes one of his parts (Nishida, 1917, 83–4). Yet nine years later he would write:

[The universal does not contain the particular as] space contains

38 Dal is sier 2009, 481ff. The translation “encompassing” (J. Tremblay) is more neutral. “Embodiment” insists on a “bodily” dimension that will be developed by Nishida in notions such as “position” or, later, “historical body.”

39. Chen g 1997, 152. We can find three versions of the *Mozi* in Nishida’s library, c, no. 78, 246–247/188, 249. We might surmise from the content of his quotation from the Mozi that he had read it rather intensively (see Nishida 1933, 244).

things or things are in space. [The universal and the particular] do not differ from each other as space and things do. Particulars are parts of the universal and moreover constitute its images. (nkz 4: 227)

This gives us his “second” paradigm, the topological notion of a “self-enlightening mirror.”⁴⁰ I have shown this to be the reason why his philosophy of unification differs in the *Inquiry* from Leibniz’s mereology of union, as well as how it differs in 1917 from Heinrich Rickert’s theory of transcendental “totality” (*Allheit*) based on the Kantian category of quantity, and comes closer to Hermann Cohen’s idea of an “intensive unity.”⁴¹

This shift from the logic of inclusion (Gong) to a reflective and mirroring embodiment theory (Nishida) already illustrates a recurring theme of the present study: a first proximity between Nishidean philosophy and Chinese thought may be significant, as it is likely to eventually reveal a rather fundamental distance that will have to be questioned as phenomenologically and philosophically significant.⁴²

Let us take another example. Despite this first shift, at another time Nishida’s reflexive and secular embodiment theory seems closer to an expression of the Chinese logic of unification in terms of parts, images, and the whole that we find in a thinker of the Northern Song dynasty (eleventh century), Cheng Yi (程頤 1033–1107). Anne Cheng argues:

Between particular principles of individual things and the Principle, there is a relation not of reality to ideal, but of part to whole: *all parts being the image of the whole...* to make one with the world, to participate in its great unity is to act morally. (1997, 479, 485–6)

But this relation of parts and the whole and mirroring is eventually explained according to a paradigm of reciprocity and “opposition” (睽). To quote Cheng Yi’s words:

Community implies unity, individuality, and multiplicity. Ultimately everything returns to the one; the essential meaning cannot be two-

40. For example, Nishida writes: “To progress forward is to retreat one foot behind; to move is to intuit” (nkz 3:283). See Dalissier 2009, 33, 203–73.

41. See Dalissier 2006a, 100–22, especially 110. See also Maraldo 2006.

42. For this latter question, the reader is referred to the second part of this study.

fold. If the spirits of men are as different as their faces, this is only because of their individuality.... Expand what is common in the principles of things to illustrate the proper use of *opposition*; this is the *Dao* in which the saint *reunites oppositions*.... [and] brings back the whole universe to the same thing in the thousand categories. [Oppositions between] Sky and Earth, masculine and feminine, and the thousand beings illustrate this point. (*Er Cheng ji* 144, 889)

But this paradigm, while included as an element in Nishida's logic, is in no way identical to it. Therefore, once again, we are obliged to oppose two models of mirroring logic, that of Cheng Yi and that of Nishida: a vertical and reciprocal "finite" unification of parts and whole, in a place of "oppositions," and a topological and transitive infinite unification of universal and particulars in a place of absolute nothingness.

Attraction, Waiting, and Retreat

We cannot neglect to note here that the salient dimension of the logic of place, the noetic self-determination of absolute nothingness, hollowing itself out indefinitely (Dal is sier 2009, 526ff), offers some further suggestive parallels.

First, *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Realization* approaches nothingness as a kind of "snapping out" (躍入), tracking a Bergsonian-type ontological *élan* of life (Nishida 1917, 83–4), a notion explicitly borrowed from the philosophical psychology of Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) (Dal is sier 2006a, 118; 2007b; 2009, 215). Such "attraction" can direct us back to a number of notions in Daoism, though not only there. Already in Confucius, we find this image: the one "who rules [exercises government] by means of his own moral power (德) may be compared to the polestar, immutable on its axis, yet the *center of attraction* for all planets."⁴³

43. *Analects* ii. 1; see also xv. 4; emphasis added. During the Han period, in Huang-Lao's (黃老) thinking, we find the idea that, the sovereign has nothing else to do than "do nothing and stay quiet." His role does not extend farther than to guarantee the fact that "forms" and "names" should be in perfect accord, and to oversee the good march of this ideal political order. It is as though he is in the guise of a Daoist wise man, who, as the

The very notion of the “middle” already refers generally to the idea of an “attraction” towards the good,⁴⁴ reminding us of the title of Nishida’s *Inquiry*. In the *Laozi*, the ideal of “non-acting” (無為) refers specifically to the overcoming of violent action through no-action, to a retreat from the stage of action in order to neutralize the aggressive substance of action. “No-action” emerges as the “feminine” aspect responding to the “masculine” aspect of Confucian ordering. The agent lets the other act, just as avoiding violence is not to oppose or to seek revenge against the aggressor but to lower oneself in order to defuse violence, as “water” escapes any form, as “the way of suppleness” (柔道) that became Judo in Japan, is the art of using the strength of the opponent. “In sum, no acting takes the advantage over acting, through *attraction* more than constraint, through the way of being rather than of having or doing” (Chen g 1997, 191–3, 196; emphasis added).

Second, such a dynamics recalls the words of the great treatise of political philosophy by the legal scholar, Han Fei 韓非: “The Sage holds the source, and the four quarters come to serve him. In emptiness he *awaits* (*dai* 待) them, and they spontaneously do what is needed.”⁴⁵ As Nishida himself remarks, here is a form of “practical nothingness” (Nishida 1933, 250) in this very fact of waiting for action (Cheng 1997, 246–7). In the *Yijing* or *Book of Changes*, of such a plasticity it is said that “waiting is not to be understood as resignation, but as the strong expectation of a resolution not to hurry too hastily towards an anticipated result.”⁴⁶ As the Korean philosopher Pak Tong-kwan has shown, in Chinese cul-

Dao, is the “empty” and, at the same time, the generating center of the infinite mutations of the universe. (Chen g 1997, 296)

The Japanese term 天皇 refers to a Chinese expression naming a celestial divinity compared to the pole-star, as the emperor could be compared to “the one who, without moving, defines a fixed direction and allows the universe to give itself its order” (Hérail 1986, 67, 77).

44. “The middle is not an equidistant point between two terms, but rather this pole *whose attraction draws us higher*, creating and maintaining in all life situations a tension that makes us aspire always more to the best part of what is born between us” (Chen g 1997, 42; emphasis added).

45. 虛而待之,彼自以之. *Han Feizi* 8, reference in zzjc, 30; see Watson 1964, 35. There are three editions of the work in Nishida’s library, c, no. 78, 250–251/B8, 198.

46. Chen g 1997, 277. We can find six different editions of the *Yijing* (『易經』) in

ture the natural lies in the fact of “waiting,” while science tries to force and manipulate nature, for instance in prediction and synthesis of new events.⁴⁷

Third, as we have seen, Nishida’s topology defines absolute nothingness as the endlessly operating “withdrawal,” allowing the place for something to be or not to be. In this sense, we might articulate the concepts of attraction, waiting, and retreat, that are mentioned above, in this way: to *attract* is to *wait* for what is attracted in a kind of *retreat*. This receding is perceptible in the *Zhuangzi*: “*the saint puts his person in retreat*. [While] his person takes the first rank, he puts it outside; this is how it is preserved.”⁴⁸

Being and One

Apart from the noetic self-withdrawal of the “retreat,” if we probe symmetrically into the other “depth” that Nishida calls “dissemination,” and if we follow the opening, blossoming path of the “noematic determination of absolute nothingness,” we cannot but find compelling new comparisons. “Absolute nothingness” (絶対無) represents the vanishing

Nishida’s library, st ic , volumes 3 and 4 and more ancient editions, c, no. 210, 212, 214 and 220/195–196. The most important is an impressively annotated version, no. 422/208, full of comments and drawings of the Hexagrams, that requires a special graphological and analytical exegesis. Nishida refers to the *Yijing* in a diary entry for July 1943, c, no. 751/23; see also 1061/30.

47. “Through thousands of years of farming experience, the Chinese could confirm the cyclic principle of Nature which would have satisfied them. Farming is not done by man’s artificial manipulation of nature but by *waiting* till the crops grow for themselves. Nature undergoes its cyclic changes for itself without borrowing any force other than nature itself” (Pak 2004, 35–6; emphasis added).

48. “The Sky remains, the Earth persists. What makes them persist and remain? It is the fact that they do not live for themselves. Here we encounter what makes them live for eternity. *In the same way the saint puts his person in retreat*. [While] his person takes the first rank, he puts it outside. This is how it is preserved. Is he not left without his own I? In this his I accomplishes itself” (*Zhuangzi*, quoted in Cheng 1997, 208, emphasis added). This “retreat” of the saint in Hu Qiu, *Liezi*, and Confucius is conceived of as a “return” to oneself in order to recover the renewing taking place within oneself (Billet 2004, 117–22). Rather than a return to a source (*Laozi*), the retreat conforms to the sliding movement of reality without any source (*Zhuangzi*; Billet 2004, 124–5, 136).

and polishing place in which *being* and *unity* are shaped, and topology, the place required for ontology and henology. In a similar vein, Nishida remarks that *Laozi* defines the *Dao* as this never overflowing void that produces planes, cleanses being, and dissipates differentiation to produce unity (Nishida 1933, 242, 250).

Dao is void. Should we fill it, it never overflow .

From this ungrounded [place] the thousand beings take their origin.

It blunts all cutting edges. It disentangles all knots. It harmonizes all lights. It brings to unity all [particles of] dust. (*Laozi* 4)⁴⁹

Let us begin with the idea of the “creation” of being. On the one hand, the *Dao*, as “beginning” or “germ,” is “without name.” It is constantly “determining itself” in its “simplicity” and vacuity. In Chinese cosmological thinking, this refers to the everlasting self-creation of the universe in a constant organic evolution through “primordial energy” (元氣) as “expiration,” “dissolution,” and “dispersion” in death, an “extinction” identified as the “return” to “non-existence.”⁵⁰ This might be likened in some sense to the “noetic determination of nothingness,” as highlighted in the last section.

On the other hand, as “mother of the ten thousand beings” or “term,” the *Dao* receives a name (*Laozi* 1 and 37). Cosmologically, it corresponds to a “condensation” of the “primordial energy” in the inspiration of life and birth (Cheng 1997, 206, 252, 298, 378–9). In topological terms, such an “ontologization,” magnified in the Nishidean analysis of the “condensation” (Dalissier 2009, 526–36), leads us to the “place of determinate being,” and calls to mind the “noematic determination of absolute nothingness.”

49. Izutsu translates: “The Way is an empty vessel, yet use will never fill it up. Unfathomably deep, it is like the ancestor of the ten thousand beings. It blunts the sharpness of all things. It untangles their entanglements. It softens their glare. And itself remains concealed in the dust of things” (2001, 34).

50. Nishida will particularly stress this “return to non-being” (復歸無物) in *Laozi* and “return to nature” (自然に復歸する) or “return to the mysterious sources of heaven and earth by negation of all things” (すべてを否定して幽玄なる天地の根源に復歸する) in Daoism (Nishida 1911, 242).

Moreover, Nishida claims that if modern European science “negates the actual world in the direction of *noema* [object of knowledge], conversely, “the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi deny the actual world in the direction of *noesis* [act of knowledge] (Nishida 1933, 244). As a matter of fact, the noetic aspect seems prior to the noematic in Chinese thought. According to the *Huainanzi*,⁵¹ ethereal “concentration” or “convergence” (合) of the Sky precedes heavy “coagulation” or “congealment” (凝滯) of the earth, so that “what there is, is born from what there is not.”⁵² This priority was rediscovered by the Buddhist monk Huiyuan (慧遠 334–416) in the idea of an “immutable spirit,” maintaining and transforming itself through mutation: “life is a hindrance for man, while death is the return to the origin.”⁵³

Now if we keep in mind that the “*Dao* is constant, without name and at the same time *includes* all expressible reality” (Chen g 1997, 204), we might say that the first aspect unfolds the second and gets closer to Nishida’s topological account of a “wrapping” (つつむ). In this regard, we may ask if this Daoist “inclusion” (含む) is to be conceived as enclosed and completed within the frame of a “final” circle, if it is identical to the infinite “superposition” (重なり合う) according to the depth of the place (Dal issier 2009, 49 ff) in which it is located. (I will provide a general answer to these questions in the second part of this study.)

What can be said about a creation of unity that seems prior to the creation of being?

The *Dao* produces the one.

One produces the two.

Two produces the three.

Three produces the thousand beings.⁵⁴

51 *Huainanzi*, 3; zjzc, 35–6; English in Major 1993. See sk 14: 1A. See also the notion of “coagulation” in Zhu Xi (Chen g 1997, 502).

52 *Laozi*, 40. Izut su translates: “Being is born out of Non-Being” (2001, 104).

53 Huiyuan: “Corporal form exhausts itself but spirit is indestructible” (*Xing jin shen bu mie*), quoted in Chen g 1997, 378–9. On the notion of “return,” see also *Liezi*, i.6, iv.9. In Nishida’s a and b editions, the relevant term (鬼歸) is marked with a red circle, and written in the margin in a.

54 道生一 一生二 二生三 三生萬物. *Laozi*, 42 and Chen g 1997, 205. Izut su: “The Way begets one. One begets two. Two begets three. And three begets the ten thou-

Unity appears before diversity and being. To quote Anne Cheng, interpreting Shao Yong's⁵⁵ words in this account, "One is not a [simple] number," and in this sense, "henology," as it were, precedes "ontology." But diversity is at the same time a return to the one:

The one is not monolithic and fixed in its unity and uniformity; it diversifies in the duality of breaths of Yin/Yang or Sky-Earth. But duality is not an end in itself: it would be locked in an unproductive face-to-face encounter if it were not animated by a tertiary relation introducing the possibility of mutation and transformation. Thus, the dynamics of the duality of breaths, Yin/Yang, issues from the void.... This aspiration of a return to a lost unity can be found in other cultures, but what is specific to Chinese thought is the continuity provided by the constant coming-and-going between there-is-not and there-is, between the invisible and the visible.⁵⁶

As Nishida explains, absolute nothingness is the birthplace of a "formless unity" (Nishida 1933, 249–50), it stands before unity crystallizes in ontological form. Unity, as born from the void, has to be conceived of as an eternal unification operation. Whereas in Chinese thought this will take the non-dual form of an effective alternative process, for Nishida it will rather take place as a transitive striving for unity.

Phenomenological contrast:
Wang bi, go xiang, and nishida

Introduction: Moving or/and Not Moving in Zhou Dunyi

The unifying actuality of nothingness offers further parallels and points of discord between Chinese and Japanese philosophy. In Nishida, we find a dialectical conception of moving and immobility that seems to be at least partly grounded in Brahmanism⁵⁷ and Chinese concep-

sand things" (2001, 108).

⁵⁵ *Huangji jingshi shu*, 8b, 23a, cited and commented on in Cheng 1997, 435

⁵⁶ Cheng 1997, 206. Interestingly, the term "monolithic" in Nishida's topology refers precisely to the place of determinate being (see Dalisier 2009, 431–5).

⁵⁷ Basing himself on Monier-Williams (1919), Nishida argues, that "He [the

tions like those found in *Zhuangzi* xiii: “Void, it is stillness; quiet, it moves; moving, it accomplishes itself.” This proximity emerges more clearly in the thought of Zhou Dunyi: “Moving while not still, still while not moving—so it is with things. Moving while not moving, quiet while not quiet—so it is with spiritual power (神)” (*Tongshu*, 16; *Zhou Dunyi ji*, 26).⁵⁸ Hence “authenticity” is for the saint the capability to recover stillness in one’s very ritual and ordering activity. At the same time Zhou stresses a concern with unification that is essential for Chinese thought before and after the introduction of Buddhism:⁵⁹

To concentrate on the One is the golden rule. To concentrate on the One is to be without desire. To be without desire is *to be empty in quietude, and to go straight in movement*.⁶⁰

This last phrase reminds us of Nishida, who highlights the dynamic unity of the operation consisting in eternally (immobility) unifying itself (movement):

Unity of consciousness in its entirety transcends change and must be the constant overfl wing immobility from whence change arises, that is, *something which moves while not moving*. (Nishida 1911, 186)

The place for this contradictory unity is nothingness:

The flow of consciousness, considered in one direction, is considered as progressing through each moment in time and as not being able to return even for a moment to the past; but, at the same time, what

God of the Brahmanic religion] moves and does not move,” and that “the unique reality of the religion of India” is said to be “both rest and motion” (動にして静、静にして動; Nishida 1933, 240, 251). This work cannot be found in Nishida’s personal library, but has the reference c., no. 207/234.

58 We can find the other great book of Zhou Dunyi, 『太極圖說』 [Explanations of the diagram of the Great Ultimate] in Nishida’s library, in a 1673 edition, c, 257/98.

59. “Like Shao Yong, Zhou Dunyi questions himself regarding the relations of the one and the many, a theme already approached by Wang Bi in the third century, then elaborated in Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism before being revived in the Chan: ‘the multiple returns to the One and the One differentiates itself in the multiple’” (Chen g 1997, 447).

60. 一爲要。一者無欲也、無欲則靜虛、動直。 *Da tongshu*, 20; *Zhou Dunyi ji*, 29–30; emphasis added. See Chen g 1997, 445.

is eternally unchanging must be its foundation. Because this eternally unchanging thing is nothingness, consciousness is considered incapable of going backwards. (nkz 4:237–8; cf. Dalissier 2009, 399)

Nishida's "Chinese master"?

Such an account of the unity of stillness and movement represents the first conceptual crossroad at which Nishida's arguments encounter those of Wang Bi (王弼 226–249), to whom he seems so close that we may even call him Nishida's "Chinese master."⁶¹ In this sense, Wang Bi, like Nishida, rejects the view that "moving" by itself can provide the ultimate ruling element of reality (see Dalissier 2007b), and both search for a *unity* of the moving:

The many cannot govern the many; that which governs the many is the most solitary [the One]. Activity [the moving] cannot govern actuality; that which controls all activity that occurs in the world, thanks to constancy, is the One. Therefore, for all the many who manage to exist, their controlling principle must reach back to the One [Cheng: what enables the multiple to maintain itself in its cohesion is the fact that it has a master realizing its unity], and for all activities to manage to function, their source cannot but be the One. No thing ever behaves haphazardly, but necessarily follows its own principle. To unite things, there is a fundamental regulator; to integrate them, there is a primordial generator. Therefore, things are complex but not chaotic, multitudinous but not confused.⁶²

As is the case with Nishida, "the central intuition of Wang Bi's thought dwells in the unity that underlies all that exists" (Chen g 1997, 329), not simply the search for a "final unity" but a concern with unity. Similarly, he "rejects straightaway the idea of an irreducible multiplicity that would exclude all connection between things (Chen g 1997, 329). Multiplicity

61. This can be said even if historically the link remains uncertain. We can only find the second volume (§38–81) of Wang Bi's *Commentary on the Laozi* in Nishida's library, in a 1771 edition, c. no. 238/197, but the first one is missing.

