This article looks at religious and semi-religious paraphernalia in everyday life from the perspective of disposal. Recent research in religious studies and anthropology has focused on the ways in which beliefs are performed through religious objects. But what happens to the object that is not performed? What notions of materiality do they bring into play? By using the notion of migawari (body substitution) and ethnographic vignettes, I argue that talismans and amulets become “believing substitutes” that allow for an externalization of belief altogether. They become problematic again at the point of disposal. In particular, in the case of dolls, where body substitution acquires a literal sense, questions of the relationship between dolls and their owners, and of their value and inalienability, add to the dolls’ ambiguity. Memorial rites for dolls instill a sense of closure for participants by appealing to orthopraxy rather than by addressing beliefs concerning dolls.

**KEYWORDS:** materiality—orthopraxy—belief—substitution—dolls—migawari—kuyō
What is the relationship between religious objects and beliefs, between the materiality of things and the immaterial idea? There are, broadly speaking, two ways of approaching this question in the anthropology of religion. Either religious objects are understood as expressions of cognitively held beliefs, or, conversely, belief emerges as the result of practices involving religious objects.

For the former to work, several conceptual accommodations are required. For example, to treat religious objects as mere expressions of belief is part of the Protestant strategy to decontaminate matter from its more contagious Catholic forms in which the sacred can appear in the material shape of relics. Objects of belief are therefore based on a belief in objects. Webb Keane calls this “semiotic ideology,” a system of assumptions that define what counts as real presence and what counts as sign (2005, 194). These semiotic ideologies are there to create stable links between the signifier and the signified, between the material and the numinous world. Such settlements are, however, rarely stable; things always exceed their own signification (Nakamura 2005, 23).

The second approach, which is concerned with the material and bodily practices of believers rather than with cognitive content, has been particularly fruitful in the study of Japanese religions, where the notion of belief has long been a thorny issue, especially in postwar anthropology (Isomae 2012; Fitzgerald 2003). This shift in focus allows the circumvention of belief as a core concept in the analysis of indigenous practice, addressing instead “the conditions that shape the feelings, senses, spaces, and performances of belief, that is, the material coordinates or forms of religious practice” (Morgan 2010, 6). Such a re-focusing not only brings matter back into the fold, it also re-centers the study of religion on practice:

Rematerializing the study of religion from its long-term commitment to scripture and theology means returning texts to their contexts of objects, images, and spaces wherein texts are found and used. There we also find, animating this whole magnificent panoply of things, the actual people who produce objects and then render them dynamic in practice. (Zito 2011, 20)

Religious objects, then, become things to believe with—material entities through which belief is created and performed—as opposed to the more Protestant view that ritual enacts beliefs that are already cognitively held (Bachnik 1995, 109).
But what happens to such objects when they are not used, enacted, or part of a performance? If the tenets of practice theory are strictly applied, would they then not cease to be religious objects? This article explores what happens to religious objects when they are simply left to their own devices in Japanese households. I am following the trail of Fabio Rambelli, who cogently argues that “being a Buddhist” in Japan means foremost that one handles Buddhist objects (2007, 2). My contention is that, rather than describing these household items as objects of belief, evidence of belief in objects, or objects to believe with, we can more accurately understand them as “objects that believe.” By this I do not mean that they are animated entities with agency and subjectivity, but that they allow for an externalization of cognitive belief altogether.

Methodologically, my argument is based on the attempt to reverse engineer a theory of religious materiality, not from doctrinal notions and disputes but from the vantage point of disposal. What notion of materiality emerges from such a shift in perspective? What is stuck in matter that makes it so difficult to dispose of? And why do concerns with orthopraxy return as soon as it comes to getting rid of things? Disposal in this context is like an ethno-methodological experiment; what the thing was or meant (or what it is) is only revealed in a moment of crisis, when the existence of the thing is threatened. The method I am proposing here is therefore a kind of negative ethnography in two distinct senses: first, because it is based on removing the things that one wants to understand, thus eliminating the phenomenon under inquiry, and, second, because it is based on that which is not voiced or articulated.

The fieldwork data stem from a larger project dealing with hoarding in a Japanese context, over eighteen months of fieldwork in Tokyo (2006–2007) and more intermittent bursts of fieldwork from 2010 to 2013 when I was working in the Kansai area. The first period consisted mainly of helping people to tidy up and get rid of accumulated stuff (Gygi 2011). The second, while continuing with collaborative cleanups, was more focused on understanding the pathways to disposal (Gygi 2018). There was no particular focus on religious paraphernalia, so the data presented here are in a way a side product of understanding the processes of disposal more generally. My interest in memorial rites for things was triggered by the desire of my participants to find a mechanism for what Ikeuchi calls “voluntary loss” (じはつてきそうしつ 自発的喪失; 2010, 169).

A focus on the process of disposal, during which an object is moved into the category of “no longer useful,” is particularly interesting in the context of sacred objects, because of the widespread assumption that sacred objects become inalienable and therefore “terminal commodities” (Kopytoff 1986, 75), that is, objects that can no longer be exchanged further. Memorial rites that destroy the objects are one way to protect this terminal commodity status. In my own fieldwork this was not always the case, however, and much of
the emotional ambiguity my participants felt was informed by the possibility of alienating inalienable things. This mostly applied to objects that were created to be enduring presences in people’s lives, such as dolls. Ephemeral sacred objects such as talismans and amulets were expected to circulate between the temporary owner and the institution that issued them—a shrine or a temple—on a yearly basis, therefore creating a lasting exchange relationship. As material traces of the power of the entity the talismans participate in, they have to be renewed and redistributed, leading to spiritual prosperity on the side of the supplicant and economic prosperity on the side of the institution. At least this is what a description of the religious system would look like from the perspective of exchange theory.

The concerns of my participants, however, did not map neatly on to these processes of exchange, nor did they match with ideas of the talisman as distributed sacred power. What struck me during my fieldwork was the difference between the forgotten, “unperformed” object whose presence is not imbued with any significance and the same object that on the brink of disposal suddenly becomes “sticky.” My argument is that this only seems contradictory if we assume objects to be expressions of beliefs that are otherwise held cognitively. To conceptualize these objects as embodiments of sacred power is to map both the spiritual and material connection between the objects and the numinous entity they represent, from the entity’s point of view. The objects therefore appear as the literal body (\textit{bunshin 分身}) of the \textit{kami 神} or \textit{hotoke 仏}. By contrast, my hypothesis is that we can gain a better understanding of these objects and their place in people’s everyday lives if we think of them less as embodiments of sacred power, but rather as \textit{bunshin} that believe in lieu of the person who owns them. By conceptualizing these objects as body substitutes for the believer rather than the believed-in, we can think through the semiotic believer-divinity link from the position of the person, rather than the divine.\footnote{I do not argue here that this is a better understanding of materiality in a Japanese context than an account based on doctrinal exegesis. Rather than to assume a culturally specific understanding of materiality, my argument is that from the vantage point of disposal, the materiality of religious objects appears as a particular formation. This may go against recent trends in anthropology that focus on the nonhuman and/or post-human. But as an ethnographer my first allegiance is to those who participated in my research, most of whom were humans.}

