The United States and Japan both subscribed to secularism as modern nation-states, but the sphere in which Shinto shrines were legally located—religious or secular—differed between them. This article takes Hilo Daijingū, an overseas Shinto shrine in the periphery of Territorial Hawai‘i, as a case study to examine how its Japanese community adapted to differing secularisms. This local shrine was largely conceived of and treated in a manner similar to secular shrines in Japan by its Hawai‘i-Japanese community, but was also translated into the religious sphere of an American context. The community’s Japanese secular conception of its shrine helped connect the Hawai‘i-Japanese in the periphery to the Japanese center and locate them within the Japanese sphere. This legitimized local customs as Japanese rather than foreign and became the framework through which many Hawai‘i-Japanese interpreted their reality.

KEYWORDS: colonialism—immigration—modernization—secularism—overseas shrines—Shinto

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The nature of Shinto shrines—religious or secular—was vitally important to their continued existence after Japan’s surrender in 1945. A secular shrine demanded dismantling as an organ of the imperial state, but a religious shrine was misused by an oppressive state and could continue operation as a private organization. While most overseas shrines were determined to be secular and dismantled, shrines within the home islands, Okinawa, and Hokkaido were allowed continued existence under the Shinto Directive issued by the Occupation authorities.¹ The role of overseas Shinto shrines (kaigai jinja 海外神社) in former Japanese colonies, especially Korea and Taiwan, has been the subject of significant research, but research on shrines outside of Japanese-controlled territories has been limited.² Despite the unusual pressures Japanese communities in Hawai‘i faced, the history of Shinto shrines in Hawai‘i has often been merged into the narrative of Japanese-American studies (Ruoff 2010, 180).³ The lingering repercussions of the racially-motivated incarceration of ethnic Japanese during World War II and the effects of the Occupation’s Shinto Directive has discouraged discussion about Hawai‘i shrines and the connections many Hawai‘i-Japanese had to Imperial Japan (Asato 2006, 110; Stephan 1984, 177). In contrast to the Japanese who resided in the United States, Hawai‘i’s vastly

¹. An example of the former category is Chōsen Jingū 朝鮮神宮 in Korea. The General Headquarters (GHQ) gave permission for the shrine to be demolished by the Japanese government on basis of its secular nature (Henry 2014, 206). Shrin es in Hokkaido and Okinawa fell into the latter category as they are considered an integral part of Japan today, but the position of these “near overseas” territories in the history of Japanese colonialism is controversial (Seaton 2016). Suga (2014, 131–32) argues that shrines like Sapporo Jinja 札幌神社 in Hokkaido can be seen as pioneer examples of the overseas shrines established in Japanese colonies like Taiwan.


³. One effect of merging the experience of the Hawai‘i-Japanese into the larger narrative of Japanese-American studies is to treat the entire community as immigrants, that is, migrants with the intention of staying in the U.S. But, the case of Hawai‘i was unusual. Not only did a majority of Japanese migrants to Hawai‘i eventually return to Japan, the second generation with dual citizenship often returned to Japan for at least their education (kibei 帰米), blurring the line between generations. Furthermore, while many Hawai‘i-Japanese felt a strong connection to the land of Hawai‘i this was not necessarily equivalent to a strong connection to the U.S. For example, some Hawai‘i-Japanese internees during World War II hoping to return to Hawai‘i considered repatriation, confident Japan would soon capture Hawai‘i (see, for example, Furuya 2017, 95). Thus, in this article I have used the more general term “migrant,” rather than “immigrant,” when discussing the prewar Japanese community in Hawai‘i, regardless of generation.
different history and culture, its status as an American colonial possession, and its large Japanese population makes the relationship between Shinto and secularism in Hawai‘i an interesting case study.

This article takes Hilo Daijingū ヒロ大神宮, the first shrine established in Hawai‘i, as a case study of the relationship between Shinto shrines, religion, and the secular. While shrines in Hawai‘i were generally defined as religious institutions by the dominating American elite, the prewar Japanese community largely adopted a secular conception similar to that in Japan. The translation of Shrine Shinto into English for an external audience, however, included a translation of Shinto from the Japanese secular sphere into the American religious sphere. This secular conception of Shinto helped locate Hawai‘i shrines into the informal network of Shrine Shinto, which provided an ideological space for Hawai‘i-Japanese in the broader political system of Japanese secularism. This legitimized the migrants’ position in the periphery of the Japanese sphere and provided a framework for incorporating “foreign” customs into daily life.

Religion and Secularism

Religion, the secular, and the division between them are often considered innate features of human society, but recent research has shown that the modern concept of religion, and by extension the secular, are far from universal and developed in the specific geographic and temporal context of the modern West. The modern meaning of religion as a private sphere of personal belief separable from a public secular sphere of universal fact is a concept that developed in Western Europe in conjunction with the modern nation-state (Asad 2003; Masuzawa 2005; Nongbri 2013; Taylor 1998). Secularism—a “political doctrine... [which] presupposes new concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘ethics,’ and ‘politics,’ and new imperative associated with them”—became an essential part of the modern project (Asad 2003, 1–2, 13).

The concept of religion and the secular within the political system of secularism was not born out of whole cloth, but developed with time. When the U.S. Constitution was written in the late eighteenth century, a hierarchical concept of religion that positioned Christianity as the only “true religion” was standard in English-language discourse (Masuzawa 2005, 59–60). The things that all “religions” or denominations agreed on fell into the secular sphere based upon a common consensus, while the details of theology were confined to the private sphere. Many states in Europe established a state-sponsored religion while legally allowing religious pluralism. The colonies founded in North America generally followed this practice, but the U.S. Constitution prohibited a state-sponsored religion at the federal level with the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights.
This defined the U.S. as a secular state, where citizens were free to privately believe in the religion/denomination they preferred. However, ideas such as a single Creator God and individual human souls were considered universally accepted facts by all religions/denominations. Far from being confined to a private sphere, ideas such as God-given (“natural”) rights formed the basis of the state's legitimacy, becoming part of what Bellah (1991) referred to as “civil religion.” This secularism provided a political system that allowed for a united nation-state based on deism with the various conflicting beliefs of religious sects being moderated by their confinement to the private sphere of religion. Religion, as a sphere within secularism, was not defined by its connection to a supernatural deity, but by its private sectarian nature. In the late nineteenth century, these new concepts of religion and the secular underwent a period of confusion, precipitated by increasing contact with non-Western cultures. The hierarchical concept of religion that positioned only Christianity as “true” gradually gave way to a flattened concept of “world religions” (Masuzawa 2005). Thus the term “religion” came to describe a set of customs with “a perceived similarity to European Christianity” (Josephson 2012, 9). This change pushed “Christianity” further into the private sphere of religion while universalizing (“secularizing”) Christian concepts such as “God-given” rights by divorcing them from their theological origins. This had a major influence on the development of secularism in non-Western countries encountering the West on an unequal basis, including Japan.