62. *Zhou yi lüeli*, chapter on "Clarifying the Judgments," 391. See Lynn 1994, 25.

needs a *leading* unity (統一) to be itself, as a multiplicity of unities.⁶³ As multiplicity has a master realizing its unity, all beings have a master realizing them: the “undifferentiating” (*wu*). In Nishidean terms, absolute nothingness realizes the place where unity is made.

What is more, “being” springs from non-differentiation and means “possession.”

As the negation of *you* 有 that means “to have,” “having,” or “there-is,” *wu* indicates “there-is-not,” not in the sense of nothingness or nothing, but because it “has not” the determinations and finitude of the “there-is”.... As non-differentiation is not negatively conceived in terms of nothingness or the absence of all existence, silence is not conceived in terms of muteness or absence of speech, but instead as something beyond speech.⁶⁴

In Nishidean terminology, “determinate” and “finite” being (限定せられ

63. “The centralization of the Han world actually takes place under the reign of the emperor Wu (140–87 bce). The “Supreme One” (太一) then becomes the object of an imperial cult whose clearly political impact appears in the “great unification” (大一統) so exalted during the first part of the dynasty. The glyph 統 refers etymologically to the extremity of a silk cocoon thread, whence comes the idea of continuous succession and unifying power.” Chen g 1997, 302–3.

64. Chen g 1997, 329, 333. The *finitude* and mortality of being (in Nishida’s terms, the “place of determinate being”) is stressed in the *Liezi*, 1.4: “Those whose nature is fixed have no escape” (宜定者不出所位, marked and commented on in Nishida’s b edition) as well as in i.6 and iv.9: “To be useful and die is also called the Way,” a passage which is crucial for a Nishida-inspired reading (if we consider in particular the expression 無用而生謂之道: “Produce” [or “being” (存), as someone has written here in the text of the b edition to indicate the meaning of the character 生] from nothingness is the Way”). We find here a piece of paper, explaining in Japanese the various expressions involved in this analysis of finitude (由生而生, 由生而亡, 由死而死, and 由死而生). Moreover, Claude Romano, “Un étrange oubli” in *ypc*, 165–6, shows how we can see in the *Zhuangzi* the idea that only a real “forgetting” leads to a real depth of action. If, for Aristotle, virtue comes with possession of something in the actualization of a disposition, in *Zhuangzi*, “virtues in general are precisely what we do possess only when we are not possessing them and what we do not possess if we possess [them as something]: they are never acquired.” The forgetting of possession leads to virtue. Oblivion becomes the source of actualization, in Nishidean terms, nothingness the operation of reality. See also *Liezi* iii.8 (in the b edition, this passage is marked with red ink, and the verb 忘 is consistently marked with a red circle).

た有, 有限) are born from “absolute nothingness,” and “being” (有) means “possession (有つ).” Nothingness is not “negation” of being but what *stands* beyond being, a kind of dis-possession.⁶⁵ Thus even in terms of a “logic of place,” Wang’s and Nishida’s positions partially coincide: “there-is” can be implicitly expressed as “there-is-here.” Wang Bi argues:

We would like to say that it is not here (*wu*), however it accomplishes all things. We would like to say that it is here (*you*); however we do not see its form.⁶⁶

Anne Cheng adds:

Beings in their infinite multiplicity cannot be here by themselves, they necessarily proceed from a unique fund. Thus, the undifferentiating cannot be an entity opposing the manifest; it is the “reason why” (所以) the there-is [takes place] here.⁶⁷

For Nishida’s terms, “being” is not a “thing” opposing and negating non-being, an “oppositional nothingness.” It is because of the retreat of absolute nothingness in and through itself. But this is not all; we might underline a “phenomenological”⁶⁸ proximity as well. As Cheng argues:

65. Dal issier 2009, 334ff. On the equivalence of “being” and “possession,” see Sakabe 2007, 56–8

66. *Commentary on the Laozi*, 14 (1:32). The topological dimension tends to disappear in this translation: “You might wish to say that it does not exist, but everything achieves existence because of it, and then you might wish to say that it does exist, but we do not see its form” (Lynn 1999, 73). But it appears in this one: “If we speak of its non-being, everything comes *from it*. If we speak of its being, its shape cannot be seen” (Lin 1977, 25; emphasis added).

67. Cheng 1997, 329. On the topological meaning of 所以 in Nishida as the “place” (所) providing the “reason why” (以), see Dal issier 2009, Appendix xv, 444, 449.

68. It might be criticized that such a term, borrowed from Western thinking, is no more applicable to Chinese thought than it is to Nishida’s philosophy. Hence it will be employed here in a very general meaning, the description of the contrast according to which phenomena are given to human consciousness. Incidentally, Nishida’s critique of Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenology could be rooted in some readings in Chinese philosophy, if we keep in mind, for example, the critique of the “intentional” (故), what comes before the act, as destroying the “necessary” (命) inner bodily experience that J. F. Billetier highlights in the *Zhuangzi* (2004, 41–2, 48–9, 78, 82, 108, and 113). The hierarchy introduced—“The human, the conscious and intentional

Wu indicates “there-is-not”... in the sense of *still being not manifested*; it lacks the contours of visible reality. (Chen g 1997, 329; emphasis added)

In Wang Bi’s view:

What is still not, cannot manifest itself through what there-is-not, but must do so through what is already here.⁶⁹

The thousand beings, in all their nobleness, find their efficienc (*yong*) in the undiffe entiating, without which they could not give themselves a constitution (*ti*). If they leave the undiffe entiating to reach manifes-tation (*ti*), they lose then what makes their greatness.⁷⁰

To some extent, we see a “phenomenology” of the “still not” in Wang Bi. First of all, to use our own words, because speaking of the “absolute” is losing it, letting it go: “language is both what tells something and what refers to another thing” (Chen g 1997, 332–3). Second, according to an ontological dimension, we may distinguish a five-step process:

1. “What is still not,” the invisible, unspeakable, and essential “root” (*ben* 本) is at the same time to the saint’s eyes the “constitutive foundation” (*ti* 體 / *benti* 本體) of the world as *li* 理 (Cheng 1997, 336–7, 362, 435). Accordingly, “the reason why” all beings come to manifest themselves, is the “function/operation” (*yong* 用 / *fayong* 發用) of the non-diffe entiating, the “paradoxical actuality of there-is-not” in its unity, exposed in the *Laozi*.⁷¹ This actuality of unity

activity is inferior; the Sky, the necessary and spontaneous activity, unconscious in some sense, is superior”—might be expressed topologically as a priority of the place of absolute nothingness unfolding the plane of oppositional nothingness in which Nishida localizes the realms of the whole phenomenological “adventure.”

69. Wang Bi, quoted by Han Kangbo, in the margins of the *Great Commentary on the Changes*; see Chen g 1997, 330.

70. *Commentary on the Laozi* 38 (1:94). “Although the myriad things are noble, their function is based on nothing, and they cannot reject having nothingness as their embodiment. If one were to reject nothingness as his embodiment, he would lose his power to be great” (translation from Lynn 1999, 121–2). “Though all things are valuable, they must employ non-being and cannot cease to embody non-being. Not being able to cease to embody non-being, they cannot be great” (Lin 1977, 71).

71. “Thirty spokes converge at the hub. But it is precisely where there is nothing that the utility of the chariot is. One kneads clay to make a vessel. But it is where there

allows for the “greatness” of a genuine multiplicity of (material, human, divine) beings, which is not to be confused with an “irreducible multiplicity.”

2. “What is already here,” the “manifestation,” as the visible and unessential “branch” (*mo* 末) of the three, corresponds to the produced “constitution” (*ti*) and “accumulation” of the thousand beings in their “determinations and finitude,” their “multiplicity” of “forms,” “delimitation,” or “separation” (*fen* 分), their “designations” (*cheng* 稱) in our speech.⁷²
3. While preferring the latter, we take the branch for the root, fall into error, reverse the right order of reality and impose substantiation, concealing and disguising the real poverty of the origin.⁷³
4. To “learn” is to leave the accessory for the essential, “return” (*fu* 復) to the root, make action “decrease” until there is no acting, “return” (*fan* 反) from “movement” to “stillness,” condense multiplicity into “unity,” that is, the “great ultimate” (*taiji* 太極), the *wu*.⁷⁴

is nothing that the utility of the container is. We open doors and windows to make a room. But it is where nothing is that the utility of the room is. Thus there is some convenience that there-is-not transforms into utilities.” *Laozi* 11. Izutsu: “Thus, if Being profits us, it is due to the working of Non-Being” (2001, 45).

72. *Commentary on the Laozi*, 25, 38; Lynn 1999, 95, 119–24; Lin 1977, 46, 70–3.

73. “The spontaneous *Dao* is as a tree. The more it accumulates *some substance*, the more it moves away from the root. The less it accumulates [some substance 轉], the more it gets close to the foundation. To accumulate is to get away from its *truth*... to be satisfied with a few is to grasp the foundation” Wang Bi, *Commentary on the Laozi*, 22 (1:54, emphasis added). “This is the *Dao* of Nature [*ziran*], just like a tree. The more a tree has, the farther it is from its roots. The more one has, the farther he is from his authenticity.... The less one has, the better the access to its roots” (from Lynn 1999, 89). “The *Dao* of nature is like a tree. Turning too much will make it go far away from its roots. Turning less will make it obtain its roots. Turning too much is far from its truth” (from Lin 1977, 22, but incomplete). On this substantiating “inversion” of root and branch in Chinese thought, see Dalissier 2009, 287.

74. Chen g 1997, 330–33. *Zhou yi liuli* and “Clarifying the Judgments,” Hexagram 24 復 (1: 336–7). For instance, to leave “speech” to “quietness” is to “ponder” the “words” (言: names, forms of speech) that “explain” images, to “forget” them and “observe” the “images” (象: figures); and then, to ponder images that “express” and “find” meaning, forget them and observe “meaning” (意: ideas). This kind of “yielding” or “deepening” issues from oblivion: to return is to return to the *wu* (*Zhou yi liuli*, chapter on “Clarifying the Images”). To understand the logic of absolute nothing-

Nishida had emphasized both aspects in Daoism.⁷⁵ Wang eventually identifies *Dao*, One, and “great ultimate” with *wu*; whereas in *Laozi* the one was born from the *wu*. Thus the One disappears in non-diffé entiation, the non-diffé entiating is the One (Chen g 1997, 331).

5. Here the saint recovers the intelligible structure and foundation (*ti*) of the world (*li*), apart from the false (3) and manifest structure (2), and realizes “the reason why everything is such as it is.”⁷⁶ The *Dao* as undiffé entiated “takes itself as a model,”⁷⁷ “is just as it is,” “as such.”⁷⁸ Non-diffé entiation makes the suchness of things.

Correspondingly, according to a topological phenomenology of “absolute nothingness,” we may distinguish five levels:

1. Absolute nothingness, the place at which being can be what it is, represents a noetic self-constitution as the “operation” of “hollowing itself out,” disappearing in itself within the realizing depth of reality, an endless retreat. Actuality of nothingness always refreshes and plunges unity into an endless striving for unification, while making the “richness” of a real “diffé entiation” irreducible to “pure and simple nothingness” (Dal issier 2009, 346–9).

2. “Determinate beings” are noematic determinations in absolute

ingness in Nishida, it is useful to forget the word “nothingness” and return to the glyph 無, recalling its original meaning as a dancer 舞. From words to representations to ideas, the infinity of meaning is liberated from concentration and condensation. See Dal issier 2009, 502.

75 Not only the “return” (復, 復歸) to being or nature in *Laozi* and Daoism, but also the “return” (反) of the *Dao* itself, as “going off into the distance means that it will return” (遠曰反, Nishida 1933, 243).

76. 所以然, from Wang Bi, cited in Chen g 1997, 336.

77. Nishida twice recalls the *Laozi* teaching: “*Dao* models itself after nature” (道法自然), in order to insist on the idea of imprisonment in rituality: “The Chinese, to the very end never went beyond a concept of ritual. Laozi’s statement: ‘man models himself after earth, earth after heaven, heaven after *Dao*, and *Dao* after nature’ (人法地、地法天、天法道、道法自然), probably pressed such an idea of nature to its highest point” (Nishida 1933, 243).

78. *Laozi* 25. Izutsu: “The Way models itself on (its own) spontaneity” (2001, 73).

nothingness, a structuring and “dissemination” from within the constitutive depth of reality.

3. To “invert the root and the branch” (本末転倒) is to take nothingness as non-being, “substantialize” things, words and ideas, and thus to fall into “error.”⁷⁹
4. “Self-awakening” (自覚) is the inner liberation of the self, in consciousness of nothingness as the secret unifying power of the self and others.
5. Within “pure experience,” and then in its purifying vanishing place identified as absolute nothingness, we find the “thing as such,” liberated from the approximation of being. Absolute nothingness reveals things not *as they are*, but *as such* (そのままに) (Dal issier 2009, 148, 396).

Of course, if we insist on finding potentiality and temporality within the expression “what is still not,” we may suppose that Wang Bi is considering a kind of indeterminate being, in retreat and ready to become. If this is true, we may go further and speak of something like the “rest” of being as lying in nothingness, and point to the topological articulations that Nishida exposes at work in phenomenology and especially in Husserl (Dal issier 2009, 461; 2006b). Here a phenomenology of the “still not” and a phenomenology of “absolute nothingness” will diverge. This is all very well, but it can be criticized as going too far, or claimed that such a vocabulary is imported from Western and Japanese philosophy and does not respect the great originality of Wang Bi’s thought.

79. See, for example, nkz 3: 370. Compare the analysis in Dal issier 2009, 286ff and 374ff. We find in the *Liezi* a remarkable expression of this logic of “doubling” (*doublage* in French):

While beings *oppose* the Way, the Way *does not oppose* beings.... Trying to excel precisely as the Way does, by using vision, hearing, body, and intelligence, leads to defeat: that is *like looking forward [to see] what is behind* (瞻之在前、忽焉在後).... How could the one who succeeds in *not being able* [reaches non-potentiality] still *act*? (iv.15)

This passage can be found in sk 24: 207–8, where the beginning of the passage is marked in red in the b edition. In Nishidean terms, the “opposition” of being at the level of “action” and “potentiality” (oppositional nothingness) conceals and disguises the “operation” of absolute nothingness.

The important thing is to recall the remarkable proximity of the two authors.

Immanentism of Being?

This proximity is further strengthened when we focus in particular on the great distance between Wang Bi's position and that of the tenets of a "pure immanentism" such as Guo Xiang (郭象 252–312), a distance later stereotyped in Southern Han Buddhism in the conflict setting "adepts of the *wu*" against "adepts of the *you*" (Chen g 1997, 362).

For the latter, things proceed from themselves without any other explanatory principle; they just exist. Something like a "void" would entail an obstruction of the infinite mutations. The autonomy of the principle becomes the "spontaneous creation" of things, in line with a Daoist fundamental concept: all being "creates itself by itself (自造), is born of itself (自生), and obtains itself by itself (自得; see Cheng 1997, 338). Being is "naturally" (天然) as it *is*: "spontaneous is what is by itself as such, without action."⁸⁰ From a sociopolitical point of view, we may speak of a transition from "an ideal society that would be without classes and remind us of the egalitarian utopia of great peace" (Wang Bi) to "the perfect government [that] allows the hierarchical distinction existing as a part of the natural order to function" (Guo Xiang) (Robinet 1983, 102).

Thus, the *wu*, understood as "pure and simple contrary of the there-is (*you*)," is precisely the there-is-not, conceived as not-existing. Up to a point, if Wang's position recalls Nishida's, Guo's position recalls Bergson's as well as Nishida's critique (see Dal is sier 2007b). Guo argues:

80. 自然為正自然不為. Guo Xiang, in *zzjc* 3: 10, cited in Cheng 1997, 338–9. This work is in Nishida's library, in a 1662 edition, c, no. 245/197. Chapters 1 and 2, to which we will mostly refer, are richly annotated with black, brown, and red ink (we can also find some traces of a kind of "correction flui "), perhaps by Nishida himself. The book is probably not his grandfather's. The same words of Guo, as well as the whole passage of *Zhuangzi* and Guo's commentary on it, are noted with brown marks of transcription and annotation. Similarly, the beginning and end of Guo's commentary are set off in the text with red marks, 8–9 in Nishida's edition. We may add that in Nishida's commented b edition of *Liezi* ii, the expression "Guo Xiang said" is very often underlined in red.

What *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi* call *wu*, what can it be? It means simply that what brings life to beings is not a being (無物) and that those beings live by themselves. (Guo Xiang 11, in *zzjc* 3:173)

There-is-not (*wu*) cannot transform itself into there-is, any more than there-is can transform itself into there-is-not. Beings can transform themselves in infinite ways but they will never be able not to exist. Thus, there has never been a time when nothing existed, and there has always been something (故自古無末有之時而常存也). (Guo Xiang 22, in *zzjc* 3:332)

Guo Xiang paradoxically empties emptiness of all “substance and actuality” (Chen g 1997, 337), believing that only substance effectively exists, without any “shadow” of nothingness, and does not see the point of considering the void as precisely void.⁸¹ Whereas for Laozi and Wang Bi, *wu* is “ungrounded” (淵) in the sense of being non-differentiating, for Guo Xiang, *you* is substantially “ungrounded” in the sense of not having any other ground than itself (*Laozi*, 4).⁸²

In Nishida’s terms, being as “possession” becomes “‘being’ as existence” (存在としての「ある」) (Dal issier 2009, 339). As nothingness is conceived as secondary to “being” (*on*), that is, as “non-being” (*mē on*), it does not really exist; “absolute nothingness” is an intellectual construct (Bergson) and then being returns, in what we call a *réontologisation* (212f, 334–77). The realm of being, the empire of manifestation without foundation, does not house the faintest “shadow” of nothingness, while actual being is nothing but an “image” emerging within a transparent nothingness as a “self-enlightening mirror,” with nothingness being the real “shadow” (490). Being, without any other ground or any other depth, takes the place of absolute nothingness which represents an ungrounded depth.

81. The term “shadow” comes from the translation of the sequence “everything, even a shadow, transforms by itself in a mysterious darkness.” See Guo Xiang 2, in *zzjc* 3:24–6, 53. Pages 22 and below in Nishida’s edition are richly annotated.

82. Up to a point, we can recall here that in Cartesian metaphysics the meaning of the word “substance” is autonomy. See, for instance, the definition of substance in Descartes: “A thing that exists in such a way that it needs only itself to exist,” *Principles of Philosophy*, §51.

But self-creation follows an “individualization principle” (分命), imposing a destiny to which each individual must conform.⁸³ Self-creation becomes self-regulation according to the *li*. Guo Xiang argues:

There is no being that has not its principle; it simply has to conform to it (當順之). (Guo Xiang 22, in *zzjc* 3:325)

All beings exist by themselves; that is all: *they do not mutually make themselves exist* (非相為). If we let them operate in this way, the principle will take place by itself.⁸⁴

Wherever he goes [the accomplished man] is in peace and thus feels comfortable everywhere.⁸⁵

In my view of the “logic of place,” what we find here is the typical dialectical relation between ontology and “meontology” (Dal issier 2009, 331; 2006). Being is spontaneously self-creating beings (bodies, forces, particulars, phenomena) opposing each other in the space of an oppositional nothingness. But as an “absolute nothingness” is masked and sidestepped from this perspective, we take our place on a plane of purely determinate being in which the hegemony of being (being “everywhere”) find its “security” and “stability” (“peace” and “easiness”) (see Dal issier 2008, 646). Accordingly, we follow a path of the determination of all beings, not orchestrated by a perfect God, as in Leibniz, but according to the very nature of being itself: meontology returns to ontology, and the path to neontology that had been opened by Wang Bi is closed.