Recent academic work on semiotics in Buddhism has mostly focused on the material and semiotic links between the unconditioned buddha-nature and its representation (Rambelli 2013, 37). Ironically, this focus on doctrine and concept has left the relationship between these sign-objects and their owners to the more literal-minded sociologists of religion. Much of the religious studies research on Japan is informed by the particular semiotic ideology of sociological research in which religious objects become readable as expressions of
religious belief (Anderson 1991, 369). But what if we posit a different relationship between external/material objects and internal/cognitive beliefs? What if, rather than a relationship of representation in which what is inside corresponds to what is outside and vice-versa, we assume that the underlying relationship is one of substitution?

I am inspired to argue this by Takie Sugiyama Lebra’s example of the cultural idiom of *migawari* 身代わり, which can be translated as either body substitution or body surrogacy:

In interviewing a woman in her sixties I found her firmly dedicated to a Shinto sect without being a member of it. It turned out that her action had nothing to do with her own faith but was a surrogate devotion for the sake of her deceased mother, who had been a devout member. She missed her mother deeply and became a religious successor without, however, losing her nonreligious identity. (Sugiyama Lebra 1994, 109–10)

In this case, the surrogacy is not just a question of social role, but can express another person’s faith or sincerity. The supplicant does not pray for others, but instead of them, a common practice at Shinto shrines. While the idiom of *migawari* allows for persons to be substituted by others, these others must not necessarily be human. “Body substitution” with material surrogates is an important way to safely communicate with the divine. The body substitute enables contact by being exposed to the presence of the deity, but the *honnin* 本人 (literally “original person,” meaning the person who is doubled by the *migawari*) remains protected from the forces thus unleashed. The doubling of the body that allowed impurities to be removed and contained is one of the enduring models for rites of purification that consist of a complex intermingling of Shinto, Daoist, and Buddhist beliefs (Law 1997, 34). In early modern Japan, *migawari* talismans emerged as a popular form of material culture that would protect the person by offering a double, to which negative forces could attach themselves (Bond 2014, 122). Building on traditional practices, I shall argue that in postwar Japan questions of religious belief more broadly have been dealt with in an analogous manner. In other words, what if we do not assume that the sign instantiates a presence of that which is absent, but instead that it creates a distance of that which is otherwise too closely present?

If belief is usually understood as a vertical relationship between an immanent material object and a transcendental idea held as a cognitive disposition, then the approach taken here is more horizontal: the nature and the content of beliefs change as a function of distance from the religious center from which power emanates.

2. This reference is to the Gedatsu kai 解脱会 new religious movement founded in 1929 that incorporates elements of Shinto and Shingon Buddhism.
The material objects serve as vehicles whose geographical distribution mark the reach of a religious institution. Following this idea, I will first look at how materiality is understood at Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines and then at the ways in which certain objects have been dealt with in ethnographic writings on Japan. After that I will present three ethnographic vignettes from my own fieldwork that deal with the more or less ephemeral sacred and how to get rid of it.

Mapping Object-Subject Relations in Buddhism and Shinto: Bunshin Versus Migawari

While a detailed understanding of Buddhist and Shinto notions of materiality is important to understand objects and their presence in a Japanese context, these are formulated from the point of view of religious institutions or even from the point of view of the entities that are enshrined. Rambelli (2001, 3), for example, argues that the Buddhist ambivalence towards the material world is a result of the different answers that can be given to the question of the scope of the dharma. In other words, to what degree does buddha-nature penetrate the cosmos? Does it extend only to sentient beings, or do non-sentient entities such as plants and rocks have the same potential for enlightenment? Rambelli describes the complex chains of transformations that shape Buddhist materiality:

The idea that material donations … to religious institutions and their members (the sangha) would generate spiritual benefits is crucial [to] Buddhist materiality because it means that material objects can be transfigured through ritual action into sacred entities…. This circular transformation of the material into the spiritual and the profane into the sacred and back forms the basis of the sacred Buddhist economy, in which a community of renunciants survived… thanks to laypeople’s donations in exchange for “spiritual” services.

(Rambelli 2007, 68)

While objects and services are exchanged in a circle of transmutation, Buddhist icons exist at the boundary of the ontological registers of the conditioned/unconditioned buddha-nature and therefore can be seen as real presences in the world (Faure 1998, 784); they make the power of the sacred visible, tangible, and material.

In Shinto, on the other hand, the kami (deities) were worshiped in shrines that served as temporary shelters. They were invited and hosted in yorishiro 依り代, particular objects that can be man-made (a mirror, or a folded piece of paper) or natural (a large tree, rock, or another scenic element of nature). It was perhaps only after Buddhist monasteries started changing the religious landscape in the sixth century that shrines became permanent structures to provide housing for the deities (who still required enticement to manifest). However, once settlement was achieved, mobility became a major concern for both Buddhism and Shinto.
As the distinction between sacred and secular spaces gained traction, the sacred needed to be mobile to extend its reach. This is evident in Shinto shrine festivals during which the deities are translated into portable shrines and are carried into the communities of worshipers to protect and bestow merit. Although some argue that Shinto does not have the independent doctrinal apparatus to make it into a religion in the strict sense, different branches started to spread around Japan with the development of the road network and pilgrimages as an early form of religious tourism. Portable sacred objects that could be installed in shrine branches in other places in Japan necessitated a more technical understanding of their relationship to the original sacred entity and its embodiment (see Sugahara 1996 for an account of how Shinto branches adopted Buddhist doctrine).

In her ethnography of Inari worship, Karen Smyers argues that the Inari cult spread across Japan because its main centers of worship allowed the spiritual essence of the Inari deity to be apportioned:

Inari has been divided and re-enshrined with far greater ease and frequency than other Shinto kami, and this may in part account for its great diversity. In this division the original kami remains in place in his shrine, but a portion of his spirit (wakemitama, bunrei 分霊) is ritually separated and enshrined in a new location. The technical term for this re-enshrinement is kanjō 労請. Priests explain it as something akin to lighting a new candle from a burning one: the light of the first is in no way diminished as it becomes two. (Smyers 1996, 89)

The wakemitama 分け御魂 is a portion of the deity itself and therefore considered to be alive in its new abode. This suggests a fractal relationship to the original kami in which the part contains the whole, as opposed to being a part of a greater whole.3

A similar relationship between a numinous entity and its material trace is apparent in the term bunshin, literally “divided body.” Reader (1991b, 177) translates it as “offshoot” of either kami or hotoke. Different from the relics in Catholicism that work in a pars pro toto logic in which the notion of sacred power is based on the finite body of the saint and their personal objects, bunshin do not diminish the power of the deity but distribute it in material form. The power of the entity (whether Buddhist or Shinto matters very little to the worshiper who seeks assistance) can be acquired through buying amulets (ofuda お札) or talismans (omamori お守り). These talismans are usually made from a piece of wood or paper inscribed with the name of the deity or a short invocation, put into a brocade pouch which again bears an inscription of the place of origin.