The concept of religion was in flux during the mid to late nineteenth century when it was introduced to Japan through treaties signed with Western nations.

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4. This clause did not prohibit individual states from establishing an official church at the state level, but the trend was against this, with Massachusetts becoming the last state to abandon an established church in 1833.

5. This refers to all religions/denominations “that mattered.” Josephson suggests that the political doctrine of secularism can be seen as a triad of the secular, superstition, and religion. The secular is that which falls into the common consensus or the “real,” while superstition or “delusion” are those things the state considers dangerous enough to repress. Religion moderates between these two by relegating those non-“real” beliefs/practices that cannot be stamped out to the private sphere (Josephson 2012, 260–62).

6. In this article the term “religion” is used to mean a privatized, sectarian sphere, which contrasts with its sister concept of a public, universal sphere of the secular, both of which are defined by the state as a part of the political system of secularism. By this definition, Bellah’s civil religion falls in the secular sphere, not the religious sphere. Bellah (1991, 187) seems to be aware of this and notes that his use of religion includes more than the “peculiarly Western concept of ‘religion’” that limits itself to exclusive sects. It is significant that Bellah (1991, 179) defines the “American Shinto” of some critics as civil religion, that is, he equates American civil religion to a perceived American version of Shinto.

7. For a discussion on the invention of “religion” in other non-Western states, see Yang (2008) on China and Elmore (2016) on India.
The desire to revise these unequal treaties led Japanese officials to experiment with a variety of ideas, including converting Japan into a Christian nation, formulating Shinto into a monotheistic religion, or designating Buddhism as a state religion. The most significant project of this kind was the Taikyō Senpu 大教宣布 movement, which enlisted Shinto, Buddhist, and non-affiliated instructors in spreading a “national doctrine” that encouraged the populace to be good citizens (HARDACRE 1989, 43–44). This movement was considered a failure, but was followed by the enactment of the Meiji Constitution in 1890. This constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, enshrined religious freedom rather than the religious toleration of many Western states with an established church (MAXEY 2014, 186). The nature of religion in Japan was defined through an active public debate over the next decade that developed a “grammar of religion” that delineated non-religious Shrine Shinto from religious temples and churches (MAXEY 2014, 232).

Although Japan adopted the political system of secularism, it did not found the state on the same Christian-based secularity as the West. Rather, the legitimacy of the state rested upon a “hybrid Shinto-scientific ideology” (JOSEPHSON 2012, 132). The adoption of secularism during the project of modernization required a new way of partitioning knowledge and included instilling a changed sense of basic elements of reality such as space and time. As Japan became a colonial power, the area to which the Japanese secularity was considered relevant was expanded to encompass not only direct colonies of Japan, but the entire sphere of Greater East Asia. While many institutions, from schools to the military, played a role in communicating this new Japanese reality to imperial subjects, Shinto shrines were some of the most visible. Thus in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, when colonizing nations began taking interest in Hawai‘i, the two nations flanking Hawai‘i—the U.S. and Japan—were both secular nation-states, but with differing secularities.

Hawai‘i In-between

The U.S. and Japan were both adding to their colonial possessions in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. Hawai‘i, an island kingdom located between colonial powers, was well aware of her precarious independence. While recognized as a sovereign nation internationally, the Kingdom of Hawai‘i possessed little military strength and the U.S. became the dominating influence in the islands. In 1881, concern over this situation prompted the monarch of Hawai‘i, King Kalākaua, to ask for a protectorate-style relationship with Japan (HAZAMA and KOMEIJI 2008, 14). Japan declined, but agreed to send migrants to work on the sugar plantations in Hawai‘i. However, within six years, King Kalākaua

8. For a case study on how one shrine in the home islands helped communicate this changed sense of reality to imperial subjects, see SHIMIZU (2017).
was forced to sign the Bayonet Constitution, a document which placed power into the hands of the American-controlled legislature. When King Kalākaua’s successor, Queen Lili’uokalani, attempted to replace the Bayonet Constitution, the Committee of Safety—a group largely composed of Americans and advocating the annexation of Hawai‘i by the U.S.—overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy with the support of U.S. troops. While the Japanese government recognized the provisional government formed by the annexationists, many Japanese were incensed by the overthrow; the Japanese warship Naniwa refused to lower the kingdom’s flag and a diplomat on board attempted suicide in protest (Stephan 1984, 19). Repeated requests by the new government in Hawai‘i eventually led to the annexation of the islands by the U.S. in 1898, a decision pushed through by the acquisition of the Philippines as a colony (Bell 1984, 33–34).

While acceptance of an American-controlled Hawai‘i was the formal policy of the Japanese government, the location of Hawai‘i and the high percentage of Japanese subjects there meant Japan continued to take an interest in the islands. The Japanese Consulate took an active role in supporting Japanese education for local Japanese (Asato 2006, 20) and the Hawai‘i-Japanese were active followers of news from Japan. They continued to send remittances back to Japan, including donations to support the Sino-Japanese wars (1894–1895, 1937–1945), and the Grand Congress of Overseas Compatriots, an event organized in 1940 to celebrate the continuing expansion of the Japanese sphere, included almost two hundred participants from Hawai‘i (Ruoff 2010, 161; Stephan 1984, 49). The same year, plans drawn up by the navy explicitly included Hawai‘i within the middle subsphere of Greater East Asia (Stephan 1984, 136). Although Hawai‘i was an American territory, Japan did not see it as an integral part of the U.S. and increasingly considered it part of Japan’s sphere of influence.

The position of Hawai‘i between two great powers led to an unusual ethnic situation there. Even during the later years of the Hawaiian monarchy, political power was held by a white American elite while a separate but related group of mostly white American sugar plantation owners controlled Hawai‘i’s economy. The dethroned Queen Lili’uokalani was unable to prevent annexation, despite widespread anti-annexation feelings among native Hawaiians. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the majority of the population of Hawai‘i was not white or native Hawaiian, but made up of migrants from various countries. The Japanese comprised the largest percentage, making up nearly 40 percent in 1900, with this number still increasing at that time; full- and part-native Hawaiians made up about 26 percent, and non-Portuguese Caucasians,9 who controlled the

9. In Hawai‘i censuses, Portuguese were often counted separately since they were brought to Hawai‘i as plantation laborers, similar to non-Caucasian groups.
political and economic power, made up less than 6 percent of the population the same year (ADAMS 1924, 9).