83 Guo Xiang, 1, 2 (annotated in Nishida’s edition) and 22, in *zzjc* 17, 24, 27, 325. Here again, we may construct certain parallels to Cartesian ethics in the *Passions of the Soul*.

84. Guo Xiang 2, in *zzjc* 3:27, emphasis added. This passage is annotated in brown ink in Nishida’s edition, 16.

85 Guo Xiang 1, in *zzjc* 3:17, quoted in Chen g 1997, 340. This passage is annotated in brown and black ink Nishida’s edition, 14.

References

Abbreviations

- c. Yamashita Masao 山下正男, ed., 『西田幾多郎全蔵書目録』 [Complete list of Nishida Kitarō's book collection] (Kyoto: Institute of Cultural Studies of Kyoto University, 1982).
- nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 20 vols.
- sk 『新訳漢文大系』 [A New Compendium of Translations of Kanbun] (Meiji Shoin, 1979).
- st ic 『先哲遺著漢籍国字解全集』 [Collected works of the writings of the great ancient philosophers, with transliteration and comments in Japanese] (Tokyo: Waseda University, 1912).
- ypc “Y a-t-il une philosophie chinoise? Un état de la question Extrême-Orient,” *Extrême Occident* 27 (Saint Denis: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 2005).
- zzjc 『諸子集成』 *Zhuzi jicheng* (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1978).

Chinese and Korean Works

- 『韓詩外伝』 [An anthology of Korean poetry] (Shōmuinshokan, 6th Year of Minkoku or 1918), 4 vols.
- 『朝鮮司訳院日満蒙語学書断簡』 [A Korean manual for the study of the Mongolian language] (Kyoto Imperial University, 1918).
- Analects*. 『論語』. Trans. by James Legge (Hong Kong University Press, 1960).
- Baihei lun*. 『白黒論』 [Treatise of white and black].
- Chuanxi lu*. 『傳習錄』 [Notes on the transmission of moral practice]. Chan Wing-tsit, *Instructions for Practical Learning and Others Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1963).
- Commentary on the Laozi*. 「欲言無邪,而物由以成。欲言有邪,而不見其形」, in 『王弼集校釋』 [The works of Wang Bi, revised with commentaries] (Zhonghua Shuju, 1980).
- Datong shu*. 『大同書』 [Book of the great unity] 康有為 Kang You-wei (1935).
- Da xue wen*. 『大學問』 [Inquiry on the great learning], Wang Yangming.
- Er Cheng ji*. [Writings of the Cheng brothers] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981).
- The Great Learning*. Trans. by James Legge (Hong Kong University Press, 1960).
- Guo Xiang. 郭象『自然為正自然不為』, *Commentary to the Zhuangzi*.
- Shao Yong. 『皇極經世書』 [Crossing of centuries of the noble ultimate].

Huainanzi. 淮南子. zzjc edition.

Laozi. 『老子』. See Izutsu 2001.

Liezi. 『列子』, trans. by Jean-Jacques Lafitt, *Traité du vide parfait* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1997).

Mencius. Trans. by James Legge (Hong Kong University Press, 1960).

Renxue. 『仁學』 [A study of humaneness], by Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1918).

Wang Bi ji jiaoshi. 『王弼集校釋』 [Complete works of Wang Bi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980).

Wang Yangming quanji. 『王陽明全集』 [Complete works of Wang Yangming] (Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992).

Zhangzaiji. 『張載集』 [The works of Zhang Zai] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978).

Zhangziyulu. 『張子語錄』 [Sayings reported to Master Zhang].

Zhou Dunyi ji. 『周敦頤集』 [The works of Zhou Dunji] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1990).

Zhou yi lüeli. 『周易略例』 [General remarks on the changes of the *zhou*], in 『王弼集校釋』 [The works of Wang Bi, revised with commentaries] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980).

Zhuangzi. *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, trans. by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

Other References

Bil l et er, Jean-François

2004 *Leçons sur Tchouang-tseu* (Paris: Allia, 2004).

Chan, Wing-tsit

1963 *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton University Press).

Chen g, Anne

1997 *Histoire de la pensée chinoise* (Paris: Seuil, 1997).

Dal issier, Michel

2005 *Nishida Kitarō, une philosophie de l'unification*. Doctoral dissertation, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris.

2006a “The Idea of Mirror in Nishida and Dōgen,” in Heisig 2006, 99–142.

2006b “De la néontologie chez Nishida Kitarō” 『フランス哲学・思想研究』 11: 184–94.

2007a “Unification and Emptiness in Predication: The Stoics, Frege, Quine, Strawson, Nishida Kitarō. History of Logic under a Topological Enlightenment,” *Philosophia Osaka* (2007): 29–37.

- 2007b “Nishida, interprète de Bergson, 1: L’élan et la durée; ii: Bergson et le doublage,” 『人文』 (2007) 6: 21–31; (2008) 7: 1–44
 - 2008 “La topologie philosophique. Un essai d’introduction à Nishida Kitarō,” *Les Archives de philosophie* 71/4: 631–68.
 - 2009 *Anfractuosité et unification. La philosophie de Nishida Kitarō* (Genève: Droz). The Appendice to this work we refer to in the present study can be found on-line at www.droz.org/siteDroz/rubrique.php?ID=1002339.
- Faur e, Bernard
- 1998 *Bouddhismes, Philosophies et religions* (Paris: Flammarion).
- Gr a h a m, Angus C.
- 1989 *Disputers of the Dao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China* (La Salle: Open Court).
- Gr a n e t , Marcel
- 1934 *La pensée chinoise* (Paris: La renaissance du livre).
- Hegel, Georg W. F.
- 1975 *Hegel’s Logic*, trans. by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Heisig, James W.
- 2001 *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press).
 - 2004 “Nishida’s Medieval Bent,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 31/1: 55–72.
 - 2006 (ed.). *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy* (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture).
- Hér ail, Francine
- 1986 *Histoire du Japon des origines à la fin de Meiji* (Paris: Publication Orientalistes de France).
- Izut su Toshihiko
- 2001 *The Way and Its Virtue* (Tokyo: Keio University Press).
- Kamena ro vic, Ivan P.
- 2005 “De la ‘traduction philosophique,’” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 232: 199–212.
- Lee Seung-hwan
- 2004 “Continuity and Discontinuity of Traditional and Modern Philosophy in Korea,” in *Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation* (Seoul: Hollym).
- Lin, Paul J.
- 1977 *A Translation of Lao Tzu’s Dao Te Ching and Wang Bi’s Commentary* (Michigan papers in Chinese Studies).

Lynn, Richard J. (trans.)

1994 *The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the Yijing as Interpreted by Wang Bi* (New York: Columbia University Press)

1999 *The Classic of the Way and Virtue. A New Translation of the Tao-te-Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Major, John S.

1993 *Heaven and Earth in Early Han Thought: Chapters Three, Four and Five of the Huainanzi* (Albany: SUNY Press).

Maraldo, John

2006 "Self-Mirroring and Self-Awareness: Dedekind, Royce, and Nishida," in Heisig 2006, 143–64

Marquet, J. F.

2001 *Restitutions, études d'histoire de la philosophie allemande* (Paris: Vrin).

Monier-Wiliams, Monier

1919 *Hinduism* (London: Macmillan).

Nakagawa Hisayasu

2005 *Introduction à la culture japonaise* (Paris: puf).

Nishida Kitarō

1911 *An Inquiry into the Good*, trans. by Abe Masao and Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University Press).

1917 *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*, trans. by Valdo H. Viglielmo with Takeuchi Yoshinori and Joseph S. O'Leary (Albany: State University of New York Press).

1923 *Art and Morality*, trans. by Valdo H. Viglielmo (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

1931 "La dialectique de Hegel considérée de ma position," trans. by M. Dalissier and D. Ibaragi, *Philosophie* (2009).

1933 "The Forms of Culture of the Classical Period of East and West Seen from a Metaphysical Perspective." Trans. in David A. Dilworth, *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* (Tokyo: Sophia University), 237–54. The original text can be found in nkz 7: 429–53.

Nishitani Keiji

1982 *Religion and Nothingness*, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Pak Tong-kwan

2004 "Korean Thought: Its Development Pattern Examined in the Context of Social Circumstances," in *Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation* (Seoul: Hollym), 25–3.

Robinet, Isabelle

1983 “Kouo Siang ou le monde comme absolu,” *T'oung Pao* 69: 73–107.

Sakabe Megumi 坂部 恵

2007 「あらわれと Copula——《おもて》の解釈学試論」 [Expression and copula: an essay on the hermeneutics of the face] in 『坂部恵集』 [Works of Sakabe Megumi] (Tokyo: Iwanami) 3: 51–73.

Takeuchi Seichi 竹内 整一 (ed.)

1996 『《善の研究》用語索引』 [Glossary of *An Inquiry into the Good*] (Tokyo: Pelican).

Tang Junyi

1967 “The Individual and the World in Chinese Methodology,” in Charles A. Moore, ed., *The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press), 264–85.

Vandermeersch, Léon

1988 “Tradition chinoise et religion,” in *Catholicisme et sociétés asiatiques* (Paris and Tokyo: l’Harmattan and Sophia University), 28–9.

Watson, Burton (trans.)

1964 *Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings* (New York and London: Columbia University Press).

Yusa Michiko

2002 *Zen and Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press).

Zheng Jiadong

2005 “De l’écriture d’une ‘histoire de la philosophie chinoise,’” *ypc*, 121–44.

Assimilation and Dissimilation in Japanese and Chinese Philosophy

Lam Wing-keung

As far as Japan and China are concerned, the term “philosophy” with its Greek origins is a concept imported from the West. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Japan and China have undergone reception, confrontation, and the making of their own philosophies. Taking these three stages into consideration, this article attempts to suggest that both Japan and China have simultaneously employed assimilation and dissimilation methods to assimilate their respective and other intellectual traditions with those of the Western world, and at the same time to dissimilate the above traditions, so as to make their own unique philosophical systems derived from those they have become assimilated with. This does not mean that assimilation is the prerequisite for dissimilation, or that dissimilation is the consequence of assimilation. Rather, the two are interrelated, that is, dissimilation is embedded in assimilation, and vice versa. In other words, not only are the two approaches inseparable, they also intercept each other.

My concern is, however, how these two approaches have been undertaken in Japanese and Chinese philosophical movements, and what philosophical potential both traditions contribute to philosophy itself. Philosophically it is believed that the two traditions have an intimate rela-

tionship. Alongside the very broad and in-depth comparative studies of “Western-Japanese” and “Western-Chinese” philosophical interchanges, the Japanese-Chinese connection should not be overlooked, particularly with their respective convictions throughout the last century for making “unique” philosophies in contrast to the Western philosophical canon.

Assimilation and dissimulation: the inevitable steps for the east?

John Maraldo has given a very profound analysis concerning the identity of Japanese philosophy, stating that its uniqueness is embedded in the “trans-lation” of Western philosophy through the transformation and addition of Japanese culture:

The trans-lation of “Western” philosophy into Japan obviously helped bring out a transformation of Japanese culture often called “westernization” or “modernization.” This trans-lation, moreover, also entails the transformation of philosophy by the addition of Japan perspectives, and these perspectives apply to the reading of traditional texts and of texts yet to be traditionalized. (Maraldo 1995,239)

By defining the term “trans-lation” as “both an inter-lingual and an intra-lingual transmission,” Maraldo argues that it not only denotes “the transference of texts from one natural language to another, but also the transformation of textually embedded problems, methods, and terminologies both across and within natural languages.” My position is that such trans-lation in fact entails two aspects, namely assimilation and dissimulation, that enable “the transformation of philosophy by the addition of Japanese perspectives, and these perspectives apply to the reading of traditional texts and of text yet to be traditionalized” (227).

It is believed that the addition of Japanese perspectives is not merely the Japanese topping on a Western philosophical cake, but that they also embody the questions of what, why, and how there must be Japanese perspectives in Western philosophy. Taking the transformation of cuisine as an example, it is not an unusual phenomenon for a foreign cuisine to undergo a degree of modification from its original taste in order to be

accepted by its prospective customers. Such modifications, however, are not simply a smear of Japanese *wasabi* atop a New York cheesecake. To boost its popularity and increase profit margins, the cake should embrace both “New York” and “Japanese” flavors that help retain or even increase the number of New York cheesecake lovers as well as entice prospective new customers, including Japanese.

Of course, there are dissimilarities involved in comparing cuisine and philosophy, as the latter basically aims to establish a kind of universal logic toward a particular argument instead of profit increment, but the modification embedded in the addition somewhat entails the two notions I highlight in this essay: assimilation and dissimilation. Without assimilating the original taste of New York cheesecake while adding Japanese *wasabi*, people, especially New York cheesecake lovers, may not accept the “transformed” New York cheesecake.

In other words, applying this to philosophy, we see that in the course of the importation of the concept of philosophy into Japan, the “addition” that Maraldo suggests does not simply add something new to existing texts, but embodies the trans-lation of texts through assimilation with its respective culture or traditions. It is quite obvious that it is hard for Japanese to understand what philosophy means exactly by transcribing it literally into the Japanese syllabary ヒロソヒ or into glyphs as 斐鹵蘇比 as we see in Nishi Amane’s 『開題門』, where his later translations of philosophy as 希哲学 are given in the postscript; or in 『性理論』 (1861) by Tsuda Mamichi 津田真道; or again as 希賢学 and 窮理学 in 『百学連環』, in which they embrace the assimilation of Confucian ideas that Japanese are more familiar with, especially with its national learning (国学) throughout the Edo period.

What is more, the trans-lation of Western philosophy through the addition of Japanese perspectives is not confined to the assimilation of Confucian ideas, but also entails the dissimilation of Western philosophy with Japanese perspectives. Similarly, although the New York cheesecake with *wasabi* may still be considered a New York cheesecake, it no longer has the “original” flavor; it has been dissimilated. Applying this to the importation of Western philosophy to Japan, on the one hand, Western philosophy undergoes modification through the assimilation of Japanese perspectives; and on the other, it undergoes modifications through dis-

similating it with Japanese perspectives that alter so-called Western philosophy.

Of course, questions concerning what the terms “Western” and “Japanese” mean should not be overlooked. It seems quite clear, however, that the trans-lation suggested by Maraldo is not merely an addition, but rather embodies assimilation and dissimilation, in which they are the two indispensable and inseparable steps for philosophy to be imported to Japan. More importantly, the imported concept of philosophy that undergoes assimilation and dissimilation may generate a new understanding of philosophy, which is somewhat exported to the West as well as to other “markets.” Hence, I do have reservations about the two-story building (二階建) theory proposed by Karl Löwith (Ōhashi 1992, 152–3) that two different layers of philosophy remain, Western and Japanese, while Western culture infiltrates Japan.

Following the theory of trans-lation given by Maraldo, I would like to argue that one may find Japanese architectural or interior influence on the Western floor and vice versa, so that it would be quite difficult to distinguish the two distinctive floors, as Löwith posited. It is not an exaggeration to say that, in the course of receiving Western philosophy, there is significant potential for assimilation and dissimilation in contemporary Japanese philosophy, so that philosophy does not remain “Western,” but also includes a “Japanese” perspective.

This is also the case in China. Philosophy is an imported concept that has been acquired through assimilation and dissimilation. By borrowing the *kanji* translation 哲学 (Jp. *tetsugaku*; 哲学 in simplified Chinese, pronounced *zhexue* in Mandarin; 哲學 in traditional Chinese characters, pronounced *jithok* in Cantonese), it carries a similar connotation as suggested by Nishi in his *Encyclopedia* (『百学連環』Kitano 1997, 20) that philosophy refers to the science of all sciences. Recently, however, there have been a number of etymological studies¹ on the term *zhexue* (or *jithok*) that highlight some of the disparities between Western philosophy in a Chinese context. One example is Zhou Hai-chun 周海春, who states:

1. See, for example, Zhou 2008 and KWan 2008.

The word *zhe* 哲 embraces transcendental orientation (超越論的傾向) and the orientation of experiencing the world with humans as the centre (從人的中心體驗世界), whereas *xue* 學 carries the meaning of awakening (覺悟). . . . The combination of *zhe* and *xue* demonstrates precisely a method and a goal, in which *zhe* stresses a goal and an ideal, and *xue* emphasizes a method. (Zhou 2008, 45)

Unlike Zhou, Kwan Tze-wan 關子尹 does not specify the differences between Western and Chinese philosophy, suggesting only that the ideas that Western philosophy highlights such as “judgment” in English or to be more precise, *urteilen* in German, can also be found in the word 哲, which is used in some ancient Chinese works (KWan 2008, 13), and means “situation” (9). However, Kwan argues that philosophy should not merely be a conceptual game on paper or a kind of study (學問), and that even when it is considered to be a kind of study, it should be a study of life (生命的學問). In other words, philosophy, with its Greek origins, is not confined to the meaning of love of wisdom in the case of China, but also in line with its transcendental orientation or judgment of a situation, it embodies humanity at its centre.

Defining philosophy as the study of life is very common among some contemporary Confucians. Mou Zong-san 牟宗三 (1909–1995) and Tang Jun-yi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), for example, did not merely emphasize “life” as being a central concern for philosophy, but went on to claim that it is the very center of philosophy itself, thus displacing the knowledge (知識) that Western philosophy generally places at the center. This does not mean that Chinese philosophy discounts knowledge. Chinese philosophy, however, does place importance on life instead of the objectivity of the knowledge emphasized by Western philosophy. Accordingly, we may arrive at a preliminary conclusion that philosophy in China also undergoes assimilation and dissimulation, in which the former refers to the assimilation of the distinctive Chinese concerns of life while philosophizing, whereas the latter may exemplify a kind of dissimulation with Western philosophy that values the objectivity of knowledge, as compared with the heavy attention of subjectivity denoted by the concept of life that Chinese philosophy emphasizes.

Assimilation and dissimulation: the Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist Ways

It is not unusual to employ the assimilation method whenever we encounter something new or different to our own understanding or traditions. Take Japanese *ramen*, for example. If we had to introduce it to someone who had never heard of it or had no experience of eating *ramen*, we would have to find a “similar” object or food to illustrate that *ramen* are noodles. In so doing, we are using one of the methods, assimilation, for doing the “trans-lation.” Here I will attempt to demonstrate that assimilation is not confined to a kind of imitation, that is, employing terminologies and ideas with which we are familiar without distortion, but is rather an inevitable step for receiving “foreign” elements, believing that there is philosophical potential in methods of assimilation and dissimulation that can contribute to both to Japanese and Chinese philosophical traditions.