3. Smyers points out that kanjō 勧請 is originally a Buddhist term that meant “to request a sermon from Buddha with a sincere heart” and later “to call Buddhas to descend to an altar.” In Japan’s syncretistic climate, the term came to mean “to enshrine a kami or a Buddha for the first time” (Smyers 1996, 89).
and the efficacy of the talisman (traffic safety, examination success, and convalescence from illness are common themes). The inner contents of the talismans remain hidden and one is not supposed to open them, lest their efficacy should be undermined:

The person who acquires them, then, does not receive a piece of wood or paper but a charged concretisation of power, the essence not simply of the kami or Buddha’s power and compassion but of the entity itself. Thus they, the kami and Buddhas, may be carried with one or kept in the home or elsewhere to bring in good fortune, ward off spiritual impediments and absorb bad luck that otherwise would afflict the person concerned. Unlike statues, however, their power and efficacy are transient: having absorbed bad luck or having opened the way to good, they may need to be changed. The general custom (encouraged by shrines and temples, for whom the sale of amulets and the like can be an important element in their economies) is to change them yearly, with the major period of exchange being at New Year. (Reader 1991b, 178)

In contrast to the material connection to a numinous entity that has to be renewed and replaced to remain efficacious, the notion of bunshin has also been used to refer to fractal relationships of a different kind. In the theology of the new religion Yamakage-Shinto for example, human beings are understood to contain bunrei of deities within their bodies (Yamakage 2010, 26). Furthermore, Sugiyama Lebra argues that the relationship between mother and child can also be understood as a bunshin relationship in which the mother’s sense of self and her purpose in life (ikigai 生き甲斐) is felt as “being one with her child”:

We might look at the instances of divorce avoidance not only from the standpoint of the child’s welfare but also from the view of the child as bunshin (split part) of the mother’s body, in light of the mother’s feeling of inseparability. (Sugiyama Lebra 1984, 163)

Tanaka Senichi uses the term bunshin to refer to the relationship between an artisan and their instruments (dōgu 道具), which, having been used with affection for many years, become one with the artisan’s body. They are, therefore, treated differently from other objects of everyday use (Tanaka 1987, 8). In the case of both the mother and the artisan, what is described as bunshin is an extension of the original body from the point of view of the subject. There is a further category of smaller objects that complicate the picture even more, the broad and somewhat vague engimono 縁起物. Engimono are auspicious objects that are both decorative and symbolic, sometimes taking the form of miniatures and sometimes that of toys or zodiac animals. They are sometimes associated

with temple and shrine fairs and double as talismans. Indeed, Kyburz (1994, 8) seeks to explain them by reference to the karmic links they embody, when he translates the word as “material link.” Their auspicious nature has different sources. Sometimes it is an association by homonym as in the example of the frog (*kaeru* 蛙), whose Japanese name is homonymous with “to return” (*kaeru* 帰る). Sometimes it is a metonymic link, as is the case with the rake, the motion of which suggests scooping up positive benefits. They are usually made from widely available materials such as wood or papier-mâché.

**Ethnographic Accounts of the Material Culture of Luck**

If we move away from religious centers, explanations in terms of belief weaken considerably. Working in the ethnographic mode, Tanabe and Reader provide an explanation of why people buy talismans and amulets in terms of psychological well-being, a feeling of safety (*anshin* 安心) that is only indirectly linked to an actual “religious” belief. Rather, the sense of security is created by attributions through which a traffic safety talisman appears as a sign of the taxi driver’s conscientiousness and care for the customers, for example.

Similarly, the description of explicit cognitive belief and metaphysical speculation has only played a minor role in the ethnography of everyday Japanese lives in the postwar years. In his seminal “Life in a Tokyo Ward,” Ronald Dore has the following to say about the vagueness of religious notions in everyday life:

>[C]hildren are taught to bow to the *kamisama* as they are taught to bow to visitors, and they grow up with an idea of the *kamisama* as important beings to whom deference must be shown without ever receiving explicit instruction concerning the nature, abode or function of the *kami*.

(Dore 1958, 307).

Contrary to the strict rules of decorum in the workplace and other formal settings, religious expression is an area in which considerable freedom is possible. John Nelson found in his ethnographic work at Suwa Jinja in Nagasaki (1996a) and at Kamigamo Jinja in Kyoto (1996b) a broad range of possible behaviors, from unorthodox personal forms of prayers to furtive night-time devotions that the groundskeepers complained about. Although many of those he interviewed after a shrine visit came away with amulets and talismans, the overwhelming majority were unable to identify the deity that they had just visited.

From the perspective of medical anthropology, John Traphagan (2004, 79, 178) has described the house altar (*butsudan* 仏壇), its associated religious

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5. As votive plaques are not normally taken home from shrines, I exclude them from discussion here. See Robertson (2008) for a historical and Reader (1991a) for an ethnographic account. For an in-depth etymology of the term *engi*, see Kyburz (1991).
paraphernalia, and the rituals that go with them as a “total life care system.” He identifies “religiously oriented ritual practice ... as a type of health and well-being management system” that instead of being directed towards numinous entities were a practice of concern for those (still) alive.

Following in this vein, Inge Daniels, working mostly with families in the Kansai area, has argued that engimono form part of the “domestic, spiritual defense system” (2010, 98). This functionalist perspective is useful to understand the kinds of relationships that this particular material culture of luck engenders. However, Daniels is not clear about whether this system is her interpretation or whether she attributes it as a form of belief to her informants. The engimono in her description do not appear as material traces of the sacred, but as objects whose meaning is contained in their shape and their name. After describing the notions of luck in some detail, she has this to say:

During my fieldwork, however, it emerged that individual attitudes towards engimono may vary greatly. For example, the two Miyada daughters, both unmarried and in their late 30s, express contrasting views about the disposal of the luck items displayed in their home. Naoko, the younger, said that because these objects are linked with temples and shrines they should be handled with great care. Kaori, on the other hand, claimed that she does not see any problem in disposing of them in the bin. One way to interpret her words is that the commodification of engimono has resulted in a kind of inflation effect, whereby the presence of too many engimono in the home might have devalued their power. (Daniels 2003, 630)

Daniel’s reference to commodification, however, does not explain why there should be two diametrically opposed attitudes to the same category of things in the same family. The idea of devaluation also directly contradicts her earlier work on the commodification of rice scoops and how this process extends the aura and power of the place of origin (in her case Itsukushima shrine). Rather, the above passage points towards individual differences in attitudes towards things.