This power imbalance in relation to population and the differing motivation between annexationists and plantation owners had significant effects on the Japanese community. Since Americanized migrants were more likely to demand higher wages and participate in cross-ethnic union strikes, plantation owners often encouraged migrants to maintain their cultural values and form ethnic conclaves (ASATO 2006, 22). Meanwhile, advocates of annexation and eventual statehood saw the total Americanization of migrants as the only way to allay fears of granting the large second-generation population of Hawai‘i voting rights (BELL 1984, 96). Thus Japanese migrants were under conflicting pressures from the white elite to retain a Japanese identity and to Americanize. The strength of these pressures often depended on the location of the Japanese community, with urban migrants in Honolulu, the seat of the territorial government, feeling more pressure to Americanize and rural migrants working on sugar plantations on the outer islands feeling more pressure to retain an ethnic identity. This article focuses on Hilo Daijingū, located on an outer island where pressure to retain an ethnic identity was more prominent.

While it is sometimes convenient to group the experience of the Hawai‘i-Japanese into the broader narrative of Japanese-Americans, the situation of these two Japanese groups differed significantly from each other. First, Hawai‘i was not an integral part of the United States politically until it became the fiftieth state in 1959. Hawai‘i was recognized as an independent nation until annexed in 1898, remaining an American territory for a majority of the twentieth century. Second, Hawai‘i is located in Oceania rather than North America. Geographically and culturally, Hawai‘i has shared more with the Asia-Pacific than the U.S. Third, Japanese made up nearly half of Hawai‘i’s population (42.7 percent) in 1920, while in California, the U.S. state then with the largest Japanese population, Japanese made up a mere 2 percent of the population (KANZAKI 1921, 90). Fourth, it was more likely than on the mainland that Japanese in Hawai‘i did not possess American citizenship. These differences suggest that the experiences of Japanese in Hawai‘i merit their own research for comparison with the experiences of Japanese migrants not only in the U.S., but in places considered within Greater East Asia such as Micronesia and Taiwan.

Buddhist Temples and Shinto Shrines in Hawai‘i

Before looking at a single shrine in detail, it is helpful to summarize the broader development of Japanese Buddhism and Shinto in Hawai‘i. Large-scale migration from Japan to Hawai‘i began in 1885 as a result of the migration treaty arranged by King Kalākaua. These migrants were generally required to come
on contract as sugar plantation laborers, but they usually intended to return to Japan. Buddhism quickly followed the migrants and the first temple, belonging to Nishi Hongwanji (the largest sect in Hawai‘i), was established in Hilo in 1889. Buddhist priests often presented Buddhism as a modern universal religion capable of instilling temperate values in rowdy plantation laborers and preventing conversion to Christianity. The founder of Hawai‘i’s first temple, Kagahi Sōryū曜日蒼龍 (1855–1917), argued controversially that Amida Buddha should be identified with the Christian God. Imamura Yemyō今村恵猛 (1866–1932), an advocate of pan-Asian Buddhism who arrived in Hawai‘i in 1899, argued that Buddhism promoted democratic Americanism and rewrote Buddhist gathas into Christian-style hymns (Tanabe and Tanabe 2013, 10–11). This inclined plantation owners to support the establishment of temples in plantation settlements (Hazama and Komeiji 2008, 80; Tamura 1994, 16).

The annexation of Hawai‘i in 1898 opened up migration to all occupations. During this period, many Japanese began settling down in Hawai‘i and the first shrine, Hilo Daijingū, was established in 1898. Growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. led to the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907 that limited Japanese migration, including to Hawai‘i, to relatives of current residents. Japanese schools in Hawai‘i also began to increase, with nearly 98 percent of Japanese children in Hawai‘i attending them by 1920 (Asato 2003, 15). These schools, often run by temples or shrines, became the subject of controversy and were charged with teaching “anti-Americanism.” The opponents of temple-run schools often saw Christianity as integral to Americanization, and arguments against Japanese schools included the accusation that Buddhist temples—which celebrated Japanese holidays and used government-published textbooks—were “patriotic” entities that used religion as a cover for teaching Japanese patriotism (Hazama and Komeiji 2008, 85; Asato 2006, 39). These accusations demonstrate how excising secular elements such as holiday celebrations and emphasizing the religious nature of Buddhism was a way temple-run language schools could protect themselves.

The pressure on Hawai‘i-Japanese to Americanize continued to grow, and in 1941 the Pearl Harbor attack led to martial law in Hawai‘i. The entire territory was put under curfew and free mobility was curtailed. Community leaders and other suspect Japanese such as newspaper men and priests were sent to internment camps. The Japanese remaining in Hawai‘i moved to demonstrate their American patriotism and rid themselves of anything that might indicate loyalty to Japan. Temples, shrines, and schools were shut down and their assets confiscated by the government under the Trading with the Enemy Act. After the end of the war, Buddhist temples were usually returned to their communities as religious buildings, but shrine assets were put up for auction by the government.
Hilo Daijingū as Secular

Shinto shrines in Hawai‘i had an ambiguous status. To American officials, Shinto “temples” resembled religion in that they were institutions that conducted rituals. On the other hand, these foreign rituals and other shrine activities seemed suspiciously similar to nonreligious Japanese patriotism. While Shinto shrines fit poorly into both American categories of religion and the secular, Japanese migrants who supported the Hilo Daijingū largely saw the shrine as a public organization relevant to all Japanese—in other words, as a secular institution.

A Universal Shrine

Hilo Daijingū (Yamato Jinsha 大和神社) was founded in 1898 in the thriving plantation city of Hilo on Hawai‘i Island. Hilo, while located away from the political center of Honolulu on O‘ahu Island, was an important port of call for ships and had a significant concentration of Japanese migrants. The main figure behind the shrine’s foundation was a contract laborer from Kumamoto.

10. In Kotohira Jinsha v. McGrath (1950), the Honolulu shrine, Kotohira Jinsha 金刀比羅神社, contested the confiscation of its assets and won, which paved the way for the return of other shrine property in Hawai‘i.
Prefecture, Kōshi Kakuta 合志覚太. Having left his family in Japan, Kōshi likely intended to return once his contract was completed, but he felt inspired to found a shrine for the Hilo community. While a laborer, he began collecting donations and on 3 November, Yamato Jinsha was established with Kōshi serving as its first minister.11 This foundation date and name are significant. The third of November was the emperor’s birthday and a national holiday in Japan. Shrines within Japan were commonly named after their location or main kami (gosaijin 御祭神), often a local legendary figure. Kumamoto migrants might name a shrine after the village in Kumamoto from where they came, or might establish a Katō Jinja 加藤神社 dedicated to Lord Katō, a former daimyo of Kumamoto. Hawai‘i-Japanese did form strong prefectural identities, as seen by the many prefectural associations (kenjinkai 県人会). But the unusual choice of “Yamato” by the Hilo Japanese positioned Yamato Jinsha as relevant to all Japanese, rather than a single prefecture. This indicates the shrine’s conception as universal to all Japanese.