As was briefly mentioned above, “philosophy” is a term translated into *katakana* phonetically and into *kanji* by Nishi Amane. The *kanji* translations, including 希哲学 and 哲学, in fact carry Confucian and Buddhist flavor. For the former, as Kitano Hiroyuki points out, Nishi considered philosophy as the study of the nature and theory of the West (西洋之性理之学), in which “nature and theory” (性 and 理) are concepts of Chinese philosophy, in particular the tradition of Neo-Confucianism in the Sung-Ming Dynasty (Kitano 1997, 8). Ōhashi Ryōsuke also indicates that there is a Confucian flavor to Nishi’s translations of the term “philosophy,” but added that, “in contrast to the examination of the ‘function of mind and nature’ (心性の用) of Confucianism in the East, the philosophy of the West postulates ‘the substance of soul’ (靈魂の体)” (Ōhashi 1992). Unveiling such differences, not only does it demonstrate an undertaking of the assimilation method by employing Confucian elements, it also denotes the dissimulation method of highlighting the “unique” understanding of philosophy in the East, particularly as seen through Confucian eyes. In so saying, it somewhat supports my position here that both assimilation and dissimulation are involved in receiving philosophy from the West as well as in the intercept of the two methods.

Aside from the Confucian approach to assimilation and dissimulation,

Buddhism serves as another significant channel. Ōhashi points out that the term “consciousness” was translated into 意識 and 独知 by Nishi, and that both in fact originate in Buddhism. The former is derived from the Yogācāra tradition, and the latter is borrowed from the ideas of substance (体), function (用) and appearance (相). Besides these, the translation of sociology as 人間学 in fact entails an equivalent meaning of 人の世 with the Buddhist idea of 人間 (Ōhashi 1992, 43). Although Ōhashi admits that there are limitations to translating (Western) philosophical terms into Confucian and Buddhist terminologies, he gives a comparatively positive conclusion to the method of assimilation:

The translation of the philosophical terminology of Nishi signifies an aspect of a multi-layered process of the Confucian and Buddhist cultures of Asia with a European modernity that is rooted in Greek philosophy and Christianity. (47)

Clearly a very detailed examination of the extent to which the assimilation of Confucian and Buddhist ideas helped Asians understand what (Western) philosophy is about is required. It would seem that assimilation is an inevitable step for receiving (Western) philosophy, at least in the case of Nishi. However, we should not overlook the point that Nishi's translation does not merely denote the inevitability of assimilation; it also highlights the importance of dissimilation. By assimilating Western philosophical terminologies with Confucian and Buddhist concepts, there are unquestionably differences and incommensurable elements.

The concepts of 性 and 理, 体 and 用, and 意識, for instance, have contextual meanings embedded in their respective traditions, which may induce dissimilation of what (Western) philosophy and its philosophical concepts refer to. This is not only a kind of dissimilation of terminologies, but also relates to the connotation, meaning, or even definition of philosophy.

As mentioned above, Mou Zong-san argued that philosophy, and Chinese philosophy in particular, be considered the study of life rather than simply knowledge, as Western philosophy is wont to do. Although Mou did not intend to disregard the epistemological aspect of Chinese philosophy, as the word “study” (學問) itself carries the meaning of knowledge or at least the inquiry into knowledge, Mou emphasizes that the

focus of Chinese philosophy should be life (生命), and that it is different to the knowledge-based approach that Western philosophy generally upholds.² In other words, it is not only the Japanese, but also the Chinese that undergo assimilation and dissimilation while receiving Western philosophy.

By highlighting the fact that Chinese philosophy focuses on “life” instead of “knowledge,” Mou attempts to dissimilate it with Western philosophy, while simultaneously employing the assimilation method of following the Western philosophical path of inquiry into “study”—the theoretical exploration and explanation of “life.” Similar to Nishida Kitarō, when Mou defines philosophy as the study of life, he is not simply considering life as one of the subjects of philosophy. Rather, he is speaking of philosophy itself, thus elucidating the point at which assimilation and dissimilation intercept rather than merely prioritize one or the other.

Assimilation is not a “new” method used to face “foreign” ideas, nor has it held a monopoly in the contemporary period since the nineteenth century. When Buddhism was introduced into China by India, many Buddhist concepts were assimilated with Confucianism and Daoism. As Ng Yu-kwan 吳汝鈞 points out, Buddhist “emptiness” (空) was analogized with the Daoist *wu* (無), a concept comparatively well-known among Chinese. Ng believes that assimilated Buddhism (格義佛教) conveyed very profound values that not only enabled people who were not very familiar with Buddhism to understand the doctrines more easily, but also helped spread Buddhism throughout China. Ng, of course, also acknowledges that there are weaknesses and limitations with assimilated Buddhism, in that Buddhism may have lost its original appearance (本來面目) by being Confucianized (儒家化) and Daoistized (道家化) (Ng 1995, 9–10).

Such criticism unquestionably relates to a kind of hermeneutic question, that is, what is meant by “original appearance” and how can it be attained? Alongside the critical reservations we may have, I am inclined

2. Aside from the works listed in the bibliography, there are in fact thirty-three volumes of the writings of Mou. See 『牟宗三先生全集』 (Taipei: Lianhebaosinwenhua-jijinhui, 2003).

to opine that assimilation again proves to be an inevitable step for receiving “foreign” ideas. Even though Buddhism may have lost its “original appearance,” it seems to have been an effective or even unavoidable step in the introduction of Buddhism to China. Whenever we learn a foreign language, we “trans-late” it into a language we are familiar with. In other words, without such “trans-lation” or “assimilation,” not only is it untrue to our “normal” or “natural” behavior, it also means that the so-called “original appearance” is lost. The term “original appearance” in fact implies that there is something we can term “unoriginal,” something that is somehow embedded in the course of assimilation. Without undergoing the process of assimilation that induces an “unoriginal appearance,” how could one speak of a loss of the “original appearance”?

Besides, the hindrance of the “original appearance” induced by assimilation opens up a variety of interpretations and understandings of what Buddhism is, regardless of its Confucianized or Daoistized forms, as it signifies that Buddhism can be (mis)interpreted, expressed, and understood through other intellectual angles. In so doing, it somewhat enriches the potential of Buddhism by embracing its various forms of potential interpretations. Furthermore, the loss of the “original appearance” indicates that we are dissimilating what “true” Buddhism is, meaning that dissimulation in fact goes hand in hand with assimilation, and vice versa. The two approaches are in fact interdependent and intercept each other.

Philosophical potential through assimilation and dissimulation

Granted that assimilation and dissimulation enrich the potential of Buddhism, we may apply the same logic to philosophy itself. Whether or not there is an “original appearance” of philosophy remains doubtful. Even if we may argue that the Western mode of philosophy loses some of its original appearance by assimilating and dissimilating it with Confucian and Buddhist terminologies and related concepts, it does enrich the understanding and the underlying potential of philosophy. Philosophy can also be expressed by different intellectual traditions with regard to

their terminologies and concepts. As Fujita Masakatsu points out, philosophy can be considered as:

the quest of a universal axiom... [This] does not mean that it is freed of the restriction of language that is being used. Our thinking is embedded in our culture and tradition. (Fujita 2000, 4)

In other words, this liberation makes it clear that philosophy is not confined to a particular language, nation, or tradition, and its various manifestations can also be found in other forms, including Confucianism and Buddhism. Apropos of this, Ōhashi remarks:

Philosophy is perceived in a Confucian and Buddhist way. Is it even possible to speak of reception without the ability to see? When a text can be found that is being transmitted to a later generation, then the later generation should look at it through the eyes of the earlier generation. Even when a kind of hermeneutics occurs, we cannot extinguish the original vision itself.... Although it is negative in the sense that the eye of subjectivity sustains twists of interpretation, it is positive in the sense that a creative transformation takes place through the stimulus of the text. In each case, there is a pair of “creative” eyes. (Ōhashi 1992, 49)

According to Ōhashi, “creative philosophical thought starts with Nishida Kitarō” (Ōhashi 1992, 50) and took a creative turn with his introduction of the idea of *basho* or “place” (see Ōhashi 1995). Maraldo shares with Ōhashi the view that Nishida’s logic of *basho* is “a new logic based in part upon the Asian Buddhist concept... [that] implies a questioning of the universal validity of the logic imported from the West” (Maraldo 1995, 232).

It is not our concern here to examine whether or not Nishida’s philosophy is creative, and if so, just how creative it is; or again, or whether it succeeds at steering *basho* towards philosophy, Ōhashi’s comment on receiving philosophy through Confucian and Buddhist eyes demonstrates that there is a perceptual perspective entailed in reading the texts, which supports the point being made here with regard to assimilation and dissimilation. The philosophical potential revealed by assimilation and dissimilation toward philosophy does not merely enrich the understanding

of philosophy itself; it also leads to “creative,” “new,” or “unique” systems of philosophy. Ueda Shizuteru 上田閑照 comments:

On the one hand, Nishida follows the path of tradition in the East and continues studying the philosophy of the West as philosophy. On the other, he construes a new theory of the world from the bottom in between (*aida* 間)... [for] opening up a world-like world (世界の世界). (Ueda 2008, 3–4)

The phrase “world-like world” requires detailed examination, in particular regarding the relationship between the individual and the communal. By going back to the example of *ramen*, we may find that *ramen* that is cooked by different people in different places tastes different. Still, we cannot avoid employing assimilation and dissimulation to introduce it to those who have no concept of it or any experience of eating it. The same may be said of opening up the “world-like world” by seeking a common ground between East and West, as well as in and within the East (for instance, Japan and China). On the one hand, assimilation and dissimulation help us understand those “foreign” concepts, and on the other, they disclose the varieties of what *ramen* could be through assimilating and dissimulating with a different set of eyes.

By emphasizing the potential of assimilation and dissimulation in contemporary Japanese and Chinese philosophical currents, I do not mean to overlook questions of feasibility or limitation. How could assimilation and dissimulation be possible if philosophy as an imported concept were completely “new” to Japanese and Chinese before arriving in Japan and China in the mid-nineteenth century? By assimilating *ramen* with the word “noodles,” for instance, it seems that we do have a certain understanding of what *ramen* means, or even the implication that there are “similarities” between *ramen* and noodles. Where does our understanding of *ramen* as a kind of noodles come from, and how can we assimilate *ramen* with noodles? The former may be considered to be an epistemological or an ontological question, whereas the latter may be categorized as a hermeneutic question.

It is not my intention to touch on the issue of hermeneutics in this short essay, but by examining the hermeneutic question, I am inclined to say it may help provide some hints for taking up the epistemological

and ontological questions entailed. In the context of his theory of translation, Maraldo suggests:

Philosophy is recognizable as an idiom by and large because it is formed by a tradition of certain texts and reactions to those texts... The reading process that sustains them can be regarded as a process of translation. It is an active and transformative process that includes deletion and distortion as well as ‘faithful’ rendering. (Mar al do 1995,233)

In other words, it is the “texts” that induce translation and the texts that form the basis for translation. The epistemological or ontological base of translation are the texts where the hermeneutic activity takes place. Neither Nishi Amane nor other scholars in Japan and China who attempted to “translate” philosophy through assimilation and dissimilation aimed to build up its “original” meaning or have a better understanding of this meaning in the way Schleiermacher suggested, and one merely assimilates and dissimilates the imported concept of philosophy from the West in line with their respective horizons as Heideggerian hermeneutics postulates. Differences induced by different understandings further elevate the importance of the texts, insofar as various understandings are derived from the texts. At the same time, the differences indicate that there is an open or endless horizon of meaning. This is indeed where the potential of the assimilation and dissimilation of contemporary Japanese and Chinese philosophical currents lies.

References

Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝

2000 「日本の哲学?」 [What is Japanese philosophy?], in 『知の座標軸——日本における哲学の形成とその可能性』 [The axis of knowledge: The formation of philosophy and its possibility in Japan] (Kyoto: Kōyō Shobō), 3–9.

Kitano Hiroyuki 北野裕通

1997 「《哲学》との出会い——西周」 [The encounter of “philosophy”: Nishi Amane], in Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝, ed., 『近代日本思想を学ぶ人のために』 [For those studying modern Japanese thought] (Kyoto: Sekai-shisōsha), 4–23.

KWān Tze-wan 關子尹

- 2008 「從《大克鼎》和《史牆盤》中的《哲》字看哲學」 [Examining philosophy from the word *zhe* in *daikeding* and *shiqiangpan*], in Kwan Tze-wan, 『語默無常:尋找定向中的哲學反思』 [Articulation-cum-silence: In search of a philosophy of orientation] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press), 1–26.

Mar al do, John

- 1995 “Tradition, textuality, and the trans-lation of philosophy,” in Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Steven Heine, eds. *Japan in Traditional and Post-modern Perspectives* (New York: sun y Press), 225–43.

Mou Zong-san 牟宗三

- 1994 『生命的學問』 [The study of life] (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju).
 1997 『中國哲學十九講』 [Nineteen lectures on Chinese philosophy] (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju).
 1998 『中國哲學的特質』 [Unique features of Chinese philosophy] (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju).

Ng Yu-kwan 吳汝鈞

- 1995 『中國佛學的現代詮釋』 [Modern interpretations of Chinese Buddhism] (Taipei: Wenjin).

Ōhashi Ryōsuke 大橋良介

- 1992 「西洋思想「ヒロソヒ」の翻訳:西周」 [The translation of “philosophy” in Western thought: Nishi Amane] in 『日本のなもの、ヨーロッパのなもの』 [Things Japanese, things European] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha).
 1995 『西田哲学の世界—あるいは哲学の転回』 [The world of Nishida’s philosophy: A turn of philosophy] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō).

Ueda Shizuteru 上田閑照

- 2008 「西田哲学『理想』特集号への巻頭言」 [Opening remarks for the special issue of *Risō* on Nishida philosophy], 『理想』 681 (September): 3–4.

Zhou Hai-chun 周海春

- 2008 「《哲》與《學》與中國哲學」 [*Zhe*, *xue*, and Chinese philosophy], in 『鵝湖』 400 (2008/10): 45–51.

Thinking and Perceiving

Nishida and Park as Embodied Subjects?

Huh Woo-sung

Most philosophers are not always doing philosophy. Doing philosophy involves not only reading, thinking, and writing, but also perceiving, hearing, listening, and even touching. Since perception gives us only a partial view of a thing or an event, it is perspectival, deficient, deformed, shortsighted, and limited in itself. Thus it tends to interfere with or delimit thinking. One of the areas where perception is at its most powerful is in forming political ideas; a case in point being nationalistic sentiment or patriotism, which is inextricably tied into a philosopher's perception of things and encounters with people.

Nationalism can be a sentiment and ideology that creeps up on us through such shared memories as culture, tradition, history, and language. Or again, it may come to us through political institutions, policies, laws, and personal contact with powerful politicians. Nationalism is deeply rooted in the place where philosophers live and in this sense is somatic. The problem of nationalism is connected not only with thinking but also with perception. How can we justify our nationalism and understand the nationalism of others whom we do not see? Is it possible for a philosopher to strike a balance between thinking and perceiving? If a philosopher is not free from his/her locality, then what is the use of doing philosophy, which is supposed to be universal? I will ask these

questions of two philosophers, Nishida Kitarō from Japan, and Park Chong-hong from Korea, both of whom are to some degree influential in their respective nations.

The dictionary definition of “nationalism” is given as “the sentiment and ideology of attachment to a nation and to its interests.” Imperialism is defined as:

The extension of power through conquest, or the pursuit of “empire,” that is, of a global influence so dominant as to amount to virtual sovereignty wherever it is successful. Empire was advocated in the UK in the 1880s by Joseph Chamberlain, in opposition to the “Little Englanders” who favoured a policy of isolationism. Chamberlain argued that the expanding influence of France and Germany must be counterbalanced by the expanding influence of the UK. (Scruton 1982, 315)

If the latter definition may be considered acceptable, imperialism appears to have sprung up as a result of competition and struggle among European nations. Combining these two definitions, one could argue with some confidence that nationalism has evolved or expanded into imperialism. Indeed, in East Asia nationalism and imperialism were highly contagious during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Nishida Kitarō, who fought admirably against Western imperialism on the philosophical battleground through his writings, began in the 1930s to express his highly nationalistic political views. At the same time, he warned of the danger of Japan becoming imperialistic. Partly due to the lack of available information on other peoples of East Asia, and partly due to his simple extension of the form of self-consciousness, he could not imagine that imperial Japan, with its East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and idea of “All the world under one roof (八紘一宇),” would bring about deep dissatisfaction among other peoples, not to mention the violence, intimidation, control of speech and thought, arrests, and imprisonment. Imperialist slogans in vogue at the time seem to have been reborn in his historical-philosophical terms.

Following Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonialism, Park Chong-hong expressed the strong nationalist belief that national subjectivity was required for Korea’s independence and its economic development. As special education advisor to the president, he supported President Park

Chung-hee (1917–1979), whose presidency has been at the center of a fierce debate among Korean scholars and politicians.

The primary aim of this essay is to argue that perception exerts a decisive influence on nationalistic sentiment, thus limiting thinking, and that in order to examine and assess the political views of a philosopher, we have to take into account the concrete situation of the embodied subject, as a nation is always localized. In addition, I wish to raise a few questions regarding the relationship between thinking and perceiving, and to take up the possibility of a self-consciousness that does not engage in a life-and-death struggle with others. The most important question in this paper is this: Is Nishida's philosophy of self-consciousness fundamentally unsuited to develop an ethics of the "other"?

Nishida's Philosophy

Nishida's Philosophy of Self-Consciousness

In the course of his philosophical writings, Nishida Kitarō (西田幾多郎 1879–1945) pursued two main lines of thought, more or less equally pervasive and persistent: the development of a philosophy of self-consciousness in his pre-1931 corpus, and a historical-political philosophy in his later writings. Both philosophies are essentially ontologies, by virtue of what Nishida calls the application of forms of self-consciousness (自覺の形式). These forms function in almost every phase of Nishida's philosophy, and in the main include activity, self-determination, actuality, one-*qua*-many logic, and immanent-*qua*-transcendent logic. The phrase "the self's seeing itself in itself" is included in these forms and expresses the immediate, absolute, and self-sufficient characteristics of self-consciousness. After an enormous struggle with the thought of numerous Western philosophers, Nishida finally came to a comprehensive grasp of these forms with his mature theory of self-consciousness around 1929 or 1930. Then, in what I call the "turn" in Nishida's philosophy, he extended their application to non-conscious phenomena such as the historical epoch and the state.

Whatever Nishida applied the forms of self-consciousness to was attributed, in virtue of that application, full reality in Nishida's texts. In general,

these forms were applied in turn to pure experience, to artistic creation, to acts of self-consciousness, to the historical epoch, to the state, and to the emperor. The extension of his forms from acts of self-consciousness to the historical epoch occurred around 1931 when the Japanese military government attempted to collect the cumulative energy and power of the country in order to galvanize its people as a nation. That extension was the most decisive shift in Nishida's philosophy because it paved the way for his return to a world which he had once rejected and called transitory (浮世). This turn signifies not only that the applications of these forms are turned from conscious phenomena to non-conscious phenomena, it also reflects Nishida's own critical stance toward his earlier religious-soteriological philosophy. In his later philosophy, he was fond of citing Leopold von Ranke's (1795–1886) phrase “Eine Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott” (An age is immediate to God).