*The Comforts of Orthopraxy I*

In my own fieldwork with people who had difficulty getting rid of things, I found a broad range of individual and sometimes idiosyncratic attitudes towards everyday objects. The following two ethnographic vignettes illustrate some of the tensions surrounding the disposal of religious objects, a tension that manifests itself as a desire for orthopraxy.

Doing fieldwork on person-object relationships required a lot of delicate maneuvering. To gain access to people’s private space and handle their possessions I had to be careful not to insist too forcefully on disposal, lest this should
jeopardize the relationship of trust I aimed to establish with my participants. Our aims were very different when we began in the morning; I wanted to find out about the objects and they wanted my help to get rid of them. As the day progressed, however, our aims would start to align, as my interlocutors got closer to the dreaded moment of actual disposal. They soon realized that long conversations would stall the process and that they could save objects through “narrative binding.” Once we had explored the meaning of a particular thing, I was no longer able to say “let’s throw this out” with the same ease. The case of Tomohiro illustrates this.

After a day of sorting through mountains of stuff and putting as much as possible of it into bin bags, we stood in the crisp winter air in front of the apartment door on the fourth floor of a residential building in a crowded Tokyo suburb. The sun was about to set and cast a last ray of golden light through the high-rise office towers onto twelve bulging bin bags that waited to be taken down to the rubbish and recycling area. Tomohiro, who lived in the apartment he and I had spent the last few days tidying up, sighed, his breath condensing in the crisp winter air. I knew this was a crucial moment and steeled myself for what I suspected would happen, based on the experience of the day before. After swift progress during the day, doubts about what we were trying to accomplish started bothering Tomohiro, and, although we managed to put the bags downstairs, I had noticed the next morning that suspiciously familiar magazines, books, and flyers had reappeared overnight. Among the “returned” stuff were all the objects I vaguely classified in my mind as religious. As I did not want to confront him directly, I seized this as an opportunity to ask him about what bound him to these objects.

But while the computer magazine of the late 1990s led to a prolonged nostalgic meditation about how the internet had changed over the last ten years, a little talisman lead to an embarrassed silence. After a while, Tomohiro said, “Well, you know, we Japanese do not really believe in all of this, it’s just custom.” Whatever was bothering Tomohiro, he framed it in terms of orthopraxy; if only there were a “correct” way to throw these things away, it would be so much easier. The hamaya 破魔矢, a type of lucky arrow he had bought with his girlfriend last year for the New Year, and the kadomatsu 門松 decoration woven from straw and attached to the door were both past their normative life cycle of one year and should be disposed of. Yet to do so properly would require an added effort at identifying the correct pathway of disposal. There was another small item that came back two times; a small portable talisman whose brocade surface had been

6. All participants in my fieldwork have been anonymized through the use of a Japanese first name of their choice. The first vignette is a contraction of several days of fieldwork undertaken in January 2012.
worn down to illegibility. Tomohiro could not remember where it came from or how long it had been buried under other things. I suggested half-jokingly that maybe we should open it and see what was inside, as every other means of identifying it had disappeared. This was first met with an incredulous look, despite the earlier disavowal of belief. What would happen? Would it bring bad luck? Or incur the curse of the unknown deity? Tomohiro just laughed and said, “You are the folklorist, you tell me.” When I, somewhat frustrated, threatened to open it, he enigmatically replied, “It’s better not to know what is inside.” This episode made it into my field diary as an example of the kinds of resistance I encountered. It was only much later that an interpretation suggested itself to me.

The fact that the talisman is thought to work precisely because the owner does not know what it contains is a material concretization of the argument I am trying to make. Although it was not doing anything in terms of practice, its presence helped to keep something in place. This something was not a particular content of belief, but belief itself. The unwrapping of the talisman would have “opened up” the problematic nature of belief, requiring some kind of engagement with it. Understanding the relationships people have with their things in terms of substitution instead of representation allows us to make sense of the passive, unperformed nature of much religious paraphernalia. It also provides an explanation as to why they become suddenly relevant at the point of disposal: the usual relationship between utility and function is reversed. While something is kept as long as it is used and disposed of once the end of usability is reached, the body substitute is “active” as long as nothing is done with it. It is the material presence that renders the presence of a matching cognitive belief superfluous.

This interpretation resonates with philosophical and anthropological doubts concerning the absence/presence of cognitive beliefs, raised by Wittgenstein for example. If we believe belief to be a state of mind, then how long does it continue? Is belief interrupted by sleep for example? (WITTGENSTEIN 1975, 85). In anthropology, NEEDHAM (1973, 151–52) has argued that the idea of belief as true propositions about the world is problematic because it is based on an intellectual, universalist model of belief. Furthermore, nothing provides us with evidence that belief exists as a mental state apart from utterances. The distinction between orthodoxy as the correct way of believing versus orthopraxy—the correct way to behave—has been especially influential in the Japanese case (BACHNIK 1995; SHIELDS 2010), as it allows us to disentangle cognitive belief from a broader range of nuances to belief:

Cognitive acceptance of the claims made about the efficacy of ritual is not always necessary for the ritual to be efficacious. When pressed with the question of whether or not they believe in the ability of an amulet to achieve its
stated purpose—curing disease, for instance—many people we interviewed deny any belief in such magic. (Reader and Tanabe 1998, 127)

In contradistinction, Reader and Tanabe suggest the term “affective belief,” which aligns with the distinction in philosophy of belief as proposition versus belief as disposition. Critics such as Anderson (1991) and Fitzgerald (2003) have argued that the often-reported absence of belief disqualifies the concept of religion from being used in this context altogether. The ethnographer in their view is more accurately speaking of custom when talking of buying amulets and talismans, complete with the unreflected automatism that this suggests.7 Philip Swift on the other hand has argued that the notion of belief is only problematic because we associate it with depth and assume that beliefs are inaccessible, that is, buried in people’s minds or their interiors (Swift 2010, 10). Swift suggests that cosmologies can be superficial: not only concerned with surface but also limited to it. Following this line of thought, I would add that instead of looking for interior phenomena, we can find belief hiding in plain sight. In other words, to understand the particular formation of contemporary religiosity in Japan, we need to think of belief as physically distributed in space. This notion also addresses the problem of the duration of belief raised by Wittgenstein. By externalizing the purported state of mind, belief acquires some of the temporal extension of material objects. From this perspective, religious paraphernalia do not express or symbolize belief, but they are the beliefs themselves.