In anticipation of Yamato Jinsha’s foundation, the Honolulu newspaper Yamato shinbun 大和新聞 reported that the “myriad kami of Japan” were coming to Hawai‘i, with Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大御神, Lord Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正公, and Hachimangū 八幡宮 to be venerated (Maeda 1999, 100). As ancestress to the imperial house, Amaterasu was considered a patron of all Japanese, but Hachimangū and Lord Katō were kami from Kyushu, where Kōshi’s hometown was located. Despite this, the main kami became the dual kami of Ise (Amaterasu Ōmikami and Toyouke no Ōmikami 豊受大御神), emphasizing the universal nature of the shrine over a prefectural identification. The newspaper’s description that the kami were “of Japan” also suggests the possibility of kami “of Hawai‘i.” In support of this, the local kami of Hawai‘i were later enshrined under the general term of ubusuna no kami 産土神.12 This Shintoization13 of Hawaiian figures as kami helped position Shinto as a universal framework relevant to not only Japanese subjects but all local people of Hawai‘i.

Kōshi Kakuta’s son Jikkō 実行, who had grown up in Japan, took over as minister of the shrine in 1902. A year later the name of the shrine was changed to Hilo Daijingū (Maeda 1999, 104). While adding “Hilo” to the name emphasized

11. At Hilo Daijingū, the Japanese terms for shrine ritualists like shashi 社司, gūji 宮司, and shinkan 神官 were rendered by the protestant term “minister.” Therefore, this term has been adopted throughout this article.

12. Currently, Pele, the Hawaiian volcano “goddess,” is referred to by this term, but this identification may not have existed in the prewar period. Some shrines prewar did specifically enshrine Hawaiian kami like King Kamehameha. Hansen (2010, 78) sees this as “Shinto becoming indigenized and Americanized,” but this article argues that it is the reverse: the shrine is Shintoizing Hawaiian and American figures.

13. This term is borrowed from Breen and Teeuwen (2010, ix), who argue that modern Shinto is an invention constructed from various “building blocks” that were “Shintoized” into a modern system of Shinto.
the shrine’s location in Hawai‘i, the new name also brought the shrine into line with the standard terminology of Shrine Shinto in Japan. As discussed below, shrines could be seen as a place for directing veneration towards the center from afar (yōhaisho 遠拝所) and the place name Hilo positioned the shrine as one of the many daijingū shrines focused towards the national Ise Jingū, rather than merely an independent shrine. The use of standardized terminology played an important part in distinguishing legally secular Shrine Shinto from religious sect Shinto in Japan.

CIVIC FUNCTIONS OF HILO DAIJINGŪ

Hilo Daijingū served several civic functions for the Hilo community. Kōshi Jikkō, an elementary school teacher before coming to Hawai‘i, started a primary school (Kokumin Shōgakkō 国民小学校) at the shrine in 1904. Like most Japanese schools in Hawai‘i, the school likely used Japanese government textbooks and followed a curriculum similar to that in Japan. A 1909 survey of the seventy-five Japanese schools in Hawai‘i found that almost half (44.8 percent) of them were Buddhist affiliated and a majority of the rest were secular (mushūkyō 無宗教) (Okita 1997, 114). There were no Shinto-affiliated schools recorded, implying the schools at Hilo Daijingū and other shrines were registered as nonreligious. When the English-only movement and language school controversy erupted in Hawai‘i, Buddhist schools came under criticism by Christian missionaries for conducting the secular activity of running schools as religious institutions (Asato 2006, 9–10). In this anti-Japanese atmosphere, Jikkō closed down his school after only seven years, but his influence was noted by local directories (Watanabe 1930, 24).

Hilo Daijingū also functioned as a place to commemorate the war dead. Since Japanese citizenship was transmitted by paternal lineage, most Japanese born in Hawai‘i remained subjects of Japan. While second-generation Japanese could gain American citizenship by location of birth, the first generation were prohibited from American citizenship by the Naturalization Law of 1802.14 In 1920, thirteen years after the Gentleman’s Agreement restricted new Japanese immigration, less than 45 percent of the Japanese in Hawai‘i held American citizenship (Hazama and Komeiji 2008, 84). Thus both the first generation and most of the later generations of Hawai‘i-Japanese were subject to Japanese military conscription (Stephan 1984, 25). In 1912, an obelisk-shaped war memorial (chūkonhi 忠魂碑) was dedicated at the shrine by a Hawai‘i Island military association, and in 1915 another memorial was dedicated in remembrance of the

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14. Japanese who had previously gained citizenship from the Kingdom of Hawai‘i were also eligible for American citizenship, but other first-generation Asian migrants were prohibited from citizenship by this law.
“soldiers and victims of Tsingtao” lost during the Anglo-Japanese siege against the German-held port city in China. The dedication ritual for the Tsingtao monument was an event for the entire community, with speeches given by military representatives, Buddhist priests, newspaper representatives, and a school principal. Hilo Daijingū held an annual memorial service (shōkonsai 招魂祭) around these war memorials (Maeda 1999, 105–106). In 1915, the U.S. was still claiming neutrality in the war, but Japan was actively fighting Germany in the Asia-Pacific. This ritual therefore gave the local community a place to publicly grieve their war dead that American society had not provided. These ceremonies also provided an opportunity to take pride in Japan as the first non-Western country to rival the West in military strength.

Not only were community rituals like this conducted, but Hilo Daijingū also served as a community center for the migrants. While several shrines dedicated to different kami were built on the island, shrine communities were usually determined by geographic location. This was in contrast to Buddhism, where sects often constructed separate temples at the same plantation camps. Hilo Daijingū, as the preeminent shrine on the island, could claim jurisdiction over the entire Hilo community, and more broadly the entire Hawai‘i Island. This is seen by the branch shrines located across the island (Watanabe 2000, 17). Shrine events targeted the entire community and festivals featured demonstrations by local sports and arts groups. Weeknight sumo practices were held at the shrine in the evenings (Kobayashi and Nakamura 2008, 57) and the shrine hosted civic events such as the Keirō Iankai 敬老慰安会 held in 1924, where

15. For the layout of a plantation camp such as this, see Hazama and Komeiji (2008, 37).
almost seventy elders of the community enjoyed music and theater for the evening (Maeda 1999, 109). After the shrine bought land in 1928, a two-story hall (kaikan 会館) was built next to the shrine’s main buildings to host these events (Figure 2).