Nishida's Political Ideas

Nishida's most important treatment of international politics is to be found in his 1943 essay “The Principle of the New World Order” (nkz 12: 426–34). Nishida embraced the principles of the new world order, the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and “All the world under one roof.” These were nationalist slogans used widely during World War ii to justify aggression abroad. Nishida remarks apropos of that slogan:

I think that today's world is an era of the world's self-consciousness. Each nation should build a world-historical world, that is, a world-of-worlds, by realizing its own world-historical duty. This is today's task. Even before World War i, the world had entered this era. A solution to the task remained unfinished at the end of World War i. There was no new principle of world-constitution except for the old idea of the abstract world. This is the reason why World War ii broke out again. This war demands a final solution to the task. (427)

Nishida rejected Woodrow Wilson's principle of the self-determination of each nation as improper for fulfilling the task of the constitution of the world of worlds. “The fact that each nation or a people transcends itself and constitutes a world is not the same as Wilson's so-called principle of the self-determination of nations, which recognized the equality

and independence of a people”(nkz 12: 428). The idea of the League of Nations was not the representation of the world-historical task but merely the eighteenth century’s abstract idea of the world. The impossibility of resolving the actual historical task was demonstrated by the outbreak of World War ii (428).

Thus, Nishida replaced Wilson’s principle of the self-determination of each nation with his own principle of a new world order. The essential nature of this principle is expressed by the idea “All the world under one roof,” which Maruyama Masao once referred to as one of the most shrill slogans of ultranationalism in twentieth-century Japan. Furthermore, Nishida says that the principle of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere must be derived from the principle of the new world order. Nishida believed that the Western world had oppressed and colonized the peoples of East Asia:

Previously the peoples of East Asia have been oppressed and colonized by the imperialism of European nations, and they have lost their duty in world history. Now is the time when all the nations of East Asia must realize the world-historical duty of East Asia, and constitute a special world by transcending themselves (each state), and execute their world duty. This is the principle of the constitution of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This is the time when we Asians (我々東亜民族) should uphold the idea of Asian culture together, and we must rise up world-historically. (429)

In his criticism of Wilson’s principle of self-determination, Nishida harbored a deep-rooted suspicion of what Great Britain and America had done to Asian people, and he appears to summon Asians to rise up against European imperialism. But many Koreans could not respond to the call “we Asian peoples,” although Park Chong-hong might have implicitly or partially responded to it in his use of the term “our reality” in essays written during the 1930s.

Nishida sees the League of Nations as based on nationalistic egoism (民族自己主義), also given as the “imperialism of Britain and America” (433). Against this imperialism, Nishida argues, we must uphold “the Imperial Way” (皇道) as the guiding principle of thought in the nation, according to which the emperor and his subjects are one in “helping all peoples”

(nkz 12: 431). He further states that Great Britain and America must obey the doctrine of world formation and the notion of national polity (国体) (434). Finally Nishida sums up his notion of the world-formation of the world and the state:

The formation of the world as world does not lose the subjectivity of our state (我國家の主體性). It is really a principle of subjectivity that includes others by self-emptying. To be grounded on that principle displays the glory of the national polity. Perhaps one may say that the solution of today's duty of world history will issue from this principle. Not only Britain and America must obey this principle, but pivotal powers must strive to emulate it. (434)

In this connection, it may be noted that just as his philosophy of self-consciousness was established in opposition to Western philosophy, so his principle of a new world order opposed the League of Nations. As the passage opens, the doctrine of the self-determination of the world preserves the subjectivity of Japan. Japan, at the same time through self-emptying, includes other (他) states. But it is questionable that the process of self-emptying was actually exercised. As will be shown later, Merleau-Ponty deemed the struggle between master and slave as a necessity of the human condition. From this point of view, Nishida's elevating of Japan as the center of East Asia and his treatment of Japan as a self-emptying subject is contradictory. If this contradiction is genuine, the problem is far more serious than the simple fact that Nishida lacked proper information of how other peoples felt or responded to Japanese political slogans. Japanese people and their historical situation were concrete to Nishida, but other peoples remained distant abstractions to him.

Nishida also affirms the historicity and divinity of a nation: "All peoples, as part of the historical world, have their own expression of God" (nkz 11:456). His view of history-politics may be called a "philosophical" nationalism—perhaps a "philosophical imperialism" for the other peoples of East Asia, but not for the peoples of Great Britain and America.

Konoe and Nishida: Similar Political Views

Nishida had a long and lasting relationship with the three-time Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿, 1891–1945) and shared many polit-

ical views with him: a critique of the League of Nations and of Western imperialism in East Asia, as well as a perception of Japan as the rightful leader of a new Asian order. In his twenties Konoe attended Nishida's lectures as a student at Kyoto Imperial University, and was one of his disciples when Nishida lectured at Gakushuin University from 1909 to 1910. In a diary entry of 1933, Nishida recorded his lunch with Konoe at the latter's residence (nkz 17:492); Konoe had been vice speaker of the Upper House since 1931 and was moving ever-closer to the center of parliamentary politics. In 1933 Konoe, together with Harada Kumao (原田熊雄 1881–1946), bought a house in Kamakura as a present for Nishida.

Nishida and Konoe kept up a steady relationship. Nishida followed Konoe's career closely, and in June 1940, when Konoe was appointed prime minister for the second time, Nishida called on him to express his reservations about his having accepted the office. During the course of their conversation, Konoe revealed the blueprint of his new order. Nishida's response was that "a new order may be established but the key point is the selection of leaders; there is no political party in charge in the new order, only a monolithic entity and the inherent danger of leaving posterity with an undesirable aftermath" (nkz 19: 129). Several days later, Nishida lamented to Yamamoto that the cabinet was going from bad to worse (77–8). In 1941, after Konoe had been named prime minister for the third time, Nishida even expressed his dissatisfaction with some members of the cabinet. In 1941, Nishida wrote to Konoe, feeling sorry for the way in which he had to resign: "The reason Japanese statesmen age quickly is that they do not study. Fortunately, you will have time now that you have retired from the position of prime minister—may I suggest you dedicate yourself to study?" On October 18 1941 Tōjō Hideki was appointed prime minister and Nishida wrote to Hori Koretaka: "We are going to have a military government. For reasons unknown, my limbs have swollen and I feel uncomfortable" (nkz 19: 181).

The historian J. L. McClain called Konoe "a dedicated pan-Asianist from his youth, who articulated a more noble vision of Japan as the rightful leader of a new Asian order" (McClain 2002, 451). Their relationship continued for over thirty years, and Nishida's political views cannot be explained without taking into consideration his intimate relationship with Konoe and other contemporaries. Things, people, and events that

Nishida encountered were all temporally and spatially givens, of which the philosopher Nishida was not the author.

Japan: Another Imperialist

One of the key questions involving the principle of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is whether Japan itself was imperialistic. Nishida repudiated the League of Nations as imperialistic, and warned of the danger of Japan becoming the same (nkz 12: 341). He maintains that if a subject “negates other subjects, taking them as its own self” (他の主體を否定して他を自己となさんとする), then that is no more than imperialism, which is contrary to the Japanese spirit (349). We can understand the subject here as referring to nations like Japan, India, China, and Western countries. He was clearly opposed to imperialism, which he defined as the negation of others’ subjectivity.

But his understanding of the principle of the new world order reveals an imperialist element when Nishida proceeds to identify Japan as the center of this movement as symbolized by the idea “All the world under one roof.” He argues that in the constitution of a particular world, there must be one nation at the center standing up to this historical task:

There is no other country than Japan to carry out this task.... The East Asia War should decide the direction of world history as the victory of the Greeks in the old days did for European culture. (429)

The problem in Nishida’s discussion of imperialism and the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere is the arbitrariness with which Nishida applied the logic of one-*qua*-many. This sphere was self-determinative, of the eternal now, and should not have been politically subsumed by the League of Nations. But he did not extend this logic to other sovereign nations in East Asia. Despite Nishida’s argument that the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere meant Asia for the Asiatics, and despite his denunciation of English and American imperialism, “efforts to gain support for the plan from participant countries under Japanese control... were unsuccessful as most of them regarded the Japanese as just another imperialist nation.” In an essay written in 1944 Nishida argues:

Our national polity as the self-determination of the absolute present is

the standard of historical activity. This sort of true spirit of Mahāyāna is kept alive only in Japan in the East. (nkz 11:13)

C. S. Goto-Jones attempted to defend Nishida by referring to his private conversation where Nishida stated his conception of the Co-Prosperity Sphere as follows:

[This] is definitely not imperialism. Above all, if anyone inside the sphere is dissatisfied, then it is not a Co-Prosperity sphere. If the sphere were based on a selfish decision (by one state) and the others were coerced into it, that would violate everyone's free will, and that would not be a Co-Prosperity sphere.... If it were a true Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan would be asked (by the others) to create it. If that is not the case, we cannot talk of a crusade. (Goto-Jones 2005, 94)

The notion of satisfaction immediately calls to mind a passage from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness [*in einem anderen Selbstbewußtsein*]" (1977, 110). The following passage from the same work is also essential to comprehend Hegel's understanding of the relationship of self-conscious individuals:

Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals [*das Verhältnis beider Selbstbewußtsein*] is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life and death struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being *for themselves* to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. It is only through staking one's life that freedom is won; and thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not the *immediate* form in which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure *being-for-itself*. The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. (113–4; translation modified)

Hegel discusses the dialectic of subject, desire, and the imposition of will on objects and on other subjects as two self-conscious individuals

engaged in a life-and-death struggle for recognition. Though the relationship between the two self-conscious individuals sounds similar to Nishidean self-consciousness, it is not. The former refers to a self-consciousness belonging to two different people, but the latter refers to acts of self-consciousness belonging primarily to one single person.

In his philosophy of historical-political thinking, Nishida assumes that the notion of self-consciousness may be extended to national subjectivity. Like Goto-Jones, one can easily accept, at least in principle the point that Nishida is making here. Nishida does not, however, seem to be aware of the dissatisfaction and suffering that many Asians experienced through living under the “one roof” provided by Japan. Of course, there is no denying that there were some Korean politicians who were persuaded to welcome and collaborate with Japanese colonial rulers. At the same time, it has been well documented that there were many Koreans who expressed their dissatisfaction with the Japanese in loud and no uncertain terms.

One of the most notable figures was Ham Sok-hon (咸錫憲 1901–1989). He was a well-known Korean Quaker who spent the first half of his life in colonial Korea (1905–1945); he also spent several years (1923–1928) in Tokyo as a college student, and was a follower of the Nonchurch Movement of Uchimura Kanzō (内村鑑三 1861–1930). He was also a history teacher at Osan school and a writer of Korean history, as well as being a farmer until 1945. He was imprisoned no fewer than four times by the Japanese authorities. Ham described the lives of Korean people under Japanese colonial rule with the following words: forcible oppression, military police, governing by bayonet, imperialists, wickedness, despair, agony, wail, lamentation, loss of freedom, fear, scream, confiscation, arrest, imprisonment, burning, and killing. In the English version of *Kicked By God*, he describes his imprisonment as follows: “My only crime was that of being a Korean.”

After liberation in 1945, he was arrested by North Korean communists who were themselves under Russian authority. Even after he fled to South Korea in 1947, he found himself imprisoned once again, as he fought against dictatorship led by three former presidents, including President Park Chung-hee.

Park's philosophy of national subjectivity

Soon after Korea was liberated from the grip of Japanese colonial power in 1945, it was divided into north and south, eventually leading to civil war. Park Chong-hong (朴鐘鴻 1903–1976) initiated the reception of Western philosophy into Korea, and was responsible for the rise of modern Korean philosophy in the Western sense of the term. He published *Ilban nollihak* [General Logic], the first of its kind in the history of Korean philosophy. The book was based on traditional Aristotelian concepts. He studied and introduced Kant, Hegel, Rickert, Cohen, Hartmann, Heidegger, Jaspers, Cassirer, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, and many more. Throughout his career as a philosopher he never lost his keen sense of interest in many areas of Korean culture, and wrote many articles on key figures of traditional Korean philosophy (including Neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, and *Silhak*) such as Yi Toe-gye (1501–1570), Yi Yul-gok (1536–1584), Choi Han-gi (1803–1877), Wŏnhyo (617–686), and Chinul (1158–1210). However, his main contribution to Korean philosophy was made in his introduction, adoption, and assimilation of Western philosophy.

A 1958 essay entitled “An Introductory Scheme for A Study on Korean Thought” opens with the following words: “We are Koreans; we live as Koreans, even before we bring Korean thought into question. Korean thought arose and became problematic only after Koreans lived as Koreans” (cWp 4: 3). The strong nationalistic sentiment expressed in this post-liberation writing is also found in his pre-liberation writings. In the 1970s, this sentiment colored his political engagement.

In one of his writings from 1961 Park made a short remark on his experience of imprisonment as a result of participating in a rally for Korean independence, and expressed his distaste for study in schools since he “believed that almost all studies in school were designed to make us Japs” (cWp 6: 261–2). In spite of this remark, his nationalistic sentiments often avoided direct confrontation with the colonial reality of Korea. Furthermore, one has to be puzzled or shocked at some of his pro-Japanese writings from the 1930s.

In the 1930s, some Korean intellectuals appeared to consider the colonial reality unavoidable, permanent, and final. In 1935, Park wrote eight

articles under the title “Our Reality and Philosophy” for the *Chosŏn ilbo* daily newspaper. He gave it the subtitle “The Limit-Situation (限界狀況) of the Historical Moment.” In these articles, Park placed great emphasis on reality (現實) and argued that the motive of doing philosophy is not the Aristotelian sense of wonder or intellectual curiosity. Rather, it “necessarily arises from real agony, and under an inevitable situation” (cWp 1: 389). With phrases like “our emergence” and “our ultimate situation,” he certainly points to the colonial reality of the Korean people, but he avoided using the term “colonial reality.” A serious problem was that he saw the colonial reality of the 1930s as a historical fact, as inevitable, unchangeable, and final, as was meant by “our ultimate situation.” Although he showed nationalistic sentiments, these were fundamentally limited and even suffocated by his labelling of colonialism as the ultimate situation. Thus, he demonstrated no resolve to resist Japanese imperialism, that is, to change reality itself.

It appears that many of the historical events constituting a national emergency for Japanese people, were also, for Park, a Korean emergency. His sense of these made him demand that philosophy be “most concrete and most realistic (現實的)” (cWp 1: 398). Park continued the same demands on philosophy after liberation.

Park contributed several articles to the *Mail shinbo* (Mail Daily Newspaper) entitled “The Trend of Contemporary Philosophy” (1934). The following long quotation reveals his attitude toward fascism and Nazism, and his understanding of philosophy as activity rather than thinking:

Fascism is a historical fact. It is, however, not a movement that starts with a theoretical framework or a program with the purpose of realizing it, but a movement that has necessarily been moved by the political and economic situation. Fascism revolts against an abstract and intellectual philosophy. For the fascists, philosophy is not the philosophy of thinking, but of activity (實行). Furthermore, the philosophy of activism (行動主義) is necessarily compatible with voluntarism (主意主義), and therefore it is possible that this activism comes close to Nietzsche’s will to power. We can surely discern in the thought of Mussolini’s militaristic leadership the idea of the “superman” of Nietzsche, which seeks the transvaluation of all values, rejecting egalitarian individualism, and proclaims the absolute sense of the idea of

the superman. It appears that the idea Nietzsche proclaimed in the nineteenth century has been realized today in the twentieth century. The explosion of life, the will to power, the mockery of the calculated pacifism, and the great challenge of the free superman against all kinds of lukewarm mediocrity that appears in modern times—all this is fascism.... Fascism tries to overcome actual chaos, and is ready for all kinds of sacrifice. It does not evade fighting (鬭爭), rather it considers it as the only way of life, cherishing a firm conviction in a triumphal song as the superman does. It is said that the only evil is non-action (無活動); the only virtue is passion (情熱).... For the superman, life means to rule (others) and to assert oneself. The superman never gives up his desire to become the supreme ruler, rejecting all kinds of obstacles and ruling incessantly. This is spiritualism and voluntarism. The anti-intellectual activism of fascism is related to mysticism. According to Mussolini (1883–1945), we are dependent upon and succumb to a sort of mystical sentiment. This mystical faith defies both our construction in clear and distinct concepts as well as its presentation in propositions.... Furthermore, this mysticism is intended, to a certain extent, to lead the masses under mystical mottos. In this regard there is a similarity between fascism and the thought of Georges E. Sorel (1847–1922). They differ in that for Sorel, the motto is the general strike; for fascism, the motto is the state and the Italian people.

Let's now look at Nazism. For this movement not to be short-lived but to last for a long time, it should have ideas. Public sentiment (民心) has been kept at bay externally, that is, politically and economically. The task for the future is to lead it internally, or in terms of ideas. In this regard we cannot overlook the fact that Heidegger set aside private matters, and joined the Nazi Party (in March 1933). He was appointed as the rector of the university of Freiburg a year ago (1933), and took pains to found the university system and the establishment of fundamentals for spiritual renewal following political reform. It is time for us to examine the affinity between Heidegger's philosophy and Nazism. (cWp 1:362–4)

In this long quotation, Park seems to hold that there is a close connection between the will to power and Heidegger's philosophy on the one hand, and Nazism on the other hand. Park also advocates the notion of the superman acting powerfully within history. But there is no dislike

of fascism and Nazism evidenced in this report. On the contrary, and quite astonishingly, he appears to hope that Hitler's Nazism would last. Park's view is very similar to that of Rōyama Masamichi (蠟山政道, 1895–1980), an activist-scholar from the Imperial University of Tokyo. Rōyama was desperately concerned that Konoe, as prime minister, have a united nation behind him, and was fascinated by the ability of charismatic leaders in Europe to manipulate the powerful emotionalism of fascist ideology to win the allegiance of the citizenry, and so desired that Japan “achieve an internal unity similar to the Nazis.” In contrast, “Fascism has come to Japan,” lamented Yoshino Sakuzō (吉野作造 1878–1933) in 1932, another professor at the University of Tokyo. He was a leading spokesperson for liberal democratic ideals in the Taishō period and favored what he called 民本主義, democracy based on the people. How would Rōyama and Yoshino have responded to a report like this one penned by a philosopher living in the reality of colonialism?

When Park said in 1934, “the only evil is non-action, and the only virtue is passion,” exactly what kind of action did he have in mind? It is quite possible that this refers to the military action of the Japanese army in Manchuria, or his own philosophy with the sense of an ultimate situation. This passage expresses a deep reflection on reality and a philosopher's political engagement in concrete time and space. This sentiment seems to repeat itself in his activities after the liberation.

In another pre-liberation essay from December 1939 entitled “Grasping Reality” (現實把握), there is an alarming reference to holy war, clearly indicating the war engaged in by Japanese soldiers in East Asia. What then did he really mean by “reality”? The second-last paragraph may provide a clue:

The way to grasp reality: it is a process in which ordinary reality becomes realized by the mediation of concrete practice (具體的實踐); it is the struggle for creating culture, and holy war (聖戰) for building the state (國家建設); it is a thorny path and a bloody struggle for life. It is so rough and so difficult that only a few exceptional people can really clear the way. (cWp 1:432)

The two words of “reality” and “holy war” in this paragraph quickly remind us of Nishida's writings written during the same period. Which

nation does Park refer to in building the state, Japan or Chosŏn (朝鮮)? It is surprising (or not surprising) to see that the reality faced by Park in Korea was very similar to that faced by Nishida in Japan.