The Comforts of Orthopraxy II

The second vignette addresses the problem of emotional attachment that is sometimes (but by no means always) an obstacle when getting rid of personal objects. From my own observations, I could see that a sense of attachment played an important role for both my male and female participants. unsurprisingly, however, given the gendered nature of the Japanese language and the gendered subjectivities it enforces, my female interlocutors were more vocal about the emotional aspects of disposal. One of the challenges when tidying up was to find ways to navigate the ambiguity between the emotional attachment to something and the wish to get rid of it. As illustrated below, this worked best when the ambiguity could be reduced through the established social form of rituals.

On a sunny and still warm October afternoon in 2012, I visited Fushimi Inari Taisha in the south of Kyoto with Noriko, a single woman in her thirties who worked for a small publishing house. On a previous visit a year earlier, I had

7. The scholar of religion Isomae Jun’ichi (2012) has pointed out that the distinction between religion and ritualism was crucial for the establishment of State Shinto. These apparently neutral analytical categories therefore need to be deconstructed themselves before they can be uncritically applied to the present day.
noticed an official disposal place for religious paraphernalia on the boundary between the formal shrine buildings and the less regulated backstage of the mountains on which different forms of personalized worship were practiced. I had helped Noriko with cleaning up her apartment over the last three months in small incremental steps. As somebody with a strong sense of responsibility who constantly worried about the well-being of things, it was hard for her to get rid of stuff, especially as her friends and family would continue to give her more of the things that they themselves wanted to get rid of. Noriko was frustrated by this, especially because her parents also exhorted her to be tidier, lest she be permanently unable to find a husband. I suggested that we could “say goodbye” to the kawaii engimono by bringing them to this official place. Although most of the stuff did not originate with the Fushimi Inari Taisha, I knew that the Inari deity (in fact three or five distinct entities depending on the site of worship) was thought to be tolerant and welcoming to human beings who seek solace of some kind. We carried a large cardboard box up the hill and she reluctantly deposited it in the designated small building. There was some trepidation when she saw how carelessly some of the talismans had been tossed in, but eventually she carefully put the box in and we stood in silence for a moment. I suppressed the desire to root through the kind of things that were disposed, as I had been warned on an earlier visit that this was inappropriate (as rooting through people’s garbage is in general). I was curious as to how this “correct” (or at least institutionally backed) disposal felt to her, but did not want to ask any leading questions. We strolled through the large shrine grounds and when we left her mood had visibly brightened; she felt refreshed (sappari shita さっぱりした) and a sense of relief (kaihōkan 開放感). This “refreshment” that many of my participants reported once things were gone had to do with the sense of “having done the right thing” (tadashii sutekata 正しい捨て方) rather than with any belief in the entity revered at Fushimi Inari.

In a subsequent interview Noriko reflected upon her own double bind and said that she did not want to refuse things given to her, but nor did she want to pass them on to burden someone else. The attachment she felt for the things in her case had to do more with her self-image as a caring and trustworthy person than with the particular characteristics of the objects. Who had given them to her was less important than the sense of stewardship that she felt for them. The reason why the official disposal route worked for her was that it allowed for a sense of closure. It was not that she later missed the objects or regretted

9. We used the term engimono loosely to refer to a broad range of things, some of which were marketing gimmicks using popular culture characters, key chains, and decorative figurines made from plastic, therefore technically not engimono.
disposing of them, as sometimes happened with other participants. Quite the opposite: she took pride in having been the last person to look after them and to have found a solution that did not burden anyone else. In that sense the objects became terminal commodities; they had to be destroyed in order not to become alienable possessions again. More than anything else, it was the finality of this process that gave Noriko peace of mind.10

Dolls and How to Get Rid of Them

I argued in the introduction that the notion of “body substitution” as a heuristic device can be applied to religious paraphernalia more widely. But there are also cases in which body substitution can be taken in a much more literal sense. Ichimatsu dolls present an interesting case in point: elaborately crafted and originally made with human hair, they are traditionally given to new parents by well-off grandparents as a toy, but also to protect the child by offering it a second body. This substitute body becomes a target for everything that is negative: illnesses, bad luck, and, more implicitly, evil spirits. Some elements of these practices go back all the way to Heian court rituals for purification and childbirth (Law 1997, 35–36). But like the body substitution talismans that spread as a commodity for soldiers only during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 (Bond 2014, 125) and the bride dolls of Northern Japan that were a phenomenon triggered by the Pacific War (Schattschneider 2001, 857), the view that Ichimatsu dolls function as body substitutes seems to be a Meiji and Taisho period development. It is true that the association between engimono and toys goes back to medieval times (Kyburz 1991, 114) and that migawari beliefs are documented in Buddhism and Shinto in a range of different contexts.11 But an overlap of these two categories only happens once the Ichimatsu doll travels from the Kansai area to the new capital of Tokyo, where its original likeness to the Kabuki actor

10. This sense of finality is predicated on the fact that we did not know what would happen to the things once they were disposed. Some visitors I had talked to on an earlier visit suggested that they would be burned, others said burial would be the proper mode of disposal at a Shinto institution. The point is that disposal is enabled by willful ignorance.

11. A familiar figure in folklore is the body substitute version of the bodhisattva Jizō, the migawari jizō. This benevolent entity is thought to take on suffering and pain by standing in for the body of the supplicant (Yanagita 1951, 257). This is framed in Buddhist terms as daijuku 代受苦, a voluntary taking-on of human pain, one of the virtues of the bodhisattva. Some of these stories have their origin in the Konjaku monogatari 今昔物語, compiled at the end of the Heian period. The folklorist Miyata Noboru reports another, slightly less benign form of body substitution in which a Jizō figure is tied up with ropes by the supplicant to experience the pain that they feel. The bound Jizō (shibari Jizō 縛り地蔵) is only released once the relief that is prayed for has occurred (Miyata 1975, 131–32). Body substitution in an early Shinto context most likely had the function to protect the supplicant from the dangers of an encounter with the untamed nature of the deity (aramitama 荒御魂).
Sanokawa Ichimatsu (1722–1762) is only retained in the name. The Ichimatsu dolls are a modern development of Edo-period mitsuore ningyō 三つ折れ人形 (three-jointed puppets), and, because they had articulated limbs and could be dressed and made to sit and stand independently, they served both as children’s toys and as decorative items (Pate 2008, 238).

In Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan, first published in 1894, Lafcadio Hearn (1976, 266) describes the Ichimatsu dolls as so lifelike that it was sometimes hard to tell the difference between children and dolls. He also reports that photographers would often substitute real children with dolls that were easier to handle when it came to long exposures. The verisimilitude to a living child came from innovations in the coloring of the dolls’ faces and hands. While the traditional color was based on a white, lustrous pigment made from powdered oyster shells and an animal glue called gofun 胡粉, doll makers added more gloss (egg-white) and pink to the face of the Ichimatsu dolls. Lifelikeness both in terms of size and appearance, but not in resemblance to a particular person, lent them to be conceptualized as body substitutes. Western collectors who traveled to Japan bought large quantities of them and their lifelikeness inspired fantasies of animation in Western artists. As made clear in the case of the photographers, the semiotic notion of body substitution is much more flexible than just a religious belief. Another example of this flexibility is the curious case of the tōrei ningyō 答礼人形 (friendship ambassador dolls) in 1927. In 1926, Frederick Starr, an avid doll collector, instigated a U.S.-wide doll friendship project that was aimed at creating friendly relations between the U.S. and Japan in an increasingly hostile international climate. As a gesture of friendship, 12,739 blue-eyed dolls collected from all over the U.S. were sent to Japan. Japan responded by sending fifty-seven life-sized Ichimatsu dolls representing the provinces of Japan. Each of them came with a friendship passport and they were distributed all over the United States to be displayed in libraries, museums, and schools. In exchange for the children’s toys sent by the Americans, the Japanese answer was to send friendship-by-substitution. Enthusiastically received in the beginning, as diplomatic relations began to sour the dolls were removed from display. The American dolls in Japan were eventually destroyed by imperial edict as harbingers of foreign

12. An interesting argument could be made here concerning the sensory modality of body substitution; hitogata 人形 originally were rudimentary paper shapes that could be rubbed on the body to remove pollution, thus functioning through touch. The shift towards substitution through resemblance could arguably have been influenced by the introduction of the new medium of photography. If we understand these carefully staged early photographs to be simulacra of the real world, then it would only be befitting that the figures in the picture are simulacra of human beings.

influence, a treatment that can again be understood through the cultural logic of *migawari* (Pate 2005, 219).¹⁴

Interestingly, these dolls are now widely considered to be creepy and scary (Daniels 2009). Although they are thought to have considerable value if they have been made by one of the doll masters of the early Meiji or Taisho periods, when I undertook fieldwork in Tokyo and Kyoto flea markets in 2011, I found that they were very hard to sell to fellow Japanese.¹⁵ While doubts concerning dolls were never voiced in a specifically religious way, a few people I talked to told me that as they belonged to strangers it was best to keep away from them, because one never knows what happened to the person it was originally bought for. Furthermore, one middle-aged woman told me that the Ichimatsu dolls start to resemble their owners and that you would not want to have a stranger staring at you in your own house, where they are usually displayed in glass cases. Conversely, a mother who visited the market with her ten-year-old daughter said that

¹⁴. An interesting parallel to this semi-official doll exchange is the flow of the *imon ningyō* 慰問人形, small, homemade, female “companion dolls” that were given to Japanese soldiers as talismans and that were sometimes passed on to Chinese girls, an image that reinforced connections between the home front, the soldiers abroad, and new colonial subjects (Schaftsneider 2005, 335).

¹⁵. The first living national treasure in the field of doll making was Hirata Gōyō 平田郷陽 (1903–1981).
it was because they resembled a lost, stylized ideal of beauty that modern people no longer relate to, which made them look like children from the past who never aged. A male collector of antiques who I briefly talked to at the Setagaya Boroichi flea market argued that it was the tension between lifeliness and the eerie immobility that rendered them uncanny. However, the explanation given most often was that they were creepy because they were opaque and unknowable.

If we imagine that the body surrogate absorbs everything that does not happen to the person it substitutes, then the doll becomes more other as both child and doll age together. Under the increasing verisimilitude, the doll’s content becomes a kind of negative inversion of the person. In other words, the doll becomes a container—both in the meaning of containing and delimiting—for everything that the child it was bought for was protected from. These dolls are very difficult to get rid of, because breaching the containment risks dispersing whatever is contained. The doll as apotropaic form only works, however, as long as the person is alive. The fact that the doll survives the person it is a double for renders it doubly uncanny. Although the connection to *migawari* is rarely voiced, the association with death is implicit; the sheer presence of the doll on the flea market without its owner suggests its freedom from the earlier relationship.

The unease people voiced about these dolls was in some measure counterbalanced by an appreciation of their beauty and craftsmanship, but the former outstripped the latter by far. Their sense of presence was augmented by an unspoken sense of taboo. What had been an inalienable object connected to a particular individual now reentered the marketplace, looking to attach itself to a new owner. When I tried to draw out one seller, a young woman who was working for a large antiques shop, on the implications of hosting such an uncanny object, she guardedly said, “it will certainly change the atmosphere in your house” (interview on 16 January 2016). But it is not only the uncanniness of the doll’s resemblance to an unknown other; in the older dolls there is also the element of human hair that creates a material link to a further unknown person. As organic substance, hair is prone to curl and get frizzy in a humid climate. A friendly doll collector told me that it is not unusual to find dolls with disheveled hair when reopening boxes after several months. This in turn just adds to the suspicion that the dolls literally lead a “double” life when no one is looking.

Where does that leave us in terms of a theory of materiality? There appear

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16. Unsurprisingly, Ichimatsu dolls feature in several horror films (most explicitly in *Kono ko no nanatsu no oiwai ni* (Shōchiku 1982, written and directed by Masumura Yasuzo) and *Shinsei Toire no Hanako san* (Tōei 1998, directed by Tsutsumi Yukihiko). For the Halloween season in 2016, Universal Studios Japan (USJ) opened a Japanese doll-themed attraction called “Tatari: Curse of the Living Dolls,” which drew the ire of the Tokyo Association of Toy and Shopkeepers for its negative depiction of the dolls (*Japan Times*, 19 October 2016). Piquantly, many of the dolls were leased to USJ by Awashima Myōjin in Wakayama, a shrine associated with dolls.
to be two connected understandings at work: absorbency and containment. As body substitutes absorb bad luck, bad intentions, and other kinds of negative energies, their own substance becomes compromised. They are not thought to be alive, but they become more than mere things. To dispose of them is difficult because those negative energies could always escape and return to their owners. It is safer to live with them, but the settlement is never an easy one: the contemporary Ichimatsu dolls never entirely join the family (as toys for example), they remain aloof in their display cases, and are rarely touched. If they are stored, their owners make sure that they are comfortable, lest they should feel a grudge (Daniels 2009). In other words, they are always treated as guests.

It is clear then that the function of *migawari* is linked to both proximity and passivity. It is precisely because nothing happens to the object that it can function as a body substitute. As long as the trajectory or life course of owner and object align, the relation of substitution works and the objects are inalienable but not necessarily held to be important. Quite the opposite: they can be forgotten. The moment that this alignment ceases, objects come back to mind, in the case of the death of the owner or the disposal of the object.