SHRINE SHINTO AND HILO DAIJINGŪ

Hilo Daijingū’s role as a civic organization reflected the position of Shrine Shinto in Japan. First, the festivals celebrated at Hilo Daijingū largely aligned with those celebrated in Shrine Shinto. Secular shrines in Japan were mandated to celebrate a list of festivals that largely overlapped national holidays and palace rites. In addition, shrines celebrated some other festivals of specific importance to that local shrine or area. Hilo Daijingū seems to have followed this pattern. A pamphlet published by the shrine in 1918 lists sixteen major festivals celebrated (Maeda 1999, 107), and thirteen of these overlap with national holidays and/or palace rites celebrated in Japan (see Table 1). These included the secular-sounding celebrations of Foundation Day (Kigensetsu 紀元節), the emperor’s birthday (Tenchōsetsu 天長節), and autumn thanksgiving festivals (Kannamesai 神嘗祭, Niinamesai 新嘗祭). The three festivals that did not overlap were two festivals local to Hilo Daijingū and its subsidiary shrine (Daijingū Taisai 大神宮大祭, Massha Inari Jinsha Saiten 末社稲荷神社祭典), and the war memorial service discussed previously.

Second, the community around Hilo Daijingū had deep respect for the Imperial Rescript on Education. It encouraged students to follow Confucian-style ethics and was controversial for the extreme treatment it was given in Japan. Japanese students memorized the text and schools built special fireproof safes (hōanden 奉安殿) to house the document. When Hilo Daijingū formed a supporting organization (hōsaikai 奉斎会) for the shrine in 1912, it also formed a shidōkai 斯道会 (“Society of the Way Set Forth”) to “safeguard the imperial will as set forth in the Rescript on Education that is infallible for all ages and true in all places.” In six years, this society headquartered at Hilo Daijingū had published fifty-two bulletins and formed twenty-two branches across the four most populous islands of Hawai‘i (Maeda 1999, 105). This demonstrates the close connection shrine members saw between national ethics that “all Japanese must follow” (Isomae 2014, 128) as encapsulated in the Rescript and Shrine Shinto’s role in promoting them.

Third, Hilo Daijingū sought and gained recognition from Ise Jingū after its foundation. While the shrine was born from the enthusiasm of the Hawai‘i-Japanese, it received a talisman (goshinsatsu 御神札) and offerings in

16. Although Shinto-inflected, these festivals fell within the public sphere in Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>HILO DAIJINGŪ RITES</th>
<th>SELECTED NATIONAL HOLIDAYS</th>
<th>SELECTED IMPERIAL RITES</th>
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<td>Kinensai 祈年祭</td>
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<td>Shunki Kōreisai</td>
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<td>Meiji Tennō Reisai 明治天皇例祭</td>
<td>Meiji Tennō Reisai 明治天皇例祭</td>
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<td>Shōkonsai 招魂祭</td>
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<td>Tenchōsetsusai 天長祭</td>
<td>Tenchōsetsu (1868–1912, Emperor Meiji’s birthday)</td>
<td>Tenchōsetsu (During Emperor Meiji’s reign)</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
<td>Niinamesai 新嘗祭</td>
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<td>Taishō Tennōsai 大正天皇祭 (from 1927)</td>
<td>Taishō Tennō Reisai 大正天皇例祭 (After Emperor Taishō’s death)</td>
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<td>Ōharai Shinji</td>
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1899 from Jingū Shichō 神宮司庁, the organization under the Home Ministry’s jurisdiction which managed the affairs of Ise Jingū. Hilo Daijingū’s first minister, Kōshi Kakuta, was also appointed as a ritualist (reibu 礼部) from the Jingū Hōsaikai 神宮奉斎会, an incorporated foundation in charge of the distribution of Jingū taima 大麻 (talismans) and calendars (MAEDA 1999, 103). The Jingū Hōsaikai was founded in 1882 as the doctrinal arm of Ise Jingū after the government decreed a strict separation between rite and doctrine (saikyō 祭教). However, criticism on allowing the Hōsaikai, as a religious organization, a monopoly on Jingū taima—considered a public good—led the organization to reform into a secular foundation in 1899 (SUGA 2010, 52). At the time Kōshi was appointed, the Jingū Hōsaikai was considered a nonreligious organization. Hilo Daijingū, through Kōshi, received the right to distribute Jingū taima and calendars throughout the entire territory of Hawai‘i (HILIO DAIJINGU 1928, 10). Kōshi’s son and second minister of Hilo Daijingū was also appointed as a ritualist. Daijingū was a term designating shrines recognized by Jingū Hōsaikai as venerating the kami of Ise. The efforts that the ministers of Hilo Daijingū put into gaining recognition from the Jingū Shichō and Jingū Hōsaikai demonstrates the importance that the shrine’s community placed on gaining legitimacy through official recognition as a nonreligious shrine.

In addition to this nonreligious connection, Hilo Daijingū later had a connection with Shintō Honkyoku 神道本局, one of the legally religious Shinto sects. Shintō Honkyoku was formed in 1884 out of the Shintō Jimukyoku 神道事務局, an umbrella organization for Shinto-based instructors from the Taikyō Senpu movement. As Shinto groups broke off and gained recognition as independent religious sects, Shintō Honkyoku became a religious sect of its own. The 1941 summary of Hilo Daijingū states that the Hawai‘i Branch Office of the sect was established at the shrine and the Kyūchū Sanden no Saishin 宮中三殿祭神 (Kami of the Three Palace Sanctuaries) were enshrined in 1910 (MAEDA 1999, 111). Hilo Daijingū’s association with both the secular Jingū Shichō and the religious Shintō Honkyoku may seem odd. However, since the Shintō Honkyoku’s continued focus on the “national teachings” of the Taikyō Senpu movement gave it a more universal cast than other religious sects, the connection to both does not seem to have caused conflict. The Shintō Honkyoku maintained the ambiguous character the Taikyō Senpu possessed before the categories of religion and the secular were clearly established in Japan. While many new Shinto sects took on the Protestant-like aspects of religion—a revered founder, written doctrine, salvational teachings, and a single “god” esteemed above all others—the Shintō Honkyoku did not develop these aspects and enshrined the Kyūchū Sanden no Saishin, which collectively includes all the kami of heaven and earth (amatsukami kunitsukami 天地中祇). Furthermore, as the name of the sect, “Shintō Honkyoku”
and after 1886 “Shintō” indicates, the sect positioned itself not as an exclusive and independent religion, but as the doctrinal branch of Shinto in general. Association with both the secular Hōsaikai and the religious Shintō Honkyoku could be seen as embracing both doctrine and rite as two sides of the same coin.