Thus, if one says that some of Park's pre-liberation writings are ominous, then we must say that his entire career as a philosopher is ominous since the word "realism" (現實主義) appears in his post-liberation writings, too. For example, in the conclusion of *A Study on Negation* (1959), Park borrows the Heideggerian notion of nothingness and the Hegelian notion of negation, and develops his own understanding of negation and reality. In the following key passages he argues:

Thus, I call negativity the ultimate, ontological ground of negation as reality (現實). Reality is the dynamic process itself, that is, negativity (否定性). Only in the developmental process of reality-*qua*-negativity do substance and subject become problematic. At the same time, negativity is historicity (歴史性), therefore reality is historical reality. Negativity is nothing but historical reality. (cWp 3:679–80)

Human beings are products of historical reality, but at the same time they are participating in shaping that historical reality. This is what we call creation (創造). The activeness (能動性) of self-negation cannot be nothingness. Negativity itself is the power of breaking through nothingness and overcoming it. This is why negativity itself becomes creativity (創造性). (cWp 3:682)

Park's emphasis on historical reality and his admonition for participating in the dynamic process of historical reality are repeated in his post-liberation writings. His new usage of the term "negativity" there in reference to the source of creative action may reflect his study of Heidegger and Hegel.

Worth noting is his argument that human beings are both products and producers of historical reality; this reminds one of a famous phrase of Nishida's, "From the created to the creating," which represents one of the key aspects of Nishida's philosophy of history. For Nishida and Park, admitting reality is the precondition for our creative activity in it. In other words, creativity would be displayed only after accepting a particular and given historical reality. This line of thought eventually helped both of them become nationalists.

Park's theory of negativity-*qua*-creativity was epitomized in his participation in drafting the Charter of National Education (1968), which supplied an ideological vision for President Park Chung-hee. The charter begins with the sentence, "We are born in this land with the historic mission of national restoration," establishing the state ideology by which the state could deprive any citizen of inalienable rights (for example, freedom of speech).

Park wrote a short essay in English entitled "On the Problem of Subjectivity." Its date of publication is unknown, but considering his reference to the reopening of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan (1965), and its similarity to ideas occurring in the Charter of National Education, it was probably written sometime between 1965 and 1968. In this essay, before discussing the notion of national subjectivity, Park deals with the notion of subjectivity itself. He argues:

Man is conscious of the object, and at the same time he is conscious of the fact that he is conscious of the object, that is to say, he has the ability to objectify his consciousness of the object.... I believe it reasonable at this point to differentiate subjectivity in the sense of considering it in the sense of a person's relation to objects from subjectivity in the sense of considering it within the boundary of consciousness, as the thoughts defined as inner behavior by the existentialists are powerless when they are left in that way.... Furthermore, in cases where the object as another person is not an individual but a group which has more power, the might is too great to be encountered as the subjectivity of an individual, and here takes the form of the subjectivity of a state or a nation. (cWp 5:768-9)

According to Park, there is no subject without an object, and vice versa. In addition to the normal sense of the object, whose examples are "something out there" and people, Park refers to the object considered to be within the boundary of consciousness. Thus, there are two kinds of subjectivity, each being related to its own object. Consider the case of taking people as objects. Park argued that when an individual subject faces a powerful group as an object, and cannot manage it, the necessity of national subjectivity then arises in a sort of collective subjectivity:

To secure firm subjectivity, it is necessary to be independent. But

independence is not isolation. Independence is only possible through coexistence, and subjectivity can also be established through this. This is the nation that has been formed historically and is also presently being formed in such a relationship. The subjectivity of a nation is not established by sacrificing other nations. Significance is exhibited when the characteristics of others are mutually respected. To assume that world peace occurs when the subjectivity of a nation disappears is like dreaming that the ideal society is when a person's individuality disappears. (cWp 5:771–2)

According to Park, an individual subject, confronted by a strong group, historically evolves into national subjectivity, which should be independent, but not exclusive. His notion of national subjectivity is not imperialistic, since according to Park, for national subjectivity to exist no nation need be sacrifice. Thus, he distinguishes his position from slogans such as “Peace in the Orient” or “We are members of the same family under one roof” (all the world under one roof), which forfeits true subjectivity by ignoring or despising the subjectivity of other nations. As he argues: “[our] national subjectivity is rooted deeply in our [Korean] lives, standing above classes.” He does not seem to leave any room for class struggle in Korea. Furthermore, in order to establish a national subjectivity, a nation should have the power of economy, the power of defence, an economic plan, and reeducate the people. Employing the term “self-realization,” which is another term for subjectivity, he argues that “Self-realization without practice is powerless and practice without self-realization is only blind labor” (cWp 5:775).

Park's study on negation culminated in his becoming an ideologue. His notion of negativity could not become the foundation of his negation of the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee. The reason may be this “we-ism” and his sincere preference for a “wealthy nation, strong army” (富國強兵), which was well reflected in the phrase “we respect efficiency (能率) and substance (實質).” In general, Park's notion of national subjectivity and his political engagement seemed to point out that philosophy and economics as practical sciences are needed to build a “wealthy nation, strong army.”

One has to mention that the entire philosophy of Park, before and after liberation, failed to give the individual a place going beyond both the

morality of a colonial reality and a nation state. Perhaps the time when Park wrote on aesthetic feeling (審美的感情) in 1926 (cWp 1:103) was one of the rarer moments in the development of his entire philosophy that might have evolved into a different direction in placing the “self-conscious individual” over national subjectivity. Except for his demand that Korea be strong against powerful nations, he did not develop further the idea of how a weaker nation should handle a stronger nation.

As far as his pre-liberation writings are concerned, Park did not show direct opposition to imperial Japanese slogans. But in his post-liberation writings, he was critical of the idea of “All the world under one roof.” His perception seemed to have changed. The Japanese reality as the key object of his perception was gone forever with independence in 1945.

Defending nationalism through corporality

This study shows that there is a strong affinity between Nishida and Park in their political views and activities: the belief in national subjectivity, the warning of each respective nation becoming imperialistic, close relationships with the most powerful politicians of the day, and the expression of political ideas in their work. To say that their political ideas were shaped significantly by historical situations and societal conditions sounds somewhat trite. For example, it seems that there was no way for Nishida, as a Japanese, to understand how Koreans felt under the “one roof” policy that was created during Japan’s imperialist phase. This kind of inability is basically something bodily.

Corporality, with its limitations, appears to work powerfully in both philosophers. Their thinking and writings become contextualized; the context is given by bodily positioning. Bringing in the notion of body (身体) into our discussion is not altogether inappropriate, given that Nishida discusses the various aspects of the body both in his theory of self-consciousness and philosophy of history-politics. Comparable notions in this context are the historical self, the historical body, historical mediation, and acting intuition. Nishida argues that:

We cannot exist without body... our body is the one seen as well as seeing. Without it, it is impossible to see.... Our reality has to come

into contact with our bodies somewhere. Hence the starting point must be seeing bodily (身体的に見る). (nkz 8: 328)

According to this passage, the body is not simply the object of others' gaze, but it is the seer. Nishida explains that "preserving, not leaving behind our body" is identical to "remaining always in a specific place and time of the historical world." Nishida emphasizes the notion of historical mediation when he states:

In the historical space (空間) of self-consciousness of the historical self, our actions are absolutely mediated historically. And at the same time, as Ranke says, each era is immediate to God, so we are immediate to the absolute. (nkz 10: 123)

Thus, Nishida's notions of preserving the body, historical space, and the historical self may be called on to defend his nationalism and patriotism as well as Park's. But this defence is always assailable in that nationalism often encroaches upon other subjects and inflicts violence on them.

Nishida and Merleau-Ponty

Nishida's Acting Intuition vs. Merleau-Ponty's Perception

As far as Nishida was concerned, the principle of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in itself was not imperialist at all. However, consciousness of the dissatisfaction of others is seriously hampered by the idea of acting intuition, and remains internal and self-reflective in the sense that it does not comply with Merleau-Ponty's phrase "we are what we do to others." The idea of acting intuition does not seem to allow one to give "an instant through the eyes of others."

In order to know to what extent the other is satisfied or dissatisfied, one must know others; one requirement is listening. This is well documented in one of Merleau-Ponty's texts, where, contrary to François Mauriac (1885–1970), who said "We have established a 'beneficent civilization' out there," he listens to the Vietnamese:

Your system functions beautifully. You have your colonialists. And among your administrators, writers, and journalists, you have many

men of good will. The former act, the latter speak and are the former's moral guarantee. Thus principles are saved—and colonization remains in fact just what it has always been. (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, 325)

Facing and listening to others is an essential way of knowing how the oppressed feel toward their colonial administrators and writers. Without this sort of direct contact, the principle of dissatisfaction does not say anything, always remaining abstract. Abstraction makes one “deaf to the cries of those who meddle in killing and dying.”

To borrow the first few lines from Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, Nishida's extension of the forms of self-consciousness make his philosophy of history-politics a kind of philosophy of “essences.” This disregards “an inalienable presence,” or direct and primitive contact with the world, and so are not the phenomenology of existence, or of facticity (Merleau-Ponty 1962, ii).

In this context, a comparison between Nishida's notion of acting intuition and Merleau-Ponty's notion of perception will highlight a few essential features or deficiencies perhaps inherent in the idea of acting intuition. A contrastive study is more preferable to a comparative study here. There are at least two essays where we can see Nishida's understanding of acting intuition. These are “The Perspective of Acting Intuition” (行為的直観の立場, nkz 8: 107–218, 1935) and “Objects and Practical Knowing” (395–499, 1937). A few passages from them are sufficient to see how Nishida deems the unity or intimacy between the mind and the body:

We see a thing by action, and the thing we see determines us as much as we determine the thing. That is action-intuition. (nkz 8: 131)

Just as the body of an artist is the organ of art, so is the body of a scholar the organ of scholarship; the life of an artist exists in beauty and that of a scholar in truth. Even the activity of thinking does not exist separately from our physical body. (174)

Seeing and acting must be deemed in the world of historical reality. That is, it must be deemed... bodily. We are neither merely body nor consciousness. We are dialectical existence. (407)

It is not that our living is known to us by thinking, but it is that we think since we are living. (*Preface to Philosophical Essays II*, 1937, 269)

As Michiko Yusa has noted, the notion of acting intuition focuses on “the unity between the mental (or the spiritual) and the physical (or the mental) that constitutes our experience (Yusa 2002, 265).” It is clear that for Nishida, living bodily takes primacy over thinking. Being a philosopher and living in Japan, this may be applied to his own person, facing the historical epoch as the absolute.

All these arguments serve to remind us of several key notions discussed by Merleau-Ponty in his philosophy of perception and history. There appears to be a certain affinity between these two philosophers: their emphasis on the unity of the mental and the physical, the bodily aspects of human experience. But acting intuition is very different from the phenomenological notion of perception discussed and developed by Merleau-Ponty. In *The Primacy of Perception*, he gives us a lamp as an example in order to show the essential features of perception:

It is given as the infinite sum of an indefinite series of perspectival views in each of which the object is given but in none of which is it given exhaustively. It is accidental for the object to be given to me in a “deformed” way, from the point of view (place) which I occupy. That is the price of its being “real.” The perceptual synthesis thus must be accomplished by the subject, which can both delimit certain perspectival aspects in the object, the only ones actually given, and at the same time go beyond them. This subject, which takes a point of view, is my body as the field of perception and action (*pratique*)—in so far as my gestures have a certain reach and circumscribe as my domain the whole group of objects familiar to me. (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 15–16)

Another key passage runs as follows:

I grasp the unseen side as present, and I do not affirm that the back of the lamp exists in the same sense that I say the solution of a problem exists. The hidden side is present in its own way. It is in my vicinity. Thus I should not say that the unseen sides of objects are simply possible perceptions, nor that they are the necessary conclusions of a kind of analysis or geometrical reasoning. It is not through an intellectual synthesis which would freely posit the total object that I am led from what is given to what is not actually given; that I am given, together

with the visible sides of the object, the nonvisible sides as well. It is, rather, a kind of practical synthesis: I can touch the lamp, and not only the side turned toward me but also the other side; I have only to extend my hand to hold it. (Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 14)

The lamp I am seeing is given only in a certain perspective; it is given to me by change and is deformed. It is given only from a place the embodied subject occupies or inhabits. In this way, in order to discuss perceiving objects in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the following notions are necessary: situatedness, the accidental, an indefinite series of perspectival views, the subject, the body, non-visible parts of present objects, absent objects, total objects, essential partiality, a range of possible views, deficiency, deformation, and reality.

Any notion given ontological primacy by the forms of self-consciousness in Nishida's philosophy becomes full reality. Although the historical subject of acting intuition may be called embodied subjects, these subjects do not imply limitation, weakness, or deficiency of the body. Thus, seeing (見る) in Nishida's writing is unlike perception but is intuitive, self-reflective, and self-conscious. If the term "acting intuition" applies to Nishida, "acting perception" would apply to Merleau-Ponty. The multiplicity of acts of self-consciousness is quite different from acts of perceiving subjects.

They also differ in their understanding of the experience of time. As Nishida states: "The present is the place of acting intuition. Therein we possess our bodies" (nkz 8: 387). But this present is not a present that implies non-visible parts of the present, as is the case with Merleau-Ponty. At one point Nishida even discusses the notion of flesh with body: "What I call body means historical body. With it we can understand that words have become flesh (肉) and that various social realities are of the body" (336–7). However, Nishida's understanding of body and flesh as the incarnation of words is neither perspectival nor deformed.

A Critique of Nishida's Philosophy of History-Politics

Let us repeat a previously-mentioned passage: "Each epoch is immediate to God, so we are immediate to the absolute" (nkz 10: 123), which may be seen as the key philosophical slogan in Nishida's writings after

his “turn.” Does this passage imply that, since Japanese living in this epoch are facing the absolute, they do not experience its contingencies or deficiencies? Is it true that the Japanese military actions carried out in northern China and Korea are included among examples of acting intuition? Does this also mean that these actions exclude other subjects, showing violent expansion or the culpability of imperial Japan? If it does, Nishida’s notion of the absoluteness of the historical epoch is in sharp contrast to the history and the actions of the state or the communist party as understood by Merleau-Ponty in *Humanism and Terror*. Merleau-Ponty fully accepts a passage from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “Each self-consciousness aims at the destruction and death of the other.” He continues:

But consciousness can do nothing without its body and can only act upon others by acting on their bodies.... Thus history is essentially a struggle—the struggle of the master and the slave, the struggle between classes—and this is a necessity of the human condition; because of the fundamental paradox that man is an indivisible consciousness, no one is able to affirm himself except by reducing the others to objects.

Inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our lot.... Violence is the common origin of all regimes.... It is a law of human action that the present encroaches upon the future, the self upon other people.

Political problems come from the fact that we are all subjects and yet we look upon other people and treat them as objects. Coexistence among men seems therefore doomed to failure. For either some men exercise their absolute right as subjects in which case the others submit to their will and are not recognized as subjects. Or the whole social body is devoted to some providential destiny, some philosophical mission, but then this case reverts to the first; objective politics becomes subjective politics since it is really necessary that only a few be the incumbents of this destiny or mission. (Merleau-Ponty 1969, 102, 109, 111)

Of course, all these passages appear in quite different contexts where Merleau-Ponty discusses such problems as Marxism, history, the roles of the proletariat, the party, and the state. However, they seem to fundamentally challenge Nishida’s somewhat naive understanding of human

consciousness, history, and politics. The self-consciousness in the Hegelian assertion must be quite different from an act of self-consciousness in Nishida's earlier philosophy, which is expressed in the phrase "self's seeing itself in itself." Since this act of self-consciousness is not expansive or violent but self-intentional or self-sufficient, it does not aim at the destruction and death of the other.

In the first quotation, a kind of unity of consciousness and body is asserted. As far as human relations go, acting upon others is only possible through acting on their bodies. History is essentially a struggle between master and slave. The struggle is a necessity of the human condition. Merleau-Ponty then introduces what he calls "the fundamental paradox" that the only way of affirming oneself is by reducing others to objects. This is because man is an indivisible consciousness. Therefore, "inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our lot." There is no pure human action nor regime that does not incur violation on the future or on other people. Being subjects ourselves and treating others as objects is the origin of political problems.

Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, there seems to be no possibility of coexistence among peoples. If a social body, a regime, or an empire claims to be devoted to providential destiny or some mission in world history, there is no objective politics since only a few claim to lead in fulfilling a historical mission. He would argue that if Nishida took it as his mission to philosophize political slogans (as he perhaps wished to), would this be due to his philosophical naïveté?

If violence is our lot, we must disagree with Nishida when he states: "Politics is essentially... the art of the whole as historical species. It is not a simple morality.... Aiming to achieve human formation, politics must be absolutely moral" (nkz 12: 330). One has to replace the term "absolutely" with "relatively," even if politics is indeed moral.

Early I referred to the logic or forms of self-consciousness such as the "self's seeing itself in itself," active, self-determinative, self-cognitive, self-intentional, instantaneous, unique and complete, joyful, and religious. All these forms, as long as they are called forms, are intended to be universalistic, applicable to all human existence, whether Japanese, Korean, or Western. These forms of self-consciousness do not, however, allow

any room for contingency and ambiguity, let alone the culpability of a nation acting in national and international political matters.

What then were the reasons for his naiveté in developing a philosophy of history-politics? One of the key reasons might be his extension of the forms of self-consciousness to non-conscious phenomena such as historical epochs and the imperial way. Although the Nishida of “acts of self-consciousness” philosophy (prior to his “turn”) would not have accepted the Hegelian assertion that self-consciousness aims at the destruction and death of the other, he was persuaded to develop his political philosophy.

As was indicated earlier, due to the full reality or ontological primacy given to acts of self-consciousness, Nishida’s philosophy does not admit acts of self-consciousness and any realm of habitual sub-personal experiences of the world. The sources of sub-personal experiences for Nishida’s philosophy were to be living in Japan, feeling sadness (悲哀), and seeing various political slogans such as “All the world under one roof,” “National Polity,” and the “Imperial Way.” Having a close relationship with a powerful politician was also a source of sub-personal experience. These sources were less than absolute in the sense that all of them were historically given. Simply put, the fact is that imperial Japan was a given, that is, something that was not dependent on Nishida’s free choice. Being a Japanese, and having a close relationship to Konoe, were not objects that could be shaped by self-consciousness. Thus, forming political ideas by perceiving national events and encountering his/her own people is always contingent and incomplete.

In short, Merleau-Ponty conceives the world or the “phenomenal field” as “the horizon latent in all our experiences and itself ever-present and anterior to every determining thought” (1962, 92). At least for Nishida, being a Japanese under the imperial way itself constitutes a phenomenal field, that has had a substantial impact on his philosophy. Nishida does not appear to have been aware of this fact, nor of the fact that the forms of self-consciousness eliminated all contingencies from the phenomenal field, thus depriving it decisively and permanently of its anteriority. This may be a result of an implicit intention, or perhaps simply of his personal dislike of facing the transitory world head-on as it is. Thus, in Nishida’s philosophy, thought takes precedence over perception. If Merleau-Pon-

ty's theory of perception is true, then Nishida's ontology is fundamentally challenged.