*Rites of Disposal*

When I first visited the monthly Kitano Tenmangu market in Kyoto in 1999 to study beliefs about materials, I was often told that whatever is stuck in matter owned by someone else—this could be articulated as dirt, pollution, a curse, or unspecified bacteria depending on the person I talked to—would not affect me as I was foreign. A similar discourse was in evidence regarding dolls, specifically the larger Ichimatsu dolls in and out of glass cases. Foreign tourists were considered to be the best buyers for them, as they would take them away to a place where they could do no harm. In other words, removing the dolls from Japan to a place where they would be valued as souvenirs and mementos would interrupt the connection to individual persons and turn the doll into a more general representation of Japan. A similar thing happened to Karen Smyers during her fieldwork at the Fushimi Inari Taisha. The shrine was committed to burying the discarded statues of foxes that are associated with the Inari deity, but soon ran out of space (especially as the mountain behind the shrine is, contrary to public perception, not owned by the shrine). When she showed an interest in the material culture of Inari worship, the shrine was more than happy to dispose of an unwanted surplus of what often had been private devotional statues and

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17. Such assertions usually took two forms. Either they were formulated with reference to the sturdier bodies of foreigners as compared to the more susceptible constitution of the Japanese, or they were expressed in terms of belief. As one stall owner told me, “Where you come from there surely is no such belief, therefore it cannot affect you” (November 1999).
objects by donating them to what was to become the Inari collection in the Kenneth Starr library at Columbia University.18

To get rid of something by sending it abroad, however, is not always possible. Memorial services for dolls (ningyō kuyō 人形供養) have seen a remarkable increase in popularity over the last forty years. This is part of a boom in all sorts of memorial services, especially for pets (AMBROS 2012) and aborted fetuses (HOSHINO and TAKEDA 1987; ANDERSON and MARTIN 1997). Inanimate objects, too, are ritually disposed of, usually sponsored by the local association of trade and manufacturing involved in the production of the thing in question (see KRETSCHEMER [2000] for needles and glasses, ŌSAKI [1995] for dolls and ŌSAKI [1997] for scissors). Memorial services for inanimate objects, despite indications that some already existed in the Edo period, are for the most part a recent innovation. The Tokyo Association of Toy and Doll Shopkeepers only started sponsoring a memorial service for dolls in 1958. RAMBELLI (2007, 215) argues that the meaning of leaving dolls at a temple has changed considerably and that what originally may have been a sacrificial prestation has become a way of getting rid of unwanted objects. The folklorist Tanaka Senichi, on the other hand, maintains that memorial services for inanimate things hark back to ancient folk beliefs about the animat e nature of things:

The expression of gratitude is only the superficial reason; I argue that in reality, it is the wish to dispel a sense of unease and gain a sense of security that motivates memorial services. Is this sense of unease … not a latent fear that some kind of spirit of the thing that is thrown away could cause misfortune?… We can therefore say that memorial services are undertaken to prevent the activation of the spirit through its extraction from the instrument. By removing the spirit and turning the instrument into just a thing, it can be disposed of calmly. (Tanaka 1987, 7–8)

This may make sense in conceptual and emotional terms, but my participants never spoke of objects as possessed or inhabited by spirits. While emotional attachment clearly plays an important role, this is rarely if ever expressed as an explicit belief that the object is imbued with life.

It also does not explain why these memorial services are increasing in popularity while folk Shinto beliefs are on the decline. The social psychologist Ikeuchi Hiromi undertook a survey of people who participated in a memorial service for dolls at the Mondo Yakujin Tōkōji 門戸厄神東光寺 in Nishinomiya in 2007 and found to her surprise that it was the younger generation who scored significantly higher on the animism scale (animizumu shakudo アニミズム尺度; IKEUCHI 2010, 174). She explains this as the influence of popular culture such as TV programs

(both infotainment and anime) that feature all kinds of magic and New Age spirituality.

An emphasis on economic rather than religious explanations is also apparent in contemporary folklore studies. In his work on the rites of disposal for shoes, the folklorist Matsuzaki Kenzō (1996), for example, links memorial services for inanimate things specifically to creating smooth circles of production and consumption and to organizing solidarity among competitors in the same profession.

Like other memorial services for inanimate objects, doll memorial services are known by a range of names, ningyō kuyō being perhaps the most traditional term, modeled on Buddhist funerary rites that are meant to transform the deceased into an enlightened entity. Meta Jinja 買太神社 in Nara calls it ningyō shōtensai 人形昇天祭, literally “doll ascension festival.” This annual occasion, held on 5 May, Children’s Day, involves the reading of noritō 祝詞 prayers and the actual burning of all kinds of dolls, which are said to ascend to heaven as deities. Whatever is contained is erased or transformed in the process through the purifying agency of fire. It is the destruction of the material body of the doll as migawari that resolves the conundrum of the inalienable object.

Other recent ceremonial innovations are much brighter in tone and part of a secular ethos meant to inculcate gratitude and the habit of recycling in children. In these cases, usually organized by local business associations in cooperation with schools, the occasion is called a “festival of gratitude” (kansha sai 感謝祭), which removes it from a more religious institutional frame. A monk is still invited to read the Heart Sutra (Hannya Shingyō 般若心経) to the assembled stuffed animals and dolls, but more emphasis is put on the participatory element. Some temples, such as Jōganji 成願寺 in Matsuyama on Shikoku, allow participants to throw their dolls onto the pyre themselves, which creates a more festival-like atmosphere, also helped by the summer date of their ceremony.

While the burning of the dolls is an integral part of the rite as kuyō 供養, this is often no longer possible after temples began accepting a much broader range of items beyond the traditional dolls made from wood, silk, and papier-mâché. Stuffed animals and plastic dolls are particularly problematic, and many temples that used to burn the dolls, such as the famous Shōryakuji 正暦寺 in Nara Prefecture, now use the services of specialist disposal companies. While Shōryakuji receives dolls to dispose of throughout the year, the big ceremony called

21. Founded in 992, Shōryakuji is the main temple of the Bodaisen Shingon 菩提山真言 sect. The main hall contains a rare Asuka-period bronze statue of Yakushi Nyorai, depicted sitting down, with both feet on a lotus flower.
daigoma kuyō 大行摩供養 takes place on 9 March. For each individual box of dolls received by post a brief service is held on the day of arrival, but on 9 March, the dolls are put on the altar of the sub-temple Fukujuin 福寿院 and a special service is performed.22 When I observed the ritual in 2012, there were about one hundred people in attendance. The sound of a conch shell marks the start of the ceremony at 14:00. Gagaku music is performed by the monks, followed by recitations of Buddhist scriptures, mainly the Heart Sutra. The visitors can then step forward and light incense in front of the dolls. After about thirty minutes, the priests line up and leave the main hall to where a smaller altar with representative dolls is set up in front of the wooden pyre covered with green branches. In 2012, the center piece was a warrior doll (musha ningyō 武者人形) surrounded by five decorative ishō ningyō 衣裳人形 dolls on the upper level of the shelf, five Western-style dolls in elaborate baroque dresses under them, five Ichimatsu dolls (one boy and four girls), one seated hina ningyō 雛人形, and a stuffed Miffy and Winnie the Pooh on either end of the shelf.