The distinction between secular Shinto and religious Shinto was more blurred in Hawai‘i due to the lack of legal distinction under American rule. Hilo Daijingū likely performed personal kitō 祈祷 rites for this-worldly benefits (genze riyaku 現世利益), and it maintained a subsidiary shrine for Inari, a kami associated with business success. Petitions for business success and other this-worldly benefits were personal acts, but not private acts (Reader and Tanabe 1998, 181–82). The granted benefit was seen as benefiting not only the individual but the entire community and nation (Reader and Tanabe 1998, 104–105). Shrines like Ishizuchi Jinsha and Hawai‘i Daijingū, whose founders focused on “superstitious” (inshi jakyō 淫祠邪教) personal rites over Shrine Shinto rituals, were socially sanctioned by the larger shrine community (Maeda 1999, 124). This reflected a similar situation in Japan, where the government prohibited otherworldly-focused activities at shrines such as funerals, but accepted rites for this-worldly benefits as permissible. Still, the lack of legal imperative in Hawai‘i to divide activities into secular versus religious allowed shrines the flexibility to position part or all of their activities as religious or nonreligious depending on the context.

The question over the secular or religious nature of Shrine Shinto has been controversial from the start, but in Hawai‘i there was little direct discussion about it until after World War II. Although the language school controversy in the 1920s raised a moral panic about “teaching Mikadoism,” the controversy’s religious discourse revolved around the conflict between prominent Buddhists and Christians (Asato 2006, 6). Hawai‘i remained in between the concepts of Japanese secularism, which categorized Shrine Shinto as a secular practice, and American secularism, which assumed all Shinto as religious at best or superstitious at worst. Hilo Daijingū, as an institution established for and by the Hawai‘i-Japanese, conducted its affairs mainly in Japanese. But the growing suspicion against Japanese made a translation of the shrine necessary not only into English, but also into the framework of Western secularism. This translation involved the recategorization of shrine practices considered secular in Japan as religious in America, rather than the adoption of elements modeled on American religious practices such as the hymn-writing and theological innovations seen in some Buddhist

17. In 1940, the name was changed to Shintō Taikyō.
temples in Hawai‘i. Thus the shrine could became religious in the English-language context of American secularism, while remaining mainly secular within a Japanese secularity.

In Japan, a vocabulary was developed that distinguished between Shrine Shinto and religious organizations. Religions, including sect Shinto, were divided into kyōha 教派, religious ministers were generically known as kyōshi 教師, and religious buildings were called kyōkai 教会 or tera 寺 (Maxey 2014, 220). In contrast, Shrine Shinto was hierarchically ranked rather than divided into denominations, shrine ritualists were called shinkan 神官, and shrine buildings were designated by terms like jinja/jinsha 神社 or jingū 神宮. These differences in vocabulary also conveyed information about the defining characteristics of their bearers. Kyō 教 in religious categories suggests doctrine as defining, while kan 官 and gū 宮 associate those Shrine Shinto terms with the government and imperial court. The Hawai‘i-Japanese largely adopted this vocabulary in Japanese. For example, the Nipponjin jinmeiroku compiled by Watanabe Shichirō (1930, 24), a Hawai‘i-Japanese, lists Buddhists as missionaries (kaikyōshi 開教使), monks (sōryo 僧侶), or religionists (shūkyōka 宗教家), while Shinto ministers like Kōshi Jikkō are referred to as shinkan.

This variety of Japanese terms was translated into English terms possessing a different set of connotations. Buddhist and Shinto ritualists both became “priests,” thereby aligning them with Catholic priests, or “ministers,” which associated them with the more positively-viewed protestant minister (figure 3).
Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples were lumped together as temples. “Temple” is a religious term associated with “pagan” or “primitive” religions, in contrast to Christian churches or even the mosques and synagogues of monotheistic Islam and Judaism.¹⁸ This negative association is a remnant of the hierarchical fourfold categorization of religion standard in early nineteenth-century Europe. Some shrines and temples adopted Christian terminology like “church” and “mission,” perhaps to distance themselves from that negative association. Hilo Daijingū, located on an outer island peripheral to the territorial government, was somewhat insulated from the need to simplify complex Shinto concepts into the limited vocabulary of English, but the current practice of referring to the shrine as a “church” in English suggests Hilo Daijingū was translated this way prior to the war.

The way shrines translated themselves into English had consequences for their legal categorization. As Josephson (2012, 260) has argued, the legal category of religion both regulates and protects the groups that fall into it while superstition is seen as something that should be stamped out. The property and assets of Hilo Daijingū were seized by the American military in 1941 and returned only in 1955 after the court ruled that shrines were legitimate religious organizations. Thus recognition as a religious organization—rather than a foreign superstition—provided protection for shrines within the system of American secularism. Similar to how Japanese newspapers in Hawai‘i converted the inspiring rhetoric of their Japanese articles into more detached translations favored by English-language reporters (Stephan 1984, 27), it seems shrines in Hawai‘i were fit, however clumsily, into the American framework of religion while they maintained the ambiguous nonreligious framework of shrines in Japan in a Japanese-language context.¹⁹

Buddhist temples in Hawai‘i also underwent this process of translation, but there were significant differences in their experience. Before Japan began undertaking the process of modernization, an “original” Buddhism had been “discovered” and reinterpreted into a world religion by the West (Masuzawa 2005, 131). Thus Buddhist temples had an established Western-style framework of Buddhism as a religion within which to position themselves. The pan-Asian Buddhist movement, which aimed to create an international Buddhism based on this perceived original Buddhism, was popular in Hawai‘i (Tanabe and Tanabe

¹⁸. The first definition of “temple” in the 1930 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary connects it to the paganism of ancient Greece and Rome by stating that it was “anciently usually regarded as a residing place of the deity, whose presence was symbolized by a statue,” and then referring the reader to columniation (Harris and Allen 1930, 2124, 443).