I have used the word "turn" to identify the moment when Nishida extended the application of the forms of self-consciousness from acts of self-consciousness to non-conscious phenomena. In one of his most important essays expressing this turn, "Concerning Self-Consciousness," Nishida clearly indicates in this essay (and in previous essays which deal with the historical world) that he is "directly unifying self-consciousness and the historical world" (nkz 10: 515). As I have stated elsewhere, this short essay reveals not only Nishida's intent but also his assumption that the forms of self-consciousness, primarily distilled from his discussion of artistic creation and conscious phenomena, are applicable to non-conscious phenomena or events. I have called this turn "fundamentally inappropriate," or a wrong turn. A key question for evaluating Nishida's entire texts is, then, whether an act of self-consciousness and a historical epoch are indeed similar enough that his "direct union" is possible, as Nishida clearly assumed.

Living in Korea, Park Chong-hong must have heard and seen the dissatisfaction clearly demonstrated by many Koreans against President Park's regime in the 1970s. But Park appeared to believe in the president's policy for building a wealthy nation and a strong army. In this sense, his eyes were directed to only one side of the Korean reality. Even today, divisive debates on President Park's legacy in politics and economics continue. Politicians and academics have disparaged their opponents with polemicist cries of "leftist" or "rightist." I can only say to the extent that if our perception is perspectival, one can neither see the full reality nor claim absolute truth.

Concluding remarks

The foregoing study of Nishida and Park, based on a rather loose distinction of thinking and perceiving, led me to the conclusion that we are doing philosophy as embodied subjects, inseparably related to living in a specific time and place. It also appears that thinking and writing collude with the prevailing political ideology, which worms its

way into the deeper layers of a philosopher's body-mind. In this sense, the corporality of the prevailing ideology of Japan and Korea finds its way into our body-mind through perceiving, hearing, and even touching. Thus, we may say that a philosopher's life and thoughts are often interwoven.

Problems arise as the range of perception is usually far shorter than reading and thinking. Japanese and Koreans are not the authors of the world, and things and events that appear on our perceptual horizon are usually temporally and spatially given. More importantly, according to Merleau-Ponty, perception constitutes a sub-personal experience of the world, and percolates thinking, and in this sense may be considered "prior to every determining thought." In this respect, even people encountered exert a substantial influence on, or interfere with, thinking. Perceiving our own people and not perceiving others is one of the main reasons for letting nationalistic sentiments become naturally strong but fatally problematic: these sentiments are destined to become contingent, one-sided, and often violent. However, Nishida did not seem to realize that the "one roof" policy caused not only dissatisfaction but violence to the oppressed peoples of East Asia.

Contemporary Koreans seem to enjoy the diversity of their political views. But it is not the simple matter of living in Seoul, surrounded by conflicting but loud slogans, liberal and conservative, left and right. How can we accept the deficiency of our own perception and traverse or transcend physical distances to know the dissatisfaction and violence inflicted upon others by us? If this is an impossible dream, then what is the use of doing philosophy? I am occasionally persuaded to express political views, but without firm assurance.

Are the acts of self-consciousness understood in Nishida's early philosophy something like Buddhist liberation? Is it true that they do not aim at the destruction and death of the other? Was Nishida naive to extend the philosophy of the acts of self-consciousness to explain the place of other peoples in international politics? I am quite sceptical about any facile answers. One thing is certain, though: such key notions discussed in this article as consciousness, embodied subjects, and nationalism point to a problem of alterity that was not discussed thematically anywhere in Nishida's entire philosophical corpus nor in Park's philosophy of national

subjectivity. Unless we seriously consider and solve this problem, Nishidean-type ontology will fail to develop an ethics of the other.

References

Abbreviations

cWp 『朴鍾鴻全集』 [Collected works of Park Chong-hong], enlarged edition (Seoul: Minumsa, 1988).

nkz 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete works of Nishida Kitarō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965–1966).

Other Sources

Goto-Jones, C. S.

2005 *Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School and Co-Prosperity* (London: Routledge).

Ham Sok-hon 咸錫憲

1993 『咸錫憲全集』 [Collected works of Ham Sok-hon], (Seoul: Hangil-sa).

2001 *An Anthology of Ham Sok-hon* (Seoul: Samin).

Hegel, G. F. W.

1977 *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Heisig, J. W.

2001 *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Huffman, J. L., ed.

1998 *Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.).

Huh, Woo-sung

1990 "The Philosophy of History in the 'Later' Nishida: A Philosophical Turn," *Philosophy East and West* 40/3: 343–74.

James, William

1975 *Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

McClain, James L.

2002 *Japan: A Modern History* (New York: Norton and Company).

Maruyama, Masao and I. Morris (eds.)

1963 *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (London: Oxford University Press).

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice

1962 *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge).

1964a *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).

1964b *Signs*, trans. by R. C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).

1973 *Adventures of Dialectic*, trans. by J. Bien (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).

1969 *Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem*, trans. by J. O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Press).

Ōhashi Ryōsuke 大橋良介

2001 『京都學派と日本海軍』 [The Kyoto School and the Japanese Navy] (Tokyo: php Shinsho).

Scruton, R.

1982 *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (New York: Hill and Wang).

Yusa Michiko

2002 *Zen & Philosophy: An Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitarō* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press).

Contributors

Carl Becker is Professor at the Kokoro Research Center of Kyoto University, with a joint appointment in the Graduate School of Human and Environmental Sciences, where his research has focused on medical ethics and psycho-social support for medical staff and patients. He is a director of the Japan Society for Medicine and Philosophy, the Japan Society for Spiritual Care, the Japan Vihara and Buddhist Nursing Society, the Japan Society for Mind-Body Science, the Society for the History of Medicine, and the Japan Religious Studies Association. He serves on the editorial board of *Mortality* and the *Journal of Near-Death Studies*. In addition to dozens of articles and books in Japanese, his English books include *Breaking the Circle* (1993), *Asian and Jungian Views of Ethics* (1999), and *Time for Healing* (2003).

Chen Wei-fen 陳瑋芬 received her PhD from the Department of Chinese Philosophy and History at Kyūshū University, Japan, in 1999. She has since lectured at the Academia Sinica in Taiwan, where she is currently Associate Research Fellow. Her research focuses on modern Japanese Sinology, the history of Confucianism, and East-Asian intercultural studies. Her publications include 『近代日本漢學的「關鍵詞」研究——儒學及相關概念的嬗變』 [Confucian prints in modern Japan: The development of “essential concepts”] (2005); and 『西學之子——容閔與新島襄的異國經驗與文化認同』 [Sons of Western learning: Foreign experience and cultural identification in Yung Wing and Joseph H. Neesima] (2008). In 2006 she was awarded the Ta-You Wu Award for excellence in research, and in 2007 the Junior Researcher Award from the Academia Sinica.

Cheun g Ching-yuen 張政遠 is currently teaching in the Department of Philosophy, Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests are phenomenology, Japanese philosophy, and the thought of Nishida Kitarō. His published works on Nishida include “Life and To Live: An

Essay on Nishida's Philosophy of Life" (2003); 「生命現象をめぐって——西田幾多郎における生命の哲学」 [On the phenomena of life: Nishida Kitarō's philosophy of life] (2005); 「身体と道具——行為的直観の射程をめぐって」 [Body and tool: The possibilities of acting intuition] (2006); 「状況的行為としての行為的直観——主知主義の立場を超えて」 [Acting intuition as situated Action: Overcoming intellectualism] (2007); and 「西田幾多郎的現象學哲學」 [Nishida Kitarō's phenomenological philosophy] (2007).

Michel Dalissier is a Visiting Research Scholar at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto. He received the 2007 Shibusawa Claudel Prize for his Doctoral Dissertation: "Nishida Kitarō: a Philosophy of Unificatio ," and is currently working on the relations between Japanese and Western philosophies. His publications include: *Anfractuosité et unificatio . La philosophie de Nishida Kitarô* (2009); "Nishida, interprète de Bergson" (2007–2008); "La topologie philosophique: Un essai d'introduction à Nishida Kitarô" (2008); and 「西田幾多郎——窪みと統一」 [Nishida Kitarō: Unity and divide] (2008).

Huang Wen-hong 黃文宏 is Professor of Philosophy at the National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. He received his PhD in philosophy with a thesis on phenomenology at the University of Freiburg in 1998. The focus of his current research is the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō. His recent articles include 「西田幾多郎論實在與經驗」 [Nishida Kitarō on reality and experience] (2006); 「西田幾多郎與熊十力」 [Nishida Kitarō and Xiong Shi-li] (2007); 「西田幾多郎の宗教的世界の論理」 [Nishida Kitarō on the logic of the religious world] (2008); and 「《粹》的詮釋學」 [The hermeneutics of Iki] (2009).

Huh Woo-sung 許祐盛 is professor in the Department of Philosophy at Kyunghee University and director of the Institute for Nonviolence. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Hawai'i, Manoa. His publications include "The Philosophy of History in 'Later' Nishida: A Philosophic Turn" (1990); "Manhae's Understanding of Buddhism," (2000); "Gandhi and Manhae: 'Defending Orthodoxy, Rejecting Heterodoxy' and 'Eastern Ways, Western Instruments'" (2001); "A Monk of Mukti and Karma: The Thought and Life of Baik

Yongsung” (2005); and 『근대일본의 두 얼굴』 [Two faces of modern Japan: A study of Nishida’s Philosophy] (2000). He is the co-author of 『인간이란 무엇인가』 [What is a human being?] (1997).

Kim Tae-ho 金泰昊, a native of Seoul, Korea, received his PhD from the University of Tokyo in 2002 with a dissertation on Motoori Norinaga. He is currently a lecturer at the University of Tokyo and a research fellow at its Center for Philosophy. His publications include 「山鹿素行の回帰点——『四書句読大全 大学』における《公共底》の《格物》論」 [Yamaga Sokō’s turning point] (2008); “Two Criticisms of Wang Yangming: Commentaries on the notion of *gewu* by Toegye and Sokō” (2008); and 「伊藤仁斎の政治・学問観——『大学定本』における《正心》論弁諸相」 [Itō Jinzai’s view of politics and scholarship] (2009).

Ger eon Kopf received his PhD from Temple University and is currently Associate Professor for Asian and Comparative Religion at Luther College and a Visiting Associate Professor for Japanese Buddhism at the Centre of Buddhist Studies, the University of Hong Kong. As a research fellow of the Japan Foundation and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Research, he conducted research in 1993 and 1994 at Obirin University in Machida, and at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture in Nagoya from 2002 to 2004. He is currently working on a non-dualistic philosophy based on the work of Nishida and others of his circle including Takahashi Satomi, Tanabe Hajime, and Mutai Risaku. He is the author of *Beyond Personal Identity* (2001) and the co-editor of *Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism* (2009), in addition to which he has published numerous articles on the religious philosophies of Dōgen and Nishida.

Lam Wing-keung 林永強 is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Religious and Spirituality Education, The Hong Kong Institute of Education. His research interests lie in the philosophical interchange among the Japanese, Chinese, and Korean-speaking regions of the East, including the dialogue between the Kyoto School and contemporary Neo-Confucianism. His recent publications include “‘Rationality’ in history: Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zong-san” (2009); 「生命の学問としての哲学—西田幾多郎と牟宗三」 [Philosophy as the study of life: Nishida

Kitarō and Mou Zong-san] (2008); “Space in Japanese culture: A study of Watsuji Tetsurō’s *Fūdo*” (2008); 「佛教與基督教對話的詮釋問題: 阿部正雄の倒空の神」 [The hermeneutic question of Buddhist-Christian dialogue: On Abe Masao’s kenotic God] (2008); and 「西田幾多郎における『日本』——『日本文化の問題』を中心として」 [“Japan” in Nishida Kitarō: With a focus on *The Problem of Japanese Culture*] (2007).

John C. Maraldo is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of North Florida, and has held the Roche Chair in Interreligious Research at Nanzan University (2008–2009). His PhD dissertation from the University of Munich was published in 1974 as *Der hermeneutische Zirkel: Untersuchungen zu Schleiermacher, Dilthey und Heidegger*. He is coeditor and author (with J. G. Hart) of *The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger with Commentary*, and (with J. Heisig) of *Rude Awakenings: Zen, The Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism*. He authored the entry on “Nishida Kitarō” in the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, as well as numerous other articles on Japanese and continental philosophy and on Zen Buddhism. He is currently engaged in coediting *Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook* with James Heisig and Thomas Kasulis, in addition to working on alternatives to standard notions of agency, autonomy, normativity, and practice.

Nakajima Takahiro 中島隆博 is Associate Professor of Chinese Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy at the University of Tokyo. His publications include 『残響の中国哲学—言語と政治』 [The reverberation of Chinese philosophy: Language and politics] (2007) and *The Chinese Turn in Philosophy* (2007). His numerous articles include 「声の乱調——中国と女性」 [The hunting of voice: China and femininity] (2008); 「新儒家と仏教——梁漱溟、熊十力、牟宗三」 [Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism: Liang Shu-ming, Xiong Shi-li, and Mou Zong-san] (2007); 「不服従の遺産——1960年代の竹内好」 [The legacy of disobedience: Takeuchi Yoshimi in the 1960s] (2007); and 「鬼を打つ——白話、古文そして歴史」 [Da Gui: Baihua, Guwen, and history in Hu Shi] (2005).

Noe Keiichi 野家啓一 is Professor of Philosophy at Tōhoku University. He is one of the editors of 『西田哲学選集』 [Selected works on the philosophy of Nishida] (7 vols.) and 『京都哲学撰書』 [Selected works

on Kyoto School philosophy] (30 vols.). His research is focused on the philosophy of science, the philosophy of history, and Japanese philosophy. His published writings on Japanese philosophy include 「歴史的生命的の論理——西田幾多郎の生命論」 [The logic of historical life: Nishida's theory of life] (1996); 「歴史的實在の論理——西田幾多郎とブリッジマン」 [The logic of historical reality: Nishida Kitarō and Percy Bridgman] (2002); 「主体と環境の生命論——西田幾多郎と今西錦司」 [Life between subject and environment: Nishida Kitarō and Imanishi Kinji] (2002); and “Postmodernism and ‘Overcoming Modernity’” (2003). His recent monographs include 『物語の哲学』 [A philosophy of narrative] (2005); 『科学の解釈学』 [A hermeneutics of the sciences] (2007); and 『パラダイムとは何か』 [What is a paradigm?] (2008).

Ōhashi Ryōsuke 大橋良介 is a Professor at Ryūkoku University and currently is serving as President of the Nishida Philosophy Association. He received his PhD from the University of Munich in 1973 and his habilitation from the University of Würzburg in 1983. In addition to publishing 20 books, 5 of them in German, he is the editor of *Die Philosophie der Kyoto-Schule* (2009). He is one of the editors of the Japanese edition of the *Collected Works of Martin Heidegger*.

Sugawara Jun 菅原 潤 is Professor at Nagasaki University. He received his doctoral degree in philosophy from Tōhoku University in 1998. His publications include 『シェリング哲学の逆説』 [Paradoxes in Schelling's philosophy] (2001), 『環境倫理学入門』 [An introduction to environmental ethics] (2007), and 『昭和思想史とシェリング』 [Schelling and the history of ideas during the Shōwa period] (2008).

Taguchi Shigeru 田口 茂 is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Yamagata University. He received his doctoral degree in philosophy in 2003 from the University of Wuppertal, Germany. He is the author of *Das Problem des “Ur-Ich” bei Edmund Husserl: Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen “Nähe” des Selbst* (2006). His recent essays include “Individuation und Ich-Gemeinschaft: Das Problem der Vielheit der ichlichen Individuen bei Husserl” (2002); “Die doppelte Transzendenz des Lebens: Die Transzendenz des Ich und die Erfahrung des Anderen bei Husserl” (2006); 「西田幾多郎の自由意志論——自由と悪の問題をめぐる」 [Nishida Kitarō on free will: The Problem of freedom and

evil] (2006); and “The Transformed Concept of ‘Reason’ in Phenomenology according to Husserl and Levinas” (2007).

Jacynthe Tremblay is a lecturer at the East Asian Research Center, University of Montreal. She received her PhD in religious studies from the University of Montreal in 1990. From 1990 to 1992, she carried out post-doctoral research at the University of Tokyo. From 1992 to 1997, she was a research fellow at the University of Montreal. From 1997 to 2008, she lived in Japan and in China, continuing her research on Nishida Kitarō and modern Japanese philosophy. In addition to numerous articles, translations, and edited works, her own books include: *Finitude et devenir. Fondements philosophiques du concept de révélation chez Karl Rahner* (1992); *Nishida Kitarō. Le Jeu de l'individuel et de l'universel* (2000); *La Relation et son lieu* (2000); *Introduction à la philosophie de Nishida* (2007); *Auto-éveil et temporalité. Les Défis posés par la philosophie de Nishida* (2007); and *L'Être-soi et l'être-ensemble. L'Auto-éveil comme méthode philosophique chez Nishida* (2007).

Uehara Mayuko 上原麻有子 is Associate Professor at the School of Japanese Culture in Meisei University, Tokyo. She spent seventeen years in France, where she did doctoral studies in philosophy, social science, and translation studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris), concluding with a dissertation on “Traduire la philosophie japonaise: Formation des concepts et transformation de la langue dans l'œuvre de Nishida Kitarō, sa traduction en français.” Her writings include “The Conceptualization and Translation of *jikaku* and *jiko* in Nishida” (2006); “De la nature (*shizen*) au milieu (*kankyō*)” (2007); 「九鬼周造における女性的視点の可能性」 [Is there a feminist viewpoint in Kuki Shūzō?] (2008); “La tâche du traducteur en philosophie dans le Japon moderne” (2008); and 「九鬼周造の《偶然》と《名》——哲学から文芸論へ」 [Kuki Shūzō's “Naming” and “contingency”: From philosophy to literary theory] (2009).