The pyre is ceremoniously lit from an eternal light with a large bamboo torch. At first this creates a dense gray smoke, which slowly gives way to flames while the monks continue to chant the Heart Sutra. Only then do they start to throw the wooden sacrificial sticks (goma 護摩) that had been collected over the year into the fire, where they burn in the presence of the dolls and those who come to witness the ceremony.

What is burnt, then, is no longer the dolls, but a further substitution; the participants are asked to write their names on the wooden sacrificial sticks, which are then burnt in the presence of the dolls. Tanaka Masaru (2005) argues that this substitution was forced by the Ministry of the Environment’s reduction of dioxin policy. But as a perhaps unintended consequence of this environmental concern, another interpretation becomes possible in which the compromised nature of the doll’s materiality manifests itself in a different form. On one side, there is the toxic matter of dolls and stuffed animals made from plastic. On the other, there are the antique dolls of considerable value. Both forms resist destruction by fire and therefore the severing of the ties to their former owners. Because of this, the modern form of the rite appears as an inversion of the older. Instead of burning the dolls in the presence of their former owners, the names of the owners, written on the wooden sticks, are burnt in the presence of the dolls. Seen from that perspective, what is severed is the attachment that the dolls have to their owners, who, after all, have already decided to dispose of them. By burning their names, the link between subject and object is destroyed; the dolls relinquish their existence as possessions and return to a neutral commodity form.

22. The service in 2012 cost five thousand yen for a cardboard box of fifty centimeters or a plastic bag of approximately forty-five liters.
This suggests the possibility that the dolls will ultimately not be destroyed, but will be sold or passed on by the disposal companies. I have not been able to verify this so far, as the psychological efficacy of the rite depends precisely on the fact that the attendants do not know what happens to the dolls. The monks were understandably reluctant to shed any light on their future trajectory.

At the end of the ceremony, while the fire was still smoldering, the abbot gave a short speech thanking the visitors and the dolls “that have taught us serenity and gentleness.” It was difficult to interview informants who took part in the rite without disturbing the smooth flow of events, especially since questions about attachment and where people thought the dolls were going would disturb the sense of closure that they came to achieve in an officially sanctioned way. I was only able to speak briefly to two participants. One middle-aged local woman who brought her dolls to the service had recently lost her mother and was business-like about the whole affair. She did not want to keep these traditional dolls in her modern, Western-style house. When I asked her why she did not just throw them away, she simply answered that they had come to the end of their utility and that this was the correct, official way to end it. Another woman in her sixties said after some trepidation that she did not want to leave them to her children, because they may not want them. For her, the memorial service was an expression of gratitude, but also a way to alleviate her guilt (zaiakukan 罪悪感) about disposing of something that could still be used.

Although the dolls discussed here are not understood to be religious objects per se, their saliency stems from the relationships that they have with people. By standing in for or doubling human others, they participate in their personhood. They become problematic only when the link to the person is ruptured. The recent popularity of memorial services represents an increasing desire for an orthopraxy of disposal for such problematic materialities. They provide the comfort of an officially sanctioned way of getting rid of unwanted objects, which conveys a sense of closure instead of a sense of guilt. For temples who seek to extend their business beyond the funeral industry (SUZUKI 2002, 203), it is an investment that connects financial gain with pastoral care in new and innovative ways.

Conclusion: Things that Believe

Looking at things from the point of view of disposal, two particular formations of materiality emerge. One is the circulating minor material culture of belief that seems to do nothing in particular until its disposal, which I argue allows for an externalization of the problem of belief. The other is the matter that requires more careful disposal as the substance itself is understood to be compromised. The latter appears in two different ways: on one hand as concern that matter can absorb and contain misfortune and unspecified negative energies through touch
or resemblance, and on the other that burning such things can release toxins into the environment.

In both cases I would argue that the material presence is more important than bringing out the meanings these things are imbued with. While my participants would sometimes go as far as to ridicule the notion that one could believe in the powers of charms and talismans, they would still be reluctant to discard them. What the material presence of these objects enabled was not a psychological projection of interior belief onto the external world, but rather the ability to externalize the problem of belief: literally, to keep it at arm’s length. Making belief part of your material environment protects you from having to articulate or verify what you believe. Like the Ichimatsu doll that works as a body surrogate for a particular person, paraphernalia of a religious origin (ofuda, omamori, hamaya, and so on) act as surrogate holders of beliefs. To put it more provocatively: folklorists and anthropologists have sometimes misread religiously coded paraphernalia as expressions of belief, while in fact they were believing substitutes.

This raises interesting questions about the relationship between religious practice, objects, and belief. Rather than conceptualize objects as things to believe that become meaningful through ritual, I have argued that they outlive ritual contexts and become substitutes for a general and vague notion of belief. But, this is only possible because nothing is done to or with them. Contrary to the relational view that humans and objects continuously co-construct each other in a smooth dialectical process (Miller 2005, 37), a more fine-grained approach shows that for long amounts of time, it is precisely the autonomous existence of the object in time and space that allows it to become a substitute. From the point of view of the objects, rituals such as the memorial services for inanimate objects change their status from personal possessions to waste, with the potential to return as commodities, as the case of the antique dolls illustrates. The doll watching the removal of its connection to its owner is acting as a surrogate for the owner removing their connection from the doll. When these rituals are described as having a cleansing function (jōka 浄化), what the participants pointed towards was the fact that matter was cleansed of meaning, thus reinstating the dichotomy between meaning and matter that has become blurred through substitution.

Finally, if we accept what such a statement would mean, then perhaps we can readdress some of the debates on whether the Japanese are religious or not. Depending on the perspective of the researcher, either the Japanese are entirely secular and for the most part not interested in religion at all (Fitzgerald 2003; Anderson 1991); or religion is so tightly woven into the fabric of everyday life that almost everything can be understood as being inflected by religion (Reader 1991c; Reader and Tanabe 1998). Both of these extreme positions are based on a clear distinction between the meanings of the words “secular” and “religious,” a distinction which is in itself an epistemological artifact of the Western history of
religious studies and its particular Christian assumptions (Asad 1993, 40). Talal Asad (2003) has argued that we should instead aim to describe and understand culturally and historically distinct “formations of the secular,” a challenge recently taken up by Rots and Teeuwen (2017). I would add that, in the particular case of Japanese modernity, what emerges in the postwar years is a formation of the secular in which the work of belief has shifted from persons to religious objects, which, in a materialist worldview, have the distinct advantage of being physical presences.

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