¹⁹. The judge who ruled in favor of shrines in Hawai‘i being deserving of religious protection wrote in his decision that “I am not even prepared to find on this evidence that [the shrine]... held beliefs which could be agreed to constitute a religion” (Kotohira Jinsha v. McGrath).
Many Buddhist temples made efforts to remold their traditions in the American religious models (AMA 2011, 3). Although Buddhist temples in Hawai‘i sometimes engaged in secular activities such as celebrating Japanese holidays, they usually remained sites for their specific community of members. Furthermore, while Shinto rites such as yōhai were considered universal and appropriate to conduct anywhere, the performance of Buddhist rites such as sutra reading were prohibited at Shinto shrines by the Meiji government’s orders requiring the separation of kami and buddhas.

Locating Hawai‘i in the Japanese Sphere

Within the Japanese empire, shrines played an integral part in embedding the new Japanese secularity adopted by the Meiji government into the popular consciousness. Hilo Daijingū was treated similarly to shrines in Japan by the Hawai‘i-Japanese. This included locating the shrine and its community within the wider Japanese sphere by connecting Hawai‘i at the periphery to the center of Japan. This followed the role of Shrine Shinto in Japan, but the lack of coercion by the Japanese government makes Hawai‘i an interesting case. However, adopting the worldview set forth by Japanese secularity allowed Hawai‘i-Japanese to locate themselves within the wider Japanese sphere and to legitimize American or Hawaiian customs as local variations within the Japanese order rather than foreign customs compromising the migrants as less than Japanese. This section looks at how Hilo Daijingū helped locate its community within the national network of Shrine Shinto and fostered a Japanese sense of time, space, and ethics.

A Local Shrine in a National Network

Hilo Daijingū located its community within the loose network of Shrine Shinto. After the legal separation of Buddhism and Shinto in Japan, the government aimed to unite shrines into a single network (INOUE 2003, 162). It standardized rites, consolidated small shrines to match political geographic divisions, and enacted a ranking system that solidified each shrine’s position to other shrines, both vertically and horizontally. As it was not under the Japanese government’s jurisdiction, Hilo Daijingū was not required to follow standard shrine rites, nor did it belong to the modern shrine ranking system (kindai shakaku seido 近代社格制度). However, the choice of venerated kami, the distribution of taima, and rites like yōhai connected Hilo Daijingū to the larger network of Shrine Shinto.

Buddhism in Japan also began to include patriotic Shinto rites, so much so that ŌMI (2017, 282) argues that wartime Buddhism can be called State Shinto.

Establishing shrines to develop newly incorporated territory into “Japan” was common within the Japanese empire. For a discussion focusing on Hokkaido Jingū 北海道神宮, see SUGA (2014).
As discussed above, the main kami of Hilo Daijingū was the kami of Ise Jingū, and the shrine received talismans and offerings from the Jingū Shichō. This located the Hilo Daijingū hierarchically as a recognized local shrine in the Ise lineage, below Ise Jingū but above the four other Daijingū shrines on Hawai‘i Island. Hilo Daijingū was also given permission to distribute Jingū taima, first to the entire Territory of Hawai‘i, and then as other shrines were built, to the island of Hawai‘i. This gave the shrine a role similar to that of local shrines (shosha 諸社) in the shrine ranking system, which had their own geographic communities.22

Hilo Daijingū’s location in relation to shrines in Japan was also communicated through the rites it conducted. In addition to the rites that mirrored national holidays already discussed, Hilo Daijingū regularly conducted yōhai rites. Yōhai broadly refers to Shinto-style veneration towards a distant place, and peripheral shrines were sometimes seen less as individual shrines but as yōhaisho towards their ideological parent (KIHARA 1935, 213; SUGA 2010, 66). RUOFF (2010, 59–61) has discussed the importance of mass, timed yōhai rites as a type of “rule by time”23 in uniting the Japanese empire. These rites united subjects residing within the Japanese sphere in recognizing the birthplace and center of that sphere by facing towards its center and bowing. Similar to shrines within the Japanese empire, Hilo Daijingū conducted annual yōhai rituals towards the Imperial Palace on the equinoxes and towards Emperor Jinmu and the Meiji emperor on their respective anniversaries (table 1). It seems likely that the festivals on Kigensetsu and Tenchōsetsu also included yōhai. While the etiquette of yōhai was Shinto, the ritual was considered an act of reverence and patriotism suitable for all within the Japanese sphere. In Hawai‘i, yōhai were also performed at community centers and plantations such as on the occasion of the Taisho emperor’s funeral (Tsuchiya 1927). These events used the Shinto rite of yōhai as the universal etiquette in the Japanese sphere for expressing reverence. Being able to participate in this ritual along with the entire Japanese sphere despite their distant geographic location helped instill a feeling of being, in the words of Ōzaki Otokichi 尾崎音吉 (1904–1983), a Hilo poet and a fellow internee to Hilo Daijingū’s third minister Kudō Isamu 工藤勇, “one of us one hundred million loyal subjects of the emperor” (HONDA 2012, 78).

The ministers of the Hilo Daijingū also helped connect the Hawai‘i-Japanese in the periphery to the Japanese center. All of the ministers grew up in Japan and seem to have been well-versed in Japanese scholarship. Kōshi Kakuta was described in a biography as reciting the poems of Ga Chishō 賀知章 (He Zhizhang, 659–744) while strolling down the street, and his son Jikkō was

22. Some Hawai‘i shrines like Hawai‘i Daijingū on O‘ahu directly stated their “equivalent rank” under the shrine ranking system; see MAEDA (1999, 133).

Figure 4. Kōshi Jikkō: A magatama necklace accents his flowing Heian-style coat (Watanabe 2000, 11).

Figure 5. Kudō Isamu: His simple robe evokes a Japanese judge’s uniform (Watanabe 2000, 11).
a schoolteacher (Maeda 1999, 99). The ministers’ understanding of Shinto reflected intellectual trends in Japan, and this affected their dress. Jikko’s portrait shows him in the flowing Heian-style court dress typical of Shrine Shinto ritualists and adorned with a magatama 勾玉 jewel necklace, evoking the necklace worn by the famous Meiji-era geographer Matsuura Takeshirō 松浦武四郎 (figure 4). His successor, Kudo, wore a simple black robe and cap in his portrait (figure 5), an outfit similar to the uniform of judges in Japan and favored by pan-asianists like Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三 (1863–1913) (Watanabe 2000, 11).24 This uniform was based on the dress of Shōtoku Taishi, who helped establish the ritsuryō 律令 state of classical Japan, to which Meiji-period ideologists looked back as a model for uniting Shinto ritual with state governance (Hachijō 1999). Furthermore, the shrine facilitated direct interactions between Hawai‘i-Japanese and visitors from Japan, with sumo tournaments between Japanese navel ship crews and local Japanese becoming popular at Hilo Daijingū (Kobayashi and Nakamura 2008, 57).