Index of Personal Names

- Abe Masao 阿部正雄, 126, 166, 174,
 249, 296
 Abe, K., 112
 Amida (Buddha), Amitabha, Amitayus,
 52-4, 56, 58-9, 61, 107
 Anderson, Benedict, 82
 Anesaki Masaharu 姉崎正治, 45-6
 Aoki Takamaro 青木敬磨, 58-9, 63
 Appiah, Anthony, 89
 Araki, S., 94-5, 108
 Aries, P., 104, 109
 Aristotle, 12-14, 17-8, 28, 78, 140-2,
 144-5, 148, 161, 197, 214, 223, 226-7,
 237, 274-5
 Asai, K., 101, 109
 Ayer, A. J., 274

 Bacon, Francis, 204
 Baoji 寶積, 213
 Barnhart, Michael 109
 Baumann, Gerd, 89
 Becker, Carl, 3, 90-115, 108-9, 293
 Bellah, Robert, 39-40, 47-9
 Berger, D., 94, 109
 Bergson, Henri, 160, 164, 214, 218, 229,
 243-4, 248, 294
 Billeter, Jean-François, 214, 217, 221,
 225, 231, 238, 247
 Blocker, H. G., 169, 172, 174
 Böhme, Jacob, 138
 Bohr, Niels, 121
 Bolyai, János, 121
 Bridgman, Percy, 125, 297
 Brisson, Luc, 161, 164
 Brouwer, Luitzen, 121, 125
 Bu Nan 無難, 213
 Buddha, 26, 28, 42, 52-3, 56, 59-60,
 107, 215

 Cai Yuan-pei 蔡元培, 195-6, 204-6, 209
 Carnap, Rudolf, 274
 Carr, Brian, 166, 174
 Cassirer, Ernst, 274
 Cestari, Matteo, 18, 21
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 265
 Chan Wing-tsit 陳榮捷, 222-3, 246-7
 Chappell, David, 109
 Chen Ming 陳明, 39-40, 49
 Chen Wei-fen 陳瑋芬, 3, 195-210, 293
 Cheng Yi 程頤, 228-9
 Cheng, Anne, 212, 214-19, 221-3, 228,
 232-45, 247
 Cheung Ching-yuen 張政遠, 3-4, 165-75,
 293
 Chinul. See Pojo Chinul.
 Choi Han-gi 崔漢綺, 274
 Chu, H. F. K., 109
 Cicero, 197
 Cohen, Hermann, 214, 228, 274
 Confucius, 10-11, 38, 42-4, 48, 201,
 213-4, 220, 225, 229, 231

 Dai Zhen 戴震, 206
 Dalissier, Michel, 3, 211-50, 294
 Darwin, Charles, 173, 204
 de Broglie, Louis, 121, 126
 Dedekind, Richard, 227, 249
 Decken, A., 107, 109
 Derrida, Jacques, 52, 60-3, 81, 86
 Descartes, René, 16, 167-8, 204, 244-5
 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 208, 296
 Dilworth, David A., 154-7, 163-4, 175,
 249
 Dōgen 道元, 15-16, 247, 295
 Doi Takeo 土居健郎, 221
 Duméry, Henry, 55, 63

- Eckhart, 218
 Einstein, Albert, 121
 Eliade, Mircea, 58, 63
 Euthyphro, 10
 Ezrati, Milton, 91, 109

 Faure, Bernard, 248
 Fischer, Kuno, 200
 Foshay, T., 63–4
 Frege, Gottlob, 121, 247
 Fu, Charles Wei-hsun, 2, 263
 Fujii Kinjiro 藤井健治郎, 203, 209
 Fujii Sadakazu 藤井貞和, 70, 74
 Fujino, Yoshihisa, 109
 Fujita Masakatsu 藤田正勝, 135, 137–8, 148, 150, 159, 164, 260, 262
 Fujita Misao, 105–6, 110
 Fukui, S., 97, 108, 110
 Fukushima Kashizō 福島甲子三, 49

 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 29
 Gan Chun-song 干春松, 38–9, 49
 Giles, Dr. H., 44
 Glick, I. D., 101, 110
 Goldman, N., 110
 Gongsun Long 公孫龍, 227
 Goto-Jones, C. S., 272–3, 291
 Graham, Angus C., 226, 248
 Granet, Marcel, 214, 216, 248
 Grasset, B. 74
 Green, T. H., 170
 Groth-Marnat, G., 114
 Guo Xiang 郭象, 243–6

 Haldane, J. S., 125, 170
 Han Fei 韓非, 206, 230, 250
 Han Kangbo 漢墓帛, 239
 Han Sok-hon 咸錫憲, 273, 291
 Hanazawa Hidefumi 花澤秀文, 190, 192
 Hanson, N. R., 125
 Harada Kumao 原田熊雄, 270
 Harris, P. B., 92, 110
 Hartmann, Eduard von, 200, 274
 Hase Shōtō 長谷正當, 58, 63
 Hattori Unokichi 服部宇之吉, 43–9, 53, 63
 Hegel, G. W. F., 30, 32, 77, 80, 178, 200, 209, 217, 223–4, 225, 248–9, 272, 274, 278, 286–8, 291
 Heidegger, Martin, 15, 64, 214, 218, 221, 238, 262, 274, 276, 278, 296–7
 Heine, Steven, 2, 263
 Heinrich Rickert, 228
 Heisenberg, Werner, 121
 Heisig, James W., 3–4, 21, 81, 89, 169, 174, 211, 214, 218, 247–9, 291, 296
 Henmi, T., 97, 110
 Hepburn, J. C., 197
 Hérail, Francine, 221, 230, 248
 Hilbert, David, 121
 Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松 渉, 176–7, 184, 191–2
 Hisamatsu Shin'ichi 久松真一, 85
 Hitler, Adolf, 277
 Hoelter, J. W., 105, 110
 Hoffma, Martin L., 69, 74
 Hokujo Tokiyuki 北条時敏, 119
 Holmes, L. D., 91, 110
 Hönen-bō Genkū 法然房源空, 51–6, 58, 60–4
 Hori Koretaka 堀 維孝, 270
 Hori Tatsunosuke 堀達之助, 197
 Huainanzi 淮南子, 226, 233, 247, 249
 Huang Kan 皇侃, 44
 Huang Wen-hong 黃文宏, 3, 135–6, 294
 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, 206
 Huang-Lao 黃老, 229
 Huffma, J. L., 291
 Huh Woo-sung 許祐盛, 3, 264–92, 294
 Hui Shi 惠施, 215, 222
 Huilin 慧林, 212
 Huineng 慧能, 213
 Huiyuan 慧遠, 233
 Husserl, Edmund, 27, 54–5, 64, 123, 167, 238, 242, 297–8

 Ibaragi, D., 249
 Ikeda, M., 102, 111
 Imaizumi, Y., 93, 111
 Imanishi Kinji 今西錦司, 297
 Inaga Shigemi 稻賀繁実, 211
 Indra, 78

- Inotani Kazuo 猪谷一雄, 211
 Inoue Enryō 井上圓了, 201–2, 205, 209
 Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, 41, 45–50, 71, 74, 195–203, 208–9
 Ishigami Yutaka 石神 豊, 136, 150
 Ishii Norimichi 石井教道, 63, 94, 111
 Ishiyama, F., 96, 111
 Isomae Jun'ichi 磯前順一, 41–2, 50
 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎, 65, 68, 197, 209, 295
 Itō Kichinosuke 伊藤吉之助, 169
 Izutsu Toshihiko 井筒俊彦, 223, 225, 232–3, 240–1, 247–8

 Jagger, Carol, 113
 James, William, 122, 165, 291
 János Bolyai, 121
 Jaspers, Karl, 274
 Jesus, 42
 Jia Yi 賈誼, 196
 Jiang Qing 蔣庆, 38, 50
 Jullien, François, 73, 75

 Kalish, R. A., 107, 111
 Kamenarovic, Ivan P., 224, 248
 Kang Xiao-guang 康曉光, 38, rr
 Kang You-wei 康有為, 204, 216, 246
 Kant, Immanuel, 28, 73, 80, 140, 142–4, 146, 156, 204, 225, 228, 274
 Kasulis, Thomas P., 78, 89, 296
 Katō Shūichi 加藤周一, 55, 63
 Katsuki Jōkō 香月乘光, 54–5, 63–4
 Katz, Robert L., 69, 75
 Kierkegaard, Søren, 22
 Kim Tae-ho 金泰昊, 3, 65–75, 295
 Kimura Ōtarō 木村鷹太郎, 205
 Kitahara, M., 95, 111
 Kitano Hiroyuki 北野裕通, 254, 256, 262
 Knight, J., 114
 Kondō Noriyuki, 103, 111
 Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿, 269–70, 277, 288
 Kopf, Gereon, 3, 76–89, 295
 Kosaka Kunitsugu 小坂国継, 170, 174
 Kōsaka Masaaki 高坂正顕, 176, 186
 Kouo Siang. *See* Guo Xiang

 Kōyama Iwao 高山岩男, 176, 192
 Kraut, Richard, 12–13
 Kristeva, Julia, 89
 Kubo Tenzui 久保天随, 205
 Kuki, Shūzō 九鬼周造, 159–60, 163, 298
 Kumar, A., 105, 112
 Kurata, J. H., 100, 111
 Kurosawa, H., 101, 111
 Kurozumi Makoto 黒住 真, 68, 75
 Kwan Tze-wan 關子尹, 254–5, 263

 Lafitt, Jean-Jacque, 247
 Lam Wing-keung 林永強, 3–4, 251–63, 295
 Lao Zhuang 老庄, 206
 Laozi 老子, 22, 24–5, 197, 212, 217, 223, 225, 230–3, 236, 238–1, 244, 246–7, 249
 Lask, Emil, 226
 Lee Seung-hwan, 212, 224, 248
 Legge, James, 246–7
 Lei Guo-shan 雷国山, 211
 Leibniz, 78, 168, 228, 245
 Lester, D., 92, 95, 112
 Levinas, Emmanuel, 52, 58, 60–1, 64, 298
 Li Ao 李翱, 221
 Liang Qi-chao 梁啓超, 204, 210, 216
 Liang Shu-ming 梁漱溟, 296
 Liezi 列子, 219, 222, 225, 231, 233, 237, 242–3, 247
 Linji Yixuan 臨濟義玄, 213
 Lipps, Theodor, 229
 Liu Shi-pei 劉師培, 204–5
 Liu, Lydia H. 劉禾, 196, 210
 Lobachevsky, Nikolai, 121
 Long, B. D., 112
 Long, Gongsun, 227
 Long, S. O., 110, 112,
 Lotze, Rudolf Hermann, 214
 Löwith, Karl, 254
 Loy, David, 62, 64
 Lynn, Richard J., 236, 238–40, 249

 MacArthur, Douglas, 104
 Machida Sōhō 町田宗鳳, 58–9, 64, 295

- Mahalingam, Indira, 174
 Major, John S., 233, 249
 Mao Ze-dong 毛澤東, 37
 Maraldo, John C., 2-3, 7-21, 228, 249, 252-4, 260, 262-3, 296
 Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男, 68, 75, 268, 292
 Marx, Karl, 178
 Matsubayashi, Kozo, 92, 112
 Matsusaki Minoru 全先 実, 200, 210
 Mattéi, Jean-François, 155, 164
 McClain, J. L., 270, 291
 McMordie, 105, 112
 Mencius. *See* Mengzi
 Mengzi 孟子, 38, 66-7, 73, 75, 83, 197, 209, 213, 216-18, 221-2, 247
 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 269, 282-8, 290, 292, 295
 Mikami, K., 101, 103, 112
 Miki Kiyoshi 三木 清, 155, 164
 Mill, J., 197
 Minagawa Kien 皆川淇園, 213
 Minobe Tatsukichi 美濃部達吉, 46
 Minowa, M. 93, 112
 Monier-Williams, Monier, 234, 249
 Morioka Kenji 森岡健二, 196, 210
 Morita Shiryū 森田子龍, 17-8, 21
 Morris, I., 292
 Motohashi, Y., 95, 112
 Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長, 65-73, 75, 157, 295
 Mou Zong-san 牟宗三, 255, 257-8, 263, 295-6
 Mozi 墨子, 206, 213, 225, 227
 Murata, K., 108
 Mussolini, Benito, 275-6
 Mutai Risaku 務台理作, 76-7, 81-9, 295

 Nagatomo, I., 92, 113
 Nagayama, K., 101, 113
 Nakagawa Hisayasu 中川久定, 221, 224, 249
 Nakagawa, Y., 101, 113
 Nakajima Takahiro 中島隆博, 3, 37-50, 296
 Nakamura Masanao 中村正直, 197
 Nakamura, K., 93, 113,
 Nanquan Puyuan 南泉普願, 213
 Ng Yu-kwan 吳汝鈞, 258, 263
 Nichiren 日蓮, 42, 54
 Nicholas of Cusa, 31
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 22, 275-6
 Nishi Amane 西 周, 1, 197-9, 202, 212, 253-4, 256-7, 262-3
 Nishida Aranori 西田新登, 213
 Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎, 1-3, 16-18, 21, 25, 51, 56-60, 64, 76-89, 117, 119-175, 188-9, 191, 198-9, 211-3, 241-50, 258, 260-61, 263-73, 281-98
 Nishimura Shigeki 西村茂樹, 207
 Nishisaka, S., 115
 Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治, 16, 25-6, 32-3, 153, 176, 212, 249
 Nitta Yoshihiro 新田義弘, 148, 150
 Nobechi Tōyō 野辺地東洋, 169, 175
 Noda, F., 93, 113
 Noe Keiichi 野家啓一, 3, 119-26, 173, 175, 296
 Nogi Maresuke 乃木希典, 97
 Nonaka Jun 野中 準, 207-8, 210

 Ōgyū Sorai 荻生徂徠, 19, 68, 172
 Ōhashi Ryōsuke 大橋良介, 3, 22-33, 143, 151, 254, 256-7, 260, 263, 292, 297
 Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, 109
 O'Leary, Joseph, S., 249
 Ōnishi Hajime 大西 祝, 203, 210

 Pak Tong-kwan, 230-1, 249
 Pan Gui 盤珪, 213
 Park Chong-hong 朴鍾鴻, 264-5, 268, 274, 289, 291
 Park Chung-hee, 266, 273, 279, 280
 Parry, Richard, 13-14, 17, 19
 Paulsen, Friedrich, 205
 Pei Wei 裴頤, 225
 Perler, Dominik, 3
 Plato, 11, 78, 155, 164
 Plotinus, 52
 Pojo Chinul, 普照知訥, 274
 Pu Yi 溥儀, 47

Qing Jiang, 38, 50

Ranum, P. M., 109

Reynolds, D. K., 111

Rickert, Heinrich, 228, 274

Robine, Jean-Marie, 91, 113

Robinet, Isabelle, 243, 250

Rockett, I. R. H., 95, 113

Romano, Claude, 237

Rousseau, Jean Jaques, 40, 50, 204

Rōyama Masamichi 蠟山政道, 277

Royce, Josiah, 227, 249

Ruan Ji 阮籍, 225

Russell, Bertrand, 121, 274

Saito Yasuhiko, 113

Sakabe Megumi 坂部 恵, 238, 250

Śākyamuni, 53, 212

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 85

Satan, 171

Savishinsky, J. S., 104, 114

Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 262, 296

Schrödinger, Erwin, 121

Schumaker, J. F., 105–6, 114

Scruton, R., 265, 292

Sengzhao 僧肇, 213

Shandao 善導, 51, 54, 58

Shao Yong 邵雍, 219, 234–5, 246

Shibata Shōkichi 柴田昌吉, 198

Shibusawa Eiichi 澁沢榮一, 45, 294

Shimomura Toratarō 下村寅太郎, 175–6

Shinran 親鸞, 33, 42, 57

Sidgwick, Henry, 202, 210

Smith, Colin, 292

Smith, G. S., 113

Snyder, M. L., 94, 114

Socrates, 9–11, 16, 42

Sōda Kiichirō 左右田喜一郎, 146

Sorel, Georges E., 276

Spencer, Herbert, 204

Spinoza, Baruch, 78, 227

Starling, C. L., 169, 172, 174

Sueki Takehiro 末木剛博, 149, 151

Sugawara Jun 菅原 潤, 3, 176–92, 192, 297

Sugisawa, H., 96, 114

Suh, G. H., 109

Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙, 56, 59, 64

Suzuki Shigetaka 鈴木成高, 176–7, 180–92

Tachibana Takashi 立花 隆, 114

Taguchi Shigeru 田口 茂, 3, 51–64, 297

Takahashi Kimiaki 高橋公明, 185, 192

Takahashi Satomi 高橋里美, 86, 136–7, 295

Takahashi, Y., 94, 96, 100, 109, 114

Takeuchi D. T., 101, 114,

Takeuchi Seichi 竹内整一, 200, 250

Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内 好, 191, 296

Takeuchi Yoshinori 武内義範, 249

Tamura Enchō 田村圓澄, 54, 64

Tan Sitong 譚嗣同, 216, 247

Tanabe Hajime 田辺 元, 27, 51, 60, 64, 76, 80–6, 88–9, 188–9, 191, 295

Tanaka Kyūbun 田中久文, 149, 151

Tang Jun-yi 唐君毅, 219, 250, 255

Tatai, K., 95, 114

Tōjō Hideki 東條英機, 270

Tomatsu, Y., 64

Tozer, Henry J., 50

Traphagan, 96, 114

Tremblay, Jacynthe, 3, 127–34, 227, 298

Tsomo, Karma Lekshc, 109

Tsubouchi, R., 103, 115

Tsuchiya Kōdō 土屋光道, 59, 64

Tsuda Mamichi 津田真道, 253

Tsunoda Ryūsaku 角田柳作, 174

Tucker, John, 19

Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三, 273

Uchitomi, Y., 100, 115

Ueda K., 93, 115,

Ueda Shizuteru 上田閑照, 261, 263

Ueda Yoshifumi 上田義文, 26, 33

Uehara Mayuko 上原麻有子, 3, 152–64, 298

Uesugi Shinkichi 上杉愷吉, 70, 75

Utoguchi, K., 115

Vandermeersch, 224, 250

Vico, Giambattista, 28

Viglielmo, Valdo H., 249

Von Ranke, Leopold, 177, 181, 186, 188, 267, 282

Vrin, J., 64, 249

Wang Bi 王弼, 225, 234–6, 238–49

Wang Tian-cheng 王天成, 50

Wang Yangming 王陽明, 18–19, 213, 217, 222–4, 246–7, 295

Warren, W. G., 114

Watanabe, N., 115

Watson, Burton, 215, 230, 247, 250

Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎, 42–4, 50, 208, 210, 296

Watts, J., 53, 64

Wenjin, 263

Werner Heisenberg, 121

White, David, 4

Wilson, Woodrow, 267–8

Wimberley, H., 114

Wittgenstein, 274

Wolf, 93, 115

Wōnhyo 元曉, 274

Wu, Emperor of Han 漢武帝, 237

Wundt, Wilhelm, 166, 200

Xie 謝, 66

Xiong Shi-li 熊十力, 294

Xunzi 荀子, 83, 213

Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行, 68, 295

Yamamoto Ryōkichi 山本良吉, 270

Yamamoto, T., 94, 112, 115

Yamashita Masao 山下正男, 246

Yan Fu 嚴復, 216

Yang Guo, 225

Yi Cheng, 228–9

Yi Hwang (Toe-gye) 李滉 (退溪), 274

Yi I (Yul-gok) 李耳 (栗谷), 274

Yi Jia, 196

Yonetani Masafumi 米谷匡史, 180, 192

Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造, 277

Young, Iris Marion, 89

Yu Lichu 俞正燮, 206

Yuasa Yasuo 湯淺泰雄, 16

Yung Wing 容闕, 293

Yusa Michiko 遊佐道子, 174–5, 213, 250, 284, 292

Zalta, Edward N., 13, 19

Zendō. *See* Shandao.

Zengzi 曾子, 215

Zhang Zai 張載, 218–19, 221, 247

Zhao Zhou 趙州, 213

Zheng Jiadong, 225, 250

Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤, 221, 234–5, 247

Zhou Hai-chun 周海春, 254–5, 263

Zhu Xi 朱熹, 19, 66–8, 70, 72–3, 204, 222–3, 233

Zhuangzi 莊子, 22, 25, 213–5, 217–19, 221–2, 225, 231, 233, 235, 237–8, 243–44, 246–7

Zisi 子思, 213