**Fostering a Japanese Worldview**

Although outside Japanese legal jurisdiction, Hilo Daijingū connected its community to the Japanese center and positioned it within the larger concept of the Japanese sphere. This affected how Japanese migrants interacted with time, space, and ethics, in other words, their perception of reality. When the Meiji government moved Japan to a solar calendar in the late nineteenth century, it did not merely adopt the Western calendar. The enthronement rite of Emperor Jinmu, rather than the birth of Christ, was established as the start of history, and linear time was counted from that date. Hilo Daijingū distributed the Jingū calendar, which counted time in this manner. The festival of Kigensetsu at the shrine, celebrating that enthronement rite, also raised consciousness of the imperial calendar in contrast to the Western calendar. Cyclical time was also measured by the Hawai‘i-Japanese by celebrating national holidays at the shrine. The shrine did not start this; some plantation owners gave their Japanese laborers the Tenchōsetsu day off work and that likely contributed to why Hilo Daijingū was founded that day (Kihara 1935, 213; Maeda 1999, 101). But, shrines like Hilo Daijingū affirmed Japanese time even as pressure to assimilate to Western/Christian customs increased in Hawai‘i. This also affected the non-Japanese community in Hawai‘i who could not help but notice when a majority of students did not attend public school on Japanese holidays.

Hilo Daijingū helped sustain a conception of Japanese space. The relationship between the center and periphery can be seen as a network of overlapping con-
centric circles. For Americans in Hawai‘i, the center of Hawai‘i was O‘ahu, where the territorial government was located. Hawai‘i was an American colony, so the territorial government looked to the American government in Washington D.C. as the center. Furthermore, Americans saw Europe as the original center of Western civilization, of which the dominant narrative depicted “Europeanization as the story of true civilization” (Asad 2003, 213). The Meiji government adopted this general framework, but located Japan as the center of Asian civilization. Japan was at the center, but Asian civilization included the entire expanding sphere of Greater East Asia. This concept of space was reflected in Shrine Shinto’s structure, with imperial or national shrines serving as protectors (sōchinju 総鎮守) of large areas like Hokkaido, Taiwan, or the South Seas, while smaller shrines looked after more limited communities (Nakajima 2010, 36). Shrines were bound together by the distribution of Jingū taima (Hardacre 1989, 29), sent from the Ise Jingū in the center of Japan to shrines in the periphery. These shrines in turn distributed them to their branch shrines which then distributed them to their community members. This process affirmed Japan as the center of Japanese space and allowed shrine members in the periphery to enshrine a piece of the Japanese center within their homes, with over eighteen thousand Jingū taima being distributed in Hawai‘i in 1940 (Kondō 1943, 324). This drawing of the center into the periphery was returned by legitimization of local practices as Japanese, rather than foreign. Local resources like lava rocks were incorporated into Hilo Daijingū’s architecture (figure 4) while local plants such as palms, plumeria, and norfolk pines adorned shrine grounds (figure 2). The kami of Hawai‘i (ubusuna no kami) were incorporated as a local yet still legitimate part of the Japanese sphere. This extended to other customs at the shrine like flying an American flag beside the Japanese flag. Rather than being a sign of potential disloyalty to Japan, this action incorporated an American identity as a local custom within the broader Japanese sphere.

Finally, Hilo Daijingū played an active part in promoting a Japanese sense of ethics. American ethics descend from Western civilization’s basis in classical philosophy and Christian theology. Ideas like natural rights and democracy are premised upon individualism, which was conceivable due to the Christian theology of the soul (Smith 2008, 156). The state in Japan, while incorporating many elements of Western secularism, formed its legitimacy around the Confucian-style family model which emphasized the paternal benevolence of the

25. Previous research has already noted how omamori 御守 amulets “help sustain the normative principles involved in kinship organization” (Swanger and Takayama 1981, 249–50). In a similar manner, this taima distribution process also affirmed the Confucian kinship model of the state central to the Imperial Rescript on Education.

emperor. Hawai‘i-Japanese felt it was possible to embrace both American and Japanese ideologies (shisō 思想) and lifestyles (seikatsu 生活), but saw many elements as contrasting: honor versus wealth, family versus married couple, respect for elders versus equality (Watanabe 1930, 386). Perhaps the most famous summation of these Meiji-period ethics was formulated in the Imperial Rescript on Education. As discussed above, the shrine community of Hilo Daijingū was devoted to enacting the virtues of the Rescript and promoted a society with that aim. The school and community groups run at the shrine, in addition to its festivals and events, provided situations in which Japanese ethics were expected and affirmed. These ethics were deeply ingrained within the Hawai‘i-Japanese and affected how they displayed their loyalty to the U.S. Japanese children across the territory were taught to bow before the portrait of George Washington in the mornings (Tamura 1994, 153) and Hilo Daijingū’s sister shrine on O‘ahu, Hawai‘i Daijingū, started venerating George Washington as a kami by 1940 (Hansen 2010, 78). Thus, Shinto was applied to the American state as a universal method for displaying reverence.

Hilo Daijingū’s relative distance from the territorial government lessened the pressure to Americanize than shrines closer to the American center in Hawai‘i. While O‘ahu shrines like Hawai‘i Daijingū were quicker to gain legal status as religious organizations, they moved away from “superstitious” premodern traditions and towards Shrine Shinto rites (Hansen 2010, 75–79). Examining Hilo Daijingū has shown some of the ways migrants located between two colonial powers adapted to the conflict between differing secularities. The Hawai‘i-Japanese smoothed over the contrasting conceptions of religion in Japanese and American secularisms by translating shrine activities from the Japanese secular sphere into an American religious sphere. At the same time, they saw Hilo Daijingū as a public institution relevant to all Japanese, that is, along the same lines as a secular shrine in Japan, and were able to position their peripheral community as a legitimate part of the Japanese sphere. This not only allowed the Hawai‘i-Japanese to legitimize foreign customs as Japanese, but also became the framework through which many Hawai‘i-Japanese interpreted their reality.

27. A comparable document is “The American’s Creed” adopted in 1918, which affirmed belief in American ideals such as democracy, equality, and duty to defend the nation.

28. The interpretation of loyalty to the U.S. using a Japanese rather than American framework can also be seen in the letters and writings of many Hawai‘i-Japanese during the war, such as Hilo poet Ōzaki Otokichi (Honda 2012, 29) and Honolulu businessman Furuya Suikei 古屋翠渓 (1889–1977) (Furuya 2017, 196).
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